Tuesday, 29 March 2011
The AHRC and the "Big Society" (II)
There remains a bit more to add on this question even after yesterday's posting. Firstly, I forgot to add the point that Professor Bob Brecher has resigned his membership of the AHRC's Peer Review College in protest against the way the theme of the "Big Society" has become an integral part of one of its priority research areas. Secondly, there is now a petition that can be signed in protest against the AHRC's decision to include reference to the "Big Society" in a key priority research area. Thirdly, there are also two postings on this topic that bear looking at: a) Iain Pears dissects this decision on the AHRC's part in relation to the so-called "Haldane Principle"; b) James Sumner uncovers the history of this story carefully bringing out that everyone should have started making a fuss about this a little earlier.
Monday, 28 March 2011
The AHRC and the "Big Society"
I was somewhat surprised to find that the Observer reported yesterday on the news that the Arts and Humanities Research Council has been designating research into the "big society" a priority area. I was surprised because I didn't think this was new news, not least because it was discussed (albeit briefly) on this blog some days ago. However, I was even more surprised to read that the AHRC has replied to the Observer story by posting, on the main news list for philosophers in the UK, Philos-L, an apparent "denial" of the story.
The denial was issued by no less a person than Professor Rick Rylance, the Chief Executive of the AHRC though it is interesting to note precisely what Professor Rylance chose to deny from the Observer story. What Professor Rylance focuses on is the idea that the AHRC either was pressured to accept the "big society" idea as a priority research area or that it developed it in response to Tory election slogans from last year. Instead, the idea arose from within the AHRC itself and was something that, whilst relevant to the agenda of the current government, was not apparently commissioned by it. It is, though, true, as you can see by checking the AHRC's own site, that the focus on the "big society" and the using of the language of the "big society" is something explicit in the council's own description of one of its key priority research areas. That focus on such a notion can be defended by Professor Rylance is somewhat bizarre. Further it is explicitly stated in documentation of the area that there is a link not just with the language of government policy but with the explicit idea of it:
The denial was issued by no less a person than Professor Rick Rylance, the Chief Executive of the AHRC though it is interesting to note precisely what Professor Rylance chose to deny from the Observer story. What Professor Rylance focuses on is the idea that the AHRC either was pressured to accept the "big society" idea as a priority research area or that it developed it in response to Tory election slogans from last year. Instead, the idea arose from within the AHRC itself and was something that, whilst relevant to the agenda of the current government, was not apparently commissioned by it. It is, though, true, as you can see by checking the AHRC's own site, that the focus on the "big society" and the using of the language of the "big society" is something explicit in the council's own description of one of its key priority research areas. That focus on such a notion can be defended by Professor Rylance is somewhat bizarre. Further it is explicitly stated in documentation of the area that there is a link not just with the language of government policy but with the explicit idea of it:
Radical new policies on the „Big Society‟ & localism at the heart of the new Coalition Government‟s strategy in England represent a major „social experiment‟ and research opportunity, have created urgent new needs for research to inform policy and require a step change in research engagement with local communities and groups, the third sector and local government.
So the substance of Professor Rylance's argument with the Observer story appears to boil down to the point that the AHRC thought of focusing on this idea of the "big society" before the government did but is happy to assert a link to it quite explicitly now it is government policy. And who is supposed to be satisfied with this as a response?
That no one is satisfied is apparent from the discussion of this same story that was run in the Times Higher where this time the defence is that the idea of the way this research priority area has been defined is due to needing to speak to government in a language it "understands". Such language has also defined here the specific nature and sense of the enquiry in question as is clear from the citation above. That the AHRC itself chose to make itself such a tool of government rather than requiring "pressure" from them makes the situation worse rather than better.
That no one is satisfied is apparent from the discussion of this same story that was run in the Times Higher where this time the defence is that the idea of the way this research priority area has been defined is due to needing to speak to government in a language it "understands". Such language has also defined here the specific nature and sense of the enquiry in question as is clear from the citation above. That the AHRC itself chose to make itself such a tool of government rather than requiring "pressure" from them makes the situation worse rather than better.
Thursday, 24 March 2011
Dennis Schulting in *Kant Studies Online*
Kant Studies Online has published a review article by Dennis Schulting of Scott Stapleford's book Kant's Transcendental Arguments and it can be accessed and freely downloaded here.
Justice As Reciprocity (I)
In 1971, the same year as the publication of A Theory of Justice, and presumably written as Theory was being completed, Rawls published a paper entitled "Justice As Reciprocity". One of the points of the paper is to distinguish between "justice" and "fairness" in order that the point of having a conception of justice as fairness can be more easily understood. A second point is to contrast Rawls' view of justice with the utilitarian conception with which he has multiplied problems ever since the writing of "Outline of A Decision Procedure for Ethics" in 1951.
The title of the paper is meant to bring out the core element that is shared between the conceptions of "justice" and "fairness", the notion of "reciprocity". As was suggested in earlier work the notion of "justice" itself is primarily conceived of as involving the elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment of an equilibrium between competing claims. However for the sense of this conception to be really made manifest it is required that two specific principles be set out. These principles are the familiar ones of equal rights to the most extensive liberty compatible with like liberty for all and the combination of the difference principle with the principle of equality of opportunity (or openness of offices to talents). The principle of equal liberty is itself then determined as requiring the conception that similar cases be treated similarly, a point that shows this principle is meant to be understood as generalizable. This understanding of the sense of equality implied in the first principle is combined with a notion of impartial administration and with the definition and initial specification of the practices to which it applies.
The second principle, which combines together two separable points about equality, concerns "benefits and burdens" that arise from occupancy of offices and Rawls here stresses in quite an emphatic manner that such inequalities as relate to offices have to work to the advantage of every person. Both principles have to be looked at from a general point of view, such as is supposed by the notion of the "representative man".
When Rawls goes on to invoke the basis of these principles by mentioning his "conjectural account" of their derivation he does so, as is again explicitly stated, to show that they are based on the "constraints of morality" in relation to the circumstances of justice. The veil of ignorance is invoked though not named as such and under its guise the need for generalizable principles becomes clear. Not only is this so but Rawls characteristically assumes a relationship between impartiality and morality when stating that acknowledgement of principles as applying as much to one's own case as that of others is "an essential aspect of having a morality".
The constraints on the difference principle are clearly referred to since it is recognized as plausible that inequalities can meet its condition so that: "the immediate gain which equality would allow can be considered as intelligently invested in view of its future return". This rather striking use of language is used to suggest a general incentive exists to have inequalities recognized in light of their tendency to promote the general conditions that are most favourable.
Rawls goes on to indicate that the view of justice implied in the "construction" he has given has similarities with game theory though he distinguishes it from game theory as he denies that the "construction" supposes a general theory of motivation. Nor does the "construction" suppose individual strategies though Rawls admits that a "special and general manner" of gaming is still supposed in a formal way in the "construction" he has given.
The title of the paper is meant to bring out the core element that is shared between the conceptions of "justice" and "fairness", the notion of "reciprocity". As was suggested in earlier work the notion of "justice" itself is primarily conceived of as involving the elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the establishment of an equilibrium between competing claims. However for the sense of this conception to be really made manifest it is required that two specific principles be set out. These principles are the familiar ones of equal rights to the most extensive liberty compatible with like liberty for all and the combination of the difference principle with the principle of equality of opportunity (or openness of offices to talents). The principle of equal liberty is itself then determined as requiring the conception that similar cases be treated similarly, a point that shows this principle is meant to be understood as generalizable. This understanding of the sense of equality implied in the first principle is combined with a notion of impartial administration and with the definition and initial specification of the practices to which it applies.
The second principle, which combines together two separable points about equality, concerns "benefits and burdens" that arise from occupancy of offices and Rawls here stresses in quite an emphatic manner that such inequalities as relate to offices have to work to the advantage of every person. Both principles have to be looked at from a general point of view, such as is supposed by the notion of the "representative man".
When Rawls goes on to invoke the basis of these principles by mentioning his "conjectural account" of their derivation he does so, as is again explicitly stated, to show that they are based on the "constraints of morality" in relation to the circumstances of justice. The veil of ignorance is invoked though not named as such and under its guise the need for generalizable principles becomes clear. Not only is this so but Rawls characteristically assumes a relationship between impartiality and morality when stating that acknowledgement of principles as applying as much to one's own case as that of others is "an essential aspect of having a morality".
The constraints on the difference principle are clearly referred to since it is recognized as plausible that inequalities can meet its condition so that: "the immediate gain which equality would allow can be considered as intelligently invested in view of its future return". This rather striking use of language is used to suggest a general incentive exists to have inequalities recognized in light of their tendency to promote the general conditions that are most favourable.
Rawls goes on to indicate that the view of justice implied in the "construction" he has given has similarities with game theory though he distinguishes it from game theory as he denies that the "construction" supposes a general theory of motivation. Nor does the "construction" suppose individual strategies though Rawls admits that a "special and general manner" of gaming is still supposed in a formal way in the "construction" he has given.
Wednesday, 23 March 2011
Rawls and the Justification of Civil Disobedience
In his 1969 paper "The Justification of Civil Disobedience" Rawls describes a fairly narrow conception of what civil disobedience is and how it can be justified. It is, however, an account that connects integrally to the general view of justice developed up to this point. Firstly, the theory only applies to "legally established democratic authority" and secondly it is developed from the social contract positions elaborated in the earlier papers.
The general social contract doctrine is here reaffirmed in terms of a notion of duty as it is taken to be a duty to support and uphold just and efficient institutions. This implies a broader ethical theory at the back of Rawls' view though he is, as always, careful not to draw this out too much. After restating the case for the original position and the veil of ignorance Rawls cuts to the key question of the grounds of obligation for compliance with "unjust" laws. The earlier duty mentioned is restated as the "principle of fairness", the principle that specifies that, given our willingness to accept the benefits of just institutions, so also should we bear the cost of compliance with them.
How does this principle of fairness relate to an obligation to obey unjust laws? Restating the original position a second time Rawls brings out from it the need for the principles of liberty and equality. Subsequently he turns to processes which allow for procedural decisions about "justice" but admits: "we cannot frame a procedure which guarantees that only just and effective legislation is enacted" (180). Democratic constitutions build in a form of majority rule and it is possible the majority is mistaken in its commitment to some course of action or legislation. It is not an unconditional commitment that anyone makes to follow the demands of the constitution so there could be grounds for disobeying the laws framed even given the principle of fairness.
Rawls characterizes civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent and conscientious act contrary to law "usually done with the intent to bring about a change in the policies or laws of the government". Oddly, despite being mentioned first in this description, the public element is least emphasized in Rawls' account though it is crucial in the sense that an act that was not performed with the sense of creating a general impact would hardly count. It must also, though, be an act carried out in the light of day, that is, it must be one that others are directly aware of. The conscientious character is manifested in terms of describing an act motivated by moral principles that define a view of the public good. Now, crucial to this conception of the public good is the sense that it is a view that is not merely idiosyncratic but rather appeals to a sense of justice in the majority of the community. The general point expressed by the act of civil disobedience is that something has gone deeply wrong in the application of the shared principles of justice. This is why the one acting in the way specified declares to the community generally that the ties of community have been severely damaged, a point requiring the committing of the act in question.
The publicity of the act is also manifested in the sense that the one carrying it out expects and invites the constituted authorities to execute the penalties prescribed. So the civilly disobedient act is public in these different senses: i) it is a direct address to others that others are expected to notice; ii) it appeals to principles of justice manifestly held by the community at large and emphasizes this; iii) it invites and expects punishment from the attested authorities as a means of fulfilling both the first two conditions. The last point is described by Rawls as a "bond given to make good one's sincerity" and is required in terms of the stability of systems of justice. Conscientious non-compliance has to meet the force of punishment as without such meeting the general system of justice would not fulfil conditions of stability.
The civilly disobedient act, as characterized by Rawls, is a primarily political act even though ethical and religious doctrines have often been cited in the support of such actions. They are primarily political acts as they rest principally upon appeals to the common principles of justice.
The justification given for civil disobedience on this conception is four-fold. The first element is that there is not a "normal" means to address the wrong complained of. Political parties and constituted authorities are not interested in the question which is why there is an appeal to something that is not "normal" involved. This requirement could be said to be that the injustice complained of is one that the majority and the institutions they support show indifference to. We might term this a complacency requirement. The second condition is that civil disobedience should arise only with regard to fundamentals such as relate to the substantial principles of justice as specified in the principle of equal liberty and equal opportunity. Notably, the second principle of justice is only here invoked in terms of equality of opportunity and not in relation to the difference principle. The reason given is that violations of the difference principle are a much more controversial matter and they are also taken to be less fundamental. So the second requirement appears to circumscribe civil disobedience in such a way that it is not legitimately understood to be something that can be undertaken when we have "only" social grievances.
The third element is a generality requirement: if we invoke the right to civil disobedience in a situation we are concerned with then we have to grant the right to others in similar situations. This generality requirement is again tied to questions of stability as Rawls takes it to be the case that granting civil disobedience to have this general condition shows the security of the basic principles of justice for all. The final element is distinct from these three as it concerns not the conditions under which the appeal to civil disobedience can be granted as having sense but rather the conditions under which it can be assumed to be efficacious. That is, granted you have a case in relation to the criteria listed to commit acts of a civilly disobedient nature, should you do so? This question is partly tactical, in the sense of whether acting in this way will best help to attain your ends. But it is also partly the case that the act, even if justified in relation to the standards given, may be one that produces counter-productive results and that possibility also has to weigh on one's judgment. So the final criteria concerns conditions of judgment.
Rawls closes the article by considering some objections to the view given. The first is that it relies too much on the existence of a sense of justice in others. Certainly, as was indicated in the fourth criteria, if such a sense of justice has generally decayed then it is hardly rational to engage in it even if it is justified. It is, though, also true that in a constitutional democracy some form of attachment to the principles of justice is a given for its stability and so appeal to this always has some place in the system. Separately, it could be thought that the doctrine of civil disobedience grants too much ground to subjective conceptions of rightness and fairness as anyone here has the right to judge what laws breach the bonds of social cooperation. However, Rawls' reply to this is a good one since he points out that it is factually true that it is, ultimately, left to each one of us to consider such a matter. No theory of a constitutional democracy can fail to recognise this.
Related articles
The general social contract doctrine is here reaffirmed in terms of a notion of duty as it is taken to be a duty to support and uphold just and efficient institutions. This implies a broader ethical theory at the back of Rawls' view though he is, as always, careful not to draw this out too much. After restating the case for the original position and the veil of ignorance Rawls cuts to the key question of the grounds of obligation for compliance with "unjust" laws. The earlier duty mentioned is restated as the "principle of fairness", the principle that specifies that, given our willingness to accept the benefits of just institutions, so also should we bear the cost of compliance with them.
How does this principle of fairness relate to an obligation to obey unjust laws? Restating the original position a second time Rawls brings out from it the need for the principles of liberty and equality. Subsequently he turns to processes which allow for procedural decisions about "justice" but admits: "we cannot frame a procedure which guarantees that only just and effective legislation is enacted" (180). Democratic constitutions build in a form of majority rule and it is possible the majority is mistaken in its commitment to some course of action or legislation. It is not an unconditional commitment that anyone makes to follow the demands of the constitution so there could be grounds for disobeying the laws framed even given the principle of fairness.
Rawls characterizes civil disobedience as a public, nonviolent and conscientious act contrary to law "usually done with the intent to bring about a change in the policies or laws of the government". Oddly, despite being mentioned first in this description, the public element is least emphasized in Rawls' account though it is crucial in the sense that an act that was not performed with the sense of creating a general impact would hardly count. It must also, though, be an act carried out in the light of day, that is, it must be one that others are directly aware of. The conscientious character is manifested in terms of describing an act motivated by moral principles that define a view of the public good. Now, crucial to this conception of the public good is the sense that it is a view that is not merely idiosyncratic but rather appeals to a sense of justice in the majority of the community. The general point expressed by the act of civil disobedience is that something has gone deeply wrong in the application of the shared principles of justice. This is why the one acting in the way specified declares to the community generally that the ties of community have been severely damaged, a point requiring the committing of the act in question.
The publicity of the act is also manifested in the sense that the one carrying it out expects and invites the constituted authorities to execute the penalties prescribed. So the civilly disobedient act is public in these different senses: i) it is a direct address to others that others are expected to notice; ii) it appeals to principles of justice manifestly held by the community at large and emphasizes this; iii) it invites and expects punishment from the attested authorities as a means of fulfilling both the first two conditions. The last point is described by Rawls as a "bond given to make good one's sincerity" and is required in terms of the stability of systems of justice. Conscientious non-compliance has to meet the force of punishment as without such meeting the general system of justice would not fulfil conditions of stability.
The civilly disobedient act, as characterized by Rawls, is a primarily political act even though ethical and religious doctrines have often been cited in the support of such actions. They are primarily political acts as they rest principally upon appeals to the common principles of justice.
The justification given for civil disobedience on this conception is four-fold. The first element is that there is not a "normal" means to address the wrong complained of. Political parties and constituted authorities are not interested in the question which is why there is an appeal to something that is not "normal" involved. This requirement could be said to be that the injustice complained of is one that the majority and the institutions they support show indifference to. We might term this a complacency requirement. The second condition is that civil disobedience should arise only with regard to fundamentals such as relate to the substantial principles of justice as specified in the principle of equal liberty and equal opportunity. Notably, the second principle of justice is only here invoked in terms of equality of opportunity and not in relation to the difference principle. The reason given is that violations of the difference principle are a much more controversial matter and they are also taken to be less fundamental. So the second requirement appears to circumscribe civil disobedience in such a way that it is not legitimately understood to be something that can be undertaken when we have "only" social grievances.
The third element is a generality requirement: if we invoke the right to civil disobedience in a situation we are concerned with then we have to grant the right to others in similar situations. This generality requirement is again tied to questions of stability as Rawls takes it to be the case that granting civil disobedience to have this general condition shows the security of the basic principles of justice for all. The final element is distinct from these three as it concerns not the conditions under which the appeal to civil disobedience can be granted as having sense but rather the conditions under which it can be assumed to be efficacious. That is, granted you have a case in relation to the criteria listed to commit acts of a civilly disobedient nature, should you do so? This question is partly tactical, in the sense of whether acting in this way will best help to attain your ends. But it is also partly the case that the act, even if justified in relation to the standards given, may be one that produces counter-productive results and that possibility also has to weigh on one's judgment. So the final criteria concerns conditions of judgment.
Rawls closes the article by considering some objections to the view given. The first is that it relies too much on the existence of a sense of justice in others. Certainly, as was indicated in the fourth criteria, if such a sense of justice has generally decayed then it is hardly rational to engage in it even if it is justified. It is, though, also true that in a constitutional democracy some form of attachment to the principles of justice is a given for its stability and so appeal to this always has some place in the system. Separately, it could be thought that the doctrine of civil disobedience grants too much ground to subjective conceptions of rightness and fairness as anyone here has the right to judge what laws breach the bonds of social cooperation. However, Rawls' reply to this is a good one since he points out that it is factually true that it is, ultimately, left to each one of us to consider such a matter. No theory of a constitutional democracy can fail to recognise this.
Related articles
Monday, 21 March 2011
Rawls on Fair Equality and Stability
In his 1968 paper "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda" Rawls moves further towards the outline of A Theory of Justice in some key respects. The two principles of justice are now stated in the same form as they appear in the book with the second principle being given the lion's share of the coverage. Whilst previously the second principle was stated in terms that stressed that inequality was arbitrary unless it worked out to everyone's advantage and this was coupled with a statement concerning openness to offices the new principle is given in a slightly different two-stage way. The new principle states that inequalities have to be arranged so that it can be "reasonably expected" that they will work out to everyone's advantage whilst it remains coupled to a statement of openness to offices. Whilst Rawls himself focuses on the point concerning "everyone's advantage" it is the reference to reasonable expectation that is new and which already points in the direction of a need for an account of what could be meant by the notion of "reasonable".
Some parts of this paper restate points that Rawls has by now made familiar such as the invocation of the "veil of ignorance" and its connection to the "original position" though he also here adds that the parties in this position are not individuals but, rather, "family heads", a specification presumably meant to show their representative function but which has some implications not here discussed (what of those not in families, do they not have distinguishable interests?).
Similarly Rawls again makes clear his commitment to the notion of the "basic structure" of society and the associated generality of the question being asked in his account of distributive justice. The notion of the "representative man" is again focused particularly on the least favoured income class as was the case in the 1968 paper on distributive justice. The notion of "primary goods" makes an appearance in the paper with the notion of self-respect identified as a particularly pertinent example of such a good.
The examination of the second principle is undertaken with regard to certain possible systems, and this is undertaken by rendering the principle of openness to offices by means of Pareto optimality. By contrast the notion of the mutual advantage garnered from inequalities is termed the "difference principle", the term first used by Rawls in the 1968 paper on distributive justice.
Having distinguished and specified the two parts of the second principle of justice Rawls next relates some interpretations of the principle in question that will produce certain types of social system and assesses the outcome that such systems will produce through the notion of "stability". The first such system examined is that of "natural liberty" in which the part that speaks of openness to offices is understood to mean that equality requires careers open to talents and this is combined with Pareto optimality. This produces, Rawls assumes, roughly a free market system although it does not automatically require that the means of production are privately owned. Pareto optimality is not itself tied to any particular distribution though in the system of natural liberty it is assumed to be best satisfied by a competitive market economy. The "difference principle" is here understood to require only formal equality of opportunity and this ensures that the initial distribution of assets is "strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies". This fact alone is held to count against the system of natural liberty.
By contrast to the system of natural liberty we can invoke the notion of "liberal equality" in which the principle of openness to offices is changed and rendered as equal opportunity "under similar conditions". When we render the notion of openness to offices in this way we arrive, states Rawls, at the principle of fair equality of opportunity. We are not dealing with equal opportunity in a merely formal sense but adding to the view of it that there should be a fair chance to attain opportunities.
So liberal equality seeks to reduce the effect of the natural and social contingencies that were taken to have the decisive weight under a system of merely "natural" liberty. This requires that there are in-built constraints in the social system that seek to prevent excessive concentration of wealth and to maintain equal educational opportunities.
However, whilst Rawls prefers liberal equality to the system of natural liberty he still objects to it on the grounds that the resulting distribution of wealth and income is based primarily on the natural distribution of abilities and talents. This elevates liberal equality into a meritocratic system in opposition to the dependence of the system of natural liberty on historical accidents. However, as Rawls points out, the extent to which natural capacities develop is itself affected by all kinds of social conditions, conditions he generally summarizes as those of the "natural lottery".
This is why the first part of the second principle, the part generally termed the "difference principle" is assumed instead to require that higher expectations of those better situated are treated as just "if and only if" they work as part of a scheme which improves the lot of the least advantaged members of society. This suggestion that all differences in wealth and income should work for the good of the least favoured is what leads to the term "difference principle". It is also taken to work with Pareto optimality in defining a situation that can be seen to be the most efficient one. Rawls terms this condition "democratic equality" by distinction to "liberal equality".
The difference principle is subsequently justified by reference to a number of principles that it is argued to harmonize with. To begin with it is taken to harmonize with the principle of redress or the view that undeserved inequalities require compensation. So the difference principle compensates for the unequal distribution of natural talents and in doing so "the callous aspects of a meritocratic regime are avoided", showing again the importance of the distinction between liberal and democratic equality.
Rawls also suggests that the difference principle connects to the principle of fraternity where this latter is understood to mean "not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is for the benefit of others who are less well off". If understood in this way the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity are all given a place with the first recognised in the first principle of justice, the second specified in terms of fair equality of opportunity and the third in the difference principle. Rawls also suggests a link between the difference principle and the Kantian principle of the kingdom of ends. The difference principle rules out even the view that others should be treated as means to one another's welfare as it will not permit the sacrifice of some to others that naturally emerges as an interpretation of the utilitarian view.
Rawls also takes the difference principle to relate to the principle of reciprocity or mutual benefit and this point then gives the final point to this article which is to show the system of democratic equality is the most stable of those assessed. By stability, Rawls means a system that tends to generate its own support by promoting a sense of justice that corresponds to the social order. The means by which such stability is promoted is by means of public affirmation of the two principles of justice and the way in which they make manifest a form of respect that citizens have for one another as moral persons.
The discussion of stability and its connection to publicity is given far too briefly here and yet the interconnection of the notions seems one of the strongest argumentative suggestions that the essay gives for the superiority of democratic equality over the other systems mentioned. The failure of Rawls to follow this argument further and make it the centre of the article is intriguing and suggests some questions in terms of thinking more about the justification of the difference principle.
Some parts of this paper restate points that Rawls has by now made familiar such as the invocation of the "veil of ignorance" and its connection to the "original position" though he also here adds that the parties in this position are not individuals but, rather, "family heads", a specification presumably meant to show their representative function but which has some implications not here discussed (what of those not in families, do they not have distinguishable interests?).
Similarly Rawls again makes clear his commitment to the notion of the "basic structure" of society and the associated generality of the question being asked in his account of distributive justice. The notion of the "representative man" is again focused particularly on the least favoured income class as was the case in the 1968 paper on distributive justice. The notion of "primary goods" makes an appearance in the paper with the notion of self-respect identified as a particularly pertinent example of such a good.
The examination of the second principle is undertaken with regard to certain possible systems, and this is undertaken by rendering the principle of openness to offices by means of Pareto optimality. By contrast the notion of the mutual advantage garnered from inequalities is termed the "difference principle", the term first used by Rawls in the 1968 paper on distributive justice.
Having distinguished and specified the two parts of the second principle of justice Rawls next relates some interpretations of the principle in question that will produce certain types of social system and assesses the outcome that such systems will produce through the notion of "stability". The first such system examined is that of "natural liberty" in which the part that speaks of openness to offices is understood to mean that equality requires careers open to talents and this is combined with Pareto optimality. This produces, Rawls assumes, roughly a free market system although it does not automatically require that the means of production are privately owned. Pareto optimality is not itself tied to any particular distribution though in the system of natural liberty it is assumed to be best satisfied by a competitive market economy. The "difference principle" is here understood to require only formal equality of opportunity and this ensures that the initial distribution of assets is "strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies". This fact alone is held to count against the system of natural liberty.
By contrast to the system of natural liberty we can invoke the notion of "liberal equality" in which the principle of openness to offices is changed and rendered as equal opportunity "under similar conditions". When we render the notion of openness to offices in this way we arrive, states Rawls, at the principle of fair equality of opportunity. We are not dealing with equal opportunity in a merely formal sense but adding to the view of it that there should be a fair chance to attain opportunities.
So liberal equality seeks to reduce the effect of the natural and social contingencies that were taken to have the decisive weight under a system of merely "natural" liberty. This requires that there are in-built constraints in the social system that seek to prevent excessive concentration of wealth and to maintain equal educational opportunities.
However, whilst Rawls prefers liberal equality to the system of natural liberty he still objects to it on the grounds that the resulting distribution of wealth and income is based primarily on the natural distribution of abilities and talents. This elevates liberal equality into a meritocratic system in opposition to the dependence of the system of natural liberty on historical accidents. However, as Rawls points out, the extent to which natural capacities develop is itself affected by all kinds of social conditions, conditions he generally summarizes as those of the "natural lottery".
This is why the first part of the second principle, the part generally termed the "difference principle" is assumed instead to require that higher expectations of those better situated are treated as just "if and only if" they work as part of a scheme which improves the lot of the least advantaged members of society. This suggestion that all differences in wealth and income should work for the good of the least favoured is what leads to the term "difference principle". It is also taken to work with Pareto optimality in defining a situation that can be seen to be the most efficient one. Rawls terms this condition "democratic equality" by distinction to "liberal equality".
The difference principle is subsequently justified by reference to a number of principles that it is argued to harmonize with. To begin with it is taken to harmonize with the principle of redress or the view that undeserved inequalities require compensation. So the difference principle compensates for the unequal distribution of natural talents and in doing so "the callous aspects of a meritocratic regime are avoided", showing again the importance of the distinction between liberal and democratic equality.
Rawls also suggests that the difference principle connects to the principle of fraternity where this latter is understood to mean "not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is for the benefit of others who are less well off". If understood in this way the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity are all given a place with the first recognised in the first principle of justice, the second specified in terms of fair equality of opportunity and the third in the difference principle. Rawls also suggests a link between the difference principle and the Kantian principle of the kingdom of ends. The difference principle rules out even the view that others should be treated as means to one another's welfare as it will not permit the sacrifice of some to others that naturally emerges as an interpretation of the utilitarian view.
Rawls also takes the difference principle to relate to the principle of reciprocity or mutual benefit and this point then gives the final point to this article which is to show the system of democratic equality is the most stable of those assessed. By stability, Rawls means a system that tends to generate its own support by promoting a sense of justice that corresponds to the social order. The means by which such stability is promoted is by means of public affirmation of the two principles of justice and the way in which they make manifest a form of respect that citizens have for one another as moral persons.
The discussion of stability and its connection to publicity is given far too briefly here and yet the interconnection of the notions seems one of the strongest argumentative suggestions that the essay gives for the superiority of democratic equality over the other systems mentioned. The failure of Rawls to follow this argument further and make it the centre of the article is intriguing and suggests some questions in terms of thinking more about the justification of the difference principle.
Sunday, 20 March 2011
Rawls and Distributive Justice (II)
The 1967 paper on distributive justice that I began to discuss in the previous posting continues by asking how the institutions of a constitutional democracy can be arranged so that the two principles of justice are approximately satisfied. To do this would require, as Rawls explicitly states, arranging a regulation of the economy. Some of these arrangements are pretty familiar such as provision for equal educational opportunities for all though this is left undecided between subsidy of private education and operating a public school system. The general regulation of the economy is one that requires viewing the government as divided between four branches.
These branches of government don't overlap with the usual divisions that are applied to government. The branch that keeps the economy competitive is termed the "allocation" branch which, amongst other things, sets suitable taxes. By contrast, the stabilization branch strives to maintain full employment and these two branches are meant to fit together to preserve the "efficiency" of the economy which relates to the Pareto element of Rawls' discussion.
However, this is certainly only a preliminary part of the discussion, not least because, on Rawls' view, the market alone cannot be trusted to relate to "need". This is why the next branch mentioned is the distributive one. That concerns total income, not merely wages, but also what he terms "transfers" between different elements of the population. This includes inheritance and gift taxes and the general aim concerns equality of opportunity. The distribution branch is effectively discussed in two different ways as it is meant to include the costs of public goods as well as general equality of opportunity.
Subsequently Rawls refers to even more specific notions of a general policy kind including the notion of "just savings" that is meant to relate to inter-generational justice but is perhaps unfit to respond to some of the serious questions that have since been raised about this question in subsequent philosophy.
The overall result of Rawls' analysis is to arrive at the view of a well-ordered society. However the peculiarity of the discussion is that it appears in some general sense to become here quite specific in terms of some of the policy matters recommended whilst being insufficient to meet the requirements of policy thinkers. So the essay's second part is less obvious as a piece of political philosophy than the first part but the detail of some of the questions clearly requires further working through as well as up-dating in relation to subsequent philosophical work (particularly in inter-generational terms).
These branches of government don't overlap with the usual divisions that are applied to government. The branch that keeps the economy competitive is termed the "allocation" branch which, amongst other things, sets suitable taxes. By contrast, the stabilization branch strives to maintain full employment and these two branches are meant to fit together to preserve the "efficiency" of the economy which relates to the Pareto element of Rawls' discussion.
However, this is certainly only a preliminary part of the discussion, not least because, on Rawls' view, the market alone cannot be trusted to relate to "need". This is why the next branch mentioned is the distributive one. That concerns total income, not merely wages, but also what he terms "transfers" between different elements of the population. This includes inheritance and gift taxes and the general aim concerns equality of opportunity. The distribution branch is effectively discussed in two different ways as it is meant to include the costs of public goods as well as general equality of opportunity.
Subsequently Rawls refers to even more specific notions of a general policy kind including the notion of "just savings" that is meant to relate to inter-generational justice but is perhaps unfit to respond to some of the serious questions that have since been raised about this question in subsequent philosophy.
The overall result of Rawls' analysis is to arrive at the view of a well-ordered society. However the peculiarity of the discussion is that it appears in some general sense to become here quite specific in terms of some of the policy matters recommended whilst being insufficient to meet the requirements of policy thinkers. So the essay's second part is less obvious as a piece of political philosophy than the first part but the detail of some of the questions clearly requires further working through as well as up-dating in relation to subsequent philosophical work (particularly in inter-generational terms).
Saturday, 19 March 2011
Rawls and Distributive Justice (I)
In the series of postings I have been doing on Rawls I've been gradually working through the chapters of his Collected Papers but intend to disrupt this when we get to the point that A Theory of Justice is published. But I've now reached his 1967 paper on "Distributive Justice" which seems to me to be worth more than one posting and is, in any case followed by another paper of "addenda" to the original.
In this 1967 paper Rawls introduces the notion of the "veil of ignorance" for the first time, some 4 years after he first described the "original position". The first interesting thing about this paper is the way the first sentence describes human society as "a more or less self-sufficient association" thereby implicitly aligning political life in general with the notion of association. It's also worthy of note that Rawls points out instantly that society, is characterized as much by conflict as identity of interests and that it is this that requires some kind of equilibrium point to be aimed at.
After making these opening points Rawls quickly dispatches utilitarianism as a possible standard for social arrangements, not least because a loss of freedom for some is not made right by a general sum of advantages for others. This prompts him to specifically present his own doctrine, by contrast to the utilitarian one, as contractarian. It is after this that Rawls discusses original agreement and mentions the "veil of ignorance" for the first time. However, despite invoking this notion, Rawls makes as yet little use of it, mentioning for example that he will not here attempt to show that his two principles of justice would be chosen in the original position (thus the "veil of ignorance" lacks, as yet, methodological significance).
The two principles of justice that Rawls subsequently introduces are, however, themselves more detailed than previously though the principle of liberty continues to have a clear connection to Kant's supreme principle of right. The second principle is more detailed and reads as follows:
This second principle clearly comes in two parts with the second part being one of openness to talents. The notion that inequalities are only to be tolerated if they are to the advantage of the "representative man" opens some significant questions.
Rawls is clearly aware of this and mentions at this point Hume's influential critique of social contract theory which was to the effect that criteria of the kind invoked in the second principle turn out not to be meaningful since, it is quite conceivable, that even slaves are "better off" in some sense than they would be in a state of nature. Rawls also mentions the emptiness of assessing social outcomes on the grounds of efficiency alone as appears occurs on Pareto optimality criteria. So justice has to be clearly distinguished from efficiency.
In responding to these points Rawls makes a key modification of the second principle in favour not of the "representative man" in some general sense but rather in relation to the "least advantaged" and in so doing he describes, for the first time, the first part of the second principle as the "difference principle". It is the "most unfortunate representative man" to whom we have to justify inequalities now. By this means Rawls aims to meet the standards of efficiency in the sense of attaining a sense of Pareto optimality and marrying it to the standard of justice.
In this 1967 paper Rawls introduces the notion of the "veil of ignorance" for the first time, some 4 years after he first described the "original position". The first interesting thing about this paper is the way the first sentence describes human society as "a more or less self-sufficient association" thereby implicitly aligning political life in general with the notion of association. It's also worthy of note that Rawls points out instantly that society, is characterized as much by conflict as identity of interests and that it is this that requires some kind of equilibrium point to be aimed at.
After making these opening points Rawls quickly dispatches utilitarianism as a possible standard for social arrangements, not least because a loss of freedom for some is not made right by a general sum of advantages for others. This prompts him to specifically present his own doctrine, by contrast to the utilitarian one, as contractarian. It is after this that Rawls discusses original agreement and mentions the "veil of ignorance" for the first time. However, despite invoking this notion, Rawls makes as yet little use of it, mentioning for example that he will not here attempt to show that his two principles of justice would be chosen in the original position (thus the "veil of ignorance" lacks, as yet, methodological significance).
The two principles of justice that Rawls subsequently introduces are, however, themselves more detailed than previously though the principle of liberty continues to have a clear connection to Kant's supreme principle of right. The second principle is more detailed and reads as follows:
inequalities as defined by the institutional structure or fostered by it are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out to everyone's advantage and provided that the positions and offices to which they attach or from which they may be gained are open to all
This second principle clearly comes in two parts with the second part being one of openness to talents. The notion that inequalities are only to be tolerated if they are to the advantage of the "representative man" opens some significant questions.
Rawls is clearly aware of this and mentions at this point Hume's influential critique of social contract theory which was to the effect that criteria of the kind invoked in the second principle turn out not to be meaningful since, it is quite conceivable, that even slaves are "better off" in some sense than they would be in a state of nature. Rawls also mentions the emptiness of assessing social outcomes on the grounds of efficiency alone as appears occurs on Pareto optimality criteria. So justice has to be clearly distinguished from efficiency.
In responding to these points Rawls makes a key modification of the second principle in favour not of the "representative man" in some general sense but rather in relation to the "least advantaged" and in so doing he describes, for the first time, the first part of the second principle as the "difference principle". It is the "most unfortunate representative man" to whom we have to justify inequalities now. By this means Rawls aims to meet the standards of efficiency in the sense of attaining a sense of Pareto optimality and marrying it to the standard of justice.
Friday, 18 March 2011
Libya and R2P
The surprising result of debates at the UN has been the passing of a resolution that permits all "necessary action" to protect people who are being attacked by the Gaddaffi regime in Libya. This has followed a period of inaction which appeared likely to result in a victory for the regime over the uprising. Such a result would have ensured that a state that has become viewed as a clear "pariah" would not only have survived but done so on the backs of the slaughter of the population of Benghazi and others.
The policy of liberal intervention was discredited after the debacle in Iraq and may have been part of the reason why President Obama took sometime coming behind the view that was pushed by France and the UK. However, there are other parallels that need to be borne in mind and which show the correctness of the resolution reached. Firstly, the fact of the second Gulf War itself is based largely on the failure of the resolution of the first one. When President Bush senior failed to support the Kurdish and Marsh Arab uprisings in 1991 he not only ensured the continuance of Saddam Hussein's regime but did so on the basis of Hussein murdering his opponents. Similarly, irresolution in Bosnia in the 1990s created the basis for the Serbian slaughter of civilians in Srebnica, something prevented in Kosovo later as the lesson was learned of the need to intervene in the Balkans. Sierra Leone and Rwanda also point to reasons for thinking there remains a case for liberal intervention.
The defeat of Gaddaffi is something that should be taken to be a goal worth achieving. The UN has recognised in recent years the doctrine of a "responsibility to protect" (R2P) and this is the core of the resolution that was passed. Anyone who thinks war is a "good" thing is clearly crazy but in this situation the prima facie case is clearly for intervention as the failure to intervene would most assuredly have been tragic.
The policy of liberal intervention was discredited after the debacle in Iraq and may have been part of the reason why President Obama took sometime coming behind the view that was pushed by France and the UK. However, there are other parallels that need to be borne in mind and which show the correctness of the resolution reached. Firstly, the fact of the second Gulf War itself is based largely on the failure of the resolution of the first one. When President Bush senior failed to support the Kurdish and Marsh Arab uprisings in 1991 he not only ensured the continuance of Saddam Hussein's regime but did so on the basis of Hussein murdering his opponents. Similarly, irresolution in Bosnia in the 1990s created the basis for the Serbian slaughter of civilians in Srebnica, something prevented in Kosovo later as the lesson was learned of the need to intervene in the Balkans. Sierra Leone and Rwanda also point to reasons for thinking there remains a case for liberal intervention.
The defeat of Gaddaffi is something that should be taken to be a goal worth achieving. The UN has recognised in recent years the doctrine of a "responsibility to protect" (R2P) and this is the core of the resolution that was passed. Anyone who thinks war is a "good" thing is clearly crazy but in this situation the prima facie case is clearly for intervention as the failure to intervene would most assuredly have been tragic.
Thursday, 17 March 2011
Thomas Teufel in *Kant Studies Online*
The latest article published in Kant Studies Online has now appeared and is by Thomas Teufel of Baruch College, CUNY. The piece is entitled:
"Kant's Sensationist Conception of Particularity in the Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgment"
and it is available here.
"Kant's Sensationist Conception of Particularity in the Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgment"
and it is available here.
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