It is sometime now since I last blogged about Rawls.I left the discussion of Theory at that point where Rawls discussed properties of social systems. In this posting, by contrast, still following the logic of tracing the sections of Chapter V of the work (concerned with "distributive shares") I will look at sections 44-46. The first of these sections concerns the principle of "just savings", a principle that, in the last of the sections mentioned, is revealed to put in play a further principle of priority of the principle of equality of opportunity over the difference principle. The middle one of these sections, by contrast, has a more supplementary function in terms of giving reasons why considerations of which generation one belongs to should not be determinative for selection of principles and how this is not a point that violates democratic concern.
Section 44 is ostensibly concerned with "justice between generations" though anyone who has grappled with the questions that attach to this in works at least from Reasons and Persons onwards is highly unlikely to be satisfied with Rawls' treatment. However, if we look at what Rawls actually treats in this section we can see that, whilst much more limited in scope than much work concerned with "future generations", it does provide the basic outlines for a further clarification of one of the principles of justice in an illuminating fashion.
The real question set in the section is described well by Rawls as a concern with the "social system"'s capacity to meet the two principles of justice and this concerns, as he puts it here, an understanding of how the social minimum is set. After mentioning the "common sense" proposal that it be set so as to reach customary expectations, Rawls points out that this provides no guideline concerning when and where such expectations can be accepted as reasonable. By contrast, adoption of the difference principle indicates a means by which distribution can be governed. However, this applies not merely within a generation but also between them. This requires each generation to put aside "a suitable amount of real capital accumulation". And this is the means by which the question of justice between generations arises within the theory of justice.
Having set it out in this way Rawls proceeds to make a series of concessions concerning the need for intuitive guidance when thinking through these questions. So, as is almost instantly admitted, there are "no precise limits" on what the rate of savings should be. But this does not prevent there from being, as Rawls puts it here, "significant ethical constraints" governing the means by which savings are accumulated (note that he does not write of these as "political constraints"). Amongst these constraints are a number of reasons for not governing the mechanism of appropriation of savings by means of the principle of utility, not least because this principle tends to be excessively demanding on present generations.
By contrast to the principle of utility, the theory of justice as understood by Rawls is grounded on seeing the original position as the basis of an appropriate savings principle. Contrary to his earlier remarks in this section, however, Rawls appears not to take the basis of the savings principle to really be the difference principle after all, not least because there is no way to apply it retrospectively to previous generations and since the standing of each generation has to be somehow given place in the theory it might well seem that there has to be a different principle than the difference principle governing justice between generations.
Looked at from the standpoint of the original position there are two ways in which we can imagine the veil of ignorance applying to the question of generations. It is possible to view it from the perspective of present time entry which would favour present generations relative to previous ones or from a standpoint which adopts a principle we could wish any and every generation could have followed. Since, in principle, the veil of ignorance can be sufficiently thick for us not, in any case, to know which generation we belong to, the latter conception of the original position has the advantage for Rawls. And it is on this basis that the question of just savings is approached.
So when the question of savings is broached the means by which it is addressed are in terms of how much savings would be undertaken if we assumed that all other generations had followed the same criterion (a kind of universalisation procedure). Given this formulation the right principle of just savings would thus ensure a schedule was adopted that determined rates. This would affect the degree to which rates could be reasonably set as a wealthier society would have more to spare for savings than a poorer one. However, as noted earlier, the general conception of the level of such savings is left generally intuitive and the "strains of commitment" are invoked as one of the reasons why it would be correct to leave them intuitive. The general rationale for the savings in question also has to be constantly kept in view as one of ensuring that a material base "sufficient to establish effective just institutions within which the basic liberties can be realized".
The features of the contract approach that are specific with regard to just savings are best captured by saying that it addresses from a standpoint of justice a problem that democratic theory generally has great difficulty comprehending. Given a view that democratic decisions are grounded on reference to present parties there appears no way of ensuring that demands of future generations have any way of being represented at all (and this partly underlines the fascinating difficulties Parfit encountered in Reasons and Persons final part). But the original position does have a way of representing them, as all parties to this position are equally virtual so that differences of generation should not be considered distinct in principle from other differences.
The reason why this equal representation of distinct generations meets a "democratic" demand according to Rawls is that the basic democratic demand is that "what touches all concerns all". Each generation passes on to the next a fair equivalent in real capital by means of just savings. Having pointed out this first element of the contract position Rawls goes on to indicate that the second element concerns the definition of the aim of accumulation that it has adopted which is that such accumulation should be concerned with the attainment and maintenance of just social arrangements. So the just savings principle is a kind of coordination between generations of the means by which these aims can be met. "The savings principle represents an interpretation, arrived at in the original position, of the previously accepted natural duty to uphold and to further just institutions." Finally, given the contract conception there is no special value placed on attaining great abundance since the good society is not now viewed primarily as one with a high material standard of living.
The just savings principle is next related by Rawls to his two principles of justice by means of the reference to the standpoint of the least advantaged in each generation. This requires that the difference principle is constrained by reference to the just savings principle. Once the veil of ignorance has been understood in the appropriately thick manner it has become possible to again see the relationship of the just savings principle to the difference principle but also to comprehend that the application of the difference principle at any given point of time is constrained by reference to the continuing operation of the general coordination between generations that the just savings principle represents.
It is this striking restraint that the just savings principle operates upon the difference principle that leads Rawls to consider in section 45 the introduction of some further remarks concerning "time preference" in order to further make clear the reasonableness of this restraint upon the difference principle. We should not prefer a lesser present to a greater future good simply because of the former's nearer temporal position (again, echoes here are clear of Reasons and Persons though the latter work does, of course, post-date Theory). The just savings principle cannot be distorted in application by loose preference for a given generation. This does not prevent us from assuming interest rates are an appropriate means by which just savings can be measured. But there are no grounds for giving the living a simple preference over those as yet unborn. Collective saving for the future is a public good.
However the questions of "democracy" are again here considered by reference to the actual preferences of a given public at a given present. It is often the case that the demands of such a public are taken to be constitutive of the demos. But Rawls articulates the claim of future generations as a restraint on this preference and indicates that a judiciary informed by principles of justice would reflect this. Further, the first sustained mention of civil disobedience in Theory concerns the appropriateness of resistance to a democratic legislature that overlooked its fiduciary care for future generations.
Section 46 turns next to other cases of the priority of justice now that the priorities that arise from a consideration of just savings have been elucidated. At this point Rawls considers the general conservative case that inequalities of wealth and authority that appear to violate the second principle of justice may be justified if they provide sufficiently large economic and social benefits. Keynes' suggestion that it is an argument of this sort that justifies capitalism is mentioned with the point made that this does not justify the condition of the poorest in the circumstances in question as right but only as preferable to the alternatives. The basic point about the inequalities mentioned by Keynes is that they violate the principle of fair equality of opportunity and more conservative positions such as those of Burke and Hegel are referred to here as indicating rationales for violation of this principle. However it has to be pointed out that this conservative case has to meet a very strong condition, namely, that of showing that elimination of inequalities would limit the opportunities of the disadvantaged in a more serious way than they are presently.
The consideration of these conservative positions is not mentioned here by Rawls in order to reply to them in a systematic sense but to indicate that some recognition of inequality of opportunity may well be built into a basic structure if failure to recognise it would have greater costs and in making this point Rawls refers, as he often does, to the social costs that arise from the simple existence of the structure of family arrangements. Further, recognition of the difference principle and the priority rules that follow from it do not require attainment of perfect equality of opportunity.
Section 46 concludes with the important "final" statement of the two principles of justice for institutions which includes the formulations not just of the two principles but of their accompanying priority rules. The first principle is now stated in the following way: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all". This principle has altered little from earlier formulations and still bears important comparison with the supreme principle of right as stated by Kant in the Doctrine of Right. The second principle is stated, by contrast, in a more extensive manner than previous formulations allowed as follows:
"Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." Notably the difference principle is now explicitly constrained by the just savings principles whilst the principle of fair equality of opportunity, by contrast, is left much as it was in previous formulations.
Finally Rawls states the two priority rules. The first priority rule concerns the priority of liberty or the priority of the first principle of justice over the second. Basic liberties can be restricted, according to the first priority rule, only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases which allow this: "(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberties shared by all; (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty". The second priority rule concerns the priority of justice over efficiency and welfare but this also mandates that the principle of fair opportunity has priority over the difference principle. There are two cases in which these priorities are expressed: "(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity; (b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing the hardship".
With the attainment of the final form of the principles of justice and their accompanying priority rules Rawls reaches a key turning point in Theory. It remains to be seen to what extent and in what way the structure of the rest of the work really belongs to the theory of justice and how it helps us to formulate a political reasoning that contributes to the aims of this theory.
Showing posts with label fair equality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fair equality. Show all posts
Wednesday, 26 October 2011
Sunday, 5 June 2011
The Difference Principle and Fair Equality of Opportunity
In the last posting I did on Rawls I set out his account of the two principles of justice and concluded with his revised description of the second principle in section 13 of Chapter 2. Now we can see the second principle combines two elements together, the difference principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity and in this posting I want to look further at the relations between these two elements.
In section 14 Rawls turns more specifically to the second part of the second principle, the part that specifies the principle of fair equality of opportunity which he had earlier distinguished from what he termed the "liberal" conception of careers open to talents. In opening his account of the principle in section 14 Rawls points out that reasons for requiring openness of positions are not primarily on grounds of efficiency as failure to allow such openness constitutes a ground for complaint as it means one is deprived of a main form of human good.
This point partly relates back to the general conception of justice as concerned with the "basic structure" of society and attention to it is now buttressed by introduction of the notion of "pure procedural justice". "Pure procedural justice" to be defined requires, however, contrast with "perfect" and "imperfect" procedural justice. As an example of "perfect" procedural justice Rawls mentions as an example the way a fair cutting of a cake can be brought about by simply ensuring that the last portion goes to the one who cuts it which gives them an incentive to ensure that their portion, as equal to the others, will be a product of an egalitarian cutting. By contrast, a criminal trial is a form of imperfect procedural justice because, while there is an independent criterion for the correct outcome of the trial, there is no feasible procedure that is sure to lead to it (and prevent miscarriages of justice from ever possibly occurring).
Both perfect and imperfect procedural justice can identify an independent criteria for the correct outcome, the difference being that the perfect form can devise a procedure to achieve this identified criteria whilst the imperfect form cannot do so. By contrast, "pure" procedural justice obtains in situations where there is no independent criterion for the right result but there is a fair procedure that enables it to be the case that we can say that the outcome is fair provided the procedure is followed. Gambling illustrates one example of this assuming that there is no cheating involved on any side.
For pure procedural justice to apply to distribution it is required that there is set up and administered a just system of institutions and the connection of this discussion to the principle of fair opportunity is that the latter principle is meant to ensure that we get a system of cooperation that we can term one of pure procedural justice. In order to apply the principle of fair opportunity we abstract from individual cases as it is not the case that it treats distribution as a question of allocative justice. The notion of allocative justice belongs rather with the utilitarian conception.
In thinking through the conception of the principle of fair equality of opportunity Rawls assumes that this principle is lexically secondary to the difference principle. The difference principle is an attempt to establish objective grounds for inter-personal comparisons and it does this by two means. The first way is by identifying the least advantaged representative person and judging the social system from their position. Secondly it allows a simplification in terms of expectations of primary social goods. "The primary social goods, to give them in broad categories, are rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth."
The good for people is the recognition of their right to these primary social goods so that the good becomes "satisfaction of rational desire". The basic question then, becomes, one of weighting primary goods for the least advantaged. This requires some intuitive estimates to enter in relation to what combination of primary social goods it would be rational for the representative person of the least advantaged social group to desire. The real point of insisting on primary goods is also well brought out as being their relationship to public recognition of a measure that reasonable persons can accept. This connection of a measure to public recognition of "reasonable" persons indicates the essential role of reference to publicity in Rawls' conception.
Rawls supposes that each person possesses at least two social positions, that defined by equal citizenship and that described by their place in the distribution of income and wealth. This allows for notions of the representative citizen and the representative persons for different social positions. The basic structure requires to be seen primarily from the standpoint of the representative citizen and this is satisfied for everyone when the two principles of justice are met. However, the reference to representative persons for different social positions is not something that can be dealt with in as satisfactory a manner, not least because the identification of the least advantaged group is not easy to do.
In responding to this point Rawls identifies some contingencies that are favoured when a group is relatively advantaged compared to another one. These include family and class origin, natural endowments, fortune and luck. All are treated as types of contingency and this again brings out the basis of the "luck egalitarian" reading of Rawls. Once these are listed we can see the general characteristics of the least advantaged group though precise specification of this group is not attempted by Rawls further than this. The reference to the representative nature of the person in relation to their group is also meant to rule out special pleading that can happen within groups. By this means it is hoped that "everyone's interests are taken into account".
Section 17 of Chapter 2 brings these points together by indicating the manner in which Rawls' treatment defines an egalitarian conception and how it differs from a meritocratic one (that he again aligns with the "liberal" view). The first point made in this section is that the difference principle is meant to give some weight to a principle of redress even though it is not equivalent to one. A principle of redress is the general claim that undeserved inequalities (contingencies) deserve to be compensated for. Given that the difference principle identifies the means to achieve such compensation in general terms it addresses the point of such a principle, not least in its 'luck egalitarian' elements.
Similarly the difference principle is meant to show the way that a society can be a system of mutual benefit showing that mutual cooperation is the means by which all can have a better life. In making this case Rawls makes even more concessions to the "luck egalitarian" conception indicating that even "character" is something contingent given that it depends on fortunate circumstances.
Rawls also aligns the difference principle with a certain account of fraternity in the sense that not wanting to have advantages if they are not to the benefit of others also is taken to be a natural understanding of the relations within a family (though this may be news to some!). Finally, Rawls distinguishes his notion of egalitarianism from meritocracy on the grounds that the latter interprets the second half of the second principle only in terms of the "liberal" understanding of careers open to talents and not in the "democratic" manner of fair equality of opportunity.
In section 14 Rawls turns more specifically to the second part of the second principle, the part that specifies the principle of fair equality of opportunity which he had earlier distinguished from what he termed the "liberal" conception of careers open to talents. In opening his account of the principle in section 14 Rawls points out that reasons for requiring openness of positions are not primarily on grounds of efficiency as failure to allow such openness constitutes a ground for complaint as it means one is deprived of a main form of human good.
This point partly relates back to the general conception of justice as concerned with the "basic structure" of society and attention to it is now buttressed by introduction of the notion of "pure procedural justice". "Pure procedural justice" to be defined requires, however, contrast with "perfect" and "imperfect" procedural justice. As an example of "perfect" procedural justice Rawls mentions as an example the way a fair cutting of a cake can be brought about by simply ensuring that the last portion goes to the one who cuts it which gives them an incentive to ensure that their portion, as equal to the others, will be a product of an egalitarian cutting. By contrast, a criminal trial is a form of imperfect procedural justice because, while there is an independent criterion for the correct outcome of the trial, there is no feasible procedure that is sure to lead to it (and prevent miscarriages of justice from ever possibly occurring).
Both perfect and imperfect procedural justice can identify an independent criteria for the correct outcome, the difference being that the perfect form can devise a procedure to achieve this identified criteria whilst the imperfect form cannot do so. By contrast, "pure" procedural justice obtains in situations where there is no independent criterion for the right result but there is a fair procedure that enables it to be the case that we can say that the outcome is fair provided the procedure is followed. Gambling illustrates one example of this assuming that there is no cheating involved on any side.
For pure procedural justice to apply to distribution it is required that there is set up and administered a just system of institutions and the connection of this discussion to the principle of fair opportunity is that the latter principle is meant to ensure that we get a system of cooperation that we can term one of pure procedural justice. In order to apply the principle of fair opportunity we abstract from individual cases as it is not the case that it treats distribution as a question of allocative justice. The notion of allocative justice belongs rather with the utilitarian conception.
In thinking through the conception of the principle of fair equality of opportunity Rawls assumes that this principle is lexically secondary to the difference principle. The difference principle is an attempt to establish objective grounds for inter-personal comparisons and it does this by two means. The first way is by identifying the least advantaged representative person and judging the social system from their position. Secondly it allows a simplification in terms of expectations of primary social goods. "The primary social goods, to give them in broad categories, are rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth."
The good for people is the recognition of their right to these primary social goods so that the good becomes "satisfaction of rational desire". The basic question then, becomes, one of weighting primary goods for the least advantaged. This requires some intuitive estimates to enter in relation to what combination of primary social goods it would be rational for the representative person of the least advantaged social group to desire. The real point of insisting on primary goods is also well brought out as being their relationship to public recognition of a measure that reasonable persons can accept. This connection of a measure to public recognition of "reasonable" persons indicates the essential role of reference to publicity in Rawls' conception.
Rawls supposes that each person possesses at least two social positions, that defined by equal citizenship and that described by their place in the distribution of income and wealth. This allows for notions of the representative citizen and the representative persons for different social positions. The basic structure requires to be seen primarily from the standpoint of the representative citizen and this is satisfied for everyone when the two principles of justice are met. However, the reference to representative persons for different social positions is not something that can be dealt with in as satisfactory a manner, not least because the identification of the least advantaged group is not easy to do.
In responding to this point Rawls identifies some contingencies that are favoured when a group is relatively advantaged compared to another one. These include family and class origin, natural endowments, fortune and luck. All are treated as types of contingency and this again brings out the basis of the "luck egalitarian" reading of Rawls. Once these are listed we can see the general characteristics of the least advantaged group though precise specification of this group is not attempted by Rawls further than this. The reference to the representative nature of the person in relation to their group is also meant to rule out special pleading that can happen within groups. By this means it is hoped that "everyone's interests are taken into account".
Section 17 of Chapter 2 brings these points together by indicating the manner in which Rawls' treatment defines an egalitarian conception and how it differs from a meritocratic one (that he again aligns with the "liberal" view). The first point made in this section is that the difference principle is meant to give some weight to a principle of redress even though it is not equivalent to one. A principle of redress is the general claim that undeserved inequalities (contingencies) deserve to be compensated for. Given that the difference principle identifies the means to achieve such compensation in general terms it addresses the point of such a principle, not least in its 'luck egalitarian' elements.
Similarly the difference principle is meant to show the way that a society can be a system of mutual benefit showing that mutual cooperation is the means by which all can have a better life. In making this case Rawls makes even more concessions to the "luck egalitarian" conception indicating that even "character" is something contingent given that it depends on fortunate circumstances.
Rawls also aligns the difference principle with a certain account of fraternity in the sense that not wanting to have advantages if they are not to the benefit of others also is taken to be a natural understanding of the relations within a family (though this may be news to some!). Finally, Rawls distinguishes his notion of egalitarianism from meritocracy on the grounds that the latter interprets the second half of the second principle only in terms of the "liberal" understanding of careers open to talents and not in the "democratic" manner of fair equality of opportunity.
Monday, 21 March 2011
Rawls on Fair Equality and Stability
In his 1968 paper "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda" Rawls moves further towards the outline of A Theory of Justice in some key respects. The two principles of justice are now stated in the same form as they appear in the book with the second principle being given the lion's share of the coverage. Whilst previously the second principle was stated in terms that stressed that inequality was arbitrary unless it worked out to everyone's advantage and this was coupled with a statement concerning openness to offices the new principle is given in a slightly different two-stage way. The new principle states that inequalities have to be arranged so that it can be "reasonably expected" that they will work out to everyone's advantage whilst it remains coupled to a statement of openness to offices. Whilst Rawls himself focuses on the point concerning "everyone's advantage" it is the reference to reasonable expectation that is new and which already points in the direction of a need for an account of what could be meant by the notion of "reasonable".
Some parts of this paper restate points that Rawls has by now made familiar such as the invocation of the "veil of ignorance" and its connection to the "original position" though he also here adds that the parties in this position are not individuals but, rather, "family heads", a specification presumably meant to show their representative function but which has some implications not here discussed (what of those not in families, do they not have distinguishable interests?).
Similarly Rawls again makes clear his commitment to the notion of the "basic structure" of society and the associated generality of the question being asked in his account of distributive justice. The notion of the "representative man" is again focused particularly on the least favoured income class as was the case in the 1968 paper on distributive justice. The notion of "primary goods" makes an appearance in the paper with the notion of self-respect identified as a particularly pertinent example of such a good.
The examination of the second principle is undertaken with regard to certain possible systems, and this is undertaken by rendering the principle of openness to offices by means of Pareto optimality. By contrast the notion of the mutual advantage garnered from inequalities is termed the "difference principle", the term first used by Rawls in the 1968 paper on distributive justice.
Having distinguished and specified the two parts of the second principle of justice Rawls next relates some interpretations of the principle in question that will produce certain types of social system and assesses the outcome that such systems will produce through the notion of "stability". The first such system examined is that of "natural liberty" in which the part that speaks of openness to offices is understood to mean that equality requires careers open to talents and this is combined with Pareto optimality. This produces, Rawls assumes, roughly a free market system although it does not automatically require that the means of production are privately owned. Pareto optimality is not itself tied to any particular distribution though in the system of natural liberty it is assumed to be best satisfied by a competitive market economy. The "difference principle" is here understood to require only formal equality of opportunity and this ensures that the initial distribution of assets is "strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies". This fact alone is held to count against the system of natural liberty.
By contrast to the system of natural liberty we can invoke the notion of "liberal equality" in which the principle of openness to offices is changed and rendered as equal opportunity "under similar conditions". When we render the notion of openness to offices in this way we arrive, states Rawls, at the principle of fair equality of opportunity. We are not dealing with equal opportunity in a merely formal sense but adding to the view of it that there should be a fair chance to attain opportunities.
So liberal equality seeks to reduce the effect of the natural and social contingencies that were taken to have the decisive weight under a system of merely "natural" liberty. This requires that there are in-built constraints in the social system that seek to prevent excessive concentration of wealth and to maintain equal educational opportunities.
However, whilst Rawls prefers liberal equality to the system of natural liberty he still objects to it on the grounds that the resulting distribution of wealth and income is based primarily on the natural distribution of abilities and talents. This elevates liberal equality into a meritocratic system in opposition to the dependence of the system of natural liberty on historical accidents. However, as Rawls points out, the extent to which natural capacities develop is itself affected by all kinds of social conditions, conditions he generally summarizes as those of the "natural lottery".
This is why the first part of the second principle, the part generally termed the "difference principle" is assumed instead to require that higher expectations of those better situated are treated as just "if and only if" they work as part of a scheme which improves the lot of the least advantaged members of society. This suggestion that all differences in wealth and income should work for the good of the least favoured is what leads to the term "difference principle". It is also taken to work with Pareto optimality in defining a situation that can be seen to be the most efficient one. Rawls terms this condition "democratic equality" by distinction to "liberal equality".
The difference principle is subsequently justified by reference to a number of principles that it is argued to harmonize with. To begin with it is taken to harmonize with the principle of redress or the view that undeserved inequalities require compensation. So the difference principle compensates for the unequal distribution of natural talents and in doing so "the callous aspects of a meritocratic regime are avoided", showing again the importance of the distinction between liberal and democratic equality.
Rawls also suggests that the difference principle connects to the principle of fraternity where this latter is understood to mean "not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is for the benefit of others who are less well off". If understood in this way the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity are all given a place with the first recognised in the first principle of justice, the second specified in terms of fair equality of opportunity and the third in the difference principle. Rawls also suggests a link between the difference principle and the Kantian principle of the kingdom of ends. The difference principle rules out even the view that others should be treated as means to one another's welfare as it will not permit the sacrifice of some to others that naturally emerges as an interpretation of the utilitarian view.
Rawls also takes the difference principle to relate to the principle of reciprocity or mutual benefit and this point then gives the final point to this article which is to show the system of democratic equality is the most stable of those assessed. By stability, Rawls means a system that tends to generate its own support by promoting a sense of justice that corresponds to the social order. The means by which such stability is promoted is by means of public affirmation of the two principles of justice and the way in which they make manifest a form of respect that citizens have for one another as moral persons.
The discussion of stability and its connection to publicity is given far too briefly here and yet the interconnection of the notions seems one of the strongest argumentative suggestions that the essay gives for the superiority of democratic equality over the other systems mentioned. The failure of Rawls to follow this argument further and make it the centre of the article is intriguing and suggests some questions in terms of thinking more about the justification of the difference principle.
Some parts of this paper restate points that Rawls has by now made familiar such as the invocation of the "veil of ignorance" and its connection to the "original position" though he also here adds that the parties in this position are not individuals but, rather, "family heads", a specification presumably meant to show their representative function but which has some implications not here discussed (what of those not in families, do they not have distinguishable interests?).
Similarly Rawls again makes clear his commitment to the notion of the "basic structure" of society and the associated generality of the question being asked in his account of distributive justice. The notion of the "representative man" is again focused particularly on the least favoured income class as was the case in the 1968 paper on distributive justice. The notion of "primary goods" makes an appearance in the paper with the notion of self-respect identified as a particularly pertinent example of such a good.
The examination of the second principle is undertaken with regard to certain possible systems, and this is undertaken by rendering the principle of openness to offices by means of Pareto optimality. By contrast the notion of the mutual advantage garnered from inequalities is termed the "difference principle", the term first used by Rawls in the 1968 paper on distributive justice.
Having distinguished and specified the two parts of the second principle of justice Rawls next relates some interpretations of the principle in question that will produce certain types of social system and assesses the outcome that such systems will produce through the notion of "stability". The first such system examined is that of "natural liberty" in which the part that speaks of openness to offices is understood to mean that equality requires careers open to talents and this is combined with Pareto optimality. This produces, Rawls assumes, roughly a free market system although it does not automatically require that the means of production are privately owned. Pareto optimality is not itself tied to any particular distribution though in the system of natural liberty it is assumed to be best satisfied by a competitive market economy. The "difference principle" is here understood to require only formal equality of opportunity and this ensures that the initial distribution of assets is "strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies". This fact alone is held to count against the system of natural liberty.
By contrast to the system of natural liberty we can invoke the notion of "liberal equality" in which the principle of openness to offices is changed and rendered as equal opportunity "under similar conditions". When we render the notion of openness to offices in this way we arrive, states Rawls, at the principle of fair equality of opportunity. We are not dealing with equal opportunity in a merely formal sense but adding to the view of it that there should be a fair chance to attain opportunities.
So liberal equality seeks to reduce the effect of the natural and social contingencies that were taken to have the decisive weight under a system of merely "natural" liberty. This requires that there are in-built constraints in the social system that seek to prevent excessive concentration of wealth and to maintain equal educational opportunities.
However, whilst Rawls prefers liberal equality to the system of natural liberty he still objects to it on the grounds that the resulting distribution of wealth and income is based primarily on the natural distribution of abilities and talents. This elevates liberal equality into a meritocratic system in opposition to the dependence of the system of natural liberty on historical accidents. However, as Rawls points out, the extent to which natural capacities develop is itself affected by all kinds of social conditions, conditions he generally summarizes as those of the "natural lottery".
This is why the first part of the second principle, the part generally termed the "difference principle" is assumed instead to require that higher expectations of those better situated are treated as just "if and only if" they work as part of a scheme which improves the lot of the least advantaged members of society. This suggestion that all differences in wealth and income should work for the good of the least favoured is what leads to the term "difference principle". It is also taken to work with Pareto optimality in defining a situation that can be seen to be the most efficient one. Rawls terms this condition "democratic equality" by distinction to "liberal equality".
The difference principle is subsequently justified by reference to a number of principles that it is argued to harmonize with. To begin with it is taken to harmonize with the principle of redress or the view that undeserved inequalities require compensation. So the difference principle compensates for the unequal distribution of natural talents and in doing so "the callous aspects of a meritocratic regime are avoided", showing again the importance of the distinction between liberal and democratic equality.
Rawls also suggests that the difference principle connects to the principle of fraternity where this latter is understood to mean "not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is for the benefit of others who are less well off". If understood in this way the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity are all given a place with the first recognised in the first principle of justice, the second specified in terms of fair equality of opportunity and the third in the difference principle. Rawls also suggests a link between the difference principle and the Kantian principle of the kingdom of ends. The difference principle rules out even the view that others should be treated as means to one another's welfare as it will not permit the sacrifice of some to others that naturally emerges as an interpretation of the utilitarian view.
Rawls also takes the difference principle to relate to the principle of reciprocity or mutual benefit and this point then gives the final point to this article which is to show the system of democratic equality is the most stable of those assessed. By stability, Rawls means a system that tends to generate its own support by promoting a sense of justice that corresponds to the social order. The means by which such stability is promoted is by means of public affirmation of the two principles of justice and the way in which they make manifest a form of respect that citizens have for one another as moral persons.
The discussion of stability and its connection to publicity is given far too briefly here and yet the interconnection of the notions seems one of the strongest argumentative suggestions that the essay gives for the superiority of democratic equality over the other systems mentioned. The failure of Rawls to follow this argument further and make it the centre of the article is intriguing and suggests some questions in terms of thinking more about the justification of the difference principle.
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