Rawls turns in Chapter IV of A Theory of Justice to an account of the "principle of participation" after concluding his discussion of toleration. This is part of his general discussion of "political justice" by which he means the nature of the constitution and its inclusion in Chapter IV is part of a description of how equal liberty can be constitutionally maintained. Since, however, constitutions are, like jury trials, examples of imperfect procedural justice, they have two specific aspects that govern their arrangement. Firstly, the constitutions have to include procedures that satisfy the requirements of equal liberty and, secondly, they have to have the form that is judged most likely to result in a just "and effective" system of legislation.
The application of the principle of equal liberty to the constitution produces the principle of participation which is assumed to be "equal" though the nature of this equality, as we shall see, is a peculiar one. It defines political rights in the most general sense and is equal in terms of rights to take part in and determine the outcome of the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which citizens are expected to comply. Now, the "original position" specified such an equal status to all parties and the constitutional convention that was discussed at its conclusion further indicated ways in which the "original position" was to be left as continuing to incorporate the principles that governed its construction. But Rawls now adds that the constitution produced within the well-ordered society should be such that it involves a "transfer" of the principle of participation from the "original position" to the constitution. The point of this is that the constitutional process should "preserve the equality of the original position to the degree that this is practicable". The qualifying clause at the close of this statement will, however, turn out to be important.
Section 36 discusses the principle under "favourable conditions" whilst section 37 indicates "adjustments" to existing conditions which implies a split in Rawls' discussion of the principle of participation but this split is not one between "ideal" and "non-ideal" theory. The rationale of the split is rather to first state the elements of constitutions and then to indicate the reasons for the limitations of these elements by other factors arising from the "circumstances of justice". In section 36 the elements of the constitutional regime are made clear including the selection of a legislature in which there is the view that political parties should "advance some conception of the public good" and not be mere interest groups. The conception of the election of this legislature is understood here to be governed by a relation to the electorate in which each member of the latter has an equivalent vote and equal rights to become members of the legislature. Guarantees of liberty are also referred to and it is assumed that a lack of unanimity is part of the "circumstances of justice".
After these preliminaries Rawls goes on to discuss the way that the definition of equal liberty by the principle of participation is to be understood by discussing the meaning of the principle. Its meaning is again specified in terns of each vote having equal weight, something that is related here to equality of constituencies and safeguards against gerrymandering. Also included in the "meaning" of the principle of participation are the earlier points about equality of access to public office with the usual provisos granted concerning age and residence.
After discussing the "meaning" of the principle of participation in these ways Rawls turns next to the "extent" of its sway. The basic sense he gives to the question of "extent" is the degree to which the majoritarian principle holds sway. As this principle is restricted so is the extent of the principle that much more narrow. The extent of the principle is, naturally, narrowed by reference to such constitutional devices as the separation of powers and the adoption of bills of rights which, as adopted, are then not susceptible to political will in the sense that they are constitutional provisos that govern the way in which such will can be manifested. Assuming that these ways of narrowing the extent of the principle apply to all equally they do not violate the fairness of the principle of participation.
After discussing the "meaning" of the principle of participation and its "extent", Rawls turns next to the way that the constitution can ensure that political liberty possesses "worth" for the citizens. Everyone must have the right to use the public forum and a fair chance to add proposals to the political agenda. However there are countervailing pressures that work against such formal guarantees, not least in relation to inequality of means of relating to the political process, as manifested in market societies by wealth (and in other societies by status). In order that these pressures should not remove the "worth" of political liberties there are needed "compensating steps" as Rawls terms them. In a market society political parties could be given public support to free them from the pressures incurred by seeking donations for example.
In Section 37 Rawls turns to limits on the principle of participation although the scope of such limits was already laid out in some degree in section 36. One of the key such limits concerns the "extent" of the principle's sway through the majoritarian principle being curtailed in application. Such limitation of the majoritarian principle is governed by the way in which this guarantees the greater security and extent of other liberties. Included here are freedom of conscience and freedom of the person, two liberties which bare majoritarian rule could over-ride. The point of the constitutional procedure is to find a way of ensuring such liberties are protected without unduly narrowing the principle of participation's extent. What is not allowed scope in narrowing the principle of participation is, however, mere strength of feeling in a minority as this alone makes no specific reference to principles of justice.
After indicating the basis on which limitations of the principle of participations "extent" can be justified Rawls turns next to limitations of its "meaning" in terms of how some "unequal" liberties could in practice be granted in the constitution despite its overall aim being one of maintaining a position akin to that achieved in the "original position". Such a limitation shows that the "equality" attained in the achieved constitution may not be complete although any such limitation of its equality has to be one that can be justified to those placed in a disadvantaged position by it. It would be one that, in fact, enhanced the protection of the other liberties of those so disadvantaged.
The means by which the "meaning" of the principle of participation could be thus restricted is discussed in terms of the conception of universal equal suffrage being open to limitation. This is an historically recent notion and one that was not accepted by John Stuart Mill or Kant. Rawls does not here discuss, as he could have done, Kant's division of the citizenry between "active" and "passive" members or the account of "independence" that underpinned it. Instead Rawls describes Mill's reasons for granting extra votes to persons with "greater intelligence and education" in order that the judgment of the wiser be given more weight. This does not prevent all from possessing the vote but does require differential weighting of votes. In describing this notion Rawls does not condemn Mill's view but nor does he specifically endorse it. It is rather mentioned for the purpose of illustrating the means by which the "meaning" of the principle of participation could be restricted in application.
One of the problems with proposals like Mill's is, however, that it threatens also to restrict the "worth" of political liberties to the disadvantaged and this worth is part of the bond of citizenship. By means of the process of citizenship it is intended, after all, to raise the sight of all to interests broader than their own and this broadening is not purely a means of political liberty but an essential end of them. Whilst Rawls concludes his discussion with this account of "worth" he does not reflect, as one might think he should, on how it would be reduced by the reduction in the "meaning" of the application of the principle of participation.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has published a new article on the topic of liberalism which is by Gerald Gaus. Gaus' piece raises a number of important questions concerning the nature of "liberty", the debate about the comprehensiveness of liberalism, the discussion of its reach and the division between types of liberalism. Given the dominance of liberalism within contemporary political philosophy the discussion is an important one and most of what Gaus discusses is worth responding to in detail.
For the sake of this posting I want to focus on the way Gaus distinguishes between two forms of liberalism: the forms he terms "old" and "new" liberalism. This distinction is an interesting one, cutting, as it does, to the nature of debates within liberalism that are important for seeing reasons why liberals, who apparently share the "same" view, often have very different reasons for saying and doing things and, in fact, turn out to be at some variance with each other.
The people Gaus terms "old" liberals are more usually referred to as "classical" liberals and should be distinguished from libertarians (though Gaus conflates them to a certain degree). These types of liberals stress private property as a uniquely fitting institution for the protection and enhancement of liberty. Along with the stress on private property emerges a commitment to the market economy. As Gaus stresses, this position can be made even firmer, as it was in the case of Hayek, for whom private property is basically the only type of institution that is taken to fit the demands of liberty. This tradition is, however, not carefully related by Gaus to precedents in political philosophy. So, Gaus claims that it has precedent in the 19th century and cites Jeremy Bentham in support but says nothing about John Stuart Mill and has, in his consideration of this form of liberalism, nothing to say about its relationship with pre-19th century philosophers such as Kant. This is despite the fact that the structure of Kant's Doctrine of Right mirrors the emphasis of "classical" liberals in opening with a discussion of property and taking the relationship between freedom and property to be decisive for what he calls "private right". It should be said, however, in mitigation of this, that Kant also indicates a distinction between "private" and "public" right with the latter including a basis for state restrictions on private property. Even so, the relationship of the Kantian account of property to this "classical" notion of liberalism would certainly be worth thinking through and Gaus does not do so.
Gaus' notion of the "new" liberalism involves concern with the notion of "social justice". This emphasis involves a reference to the work of Keynes whose examination of such things as the "paradox of thrift" arrived at the view that economies based primarily on "natural" liberty would not be able to deal with structural problems of wealth that would require, instead, the intervention of the state. So, by contrast to the "old" liberals, the "new" ones promoted emphasis on state action. With the emphasis on state action comes a certain kind of suspicion of private property where this now becomes seen as the basis of inequality. Incidentally, and again not noted clearly by Gaus, this view of property indicates a re-evaluation of equality. If the classical form of liberalism emphasizes "liberty" (in accordance with the name "liberalism"), the new form, by contrast, is involved in a new emphasis on equality. Such a concern with equality naturally leads to looking at the sources of inequality but does require that the presence of inequality is seen as a distinct social ill. Here Gaus does mention John Stuart Mill in terms of the political economy of Mill leaving open the question as to whether private property was the best means of ensuring personal freedom. However, in mentioning Mill in this context, Gaus neglects to note here the tensions within Mill's thinking and particularly the ways in which he comes close to socialism at some points whilst providing arguments of a distinctly libertarian kind at others.
Having drawn this distinction, which, despite the problems noted here with the means it has been done, does indicate something of importance, Gaus proceeds to discuss contemporary liberal political philosophy primarily as contributions to the "new" liberalism. Again, somewhat surprisingly, there is no reference to Kant, despite Paul Guyer's essay discussing the relationship of Kant and Rawls, and Rawls' own history of references to Kant, references that point in many different directions. So, despite the usefulness of Gaus' analysis here, there remains room to think in much more detail about the nature of the variety of possible Kantian responses to the divide sketched.
I've been reflecting of late on the nature of liberalism, something prompted in part by the arrival of a coalition government in the UK and in part by looking at self-confessed liberal thinkers and the direction of their thought. Foremost among the liberal thinkers are John Stuart Mill and John Rawls. Mill's essay on liberty is particularly widely cited as a key document in liberal thinking. However, less widely known are his arguments for restriction of the franchise on the one hand and his increasing concessions to socialism as he grew older.
In line with the latter tendency in Mill's thought is the way Rawls distinguishes between two kinds of liberalism. The "liberalism of freedom" is contrasted in his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy with the "liberalism of happiness". The latter clearly relates to the classic utilitarian tradition from which Rawls exempts Mill when considering Mill as a political thinker, as in the latter's essay on liberty. In the essay on liberty it becomes clear that Mill takes liberty to be a cardinal political value, and, in so doing, he distinguishes himself from those who view political life primarily through the lenses of welfare. Since Kant was vociferous in rejecting welfare as a general end of politics it is just as clear that Kant opposes the "liberalism of happiness". The notion of the liberalism of happiness would be one that centrally promoted conditions of material well-being and in some contemporary discussions of the need for economists to take happiness to be a central variable we are witnessing the latest stage of the influence of utilitarianism on economics.
By contrast to this emphasis on happiness a liberalism of freedom endorses a form of pluralism concerning the good. This is explicit in Mill's defence of liberty but is also there in Rawls' many arguments against "comprehensive" moral views that assume agreement in a way that is broader than is reasonable. The Kantian conception of the social contract is explicitly endorsed by Rawls as an alternative to atomistic views of society (as formulated by methodological individualists such as Nozick) on the one hand and to state-centred conceptions on the other precisely due to the connection it suggests between reason and law.
However, where Rawls' position tends towards that of Mill and away from that of Kant is precisely in Rawls' greater willingness to endorse socialistic ends, in, that is, his deeper egalitarianism, something shared more with Mill than Kant. The split within liberal politics has tended to follow this pattern between those of a more social tendency who are attracted to egalitarian ends and those who emphasise freedom. The former push liberalism in the direction of social democracy whilst the latter, by contrast, have to articulate a defence of the state against libertarian temptations. Kant's own classic position is definitely of the latter sort in his own writings though whether this best reflects the internal tendencies of his own thought is another matter. To assess the relationship of Kant to liberalism and particularly to the more egalitarian tendencies of today's "Kantian liberals" is an endeavour that will require more work.
What I am suggesting, at least initially, is that there appears to be an important divergence within the camp of "liberalisms of freedom" between those that allow serious space for egalitarian considerations and those who are wary of so doing. Rawls' distinction, in his late work, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement, between "welfare state capitalism" and a "property owning democracy" is meant to indicate a way in which his egalitarian commitments are still distinct from those of a "liberalism of happiness" where this latter notion is associated with the welfare state. The point here is meant to be that the welfare state works primarily as ameliorative of misery and allows stark inequality in its aggregative sense of the greater good. By contrast, Rawls' own "property owning democracy" is meant to create a "fair system of cooperation" including by means of redistributing capital. This entails a radical edge to Rawls' position though, in so doing, it also threatens to undermine the lexical priority of the principle of liberty over the double-edged egalitarian second principle. Kant would appear less susceptible to this temptation and this might suggest either that the conception of Kant as a liberal is problematic in itself or, if Kant is a liberal, then his "liberalism of freedom" might yet turn out to be very different from that of Rawls.
I've been reading some John Stuart Mill. To be precise, I've been looking at his essay Representative Government. It's a curious text in lots of respects, not least in its arguments for proportional representation, which are largely drawn from a pamphlet Mill had read on the subject. In the course of the work Mill also makes clear that a democracy that doesn't include some recognition of educational qualification for the franchise has problems, even leading him to propose the kind of tests for literacy that were subsequently used to disenfranchise black people in Reconstruction America, not, of course, that he would have expected that!
Amongst other features of this odd work is a chapter in which Mill recants his previous support for the secret ballot in elections. The first part of the argument concerns the question what kind of thing is involved in having the capacity granted one to vote. It is common to treat this as a "right" and it was so argued by John Bright in his, ultimately successful, campaign for the extension of the franchise to working men in the 1860's. Mill, however, argues against this view of the vote, claiming instead that a vote is not a "right" but a "public trust". The difference, on Mill's view, is that a right does not require consultation of the public in terms of its disposal. Right is thus modelled by Mill on property ownership as he makes clear when he says that if voting is a right then there is no basis for objection to selling one's vote. The odd thing in this claim is that it entails that rights are only, on Mill's view, "private" and cannot be regarded as "public". That which is "public" has to fall under the heading of "trust". Mill's conception is one he here really takes for granted as he provides no argument in the context for thinking that right has to be construed in this way.
If this is a problematic part of Mill's argument it doesn't necessarily go to the core of it. The basic problem he is addressing is that secrecy in relation to voting encourages the view that casting the vote is something one can do without thinking of the consequences of so doing on others. So the difficulty Mill is addressing is how to ensure that voting is related to as a public duty and not merely an exercise of private caprice. One of the interesting elements of this point is that it cuts to the basis for political argument. Often people find political argument distressing and unwelcome, as it certainly can be, particularly when it involves friends or people with whom you are close. However, there is a basic reason why political argument exists which is that by means of it we hope to attain to a fuller understanding of what kinds of actions and principles are most likely to lead to outcomes we can generally see are the best for the greatest number of those affected. Putting it like that gives it a kind of utilitarian twist and, in some sense, utilitarian considerations surely are important in politics. They are far from the only considerations, however, since, in addition, there are questions touching on political right in the sense Mill seems not to allow.
Leaving aside the problem of public right for now, however, Mill's basic case against the secret ballot is that it detracts from the need to take consideration of the public good when it is cast. Mill is not insensible to the contrary argument that making voting public creates a potential problem of intimidation and acting under duress. In response, however, Mill tended to think that the wide extension of the franchise would militate against this since he assumes that under a universal franchise there will be no effective power that can counter that of the general public. In this he was, as Habermas has since indicated in detail, seriously mistaken. Mill did not account for the rise of a mass media that had concentrated ownership and whose owners might not have any particular connection even with the public voting due to not even being citizens of the polity. This effective power is not, of course, one that has any way of affecting a secret ballot in any direct sense but its representatives could have even more influence than they currently do in an open ballot. More widely Mill does not seriously consider the arrival of any type of organised pressure on those voting by agitators of many kinds. This is a clear blindness in his analysis.
However two key questions emerge from thinking about Mill's arguments against the secret ballot. Firstly, what sense if any can we give to describing voting as a "right"? This question relates to the problem of what is involved in thinking of such a notion as "public right" at all, a notion that Mill seems not to allow. Secondly, what are the limits of publicity in regard to public right? If we disagree with Mill and support the secret ballot then we do think that certain things which are closely connected to the public good are not necessarily themselves best understood in terms of a principle of publicity. If this applies to the case of voting then what else does it apply to?
