The Right of Nations and Commerce

After giving the example of how self-seeking inclinations in a sense support the notion of a republican constitution Kant moves on, in Perpetual Peace, to the question of how the right of nations is supported by an appeal to "nature". The point that he first makes concerning the right of nations is that it clearly presupposes that nations are independent of each other and that such independence of nations is, in a sense, a condition of war between the states. The only basis of overcoming such a state of war between states is, as asserted earlier in the discussion of the second definitive article, the establishment of a federative union between states.

When discussing the second definitive article Kant arguably gave no clear reason why there should not be a world state. Now, Kant responds to the problem of why states should remain independent of each other, given that this involves a state of war between states, by discussing a specific danger that arises from overcoming such a condition. This is that fusion of states together into one larger state could simply arise from one state overpowering the others and turning into a universal state by this means. However, in discussing this possibility, Kant argues that such a universal "monarchy" (as he terms it) leads to a specific problem. This is that as laws gain in range they decline in vigour. In other words, as a state expands its range of operation it becomes more difficult for the laws in question to be based on a general agreement and to capture true consent. This argument is similar to the ones used by Rousseau to argue for smaller polities (and there is precedent for it also in Plato) but is not one that arises from concern with the specificities of international right. Nor is it the case that such an argument applies to a world state that has arisen from federative unions moving by their own momentum towards a general universal state.

That Kant's concern here is primarily with conquest is made further clear when he goes on to talk of every head of state having the ambition of creating peace by means of becoming the ruler of the world. In response to this danger Kant makes his second appeal to the means of nature. Now he refers to how the ambition of heads of state to create a universal monarchy by means of conquest is undercut by two central differences within the human race. These are differences of language and religion (though Kant here inserts a note to the effect that the latter are not really differences of rational religion but of dogmatic creeds). These differences promote many bases for war between peoples thus creating an obstacle to the ambition of heads of states. However, despite making the appeal to "nature" on these grounds, Kant goes on to point out that increase of culture leads to an agreement on principles by promoting a kind of equilibrium between them (shades here perhaps of Rawls' notion of "overlapping consensus"?).

Not only does this general agreement in principles itself undermine the differences Kant points to as undercutting the ambition of heads of states but there is a further uniting factor that is mentioned now. This is what Kant terms the "spirit of commerce" (Ak. 8: 368). The point Kant makes about this is that it cannot well coexist with war and that the power of money may be the most reliable of all powers for the promotion of peace. This argument in a sense follows from the earlier argument concerning the right of the state since there we found Kant appealing to the need for security of holdings (property) as a natural ground for the formation of the state. Similarly, the need for security of trade between partners in different nations grounds a basis for resistance to war amongst traders. The need for such security of trade promotes mediation between warring partners just as if there existed a permanent league to promote peace. So there is a virtual league that emerges automatically from the relations between states which may partially explain Kant's more sanguine attitude to the formation of a world state. It does however also point us back, in a sense not clearly undertaken anywhere directly by Kant, to the need to think further about the conditions for just and fair trade, a point discussed in previous postings.

Devils and the State

The second part of the first supplement to Perpetual Peace turns directly to the question of how war promotes public right. Kant begins by talking about the right of a state arguing that even if there were not discord internal to an area leading to the need to form a state there would be the problem of facing enemies from outside the area. Due to the fact that any area could be encroached on by such external enemies the need for the existence of a state to respond to them is imperative.

This point is amplified by consideration of what kind of person is required for a republican constitution to exist. In response to those (such as Robespierre?) who think that it would require angels for such a state to exist so that a republic is indistinguishable from a state of virtue, Kant argues the reverse. The basic self-seeking inclinations of human beings is sufficient in itself to point to the need for states to exist. In arguing this Kant points out that the question of how to regulate such self-seeking requires organisation so that the interest of one clashes with the interest of another in such a way that they cancel out. The result of this is that the behaviour of the people in question will emerge as of a sort that would be equivalent to the self-seeking inclinations not even existing.

So rather than a republic being a state of virtue it is plausible even for devils to come together in such a condition. The problem of state formation is not equivalent to one of moral improvement since all that is required is, as Kant puts it, using "the mechanism of nature" (Ak. 8: 366). The mechanism at issue appears to me to be the one of forces of attraction and repulsion producing states of equilibrium. (Directly referred to in the Doctrine of Right: Ak. 6: 232.)

Setting forces of self-seeking into such states of equilibrium does not require that self-seeking is itself abolished, only that it is regulated. Any state that exists will have this in view as a key part of its mission despite the fact that states are generally imperfect and do not meet the conditions of the republican constitution. The moral improvement of the people will thus emerge in a sense as a result of the republican constitution but not due to the constitution being based on moral requirements. Hence reason can use the mechanism of nature as a means to promote the rule of right as this mechanism will, if regulated to create mutual checking of inclinations, promote this in an automatic sense.

This argument shows one basis of Kant's view that there is a "guarantee" of perpetual peace in nature and establishes the ground for the existence of states in general not on any historical commitment to social contracts but instead on two requirements that are not in themselves moral. Firstly, the need for security of any people in an area forcing organisation upon them to resist the rapine of others. Second, the self-checking of inclinations when regulated together in a state framework. This hence provides the first illustration of Kant's general argument for a "cunning of nature".

War and Peace

After stating the 3rd definitive article of perpetual peace Kant, as if being unwilling to conclude Perpetual Peace, proceeds to write two supplements and an appendix to the work though the appendix has been partly covered in previous postings on publicity. The first of the "supplements" concerns a supposed guarantee of perpetual peace that is said to derive from "nature" itself.

After a preliminary discussion of the meaning of such terms as providence and fate Kant proceeds to describe a sense in which nature has prepared persons for the possibility of peace. Three conditions are mentioned as permitting the arrival of peace: a) the possibility of people being able to live in all parts of the globe; b) the use of war to drive people to every part of the globe, even to places intrinsically inhospitable; c) by the use of war people are driven to enter into lawful relations.

In ascribing the three conditions given to "nature" in a general sense Kant is implying a teleological argument though one of a subtle kind. Hegel is well known for insisting on a "cunning of history" by means of which outcomes that none intended are produced but Kant in this passage implies a broader cunning that makes history itself possible. In some sense, if people can survive anywhere then it is because they have had to so survive. And what has forced this upon people if not war?

In making this observation Kant further indicates a basis for thinking of war as an instrument of moral progress. This point is furthered when he reflects on the means by which war has been forged, namely, in the first instance, by domestication of animals such as horses and elephants. Not only is this the case but the settling of people that is involved in the establishment of agriculture is the basis of peaceful relations between folk, a peaceful relation brought about by a passage away from "lawless freedom". This passage from "lawless freedom" is the means by which war forces lawful relations to arise. This is further specified in the movement from hunting, which permits the dispersion of family units, to agriculture, which implies rather their settlement.

War is subsequently referred to discussed as involving a "drive to honour" (Ak. 8: 365) that provides a motive to action all of its own. The desire to display courage provides war with a certain kind of dignity so that philosophers have been known to ennoble it. However this is not the key point that emerges from war. Rather, the decisive thing is the means by which it promotes the conditions of peace and public right. This will be the subject of a subsequent posting.

War and Secrecy

As specified in the posting "Publicity II" the reading of Perpetual Peace given in the first set of postings on publicity concerned only a very small portion of this text, namely, that in which the formulas of publicity were explicitly set out. The text of the work involves much more than this and I will, in a series of postings, go through the key formulations of the work from the beginning with specific attention to each clause that involves reference to questions concerning publicity.

The work opens with a brief introductory paragraph in which Kant states that, since "practical politicians" tend to look down on theoretical ones as ineffectual, so, it follows that they should not censor them since their works are of no danger to the state! The first section of the work then opens and this contains preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states, of which there are six. The first states: "No treaty of peace shall be held to be such if it is made with a secret reservation of material for a future war". (Ak. 8: 343) Notably Kant here immediately makes a reference to secrecy and indicates that acting in a way that requires it - thus acting against not merely the negative but also the positive formula of publicity - shows an action that is not in accord with its professed intention and this divergence between the act's real intent and its professed one is sufficient for the act to be deemed wrong.

The key point that is made with regard to such a secret reservation is that it shows that there is in this case no commitment to peace and so the treaty that has been signed by one who holds to this reservation has no claim to be called a peace treaty. Not only is such an act one that fails to match the expressed intent of offering peace it is also, says Kant, "beneath the dignity" of a ruler. To justify the divergence between expressed and real intent would require what Kant terms "jesuitical casuistry" and it is this that is beneath the dignity of the ruler (or minister). Such "refined" calculations demonstrate a principled commitment to avoiding consideration of what principles of publicity would involve and it is this that makes them beneath the dignity of the ruler. In including this reference to dignity Kant is implying a commitment to publicity is part of autonomous moral consideration since, as Kant claimed in the Groundwork: "Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (Ak. 4: 436). If to deliberate in a way that requires secrecy is to lack dignity, i.e. to be swayed by heteronomy, then, by contrast, to act in a way that requires publicity, as is involved in the affirmative principle of publicity, is to act in accordance with autonomy. This reading of the first preliminary article hence confirms that the conclusion of the work with the affirmative principle of publicity is structurally already signaled from the beginning of the work and shows that this affirmative principle is the key formula of it.