tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post3256801813762383740..comments2022-03-24T15:14:12.561+00:00Comments on Inter Kant: The Wrongness of ProstitutionGary Banhamhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comBlogger11125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-20869833696089151972011-11-07T16:35:47.723+00:002011-11-07T16:35:47.723+00:00Thanks for your reply, Gary.
There is a reason wh...Thanks for your reply, Gary.<br /><br />There is a reason why I stress 'violability' as a differentiating factor. As you wisely point out, all the other characteristics of objectification are intrinsic to some degree in most occupations (for employees). <br /><br />A classic example I would like to point out is assembly-line manufacturing - A very high degree of objectification exists here where aspects such as fungibility, instrumentality, denial of subjectivity all are strongly present and lead to the objectification of the worker. Service-oriented jobs where the degree of objectification (leading to 'alienation') was perceived to be lesser are thus sought out for. Thus, all aspects of objectification especially denial of subjectivity are found in assembly-manufacturing jobs especially non-unionised ones.<br /><br />Thus, I arrived at the conclusion that the clinching differentiator was that of 'violability'. There are perhaps no other formal occupations where a worker who is employed allows their employer to even lay a finger on their person and thus this profession becomes unique - in the physical world.<br /> <br />It is true that the prostitute enters into a voluntary contract with the terms of contract set out. This is troublesome in the case of sex-workers because their agreements are often informal - and thus have no legal recognition.<br /><br />Perhaps, the question really is that if a worker entered a contract allowing themselves to be abused by their employer - will it be socially acceptable? <br /><br />Prostitution, unfortunately will remain a deeply controversial topic because perhaps at the core of it - is the nature of man itself. <br /><br />PS - Thanks for the Dworkin suggestion.Yojimbonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-66348211219420266202011-11-05T20:50:29.624+00:002011-11-05T20:50:29.624+00:00Thanks for your comment Yojimbo: good to have anot...Thanks for your comment Yojimbo: good to have another contribution to the debate on this posting, particularly coming from someone who studies questions connected to labour since the source of this posting was precisely to determine a sense in which, even under the most ideal conditions, a prostitute's "labour" has characteristics that are distinct from those of other workers.<br /><br />If you look above to my reply dated 28th August you'll see I there treated of four characteristics that I took to be both elements of objectification and part of the prostitute's situation. In that reply I specifically indicated that my view of violability was less sweeping than you have suggested here. The reason why we here differ is I, think, because we have viewed this property in different ways. You are stressing the way in which violability specifies that the internal body is opened to another (Dworkin also writes quite a bit about this in her book *Intercourse* where she gives this as a problem with women's position in sex as such). I, however, was stressing a different sense of violability in my earlier reply. I was pointing to the way that a contract exists in the prostitutive relation. There has to be an agreement between prostitute and client concerning what is within the bounds of the contact between them and the prostitute is often (and certainly in the ideal case would) be in a position to indicate clearly what she will and will not allow in the area of violability. So it need not be absolute though you are right it always has to be present.<br /><br />Back in that reply, however, I was careful to stress that whilst violability is relative in the prostitute's situation, its presence is part of her condition and this could not be otherwise though I also there stressed that denial of subjectivity is likewise essential to her condition in a way it is not essential to other types of labour (even if it can be present in them). So I don't think it is only violability that makes this condition different. It is true other forms of objectification are present in other kinds of labour but the presence of this two (violability and denial of subjectivity) impacts on the presence of fungibility and instrumentality to change the character of these latter and it is the inter-relation of these four distinct types of objectification that is, I think, essential to prostitution.Gary Banhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-72775244882034787452011-11-05T17:08:40.807+00:002011-11-05T17:08:40.807+00:00I came to this blog and post through one on cosmop...I came to this blog and post through one on cosmopolitics but could not resist peeking into this. I basically study workers and labour economics and the validity of prostitution had been raised and subject to heated debate.<br />However, this led to me introspect on how exactly prostitution was different from other professions.<br /><br />And what I realised was that it was similar to all other occupations.<br /><br />Except in the case of 'violability'. 'Violability' viewed as 'violation of the personal space'. <br />No worker in any trade has to subject their body (as a demarcated, unique space) from being invaded and used by someone else (a foreign body). This is a violent humiliation when someone wilfully enters your space and - what is most personal to your being - your body.<br />It is perhaps the ultimate end of all the holy concepts of private property, privacy and personal space.<br /><br />I am no expert in philosophy but an ardent student and hence if this argument has already been stated and disproved - then I would like to be illuminated.Yojimbonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-62376412409863877772011-08-28T18:15:58.061+01:002011-08-28T18:15:58.061+01:00Sorry to get your name wrong: Moises not Moses!!Sorry to get your name wrong: Moises not Moses!!Gary Banhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-6785321649757867212011-08-28T18:14:39.582+01:002011-08-28T18:14:39.582+01:00Hi Moses, thanks for your additional comment. I un...Hi Moses, thanks for your additional comment. I understand some might disapprove of prostitution for aesthetic reasons or, as you say, for religious ones. I agree these can be combined with moral ones or presented by someone in a "mixed" way that is often not easy to disentangle.Gary Banhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-55867088780054350192011-08-28T16:51:47.884+01:002011-08-28T16:51:47.884+01:00Just a note, seeing that Tim pretty much has said ...Just a note, seeing that Tim pretty much has said what I would've said.<br /><br />"On the one hand, the argument was ventured that dislike of prostitution is an aesthetic rather than a moral stance."<br /><br />I think it might be helpful to clarify that this wasn't put forward so much as an argument for prostitution as a tentative explanation of why most people would see prostitution as inherently bad even if it weren't. Another explanation might involve social convention or religious influence on people's views, even the non-religious. None of them mutually exclusive. The main argument is the one you address. Thanks to both for this intelligent discussion.Moisesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-22651704114079995132011-08-28T15:58:25.108+01:002011-08-28T15:58:25.108+01:00Thanks for your latest Tim which was very helpful ...Thanks for your latest Tim which was very helpful and I suspected your basic argument was that objectification is only a contingent and not a necessary aspect of prostitution. It is good to get this clarified as it makes manifest where the real difference of view between us resides. I am claiming that objectification is an essential part of the prostitutive relation so let me go through again why I think this is so.<br /><br />I take four elements of objectification to be part of the prostitutive relation. I assume these to be:<br /><br />1) denial of subjectivity<br />2) violability (though, as I'll add, there are some complications with this)<br />3) fungibility<br />4) instrumentality<br /><br />Going through these in turn, I should add it is was the first that I was referring to in my last reply and that your point about intimacy touches on. You are right that when we engage the bank clerk (which is instrumental) there is no need to view them as equivalent to an ATM (which would be to treat them as fungible). So, correct, instrumentality does equate with fungibility. However, I was instead referring to denial of subjectivity which is a different point. So I'll try now to separate these characteristics out.<br /><br />Denial of subjectivity is part of the prostitutive contract I have suggested in one key sense. This is that the provision of recognition of feelings on the part of the prostitute can *never* (even under ideal conditions) form part of the contract. This does not entail, you are quite right, that the relationship *has* to be cold. It could well be that the prostitute engages with a particularly considerate client and that said client takes account of her feelings and presses nothing upon her that would violate recognition of those feelings. So, in principle, the client can recognise her subjectivity but, and this is what is crucial for me, his contract with her could *never* do so. Were the contract itself to recognise this then it would transform the relationship into one in which the subjectivity of the prostitute was officially recognised as such and, in so doing, her fungibility would be compromised. What makes her tradeable, in other words, is precisely that her subjectivity is denied a constitutive role in the relation with her that is prostitutive.<br /><br />Violability is more complicated because, as I indicated in the original posting, there is nothing absolute about it here. The prostitute can, for example, dictate contractual terms such that some elements of her body are "off-bounds". In this sense violability is only a relative part of her situation. However, the problem I have here is that I don't see how it is part of the recognised situation of other trades to include it. I am unsure on that point and may be willing to concede it but at present it strikes me that violability (even though only relative) is essential to prostitution and only contingent in other trades if present in them at all.<br /><br />Fungibility and instrumentality go together as aspects of objectification. She is fungible in being trade-able, capable of being treated as a commodity and viewed in this way as replaceable by things. That is surely essential to the prostitute's trade but, arguably, not exclusive to it. I think I can agree that others are similarly fungible but when fungibility is added to denial of subjectivity and instrumentality something different arises. <br /><br />Finally, instrumentality, the suggestion I made in the posting is not merely that the prostitute is treated like this but she is so in a narrow sense. I'd need persuasion that it wasn't a narrow sense that was applicable.Gary Banhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-5448829212777003062011-08-28T13:40:52.371+01:002011-08-28T13:40:52.371+01:00Right, Gary. Thanks for your response. I don't...Right, Gary. Thanks for your response. I don't address the point—I wanted you to illustrate what that element of objectification is that makes prostitution wrong. I'm starting to see it now.<br /><br />I've argued that in an ideal situation, objectification is no longer exists. I also argue that it is the style or demeanor of the act that has the moral content here. You argue that the act necessitates objectification. We must say that prostitution renders the prostitute fungible because otherwise the relationship becomes irreplaceable, and prostitution is devoid of intimacy. We must also say that prostitution renders the worker as merely a means to some end.<br /><br />Both problems arise only if we presume that the relationship between sex worker and client is a cold one. Why should we accept this? I will admit that the intimacy is not the same you'd find between the married, or between lovers-at-first-sight; but there are other forms of intimacy we can imagine between the sex worker and her client. We use a bank teller as a means to our money, but we do not treat her like an ATM. Even closer to the point, we still should ask the masseuse how their day has been, show them kindness, etc. Equally, I can easily imagine a sexual code of conduct, kind words exchanged, fondness reciprocated. The service exchanged is still sex, but what is left out are all the trappings of a romantic relationship: the deeper feelings of commitment, the strong obligations, the open and complete exchange of thoughts..<br /><br />I still don't know what aspect of prostitution objectifies in itself. Tim Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17947753940866093513noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-74967601548906256192011-08-28T12:06:14.237+01:002011-08-28T12:06:14.237+01:00Thanks Tim for your extended comments and replies ...Thanks Tim for your extended comments and replies raising issues I agree are entirely salient to the discussion. Taking your points in turn:<br />1) the similarities between prostitution and other occupations. You illustrate this two ways, firstly by discussing the unpleasant and often degrading nature of other occupations and secondly by asking us to see how the prostitute could control her trade such that it was not rendered unpleasant to her. With regard to the second point, however, I don't see it as that relevant whether the prostitute "enjoys" sex or not given that the act in question here is not comparable to other sexual acts in the relevant manner (i.e. is absent intimacy).<br />However I grant your first point, namely, that lots of trades are capable of being prosecuted in ways that are degrading and which require conditions being built into them to say they involve respect for the humanity of the person in question. That's entirely right I think.<br />However, the point I was making here is that, however the conditions are specified with regard to the prostitute, however well she sets her terms of trade, still there is an element in it of objectification along the lines set out in the article. You don't address this point really but instead simply indicate disbelief concerning the point.<br />Your considered argument is to the effect that the client may not (a) consider the prostitute as a mere means and (b) as replaceable. The replaceability point is, I agree, tricky in the sense that the client could come to view the relation they have with a particular prostitute as especially important to them and not something that could be replicated by another. However here we come to a boundary line. Should this develop into an intimate relationship of the kind that is not specific to prostitution the question will arise as to what it is that requires there here still to be trade involved at all? Would not such intimacy lead naturally to a relation that was non-prostitutive? If not, what is to prevent replaceability coming back into the equation.<br />With regard to treating "merely as a means" I don't see how this could ever fail to be part of the relation. The prostitute is being used for a specific human purpose without the feelings, relations and intimacy that we expect within that purpose. It is stripping this out that ensures the relation becomes commercially available. But taking it also involves treating "merely as a means".Gary Banhamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08518731833160149460noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-49134210320730983002011-08-28T11:46:02.656+01:002011-08-28T11:46:02.656+01:00Now consider the happy prostitute. She enjoys sex ...Now consider the happy prostitute. She enjoys sex enough, and she enjoys doing it as a profession. She has a list of clients of her own choosing. She dictates the terms of every sexual encounter: the cost, the time, the place, what's allowed and what isn't. Just outside her room is her roommate who can protect her if her clients do not comply (the police are supposed to serve this role). Given these conditions, it is not clear why we ought to call prostitution disrespect. As we see with factory labor, we talk the disrespect of relevant parties. If the clients don't (a) treat the prostitute as if she were *merely* replaceable or (b) treat the prostitute as a *mere* means to pleasure (a mere object of pleasure), how can we call prostitution wrong?<br /><br />But even if a client does treat the prostitute as a mere means to an end, how does that render the entire prostitution enterprise immoral? If a person is treated as a mere object, it is the form of the sexual act that is salient not the sex itself. A few analogies could be made here: it's not the word “fuck” that is harmful, but how it's said; it's not the violent image that is harmful, but its situation in some context; it's not the office job that's harmful, but the person who threatens to replace his workers at every turn. It's not sex for money that objectifies; instead, it's client's the use of prostitute for objectification's sake. Choose one form: “I can get a whore anywhere, I don't need you” or “Shut up. You have a job to do, so do it.” In either case, it's not the sex-for-money that is the problem, it's the client's disregard for the prostitute's very humanity. Tim Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17947753940866093513noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3983293735571319877.post-27813211637297916172011-08-28T11:44:39.010+01:002011-08-28T11:44:39.010+01:00I agree with your application of Martha Nussbaum a...I agree with your application of Martha Nussbaum and Rae Langton's respective views on objectification--at least, I agree to a point. I'm afraid you may have: (1) understated the similarities between prostitution and other occupations, (2) understated the potential for objectification in said occupations, and (3) overstated the prevalence of both instrumentality and fungibility in prostitution. In the end, I fail to see how either objectification or disrespect are essential to (or even necessitated by) prostitution.<br /><br />Above, you compare prostitution to construction work--this comparison fails because it doesn't draw attention to just how violated a person can feel after a long day of repetitive work. A better comparison would be between the work of a prostitute and that of a factory laborer (any monotonous job fits here). Imagine that your job is to press steel bumpers using large stamping machines. You must first place a sheet of metal on a plate, align the sheet properly, press down on two levers to activate the stamp, remove the bumper from the machine, and repeat the process. There are, however, two problems. Safety is of utmost concern to your employer, so all bumper-stampers are required to wear arm braces that pull the arms out of the stamper once the stamp is activated. The jerking motion of the safety harness causes a mild soreness in the arms. Also, to your dismay, steel splinters worm their way under your fingernails (even with gloves). The filaments take 10 to 15 minutes to remove during your 30 minute lunch break. The job is hard, and it only pays minimum wage.<br /><br />How might we interpret the bumper stamper's life? I have no qualms about using the term “interpret” here, as there is an interpretive leap being made. To put it another way, would we say that the stamper's employers have violated them somehow? Are they regarded as "merely means to ends?"<br /><br />In the case of the factory worker, the question can only be answered by further analysis of the workplace. How does the employer feel about employee unions? Does the employer provide workman's compensation, retirement pension, health insurance, sick leave, and maternity/paternity leave? Does the employer make his workers compete with one another?--feel welcome? The factory worker's potentially painful and dangerous tasks, however, are not what's in question. What matters more is the way the factory worker is treated by other human beings.Tim Brownhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17947753940866093513noreply@blogger.com