In my previous posting on the third of Parfit's 2002 Tanner Lectures I looked at the account Parfit gave of the Rawlsian view of deliberative rationality. In this posting I'm going to look further at the third 2002 lecture in order to concentrate now on the treatment Parfit gives there of what he terms "Rawls's Formula", which is Parfit's way of describing the methodological appeal Rawls makes to the "veil of ignorance".
The appeal to the "veil of ignorance" is as part of Rawls' discussion of the original position and is a way in which he moves from the initial situation to the original position. Parfit views it as a "revision" of the basic contractualist conception of rational agreement and he analyses the various defences Rawls gives for the appeal to it and offers what he takes to be a problem with the different versions of the "veil" that Rawls is said to present. Parfit mentions amongst the justifications Rawls gives for appealing to the veil of ignorance that it enables us to move away from contingent facts that apply to us at present and which may influence the way we currently view the situation but which should not, impartially, affect our understanding of just distributions. The way Parfit understands this is that there is no "threat advantage" in the situation, a point that we noted in the previous posting was utilised by Rawls to argue against contemporary Hobbesian views. Our ignorance of who we are in the situation removes any such advantage though Parfit, somewhat oddly, also assumes that this means that "everyone's well-being" is taken into account when, instead, it means that the outcome that is arrived at is one that is not based on considerations of well-being but instead is formally construed.
The difference between these understandings of the veil of ignorance becomes clearer when Parfit begins to assess the general claim that Rawls makes to the effect that the contract doctrine offers a general alternative to utilitarianism. Parfit is surprised that Rawls feels able to make such a claim given, as Parfit puts it, that an appeal to "a combination of self-interested rationality and impartiality" tends to produce utilitarianism. Rawls, however, has already rejected appeals to self-interest on the grounds of the formal constraints of right and his view of impartiality is not one that is shaped by appeal to well-being as Parfit assumes hence the notion of impartiality favoured by Rawls does not tend to lead to utilitarian conclusions.
The reason why Parfit thinks differently about the appeal to the veil of ignorance than I am suggesting is correct is due to how he views Rawls' consideration of the notion of "average" utility which Rawls discusses in section 27 of A Theory of Justice. Rawls here provides a description of why the notion of "average" utility is preferable to the "classical" notion of utilitarianism and imagines arriving at the former through recourse to a device of contractualist reasoning. The way this goes is that Rawls views the notion of "average" utility as conjoined to a conception of having an "equal chance" of being any individual within the society though he also adds to this the assumption that all individuals have "similar preferences" whether or not they belong to the same society. Given these assumptions there is a general rationale existent for the "average" principle of utility. Parfit points out, in a footnote, that there is, even given these assumptions, something to be said to favour taking the "interests" of the worst off most in the situation. In fact, Rawls goes further, pointing out, in the process, that the situation of choice involved in the original position is quite different to any other choice given that the uncertainties it involves are so great and adding that it would be rational, given such uncertainties, to go so far in weighting the position of the worst off that the principle of average utility ends up (even given the "equal chances" idea) of being practically identical with the difference principle.
Parfit pays insufficient attention to this point remaining fixed on the claim that there is something of a case for the principle of "average" utility assuming the preference for criteria of well-being are tantamount for us. In making this point Parfit draws on the way that the argument of section 27 of Theory develops by progressing from the "equal chances" conception of the veil of ignorance to a "full" veil of ignorance in which there is no knowledge provided of the place one has in society. In fact, Parfit fails to note here that it is not only the place one has in society that is affected by moving to the "full" veil of ignorance. It is also the case that we no longer assume that individuals have "similar preferences" whether or not they belong to the society. We do not claim any knowledge of such preferences when we move to the full veil which is another way of saying that questions of well-being (understood through the prism of preferences) are not assumed in advance to guide our decision of the right principles to be chosen.
Parfit points to the account Rawls gives in section 28 of Theory where Rawls gives a further argument for moving away from an "equal chances" conception of the veil of ignorance and where Rawls advances the argument that "there seem to be no objective grounds in the initial situation for assuming that one has an equal chance of turning out to be anybody". In stating this point Rawls refers to the way that the principle of average utility appears to presuppose a principle of insufficient reason as the ground for how probabilities are to be assessed and such an appeal is merely one to "as-if probabilities" that effectively are only ways of stipulating the principle of average utility and are not means of arguing for it as a principle to be adopted. Further the conception that is at work in the "equal chances" view of the veil of ignorance that is preferred by the advocate of average utility itself requires a very stark conception of the person which Rawls terms that of "bare" personhood so that the persons in question lack determinate characters (which is one of the ways the "equal chance" notion works out). By contrast Rawls posits a conception of determinate personhood as the basis of choice so that there really are "interests and ends" of the persons in question even if the nature of them is unknown to the parties involved. So the form of the veil of ignorance that supports the "equal chances" conception, whilst not as full as that which Rawls advocates, is more drastic in its treatment of the persons engaged in forming the contractual agreement.
Parfit, however, objects to the claim that there are no "objective" grounds for favouring the "equal chances" version of the veil of ignorance on the grounds that it appears to treat the original position as an actual state rather than an hypothetical one. This is incorrect as we have seen. It is not a question of treating the original position as an "actual" state, it is rather one of specifying what assumptions are involved in the relative ways the thickness of the "veil" is presented as. The "equal chances" formula requires adoption of a particular conception of probability that is itself not neutral between principles to be considered and which is, further, thicker than Rawls' version of the "veil" in another way, in the way, that is, that it treats the persons in the contractual situation since it renders them mere vessels for utility maximisation. Thus there are two ways in which the "equal chances" view of the veil of ignorance is philosophically problematic: firstly, it assumes a form of probability assessment that is a covert introduction of the principle to be argued for and secondly it pictures the contracting parties in a way that is part of the general utilitarian conception of ignoring the separateness of persons.
Indeed returning to the way the path to the principle of average utility was earlier rendered by Rawls in section 27 of Theory shows that it was precisely by assuming these points that the principle was taken to be available for consideration in the first place. Rawls wrote there: "if we waive the problem of interpersonal conceptions of utility, and if the parties are viewed as rational individuals who have no aversion to risk and who follow the principle of insufficient reason in computing likelihoods....then the idea of the initial situation leads naturally to the average principle" (my emphasis). It is only by not following through that it is these controversial assumptions that support the advocacy of the principle of average utility under the "equal chances" view of the veil that Parfit can assume that the argument for the "equal chances" view of the veil is as good as that for the "no knowledge" view of the veil (which latter is, as we have seen, mis-named).
Parfit assumes that the two versions of the veil of ignorance are equal in their impartiality. In fact, however, they express two quite different conceptions of impartiality since the "equal chances" version of the veil of ignorance takes impartiality to imply that persons are treated rightly when they are viewed only in terms of interests and desires whilst the other version of the veil of ignorance takes it that there is more to people than this. So different conceptions of the person are related to different views of impartiality and the one that supports the "equal chances" formula is one that is framed to lead us to the principle of average utility and to its formula of "impartiality".
As a separate argument Parfit considers the claim that utilitarianism conflicts with our strongest moral beliefs and that this is a distinct argument for rejection of it and to favour Rawls' principles of justice. However, against this argument Parfit states that if we use the appeal to our beliefs to favour one of the versions of the veil of ignorance we cannot also use the veil to produce a rationale for these beliefs. This fails to grasp the point of the reference to the veil of ignorance and suggests some misunderstandings on Parfit's point of Rawls' procedure. The point of appeal to the veil of ignorance is to move away, as Parfit earlier recognised, from contingent features of existing situations in order that consideration of correct principles can be undertaken. Does this entail that there are no constraints involved in the choice of the principles in question? No: Rawls is explicit in appealing to the constraints of right in the situation. He incorporates such features as, for example, the publicity condition. The point is not that such conditions are equivalent to or presented as arguments for the principles of justice. It is rather that they provide us with a way in which the criteria for what would count as a preferable conception of justice can be specified. And if some account of a principle emerges which violates some of these conditions (which include what Rawls terms the "circumstances" of justice) then this is an argument against them.
The final argument that Parfit presents against the formula of the veil of ignorance Rawls has favoured returns to the reasons Rawls gives for taking the position of the worst off into particular account. Parfit formulates this as an argument that requires us to "maximise the minimum level" and thus terms it the "Maximin Argument". There is lack of specificity in terms of how Rawls understands the worst-off since there is no one specific way that definitely defines them and Parfit suggests that this group should be understood in egoistic terms despite the point that this offends against specific constraints of right on the grounds that Rawls mentions at one time a view of a "representative" person of this group which Parfit argues offends equally against specific constraints of right. However the key problem here is not so much how the group is to be defined as to understand how addressing their situation should be understood. Parfit typically takes it that we address their situation by means of application of a consequentialist process of welfare distribution whereas this is contrary to the point and process of the difference principle. The latter points not to welfare increments but instead to the conditions under which self-respect and the general primary goods (which include conditions of character formation) are to be enhanced. So the considerations Parfit applies to the "Maximin Argument" are of the wrong sort.
Finally Parfit looks at the Maximin Argument in terms of the selection of moral principles rather than in relation to principles of justice which means that the assessment of the argument is simply understood in a way that is not apt for it. One of the reasons why this odd element of Parfit's account of the Maximin Argument is followed appears to be due to an overall claim on Parfit's part that the difference between Rawslian reasoning and that of utilitarians is much less than first appears. A reason for this appears to be Rawls' remark in section 87 of Theory that, in the "initial situation", parties are not taken to have any particular ethical motivation but instead to decide solely on the basis of what seems best calculated "to further their interests" and this passage is meant to bolster the peculiar way Parfit understands the original position. The point here is one that Rawls is making about recognising the intuitive idea of rational prudential choice but Rawls immediately adds that the formal conditions on principles and the veil of ignorance mean that it necessarily also includes moral features and we have seen that his criticism of the average principle of utility further pointed to a conception of the persons involved in the contractual situation as having ends in addition to interests even though we did not know what they were. This passage therefore does not support Parfit's conception of the original position.
Showing posts with label average utility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label average utility. Show all posts
Tuesday, 5 June 2012
Monday, 21 November 2011
Rawls and Alternative Views of Justice
In my last posting on Rawls I looked at his response to "common sense" precepts of justice. There we discovered some reasons why "common sense" precepts are at the wrong level of generality to serve as primary principles of justice. However, Rawls concludes Chapter V of A Theory of Justice by considering two other alternatives to his argument for the two principles as the right ones to be adopted in the original position. In section 49 he addresses "mixed" conceptions of justice and in section 50 concludes with a response to the arguments that have been presented for a principle of political perfectionism. In this posting I will look at these arguments in turn.
At the opening of section 49 Rawls makes clear that the "mixed" conceptions considered are ones that require the adoption of the first principle of justice and, concomitantly with this, also agree to its lexical priority over the preferred second principle where this second principle is thought to have replaced the complicated conjunction of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle that Rawls has advocated as required. So essentially the "mixed" conceptions supplement the liberty principle with something different than the directly egalitarian concerns Rawls has presented them with. An obvious example of a "mixed" conception would be a combination of the liberty principle with the principle of utility where, however, given lexical priority, the principle of utility would be subordinate to the liberty principle.
Such "mixed" conceptions would be in the classic position of intuitionist positions generally on Rawls' view which is that they would lack precision in application. You could, for example, view the second principle as a combination of "average" utility with some chosen minimum level of agreed income but it would still be an open question how to govern the relations between these elements. Effectively it might well be the case, Rawls suggests, that the difference principle would be being covertly appealed to in such a case. The difficulty here is much as with the appeal to "common sense" precepts which is that the intuitive nature of the combination in question leaves much undecided and without evident mechanisms available for decisions to be made. The difference principle, by contrast, allows for a direct form of appeal to be made in evaluation of decisions and this is a clear advantage of it.
Appeal to utility, even in a combined or "mixed" conception, constantly creates the problem of how the utility functions are to be measured. Maximisation has to include some measurement function and perhaps the most obvious one is the zero-one claim (everyone's preferences to count for one and no more than one). However this leaves a lot undecided between positive and negative outcomes and could lead, for example, to a preference for a large population that was relatively uneducated on the grounds that greater net utility was more easily achieved given greater numbers and fewer wants, an outcome that is, to say the least about it, not intuitive. (To see that Rawls' argument here is far from implausible it suffices only to consider what Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, termed the Repugnant Conclusion.) Generally speaking "mixed" conceptions that involve the principle of utility can be objected to both on grounds that they involve unacceptable uncertainty given their intuitionist basis and unacceptable risks given their utilitarian element.
In section 50 Rawls gives the principle of political perfectionism his attention and distinguishes between an absolute and a moderate variant of the principle. The "absolute" variant places a premium on the production of excellence above all else whilst the moderate version is a "mixed" conception that places the weight of excellence alongside other considerations. Essentially principles of perfection involve selection of certain types of lives as those which are given preference over others given their greater intrinsic value. Rawls terms this an "ideal-regarding" principle rather than a "want-regarding" principle. In one sense such a principle as that of perfection is close to Rawls' own endeavour since the principles of justice themselves are taken to have ideal requirements and to encourage certain types of character. But the principles of justice do not require reference to standards of excellence.
Principles of perfection would not be adopted in the original position on Rawls' view as there is no shared standard of perfection given in the original position. There is only an index of primary goods, which are assumed to be something all would want, not a standard of excellence which only some would aspire to incarnating or aiming towards. Only if a natural duty was assumed in the original position that was accepted as culturally viable could there be space within it for the choice of the principle of perfection. This does not mean that all activities will be taken to be of equal value but that there is not an assumption that the attainment of particular types of excellence will shape the basic structure.
The principle of perfection, if combined with another in the moderate "mixed" version, faces the familiar problems Rawls always poses to intuitionist views. Generally Rawls also considers the appeal to "excellence" to involve considerations that are distinct from those of justice. So, for example, appeals for certain kinds of prohibitions on behaviour (as with sodomy statutes) often require that particular ways of life be given special privilege but this consideration, given as such, has no obvious claim to be a just one. As Rawls puts it, "subtle aesthetic preferences and personal feelings of propriety" shape standards of excellence and these types of preference are not obvious bases for just evaluations.
With the rejection of the principle of perfection in both absolute and moderate forms Rawls concludes Chapter V, a conclusion that effectively closes his consideration of how the principles of justice relate to institutions in a general sense although, as we shall see, in due course, one very important question of institutional type is left for discussion in Chapter VI.
At the opening of section 49 Rawls makes clear that the "mixed" conceptions considered are ones that require the adoption of the first principle of justice and, concomitantly with this, also agree to its lexical priority over the preferred second principle where this second principle is thought to have replaced the complicated conjunction of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle that Rawls has advocated as required. So essentially the "mixed" conceptions supplement the liberty principle with something different than the directly egalitarian concerns Rawls has presented them with. An obvious example of a "mixed" conception would be a combination of the liberty principle with the principle of utility where, however, given lexical priority, the principle of utility would be subordinate to the liberty principle.
Such "mixed" conceptions would be in the classic position of intuitionist positions generally on Rawls' view which is that they would lack precision in application. You could, for example, view the second principle as a combination of "average" utility with some chosen minimum level of agreed income but it would still be an open question how to govern the relations between these elements. Effectively it might well be the case, Rawls suggests, that the difference principle would be being covertly appealed to in such a case. The difficulty here is much as with the appeal to "common sense" precepts which is that the intuitive nature of the combination in question leaves much undecided and without evident mechanisms available for decisions to be made. The difference principle, by contrast, allows for a direct form of appeal to be made in evaluation of decisions and this is a clear advantage of it.
Appeal to utility, even in a combined or "mixed" conception, constantly creates the problem of how the utility functions are to be measured. Maximisation has to include some measurement function and perhaps the most obvious one is the zero-one claim (everyone's preferences to count for one and no more than one). However this leaves a lot undecided between positive and negative outcomes and could lead, for example, to a preference for a large population that was relatively uneducated on the grounds that greater net utility was more easily achieved given greater numbers and fewer wants, an outcome that is, to say the least about it, not intuitive. (To see that Rawls' argument here is far from implausible it suffices only to consider what Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, termed the Repugnant Conclusion.) Generally speaking "mixed" conceptions that involve the principle of utility can be objected to both on grounds that they involve unacceptable uncertainty given their intuitionist basis and unacceptable risks given their utilitarian element.
In section 50 Rawls gives the principle of political perfectionism his attention and distinguishes between an absolute and a moderate variant of the principle. The "absolute" variant places a premium on the production of excellence above all else whilst the moderate version is a "mixed" conception that places the weight of excellence alongside other considerations. Essentially principles of perfection involve selection of certain types of lives as those which are given preference over others given their greater intrinsic value. Rawls terms this an "ideal-regarding" principle rather than a "want-regarding" principle. In one sense such a principle as that of perfection is close to Rawls' own endeavour since the principles of justice themselves are taken to have ideal requirements and to encourage certain types of character. But the principles of justice do not require reference to standards of excellence.
Principles of perfection would not be adopted in the original position on Rawls' view as there is no shared standard of perfection given in the original position. There is only an index of primary goods, which are assumed to be something all would want, not a standard of excellence which only some would aspire to incarnating or aiming towards. Only if a natural duty was assumed in the original position that was accepted as culturally viable could there be space within it for the choice of the principle of perfection. This does not mean that all activities will be taken to be of equal value but that there is not an assumption that the attainment of particular types of excellence will shape the basic structure.
The principle of perfection, if combined with another in the moderate "mixed" version, faces the familiar problems Rawls always poses to intuitionist views. Generally Rawls also considers the appeal to "excellence" to involve considerations that are distinct from those of justice. So, for example, appeals for certain kinds of prohibitions on behaviour (as with sodomy statutes) often require that particular ways of life be given special privilege but this consideration, given as such, has no obvious claim to be a just one. As Rawls puts it, "subtle aesthetic preferences and personal feelings of propriety" shape standards of excellence and these types of preference are not obvious bases for just evaluations.
With the rejection of the principle of perfection in both absolute and moderate forms Rawls concludes Chapter V, a conclusion that effectively closes his consideration of how the principles of justice relate to institutions in a general sense although, as we shall see, in due course, one very important question of institutional type is left for discussion in Chapter VI.
Saturday, 18 June 2011
The Two Principles of Justice and the Original Position
In recent postings on Chapter III of A Theory of Justice I have discussed the means by which the "original position" is arrived at by contrast to the more neutral "initial situation" and how it is constructed. The discussion of the reasoning that led to the notion of "average" utility also indicated both how it was preferable to "classical" utilitarianism in the "original position" and yet why Rawls can argue that it would not, nonetheless, be chosen.
In this posting I want to look at section 29, the key section of Chapter III as it is here that Rawls justifies the claim that the two principles of justice described in Chapter II are the principles that would be chosen within the "original position". In the process the methodological import of a number of features that have been referred to earlier in the chapter become more apparent.
In opening section 29 Rawls argues that the conditions of publicity and finality will give some of the main arguments for the two principles of justice. In section 23, when outlining the constraints of the concept of right, Rawls gave the principle of publicity third but concluded with the condition of finality (the other constraints being generality, universality, and the need for a resolution of the problem of ordering principles). In opening section 29 by specifically emphasising the notions of publicity and finality he gives these notions a specific form of importance and, as we will see, part of the reason for the emphasis placed on publicity concerns his response to utilitarianism.
After referring to these two elements that are constraints of the concept of right Rawls refers next to the heuristic schema suggested by the reasons for following the maximin rule. In section 26 when Rawls gave an earlier, more intuitively based set of arguments for the two principles of justice, he referred for the first time to the maximin rule. At that point the maximin rule was specified as asking us to rank alternatives by the worst possible outcome that could emerge from following them. In simpler terms, the worse the worst case scenario would be from following something, the less it emerges as something we can sensibly choose. Given that the maximin rule applies to choice under conditions of uncertainty its bite really requires the addition of the veil of ignorance.
In the revised edition of Theory Rawls indicates that the point of a contractarian scheme is precisely that it does set the condition of publicity as a limit upon what can be agreed to. This comment suggests that Rawls views the condition of publicity as a basis under which the Kantian claim that the point of the contract should be to set the conditions of possible consent is met by reference to the requirements of publicity. This suggestion relates also, as Rawls earlier recognised, to the appeal made to principles of publicity by Kant in Perpetual Peace.
However, despite these opening references to the conditions of publicity and finality on the one hand and the maximin rule on the other, Rawls begins the argument of section 29 by reference to the "strains of commitment". As was remarked in section 25 there is the assumption in the "original position" that the parties involved in negotiation are possessed of a "capacity for justice" and that they can rely on one another to carry out the agreement once the principles have been agreed to. However, there is something that cuts against this assurance and this is what Rawls terms the "strains of commitment". Effectively what is meant by this is that the agreement reached cannot be one that would be impossible to be carried out by the parties subsequently. Further, if there are circumstances that would be produced by the agreement that would render such agreement very unlikely then this also cuts against any principles that would create such circumstances. The contract, resting as it does on a mutual trust that has to be its basis, is not one that can be abandoned later so the agreement reached has to be one that will be capable of generating circumstances that will later enhance rather than undercut the motivational commitment to the agreement.
Having made these points about the "strains of commitment" Rawls considers the principles available for choice in terms of how they might or might not operate as forms of insurance for those who have chosen them. The two principles of justice are taken to meet this test as they provide insurance against the worst eventualities, not least in terms of guaranteeing basic liberties (first principle). By contrast, commitment to utility would ensure that any form of "primary good" held by one (including the basic liberties) is open to later removal if this appears to best satisfy general utility (whether summatively or averagely). This points to the requirement of the "strains of commitment" as it appears that no form of utilitarian principle can meet the test of providing insurance of the sort that these strains suggest is required. Hence Rawls' first argument for the choice of the two principles rather than a principle of utility in the original position rests upon moral psychology in relation to a specific application of the maximin rule. The moral psychology points to the sense that outcomes that could be conceived as unjust by individuals or groups are not insured against and the maximin rule has brought out the specifically urgent nature of the problem.
It is after consideration of the "strains of commitment" that Rawls next invokes the publicity condition though this again has a relationship to a view of psychological stability in the sense of asking what are the conditions that will enable conceptions of justice to generate their own support. Here Rawls refers to the "conservative" assumption made much of by Sidgwick in terms of stating that if the basic structure can publicly satisfy its principles for a good period of time then this produces a general favour for the principles continuance. Failure to satisfy these principles over time, by contrast, weakens commitment to them, particularly if the failure is one that cannot be publicly accounted for in ways that match the pre-existent "capacity for justice" of the parties in the contract.
This "conservative" point about justice is the basis of Rawls' appeal to the notion of "stability" as that is stable which responds to the requirement of providing conditions that generate its own acceptance. The principle of utility, by contrast to the two principles of justice, seems to require a form of identification with the interests of others (in terms of "impartiality"). Now if this identification is not a simple one to bring about then it will offend against stability and thus not perform the role of generating the condition of its own acceptance.
The first principle of justice has already been given some ground as an insurance principle and this is now coupled with the point that the second principle of justice shows that there is mutual benefit in social cooperation. The point about mutual benefit is then contrasted with what can be expected from the principle of utility which appears to require that some may be more favoured than others for the sake of the good of the whole. The principle of utility seems thus to require commitment to sacrifice on the part of those less fortunate but these sacrifices are not small ones but rather of the prospects in life of the less favoured. This is why Rawls describes the principle of utility as presenting an "extreme demand".
Utilitarians require impartial principles of benevolence which Rawls takes to be "less realistic" as a basis for social order than the notion of reciprocal advantage stated in the second principle of justice. This suggestion of a test that relates to "realism" brings out again the point of reference to the "strains of commitment" since these strains tell against, as was above emphasised, any demand that is unlikely to be followed in practice.
Returning to the point about publicity, Rawls emphasises next the argument that recognition of the two principles of justice increases the support given to self-respect. This claim relates less to the "strains of commitment" and more to moral psychology. Self-respect is taken to be grounded on the sense that one does receive respect from others and is thus a "natural duty" (or principle for individuals). Since it is such a duty the presence of it is something that tends to be mutually reinforcing, requiring respect for others to be manifested as a means of ensuring respect for oneself in turn. This point about self-respect produces a cooperative relationship between parties and it is thus a desideratum that a public conception of justice should strengthen it. Since the difference principle commits all to a notion of mutual benefit it meets the case of publicly strengthening self-respect.
In making this claim about self-respect Rawls refers explicitly to Kant and to the formula of humanity. Rather than expounding Kant's view that we should each treat each other as ends rather than merely as means Rawls interprets the principle in a contractarian manner and does so by viewing the principle through Kant's own claim that the foundation of public right is the conception that laws should be capable of possible consent by those governed. Rawls views this latter claim as the political form of the formula of humanity and then suggests that rather than applying it to positive law it should rather be related to the basic structure viewing it as arising from an original position of equality.
Seeing the original position as the ground of the social order and as a position of original equality is similar in force also to Kant's claim about the original right of each to claim the surface of the earth. "For in this situation men have equal representation as moral persons who regard themselves as ends and the principles they accept will be rationally designed to protect the claims of their person." So the point about seeing the formula of humanity in this political setting is that it enables the consent that is given to the social order to be related to an egalitarian sense of personhood.
The way in which this commitment is to be secured in the basic structure is by means of the two principles of justice as Rawls suggests that they give equality in relation to basic liberties and the difference principle ensures that persons are all treated as ends in themselves. Hence it is the difference principle that is viewed as the political equivalent of the formula of humanity. The reason Rawls views it in this way is because it requires that gains that are not mutually sustainable should be given up. This is why, having stigmatised the principle of utility as "extreme" Rawls now claims that the difference principle, by contrast, "has a reasonable interpretation".
Staying with the appeal to the argument from reference to the data of moral psychology and, in particular to a sense of self-respect, Rawls indicates that the principle of utility lacks advantages in this respect. Given that it can always require sacrifices of one group for another it is not a doctrine that is likely to produce generalised self-respect. In making this point Rawls then encounters the resistance that can be met by insistence on the principle of "average" utility. And in replying to this Rawls makes an especially significant appeal to the principle of publicity.
If the principle of "average" utility is to be adopted then it must be publicly affirmed as the principle governing society. It cannot be used to encourage people to adopt non-utilitarian positions. Rawls makes this stipulation without referring to a notorious element of Sidgwick's doctrine to which however he is here clearly referring. Sidgwick's position was often referred to as "Government House" utilitarianism on the grounds that Sidgwick was prepared to countenance the point that it might not be of the greatest social utility to have general endorsement of the principle of utility. Sidgwick himself was therefore prepared to adopt the view that the governance of arrangements by the principle of utility should be a secret.
In insisting on the principle of publicity Rawls aims to prevent this strategic move on Sidgwick's part. If public recognition of utilitarianism required weakening of self-respect then this consequence would have to be faced in adopting the principle as the means of arranging society. It may be the case that average utility will be increased by adopting instead the two principles of justice but, if this is so, this cannot be claimed as an indication that the principle of average utility has been adopted as the basis of the two principles of justice since its "adoption" here would be secret. And then the adoption of the two principles would not be a result of a public commitment to utilitarianism.
The initial argument from the "strains of commitment" rules out a randomizing relation to the principles of justice making clear the central importance of agreement on the correct principles of justice. Generality, universality and limited information are insufficient to bring us to a decision in the original position and this shows why further commitments than these were required. Amongst those were views about persons, such as the claim that persons possess commitments to fundamental interests and that they are not "bare". Key to these commitments was the meta-commitment to liberty as a means of revising and altering the other ends possessed. However, the possession of interests indicates, amongst other things, the point about the need for social insurance and the first principle of justice is meant to meet this demand. Further, the veil of ignorance brings out that there is no way that probabilities can be appealed to as a ground and this, when combined with the point about basic interests, suggests that the criteria used by utilitarians has little efficacy within the original position.
The argument of section 29 is not the conclusion of Chapter III as Rawls goes on to look in more detail at "classical" utilitarianism in the concluding section 30. But the argument of section 29 provides the crucial grounds for choice of the two principles of justice within the original position and it is revealing that these arguments are based on the "strains of commitment", moral psychology and the publicity condition. These build in the point of taking care of the interests of persons and bring out, on Rawls' construal, the ground for viewing the second part of the second principle as a political analogue of the formula of humanity.
In this posting I want to look at section 29, the key section of Chapter III as it is here that Rawls justifies the claim that the two principles of justice described in Chapter II are the principles that would be chosen within the "original position". In the process the methodological import of a number of features that have been referred to earlier in the chapter become more apparent.
In opening section 29 Rawls argues that the conditions of publicity and finality will give some of the main arguments for the two principles of justice. In section 23, when outlining the constraints of the concept of right, Rawls gave the principle of publicity third but concluded with the condition of finality (the other constraints being generality, universality, and the need for a resolution of the problem of ordering principles). In opening section 29 by specifically emphasising the notions of publicity and finality he gives these notions a specific form of importance and, as we will see, part of the reason for the emphasis placed on publicity concerns his response to utilitarianism.
After referring to these two elements that are constraints of the concept of right Rawls refers next to the heuristic schema suggested by the reasons for following the maximin rule. In section 26 when Rawls gave an earlier, more intuitively based set of arguments for the two principles of justice, he referred for the first time to the maximin rule. At that point the maximin rule was specified as asking us to rank alternatives by the worst possible outcome that could emerge from following them. In simpler terms, the worse the worst case scenario would be from following something, the less it emerges as something we can sensibly choose. Given that the maximin rule applies to choice under conditions of uncertainty its bite really requires the addition of the veil of ignorance.
In the revised edition of Theory Rawls indicates that the point of a contractarian scheme is precisely that it does set the condition of publicity as a limit upon what can be agreed to. This comment suggests that Rawls views the condition of publicity as a basis under which the Kantian claim that the point of the contract should be to set the conditions of possible consent is met by reference to the requirements of publicity. This suggestion relates also, as Rawls earlier recognised, to the appeal made to principles of publicity by Kant in Perpetual Peace.
However, despite these opening references to the conditions of publicity and finality on the one hand and the maximin rule on the other, Rawls begins the argument of section 29 by reference to the "strains of commitment". As was remarked in section 25 there is the assumption in the "original position" that the parties involved in negotiation are possessed of a "capacity for justice" and that they can rely on one another to carry out the agreement once the principles have been agreed to. However, there is something that cuts against this assurance and this is what Rawls terms the "strains of commitment". Effectively what is meant by this is that the agreement reached cannot be one that would be impossible to be carried out by the parties subsequently. Further, if there are circumstances that would be produced by the agreement that would render such agreement very unlikely then this also cuts against any principles that would create such circumstances. The contract, resting as it does on a mutual trust that has to be its basis, is not one that can be abandoned later so the agreement reached has to be one that will be capable of generating circumstances that will later enhance rather than undercut the motivational commitment to the agreement.
Having made these points about the "strains of commitment" Rawls considers the principles available for choice in terms of how they might or might not operate as forms of insurance for those who have chosen them. The two principles of justice are taken to meet this test as they provide insurance against the worst eventualities, not least in terms of guaranteeing basic liberties (first principle). By contrast, commitment to utility would ensure that any form of "primary good" held by one (including the basic liberties) is open to later removal if this appears to best satisfy general utility (whether summatively or averagely). This points to the requirement of the "strains of commitment" as it appears that no form of utilitarian principle can meet the test of providing insurance of the sort that these strains suggest is required. Hence Rawls' first argument for the choice of the two principles rather than a principle of utility in the original position rests upon moral psychology in relation to a specific application of the maximin rule. The moral psychology points to the sense that outcomes that could be conceived as unjust by individuals or groups are not insured against and the maximin rule has brought out the specifically urgent nature of the problem.
It is after consideration of the "strains of commitment" that Rawls next invokes the publicity condition though this again has a relationship to a view of psychological stability in the sense of asking what are the conditions that will enable conceptions of justice to generate their own support. Here Rawls refers to the "conservative" assumption made much of by Sidgwick in terms of stating that if the basic structure can publicly satisfy its principles for a good period of time then this produces a general favour for the principles continuance. Failure to satisfy these principles over time, by contrast, weakens commitment to them, particularly if the failure is one that cannot be publicly accounted for in ways that match the pre-existent "capacity for justice" of the parties in the contract.
This "conservative" point about justice is the basis of Rawls' appeal to the notion of "stability" as that is stable which responds to the requirement of providing conditions that generate its own acceptance. The principle of utility, by contrast to the two principles of justice, seems to require a form of identification with the interests of others (in terms of "impartiality"). Now if this identification is not a simple one to bring about then it will offend against stability and thus not perform the role of generating the condition of its own acceptance.
The first principle of justice has already been given some ground as an insurance principle and this is now coupled with the point that the second principle of justice shows that there is mutual benefit in social cooperation. The point about mutual benefit is then contrasted with what can be expected from the principle of utility which appears to require that some may be more favoured than others for the sake of the good of the whole. The principle of utility seems thus to require commitment to sacrifice on the part of those less fortunate but these sacrifices are not small ones but rather of the prospects in life of the less favoured. This is why Rawls describes the principle of utility as presenting an "extreme demand".
Utilitarians require impartial principles of benevolence which Rawls takes to be "less realistic" as a basis for social order than the notion of reciprocal advantage stated in the second principle of justice. This suggestion of a test that relates to "realism" brings out again the point of reference to the "strains of commitment" since these strains tell against, as was above emphasised, any demand that is unlikely to be followed in practice.
Returning to the point about publicity, Rawls emphasises next the argument that recognition of the two principles of justice increases the support given to self-respect. This claim relates less to the "strains of commitment" and more to moral psychology. Self-respect is taken to be grounded on the sense that one does receive respect from others and is thus a "natural duty" (or principle for individuals). Since it is such a duty the presence of it is something that tends to be mutually reinforcing, requiring respect for others to be manifested as a means of ensuring respect for oneself in turn. This point about self-respect produces a cooperative relationship between parties and it is thus a desideratum that a public conception of justice should strengthen it. Since the difference principle commits all to a notion of mutual benefit it meets the case of publicly strengthening self-respect.
In making this claim about self-respect Rawls refers explicitly to Kant and to the formula of humanity. Rather than expounding Kant's view that we should each treat each other as ends rather than merely as means Rawls interprets the principle in a contractarian manner and does so by viewing the principle through Kant's own claim that the foundation of public right is the conception that laws should be capable of possible consent by those governed. Rawls views this latter claim as the political form of the formula of humanity and then suggests that rather than applying it to positive law it should rather be related to the basic structure viewing it as arising from an original position of equality.
Seeing the original position as the ground of the social order and as a position of original equality is similar in force also to Kant's claim about the original right of each to claim the surface of the earth. "For in this situation men have equal representation as moral persons who regard themselves as ends and the principles they accept will be rationally designed to protect the claims of their person." So the point about seeing the formula of humanity in this political setting is that it enables the consent that is given to the social order to be related to an egalitarian sense of personhood.
The way in which this commitment is to be secured in the basic structure is by means of the two principles of justice as Rawls suggests that they give equality in relation to basic liberties and the difference principle ensures that persons are all treated as ends in themselves. Hence it is the difference principle that is viewed as the political equivalent of the formula of humanity. The reason Rawls views it in this way is because it requires that gains that are not mutually sustainable should be given up. This is why, having stigmatised the principle of utility as "extreme" Rawls now claims that the difference principle, by contrast, "has a reasonable interpretation".
Staying with the appeal to the argument from reference to the data of moral psychology and, in particular to a sense of self-respect, Rawls indicates that the principle of utility lacks advantages in this respect. Given that it can always require sacrifices of one group for another it is not a doctrine that is likely to produce generalised self-respect. In making this point Rawls then encounters the resistance that can be met by insistence on the principle of "average" utility. And in replying to this Rawls makes an especially significant appeal to the principle of publicity.
If the principle of "average" utility is to be adopted then it must be publicly affirmed as the principle governing society. It cannot be used to encourage people to adopt non-utilitarian positions. Rawls makes this stipulation without referring to a notorious element of Sidgwick's doctrine to which however he is here clearly referring. Sidgwick's position was often referred to as "Government House" utilitarianism on the grounds that Sidgwick was prepared to countenance the point that it might not be of the greatest social utility to have general endorsement of the principle of utility. Sidgwick himself was therefore prepared to adopt the view that the governance of arrangements by the principle of utility should be a secret.
In insisting on the principle of publicity Rawls aims to prevent this strategic move on Sidgwick's part. If public recognition of utilitarianism required weakening of self-respect then this consequence would have to be faced in adopting the principle as the means of arranging society. It may be the case that average utility will be increased by adopting instead the two principles of justice but, if this is so, this cannot be claimed as an indication that the principle of average utility has been adopted as the basis of the two principles of justice since its "adoption" here would be secret. And then the adoption of the two principles would not be a result of a public commitment to utilitarianism.
The initial argument from the "strains of commitment" rules out a randomizing relation to the principles of justice making clear the central importance of agreement on the correct principles of justice. Generality, universality and limited information are insufficient to bring us to a decision in the original position and this shows why further commitments than these were required. Amongst those were views about persons, such as the claim that persons possess commitments to fundamental interests and that they are not "bare". Key to these commitments was the meta-commitment to liberty as a means of revising and altering the other ends possessed. However, the possession of interests indicates, amongst other things, the point about the need for social insurance and the first principle of justice is meant to meet this demand. Further, the veil of ignorance brings out that there is no way that probabilities can be appealed to as a ground and this, when combined with the point about basic interests, suggests that the criteria used by utilitarians has little efficacy within the original position.
The argument of section 29 is not the conclusion of Chapter III as Rawls goes on to look in more detail at "classical" utilitarianism in the concluding section 30. But the argument of section 29 provides the crucial grounds for choice of the two principles of justice within the original position and it is revealing that these arguments are based on the "strains of commitment", moral psychology and the publicity condition. These build in the point of taking care of the interests of persons and bring out, on Rawls' construal, the ground for viewing the second part of the second principle as a political analogue of the formula of humanity.
Wednesday, 15 June 2011
Rawls and "average utility"
A little while ago I looked at the treatment Rawls gave of "classical utilitarianism" in the fifth section of Chapter I of A Theory of Justice. This was followed by a second posting on the treatment of "classical utilitarianism" in the sixth section of Chapter I. As we will see in a subsequent posting Rawls returns to the topic of "classical utilitarianism" in the final section of Chapter III. However, in this posting I want to look at the alternate form of utilitarianism that is addressed in sections 27 and 28 of Chapter III, the variant known as "average" utility and in doing so I will consider both the reasons why Rawls takes this alternate version to be a preferable form of utilitarianism in relation to the "original position" on the one hand and the reasons why he nonetheless argues that this principle still would not be chosen in the "original position" on the other hand.
The distinction between "average" and "classical" utilitarianism is meant to show a difference between two possible interpretations of the initial situation. The "classical" view is taken by Rawls to involve taking the arrangement of institutions on the grounds of what results from absolute weighted sums of expectations of representative people. So, on this ground, when the number of people in society increases, so also does the total utility. By contrast, the "average" doctrine is so called as it directs society to maximise not the total but the average utility. So it would then be no longer true that increases in population correlate to increases in utility since we would instead be measuring percentages of increase in utility for specified groups and these would not require increases in the sizes of the groups in question.
Now the difference in question between these variants of utilitarianism essentially affects not static but dynamic populations. So the "classical" conception, in its preference for increases in population sacrifices any specific commitment to the levels of utility for specific individuals. And Rawls takes this to mean that the "classical" position would be rejected in the original position. A reason for this is that it would appear plausible, on adoption of the "average" principle, to specify a set level below which averages of utility for given persons should not fall. Given an assumption of self-interest this would appear to be the view most likely to appeal to the parties in the reasoning situation of the "original position".
The reasoning by which the "average" principle is arrived at in the "original position" is next examined. Rawls assumes that our parties are trying to work out what society should be like and, given the conditions of the "original position", it is safe to assume that there are no violent differences in preferences. To make the situation conform to the constraints of the "original position" the parties have to assume that they have no knowledge of where in the social situation the possession of given talents will lead them. If the reasoners then add the assumption that their preferences are not merely the same as those of others but that any given person has an equal chance of being any individual then they will be identical in scope with the average utility of the society.
If we then drop the assumption that we know anything about preferences we arrive at the introduction of the veil of ignorance. Since, in this situation, the appeal of the average principle of utility is still plausible, it has been shown that contractarian reasoning can produce the "average" principle of utility, a principle that does not, unlike the "classical" principle, enjoy a "teleological" element or the intuitive appeal of the idea of maximising the good. In the original edition of Theory Rawls puts this thus: "The average principle appeals to those in the initial situation once they are conceived as single rational individuals prepared to gamble on the most abstract probabilistic reasoning in all cases". This sentence is excised from the "revised" edition.
In the "revised" edition rather than formulate the principle of utility as concerned with the "satisfaction of desire" as appears to be assumed in the formulation of the first edition, it is instead understood in terms that are more familiar from economics, namely, as "a way of representing the choices of economic agents". However, this still enables the notion of "average" utility to be formulated, and particularly gives further scope to rational risk-aversion.
Having given an argument that shows that the "average" principle is the form of utility that would have appeal in the "original position", however, Rawls goes on to argue against its being the principle that would be chosen in this situation. In doing so, Rawls keeps the point that interpretation of principles in this situation, whilst hypothetical, is sufficiently grounded to enable choice of a principle as authenticated. The first point that Rawls invokes concerns the maximin principle as the choice being made is one that is based under conditions of uncertainty (at least once the veil of ignorance has been invoked). This leads to people having to assume that the principle of insufficient reason applies (in which we have to assume any given outcome is roughly equivalent in its chance of occurring with any other given outcome).
Once the veil of ignorance has been invoked, suggests Rawls, the two principles of justice will be more appealing than the principle of average utility since they will involve protection of our liberties and a reasonable standard of life. A basic reason for taking these principles to be a better guide than that of average utility concerns what the assumptions underpinning the latter include. Rawls suggests that they include the view that there would be some means to ensure that the favours of society were evenly distributed over time. (In a sense, then, the problem with the principle of average utility might be that it promises too much!) However, not only is it the case that these assumptions are large ones for individuals to make concerning their own welfare, they also neglect the problem of ensuring that general social decisions are made in ways that advance some sense of social justice.
One of the reasons why the average principle cannot really advance any sense of social justice is that it must leave out of account not merely what conceptions of the good are held by others but also that any conceptions are held at all. The final stage in the reasoning for the principle of average utility in the "original position" can allow no appeal to this notion as it is not capable of being assessed by quantitative appeals. As Rawls put this in the "revised edition": "The parties are conceived as having no definite highest-order interests or fundamental ends by reference to which they decide what sorts of persons they care to be. They have, as it were, no determinate character of will. They are, we might say, bare-persons".
This characterisation effectively repeats a general problem Rawls has with utilitarianism, that of "abstracting from the separateness of persons" as he put it in the Chapter I consideration of "classical utilitarianism" but its statement here is meant to show that "average utility" could not meet the standards of the original position as it would leave out something essential. So, on the one hand, average utility presupposes a calculation that lacks specificity in relation to the "original position" and, on the other hand, it lacks a full conception of the parties engaged in reasoning.
The distinction between "average" and "classical" utilitarianism is meant to show a difference between two possible interpretations of the initial situation. The "classical" view is taken by Rawls to involve taking the arrangement of institutions on the grounds of what results from absolute weighted sums of expectations of representative people. So, on this ground, when the number of people in society increases, so also does the total utility. By contrast, the "average" doctrine is so called as it directs society to maximise not the total but the average utility. So it would then be no longer true that increases in population correlate to increases in utility since we would instead be measuring percentages of increase in utility for specified groups and these would not require increases in the sizes of the groups in question.
Now the difference in question between these variants of utilitarianism essentially affects not static but dynamic populations. So the "classical" conception, in its preference for increases in population sacrifices any specific commitment to the levels of utility for specific individuals. And Rawls takes this to mean that the "classical" position would be rejected in the original position. A reason for this is that it would appear plausible, on adoption of the "average" principle, to specify a set level below which averages of utility for given persons should not fall. Given an assumption of self-interest this would appear to be the view most likely to appeal to the parties in the reasoning situation of the "original position".
The reasoning by which the "average" principle is arrived at in the "original position" is next examined. Rawls assumes that our parties are trying to work out what society should be like and, given the conditions of the "original position", it is safe to assume that there are no violent differences in preferences. To make the situation conform to the constraints of the "original position" the parties have to assume that they have no knowledge of where in the social situation the possession of given talents will lead them. If the reasoners then add the assumption that their preferences are not merely the same as those of others but that any given person has an equal chance of being any individual then they will be identical in scope with the average utility of the society.
If we then drop the assumption that we know anything about preferences we arrive at the introduction of the veil of ignorance. Since, in this situation, the appeal of the average principle of utility is still plausible, it has been shown that contractarian reasoning can produce the "average" principle of utility, a principle that does not, unlike the "classical" principle, enjoy a "teleological" element or the intuitive appeal of the idea of maximising the good. In the original edition of Theory Rawls puts this thus: "The average principle appeals to those in the initial situation once they are conceived as single rational individuals prepared to gamble on the most abstract probabilistic reasoning in all cases". This sentence is excised from the "revised" edition.
In the "revised" edition rather than formulate the principle of utility as concerned with the "satisfaction of desire" as appears to be assumed in the formulation of the first edition, it is instead understood in terms that are more familiar from economics, namely, as "a way of representing the choices of economic agents". However, this still enables the notion of "average" utility to be formulated, and particularly gives further scope to rational risk-aversion.
Having given an argument that shows that the "average" principle is the form of utility that would have appeal in the "original position", however, Rawls goes on to argue against its being the principle that would be chosen in this situation. In doing so, Rawls keeps the point that interpretation of principles in this situation, whilst hypothetical, is sufficiently grounded to enable choice of a principle as authenticated. The first point that Rawls invokes concerns the maximin principle as the choice being made is one that is based under conditions of uncertainty (at least once the veil of ignorance has been invoked). This leads to people having to assume that the principle of insufficient reason applies (in which we have to assume any given outcome is roughly equivalent in its chance of occurring with any other given outcome).
Once the veil of ignorance has been invoked, suggests Rawls, the two principles of justice will be more appealing than the principle of average utility since they will involve protection of our liberties and a reasonable standard of life. A basic reason for taking these principles to be a better guide than that of average utility concerns what the assumptions underpinning the latter include. Rawls suggests that they include the view that there would be some means to ensure that the favours of society were evenly distributed over time. (In a sense, then, the problem with the principle of average utility might be that it promises too much!) However, not only is it the case that these assumptions are large ones for individuals to make concerning their own welfare, they also neglect the problem of ensuring that general social decisions are made in ways that advance some sense of social justice.
One of the reasons why the average principle cannot really advance any sense of social justice is that it must leave out of account not merely what conceptions of the good are held by others but also that any conceptions are held at all. The final stage in the reasoning for the principle of average utility in the "original position" can allow no appeal to this notion as it is not capable of being assessed by quantitative appeals. As Rawls put this in the "revised edition": "The parties are conceived as having no definite highest-order interests or fundamental ends by reference to which they decide what sorts of persons they care to be. They have, as it were, no determinate character of will. They are, we might say, bare-persons".
This characterisation effectively repeats a general problem Rawls has with utilitarianism, that of "abstracting from the separateness of persons" as he put it in the Chapter I consideration of "classical utilitarianism" but its statement here is meant to show that "average utility" could not meet the standards of the original position as it would leave out something essential. So, on the one hand, average utility presupposes a calculation that lacks specificity in relation to the "original position" and, on the other hand, it lacks a full conception of the parties engaged in reasoning.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)