My last posting on Rawls looked at the concluding part of Chapter V of A Theory of Justice. In this posting I am going to begin reading Chapter VI of Theory, a chapter that is focused on the twin topics of duty and obligation. The first two sections of this chapter return to a topic that was previously raised in sections 18 and 19 of Chapter I, namely the question of principles for individuals, a topic that I treated in relation to the earlier discussion in Chapter I, here.
The opening section of Chapter VI immediately refers back to Rawls' earlier discussion in Chapter I where principles of fairness and natural duty were outlined but differentiates the treatment now being offered by stating that the purpose of the present discussion is to show the basis of the claim that these principles would be chosen by individuals in the original position. Rawls begins with the question of natural duty (reversing the order of exposition adopted in Chapter I). The key "natural duty" from the standpoint of the theory of justice is supporting and furthering just institutions. There are two parts to this duty. The first part is showing that we comply with and do our share "within" just institutions assuming they exist and have reference to us. The second part is to establish such institutions where they do not exist though Rawls adds the rider "at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves" which appears to be a kind of prudential limitation on the second part of the duty, one that Rawls does not assume requires justification.
The alternative to this principle of natural duty that Rawls considers is the principle of utility but adoption of this by individuals after the basic structure has been regulated by the two principles of justice is assumed by him to lead to an "incoherent" conception of right. The actions that would be mandated by the principle of utility would not cohere with that demanded by the two principles of justice and should there be an accidental convergence it would lack stability. Hence given that the two principles of justice are regulative of the basic structure it appears that principles for individuals should be congruent with them. This is the reason why Rawls describes natural duty in the way he does. There is still the question of whether the natural duty could not be sensibly qualified by individuals in accord with some general idea of costs and benefits but Rawls rules this out on the basis that the full complement of equal liberties have been guaranteed by the two principles so that there could be nothing further for individuals to bargain for.
In the previous chapter Rawls stressed the importance of public knowledge that an effective sense of justice applied across a well-ordered society. Such a public knowledge produces greater stability and undermines the temptation of free-riding. At this point Rawls differentiates between two kinds of threats to the stability of a system of justice. On the one hand there are self-interested reasons for free-riding that accrue from taking the share of general social goods to be available without requisite effort being needed for all agents. However, in addition to the self-interested way in which free-riding can be articulated, there is also a second type of threat to the stability of systems of justice. This second threat is what arises when people have reason to believe that others will not do their part in relation to the obligations that the system generates. This second kind of instability has a particular urgency when there appear dangers with complying with the demands of institutions. It is a general problem of assurance and is analytically distinct from the tendencies of self-interest as it can create problems even for those committed to principles of a just sort.
How does the assurance problem get responded to in a just system thus enabling it to substantially generate stability of the second sort? There has to be something voluntary about adherence to the institutions in question and this is best achieved by the propagation of natural duty as the key principle for individuals. One of the advantages of such a principle, by comparison with the principle of utility, is that it is simple and clear. However natural duty is not exhausted by the general commitment to just institutions as there are other natural duties in addition. For example, there is the duty to show a person the respect which is due to them as moral beings. In developing this natural duty we need to understand the aims and interests of others in relation to the standpoint of these others and, separately but related, we need to develop a general willingness of persons to do each other small favours and courtesies. The development of mutual respect has mutually beneficial consequences though Rawls neglects here an obvious chance to develop a more extensive account of respect such as appears in Kant due to this discussion (a discussion that really belongs to his theory of "rightness as fairness") being only of a very general character.
Other natural duties include the duty of beneficence that Kant, again, develops a more extended account of and which Rawls does here refer to. What is built in to Rawls' discussion of beneficence, however, is the general public quality of it as a natural duty that is required of us in terms of the assurance it gives us of the character of our fellow citizens. This reference to publicity is part of the general case Rawls makes that whilst the natural duties are not taken by him to be individual cases of a general principle that they are nonetheless all adopted for similar reasons.
Having made these remarks about natural duty, however, Rawls returns to what, following the remarks of section 8 of Chapter I, we can term the "priority problem" with regard to the relationship between distinct principles of natural duty. Rawls shows no evident path through this problem referring only to "certain procedures of aggregation" that are meant to enable us to take a larger view but only illustrating this (and not in this section) by reference to the problems of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal to which I will return in a later posting.
The remaining parts of section 51 are concerned with the relationship between a duty other things being equal (taken by Rawls to be equivalent to W.D. Ross' notion of prima facie duties) and a duty all things considered. A principle does not express a universal statement which always suffices to establish how we should act on Rawls' account but, rather, singles out relevant features of moral situations such that these features lend support to a certain ethical judgment. By contrast, when prima facie duties are invoked, we are, according to Rawls, deliberately restricting our range to only a certain part of a larger scheme of reasons. These general remarks are, to say the least, hardly helpful in resolving the questions raised by Ross and whilst Rawls concludes section 51 with an agreement with Ross that the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is inadequate, this agreement on Rawls' part is not based on any kind of careful assessment of the Kantian distinction and nor is it obviously related to the overall question of the connection between prima facie duties and duties all things considered. This concluding part of section 51 is a disappointing discussion, particularly after the general account of natural duties.
Section 52 turns to an examination of the principle of fairness and Rawls opens the section with the bold claim that "all obligations arise" from this principle. Fairness is what mandates that cooperative ventures should involve similar acquiescences with regard to restrictions on conduct. Hence obligations arise only given that the right background conditions are secured. By contrast, unjust arrangements are a form of extortion so that consent to them is not of a form that can be said to really be binding on conduct.
However, it might be argued that assuming that the natural duties hold then it follows that there is no requirement for an additional principle of fairness. Whilst this has some merit with regard to the basic structure, however, it has none in regard to voluntary conduct of citizens in relation to each other. Rawls also distinguishes between obligations and duties on the grounds that they arise in different ways. So the better-placed members of societies are more likely to emerge as its rulers and this binds them more tightly than others to the scheme of justice. This form of being bound is what we can view as the imposition of "obligations" upon these citizens whilst "duties" refer to the more general and varied considerations that were adduced in section 51. Viewed this way it is in relation to the general principle of fairness that obligations are best understood as generated and regulated whilst duties are preferably understood as governed by the reference to natural duty.
Rawls fills out this distinction by describing promising as a form of conduct that is governed by the principle of fairness. Promising expresses a general intent to perform an action as an obligation voluntarily undertaken on the basis that when others give one promises there is a similar expectation that they will be fulfilled. This assumes certain general conditions of "normal" promising are met. When the practice of promising is just it assumes voluntary and stable conditions apply and these conditions are what make the practice a just one. But the rule of promising is not itself expressive of a commitment to fidelity since it simply, on Rawls' view, states a convention whereas the moral principle in question is that of fidelity, a principle that is based upon the principle of fairness.
Promising is, however, something that is done with a public intention of incurring an obligation and this is integral to it being governed by the principle of fidelity. We both want the practice that expresses such an obligation to exist and we expect others to be aware of our willingness to be governed by the obligation in question. So the practice requires mutual confidence to make sense. Such confidence and trust allow for mutually advantageous schemes of cooperation to develop. This is why the principle of fairness can be seen to be one that would be agreed to in the original position.
However it is interesting to bring out that it is an important consequence of Rawls' view of fairness that institutions do not, in themselves, mandate moral requirements. We have seen this in the case of promising as the rules of it are not equivalent for Rawls to the principle of fidelity. It is only by assumption of the principle of fairness that the latter arises, it cannot be assumed simply on the basis of the rules of promises alone but is rather what regulates these rules and gives them moral sense. So moral reasons are those which enable a judgment to be made that refers us to generic principles as governing our practices.
Showing posts with label fairness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fairness. Show all posts
Monday, 23 January 2012
Monday, 6 June 2011
Rawls' Principles for Individuals
Chapter 2 of A Theory of Justice concludes with two little referred to sections that discuss principles for individuals, included, states Rawls, for the purposes of a "complete theory of right". A diagram accompanying this explanation also makes clear how partial the theory described in Theory is in relation to practical reason since Rawls provides no theory of value or of moral worth, two topics of some interest to Kantians and which have been productive of a fair amount of dispute both between different Kantian schools and between Kantians and other moral theorists. The point of Theory is thus merely to describe an account of "right" although what is clear from the discussion Rawls has given up to this point in the book is that his view of right appears to require reference to broader conditions than Kant thought were required for a philosophy of right.
The diagram further makes clear that the theory of right covers not only the "basic structure" and individuals but also the "law of nations", the latter being finally described by Rawls in The Law of Peoples, some years after the publication of Theory and in a fashion that many Rawlsians (particularly Pogge) were puzzled by. Leaving the discussion of the "law of nations" aside, however, Rawls' diagram makes of the reference to individuals two forms of discussion, firstly in relation to requirements on individuals and secondly permissions given to them. The account of requirements is further sub-divided between obligations and natural duties. Obligations of individuals are circumscribed in terms of fairness and fidelity whilst natural duties are either positive or negative. Positive natural duties involve upholding justice, providing mutual aid and mutual respect. Negative natural duties are restricted to prohibitions on injury and particularly on harm to "innocents". Finally, the theory of permissions is restricted to ones which are either indifferent (of which Rawls says nothing) or supererogatory (involving beneficence, courage and mercy). All this indicates at the very least that the theory of social justice was conceived at the time of writing Theory as only a small part of the general theory of right that Rawls imagined.
However despite the indication the diagram provides of an expansive general theory of right Rawls provides little within the pages of Theory to address its outline. The two sections under review are the major attempt made in the work to look at such a general theory and have been, as indicated above, little addressed in the literature on the work. (They are, however, supplemented by the first two sections of Chapter VI where the two principles for individuals are given further treatment.) One of the reasons why this is likely to be so, apart from the brevity of Rawls' discussion of these principles for individuals is that he also makes clear that in the original position he believes that the principles for individuals would be selected after the principles definitive of the "basic structure". This point is motivated by the argument that principles for individuals presuppose some form of social structure already in place though this is far from obvious to anyone who has studied the history of moral and political philosophy. In support of this Rawls refers, somewhat unexpectedly, to Francis Herbert Bradley, one of the pre-eminent British Idealists, who argued that "the individual is a bare abstraction" something taken by Rawls to mean that obligations and duties presuppose a moral conception of institutions. This interpretation of Bradley's statement is deflationary of it but the key point is that moral conceptions of institutions might be taken by some to arise from principles of individuals (if you were committed to "methodological individualism"). That Rawls takes it to be obvious this is not so is a comment on his understanding of method in political reasoning.
The result of the reference to the "original position" is that the principles of right are understood in general by Rawls to be principles that are in accord with what would be chosen in the original position. This is something that Rawls correctly understands as a revisionary approach to the concept of right so that "rightness as fairness" is intended to replace the general views of right held otherwise though it does so without reference to work on value or moral worth, something that might well surprise both Kantians and others working in moral theory.
Having made these general points it is time to consider the actual principles for individuals that Rawls provides. The first such is a principle of fairness as one would expect given that we are dealing with a view of "rightness as fairness". This notion of fairness is meant to cover the requirements on individuals that are treated as obligations rather than as natural duties. "This principle holds that a person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair), that is, it satisfies the principles of justice; and second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one's interests."
Stated in this general form the principle of fairness specifies obligations in relation to institutions and so this principle for individuals is part of Rawls' general account of institutions. Given that we have already described the two principles of justice as the means by which institutions should be governed the first part of the principle of fairness simply enjoins that individuals should conform to the institutions that are socially just. It is the second element that adds something that is specific to individuals in the form of reference to voluntary engagement in the institution including acceptance of its advantages. This principle is clearly meant to ensure that mutual benefit really arises from the institutions in question and to prevent encouragement of "free riders". Hence Rawls takes the two principles of justice as defining what is "a fair share" between us given that we adhere to the principle of fairness.
One of the consequences that follows from Rawls' treatment is that one is under no obligation with regard to institutions that are patently unjust, something that would appear to rule out the kind of problem Kant is thought to run into when faced with questions about the right of rebellion. However this point clearly belongs to non-ideal theory where it would require some nuance since there are different kinds of unjust institution and some might be thought to be worth some form of fidelity even given the injustice they are incarnations of. (This is the rationale in a sense for adopting what Kant, in Perpetual Peace, refers to as "preliminary" principles.)
Obligations are generally understood by Rawls as produced by institutions which "specify what it is that one is required to do". However given that institutions include such things as promises this is not in itself sufficient to show that the principle of fairness has to be defined only in terms of the first part of the principle in relation to pre-defined general principles of social justice since the notion of a promise has a standing separate from any given particular nature of "basic structure".
Whilst Rawls describes obligations in general by reference to the principle of fairness he has no corresponding overall principle for addressing natural duties. If natural duties include duties of mutual aid and non-maleficence then it would appear that these duties would belong more naturally to a theory of virtue than to a theory of right since it is far from clear how there can be strict enforcement of such duties. Inclusion of them as part of a theory of virtue would, however, require Rawls to revisit the diagram provided and give more room to the general discussion of practical reason rather than leaving everything to be determined as part of right and this he shows no inclination to do.
Rawls distinguishes between positive and negative natural duties and assumes that negative ones have priority over positive ones although he simply makes this remark and does nothing to provide a justification of it. Natural duties are distinct from obligations in that they apply without regard to voluntary acts. The duty, for example, not to be cruel, does not require that I first have voluntarily joined something or am part of some institution that defines the sense of cruelty. So promises are not required as part of the theory of natural duties. Natural duties are also general in form, holding between all moral persons. Interestingly, one of the reasons for holding natural duties to be part of the theory of right is that Rawls takes it that such natural duties are also part of the theory of war.
The key natural duty for Rawls, however, is the duty to be just. This evidently echoes the first part of the principle of fairness. Under this understanding we all have a natural duty to act in such a way that just conduct is encouraged. Since natural duties are not, however, derived from contractual promises, the general duty to uphold fairness is not a part of Rawls' contractarianism but is rather a moral reason to support the outcome of the original position. There thus can be two kinds of reason that support a particular form of action, one that is "natural" and one that is social. Since principles of natural duties are also general they apply to all in a way that the principle of fairness does not since the latter really applies to those holding positions within institutions.
This leaves the understanding of permissions that Rawls' diagram referred to and which he states little about. Permissions are acts we are at liberty to perform as they do not violate obligations or natural duties. Since they do include the territory of supererogatory actions it remains true that a theory of permissions is not without substantive interest in moral theory. Rawls, however, says virtually nothing about this except to mention that it appears utilitarianism cannot recognise this category since it appears to require from all actions that most would take to be supererogatory.
The diagram further makes clear that the theory of right covers not only the "basic structure" and individuals but also the "law of nations", the latter being finally described by Rawls in The Law of Peoples, some years after the publication of Theory and in a fashion that many Rawlsians (particularly Pogge) were puzzled by. Leaving the discussion of the "law of nations" aside, however, Rawls' diagram makes of the reference to individuals two forms of discussion, firstly in relation to requirements on individuals and secondly permissions given to them. The account of requirements is further sub-divided between obligations and natural duties. Obligations of individuals are circumscribed in terms of fairness and fidelity whilst natural duties are either positive or negative. Positive natural duties involve upholding justice, providing mutual aid and mutual respect. Negative natural duties are restricted to prohibitions on injury and particularly on harm to "innocents". Finally, the theory of permissions is restricted to ones which are either indifferent (of which Rawls says nothing) or supererogatory (involving beneficence, courage and mercy). All this indicates at the very least that the theory of social justice was conceived at the time of writing Theory as only a small part of the general theory of right that Rawls imagined.
However despite the indication the diagram provides of an expansive general theory of right Rawls provides little within the pages of Theory to address its outline. The two sections under review are the major attempt made in the work to look at such a general theory and have been, as indicated above, little addressed in the literature on the work. (They are, however, supplemented by the first two sections of Chapter VI where the two principles for individuals are given further treatment.) One of the reasons why this is likely to be so, apart from the brevity of Rawls' discussion of these principles for individuals is that he also makes clear that in the original position he believes that the principles for individuals would be selected after the principles definitive of the "basic structure". This point is motivated by the argument that principles for individuals presuppose some form of social structure already in place though this is far from obvious to anyone who has studied the history of moral and political philosophy. In support of this Rawls refers, somewhat unexpectedly, to Francis Herbert Bradley, one of the pre-eminent British Idealists, who argued that "the individual is a bare abstraction" something taken by Rawls to mean that obligations and duties presuppose a moral conception of institutions. This interpretation of Bradley's statement is deflationary of it but the key point is that moral conceptions of institutions might be taken by some to arise from principles of individuals (if you were committed to "methodological individualism"). That Rawls takes it to be obvious this is not so is a comment on his understanding of method in political reasoning.
The result of the reference to the "original position" is that the principles of right are understood in general by Rawls to be principles that are in accord with what would be chosen in the original position. This is something that Rawls correctly understands as a revisionary approach to the concept of right so that "rightness as fairness" is intended to replace the general views of right held otherwise though it does so without reference to work on value or moral worth, something that might well surprise both Kantians and others working in moral theory.
Having made these general points it is time to consider the actual principles for individuals that Rawls provides. The first such is a principle of fairness as one would expect given that we are dealing with a view of "rightness as fairness". This notion of fairness is meant to cover the requirements on individuals that are treated as obligations rather than as natural duties. "This principle holds that a person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair), that is, it satisfies the principles of justice; and second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one's interests."
Stated in this general form the principle of fairness specifies obligations in relation to institutions and so this principle for individuals is part of Rawls' general account of institutions. Given that we have already described the two principles of justice as the means by which institutions should be governed the first part of the principle of fairness simply enjoins that individuals should conform to the institutions that are socially just. It is the second element that adds something that is specific to individuals in the form of reference to voluntary engagement in the institution including acceptance of its advantages. This principle is clearly meant to ensure that mutual benefit really arises from the institutions in question and to prevent encouragement of "free riders". Hence Rawls takes the two principles of justice as defining what is "a fair share" between us given that we adhere to the principle of fairness.
One of the consequences that follows from Rawls' treatment is that one is under no obligation with regard to institutions that are patently unjust, something that would appear to rule out the kind of problem Kant is thought to run into when faced with questions about the right of rebellion. However this point clearly belongs to non-ideal theory where it would require some nuance since there are different kinds of unjust institution and some might be thought to be worth some form of fidelity even given the injustice they are incarnations of. (This is the rationale in a sense for adopting what Kant, in Perpetual Peace, refers to as "preliminary" principles.)
Obligations are generally understood by Rawls as produced by institutions which "specify what it is that one is required to do". However given that institutions include such things as promises this is not in itself sufficient to show that the principle of fairness has to be defined only in terms of the first part of the principle in relation to pre-defined general principles of social justice since the notion of a promise has a standing separate from any given particular nature of "basic structure".
Whilst Rawls describes obligations in general by reference to the principle of fairness he has no corresponding overall principle for addressing natural duties. If natural duties include duties of mutual aid and non-maleficence then it would appear that these duties would belong more naturally to a theory of virtue than to a theory of right since it is far from clear how there can be strict enforcement of such duties. Inclusion of them as part of a theory of virtue would, however, require Rawls to revisit the diagram provided and give more room to the general discussion of practical reason rather than leaving everything to be determined as part of right and this he shows no inclination to do.
Rawls distinguishes between positive and negative natural duties and assumes that negative ones have priority over positive ones although he simply makes this remark and does nothing to provide a justification of it. Natural duties are distinct from obligations in that they apply without regard to voluntary acts. The duty, for example, not to be cruel, does not require that I first have voluntarily joined something or am part of some institution that defines the sense of cruelty. So promises are not required as part of the theory of natural duties. Natural duties are also general in form, holding between all moral persons. Interestingly, one of the reasons for holding natural duties to be part of the theory of right is that Rawls takes it that such natural duties are also part of the theory of war.
The key natural duty for Rawls, however, is the duty to be just. This evidently echoes the first part of the principle of fairness. Under this understanding we all have a natural duty to act in such a way that just conduct is encouraged. Since natural duties are not, however, derived from contractual promises, the general duty to uphold fairness is not a part of Rawls' contractarianism but is rather a moral reason to support the outcome of the original position. There thus can be two kinds of reason that support a particular form of action, one that is "natural" and one that is social. Since principles of natural duties are also general they apply to all in a way that the principle of fairness does not since the latter really applies to those holding positions within institutions.
This leaves the understanding of permissions that Rawls' diagram referred to and which he states little about. Permissions are acts we are at liberty to perform as they do not violate obligations or natural duties. Since they do include the territory of supererogatory actions it remains true that a theory of permissions is not without substantive interest in moral theory. Rawls, however, says virtually nothing about this except to mention that it appears utilitarianism cannot recognise this category since it appears to require from all actions that most would take to be supererogatory.
Thursday, 24 March 2011
Justice As Reciprocity (I)
In 1971, the same year as the publication of A Theory of Justice, and presumably written as Theory was being completed, Rawls published a paper entitled "Justice As Reciprocity". One of the points of the paper is to distinguish between "justice" and "fairness" in order that the point of having a conception of justice as fairness can be more easily understood. A second point is to contrast Rawls' view of justice with the utilitarian conception with which he has multiplied problems ever since the writing of "Outline of A Decision Procedure for Ethics" in 1951.
The title of the paper is meant to bring out the core element that is shared between the conceptions of "justice" and "fairness", the notion of "reciprocity". As was suggested in earlier work the notion of "justice" itself is primarily conceived of as involving the elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment of an equilibrium between competing claims. However for the sense of this conception to be really made manifest it is required that two specific principles be set out. These principles are the familiar ones of equal rights to the most extensive liberty compatible with like liberty for all and the combination of the difference principle with the principle of equality of opportunity (or openness of offices to talents). The principle of equal liberty is itself then determined as requiring the conception that similar cases be treated similarly, a point that shows this principle is meant to be understood as generalizable. This understanding of the sense of equality implied in the first principle is combined with a notion of impartial administration and with the definition and initial specification of the practices to which it applies.
The second principle, which combines together two separable points about equality, concerns "benefits and burdens" that arise from occupancy of offices and Rawls here stresses in quite an emphatic manner that such inequalities as relate to offices have to work to the advantage of every person. Both principles have to be looked at from a general point of view, such as is supposed by the notion of the "representative man".
When Rawls goes on to invoke the basis of these principles by mentioning his "conjectural account" of their derivation he does so, as is again explicitly stated, to show that they are based on the "constraints of morality" in relation to the circumstances of justice. The veil of ignorance is invoked though not named as such and under its guise the need for generalizable principles becomes clear. Not only is this so but Rawls characteristically assumes a relationship between impartiality and morality when stating that acknowledgement of principles as applying as much to one's own case as that of others is "an essential aspect of having a morality".
The constraints on the difference principle are clearly referred to since it is recognized as plausible that inequalities can meet its condition so that: "the immediate gain which equality would allow can be considered as intelligently invested in view of its future return". This rather striking use of language is used to suggest a general incentive exists to have inequalities recognized in light of their tendency to promote the general conditions that are most favourable.
Rawls goes on to indicate that the view of justice implied in the "construction" he has given has similarities with game theory though he distinguishes it from game theory as he denies that the "construction" supposes a general theory of motivation. Nor does the "construction" suppose individual strategies though Rawls admits that a "special and general manner" of gaming is still supposed in a formal way in the "construction" he has given.
The title of the paper is meant to bring out the core element that is shared between the conceptions of "justice" and "fairness", the notion of "reciprocity". As was suggested in earlier work the notion of "justice" itself is primarily conceived of as involving the elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment of an equilibrium between competing claims. However for the sense of this conception to be really made manifest it is required that two specific principles be set out. These principles are the familiar ones of equal rights to the most extensive liberty compatible with like liberty for all and the combination of the difference principle with the principle of equality of opportunity (or openness of offices to talents). The principle of equal liberty is itself then determined as requiring the conception that similar cases be treated similarly, a point that shows this principle is meant to be understood as generalizable. This understanding of the sense of equality implied in the first principle is combined with a notion of impartial administration and with the definition and initial specification of the practices to which it applies.
The second principle, which combines together two separable points about equality, concerns "benefits and burdens" that arise from occupancy of offices and Rawls here stresses in quite an emphatic manner that such inequalities as relate to offices have to work to the advantage of every person. Both principles have to be looked at from a general point of view, such as is supposed by the notion of the "representative man".
When Rawls goes on to invoke the basis of these principles by mentioning his "conjectural account" of their derivation he does so, as is again explicitly stated, to show that they are based on the "constraints of morality" in relation to the circumstances of justice. The veil of ignorance is invoked though not named as such and under its guise the need for generalizable principles becomes clear. Not only is this so but Rawls characteristically assumes a relationship between impartiality and morality when stating that acknowledgement of principles as applying as much to one's own case as that of others is "an essential aspect of having a morality".
The constraints on the difference principle are clearly referred to since it is recognized as plausible that inequalities can meet its condition so that: "the immediate gain which equality would allow can be considered as intelligently invested in view of its future return". This rather striking use of language is used to suggest a general incentive exists to have inequalities recognized in light of their tendency to promote the general conditions that are most favourable.
Rawls goes on to indicate that the view of justice implied in the "construction" he has given has similarities with game theory though he distinguishes it from game theory as he denies that the "construction" supposes a general theory of motivation. Nor does the "construction" suppose individual strategies though Rawls admits that a "special and general manner" of gaming is still supposed in a formal way in the "construction" he has given.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)