tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post8962606767468644478..comments2022-03-24T15:14:12.561+00:00Comments on Inter Kant: Incentives, Intelligence and ReasonGary Banhamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-88012415777768430242010-12-29T10:13:34.215+00:002010-12-29T10:13:34.215+00:00Thanks again for this David: I agree that the poin...Thanks again for this David: I agree that the point is that learning and strategic behaviour can take place without the need for explicit conceptuality (even though it can be modelled in terms of maxims nonetheless). The distinction between such behaviour and self-consciousness in the full sense is that in the latter case there is explicit recognition both of the appropriateness of response and of the principle affirming it as such a response. In such cases concepts are explicitly required and that is what leads to talk of "reason".Gary Banhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-16805247427480191252010-12-28T23:07:19.330+00:002010-12-28T23:07:19.330+00:00Both cases show that humans have modular appraisal...Both cases show that humans have modular appraisal systems which work independently of reason or any conscious judgement on our part. So it seems that a creature can be prompted to behave in its strategic interest even where it does not conceptualize the situation or behaviour in a way that would warrant the behaviour. The Garcia effect in psychology shows that these instinctual responses can be refined by learning - again, without any conceptual judgement on the part of the organism. <br /><br />So I suppose Korsgaard needs to give example where modular or sub-personal systems cannot account for such behaviors. I'm not remotely suggesting that animals don't have concepts, but the mere fact of strategically rational behaviour does not seem a sufficient condition here.<br /><br /> of modular appraisal systems in non-humans andDavidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04359327661778032716noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-1192300687789619562010-12-28T19:00:51.764+00:002010-12-28T19:00:51.764+00:00Thanks for your comment David. I understand the po...Thanks for your comment David. I understand the point concerning "constitution" though it cuts against Korsgaard's argument concerning learning. With regard to the example of learning "fear" it is correct, as you point out, that such "fear" can (and often does) arise in contexts where what is feared is not something that can harm us. However, this very point shows that "fear" is learned and not something that is only innate.<br /><br />The problem concerning "self-consciousness" in the case of the intelligent but non-rational being is meant to be that in this case the creature in question has the conception not merely of a reaction but of the appropriateness of the reaction to the environmental circumstance. It would be a further, additional element, to evaluate the rationality of the response and this indicates, at least on Korsgaard's conception, that there are intelligent behaviours that are rational and intelligent behaviours that don't require reference to reason. But the intelligent non-rational behaviour is still "self-conscious" in the sense that without an explicit endorsement of the appropriateness of the behaviour in question the creature would not perform it.Gary Banhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-60120464221540814512010-12-28T17:14:59.207+00:002010-12-28T17:14:59.207+00:00I'm not sure if I see where 'self-consciou...I'm not sure if I see where 'self-consciousness' is required in the second case. A creature may be constituted so as to respond appropriately in certain situations, even though the origin of that response is an informationally encapsulated subsystem which bypasses rational belief fixation. <br /><br />For example, we often feel fear even when we know the thing that prompts it is harmless (a spider in the bath). There is also evidence that humans have evolved kinship detectors which discourage 'inappropriate' breeding with siblings. The individual afflicted by fear, or disgust at the idea of incest may not be aware of the causes of their feelings. Their behaviour may be normatively evaluable (breeding with siblings increases the harmful mutations - so it is a Bad Thing) but we aren't responsive to reason in such cases.Davidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04359327661778032716noreply@blogger.com