Friday, 22 April 2011
Kant's Birthday: General Celebrations!
Oddly enough, Kant's birthday falls this year on the same day as the Christian celebration of Good Friday, the day on which, supposedly, Christ was crucified. Since this conjunction is suggestive, it's a good day to recommend reading Kant's major work on religion, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, which, along with Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, helped to pave the way for modernist interpretations of Scripture and the undermining of literalist approaches. In commemoration clearly of Kant's birthday, celebrations have been carried on today around the world!
Tuesday, 19 April 2011
Rawls and "Classical Utilitarianism" (I)
Cover of Methods of EthicsRawls opens this section by mentioning that there are many forms of utilitarianism and that he has no intention of surveying them here as it is rather his point to make the contrast between utilitarianism and contractarianism his major focus. However, there is a specific model that is the basis of the treatment Rawls gives here of utilitarianism and this is the work of Henry Sidgwick. (Interestingly, Sidgwick also features in the Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy where it is again the Methods of Ethics that is taken as central despite Sidgwick having written specifically on political philosophy in other works.)
Bearing in mind the Sidgwick reference is of some interest in understanding the picture that Rawls goes on to provide of "classical utilitarianism" since the device used in presenting this picture is very much that of viewing it as a "principle of rational prudence applied to an aggregative conception of the welfare of the group". This way of seeing "classical utilitarianism" is of a piece with Sidgwick's suggestion that the three methods of ethics are intuitionistic common sense, utilitarianism and egoism. It is a contention of Sidgwick's that egoism is a central ethical doctrine and, indeed, one that stands in a tension with universalistic notions of ethics (such as is given in the principle of utility) that is difficult to satisfactorily resolve. So seriously did Sidgwick take egoism that he did indeed wish to show that utilitarianism is a doctrine that can accommodate it and still retain its universalistic formulation.
So, in thinking of the principle of utility in terms of rational prudence Rawls follows Sidgwick pretty closely though it is not, perhaps, obvious that other utilitarians (such as Mill) would have been so sympathetic to the appeal to egoism. After presenting "classical utilitarianism" in this way Rawls goes on to discuss the contrast between the right and the good that I gave attention to in a posting some time ago. Here Rawls argues that the structure of ethical theories can be seen in two distinct ways depending on how one views the relationship between the "right" and the "good". What Rawls terms the "simplest" way is adopted by theories he views as "teleological". In such theories the good is defined independently from the right which ensures that the good is given a specific content and after this has been done the right is subsequently defined simply as that "which maximizes the good".
Note that the way Rawls has defined this "teleological" approach is not merely through two steps but that the second step gives its definition of the "right" purely through a maximizing procedure. In giving this account of "teleological" theories Rawls is open that he is repeating the view of them given by Frankena, a view that is not entirely convergent with that of C.D. Broad and diverges considerably from the schema of ethical theories given by Sidgwick. In understanding "teleological" approaches to ethics in the way he does Rawls effectively conflates them with consequentialism, a conflation I have questioned elsewhere.
For the sake of this posting I won't reopen the difficulty of sustaining this conflation of teleology with consequentialism but simply assume that Rawls' procedure here is alright. The point he makes concerning this kind of "teleological" approach is that it embodies a particular kind of conception of rationality. In this conception, however, are built again some specifically Sidgwickian notions such as the conception that the "good" indicates something picked out intuitively by "common sense morality" and that the step towards universalisation occurs by means of the aggregative approach of maximisation. Different "teleological" theories adopt different standards in relation to the intuitive view of the good on which they rely which is the basis of Rawls' very sketchy and brief discussions of perfectionism.
Now the important move in Rawls' response to "classical utilitarianism" is the claim that it does not matter on this view how the sum of satisfactions "is distributed among individuals" any more than it matters for it how any particular individual distributes their satisfactions over time. This again, is a specific view of Sidgwick although naturally there are many echoes of this claim amongst later utilitarians (such as Parfit). The point of making this aspect of the utilitarian approach so prominent is to suggest that it naturally works by adopting for society as a whole the "principle of rational choice for one man". Given that Rawls earlier defined the "original position" in terms of a choice problem and that he also indicated the importance of rational choice in doing so it is not the emphasis on rational choice that he can be about to object to. And nor does he do so. It is rather the attenuation of its claim in terms of its being understood through the prism of single individuals extended to the social whole so that there is no special basis either for social principles that are distinct from those that might apply to individuals on the one hand or any specific attention to distinct claims of individuals on the other. As Rawls powerfully puts it: "separate individuals are thought of as so many different lines along which rights and duties are to be assigned and scare means of satisfaction allocated in accordance with rules so as to give the greatest fulfilment of wants".
All decisions thus become understood in terms of efficiency of outcome with the result that no theory of justice is plausible in these terms. But the root of the point is that utilitarianism, thus conceived, "does not take seriously the distinction between persons". As will be discussed in subsequent postings, there are some interesting replies from utilitarians to this attack. Further, there is a lot more to be said about the pervasive nature of Rawls' engagement with utilitarianism but for the purposes of this posting the key point is that the entire construction of Rawls' attack is based very largely on viewing the utilitarian doctrine through the prism of Sidgwick's attempted synthesis between the principle of utility and the egoist principle. A utilitarian who rejected this conception of Sidgwick's might well feel that the characterisation of their doctrine was far from being accurate and since Rawls disclaims here any attempt to deal with the intricacies of utilitarianism in favour of presenting a kind of ideal type of it the key point is whether this "ideal type" is one that best represents the aims of the theory. This question will be part of what will have to be assessed in looking further at Rawls' conception of utilitarianism and utilitarian conceptions of Rawls.
Monday, 18 April 2011
Rawls' Hermeneutics
In a review article written for the European Journal of Political Theory Michael L. Frazer assesses Rawls' Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. The centre of Frazer's review of Rawls' lectures concerns a tension that he discerns within Rawls' hermeneutics, a tension that has serious philosophical roots. The hermeneutics itself is guided, for Frazer, by two principles. On the one hand, Rawls is an advocate of interpretive charity, the view that one should, in interpreting a philosophical text, attribute the strongest view possible to the author one is reading, especially rejecting the notion that the author's text is inconsistent unless it is absolutely impossible to find any other alternative. Whilst Rawls' commitment to interpretive charity appears unusually strong from Frazer's account, it is far from an unusual view to uphold.
The second commitment is to interpretive humility, the view that the authors one is reading and interpreting are, in an important sense, wiser than oneself. When this principle is added to the first then one has specific reasons to work to try to find out the "genius" of the text one is interpreting in order to work out the basis of its significant contribution to the discipline one is engaged with.
Now if these are the principles of Rawls' hermeneutics in a general sense, Frazer contrasts them with a philosophical commitment that, in a sense, undercuts the hermeneutic principles (at least that of interpretive humility). This philosophical commitment is Rawls' modest conception of the role and import of political philosophy, political-philosophical humility, a humility that deflates the place of political philosophy viewing it as, at most, a part of the background conditions for public reason to be effective. However, to this general view of the role of political philosophy is also attached the specific way Rawls understands this modesty with regard to the place of political philosophy. The modesty is defined in terms of viewing political philosophy in the terms that emerged after the "Kantian constructivist" period when Rawls stressed the notion that political philosophy is "political, not metaphysical". This claim requires political philosophy to abstain from commitments with regard to profound existential questions of political life.
Now Frazer's general point is that if you hold, as Rawls did, to such a clear form of political-philosophical humility then you will often have trouble, when interpreting texts, in viewing them through the lenses of interpretive humility when you realise that these authors do not share your view of political-philosophical humility. This tension can be resolved in one of two possible ways. On the one hand, you can interpret the authors according to a notion of interpretive charity and include in your notion of interpretive charity the view that any reasonable author will implicitly or explicitly include in their approach a form of political-philosophical humility even if not one quite as specific as the view that political philosophy should be "political, not metaphysical". This resolution of the tension between interpretive humility and political-philosophical humility by means of interpretive charity has odd results however, implying as it does anachronistic views of the task of political philosophy. The other form of resolution would be to accept that the authors in question do not fit your model of political-philosophical humility but in that case you can no longer be committed to the notion of interpretive humility with regard to these authors given your conviction of the superiority of the approach of political-philosophical humility.
Frazer's review in raising these questions about Rawls' response to the history of philosophy has the important effect of posing a problem for those, like Rawls, who are committed to the view that the interpretation of the history of philosophy has to be, in the first instance, philosophical rather than historical. If one is committed to this view then the standards that one regards as philosophically apt will tend to have the possible effect of distortion of the texts in question. To view the interpretation of philosophical texts, by contrast, as including a commitment to finding the historical basis of the texts' positions as a matter of first priority need not imply that one is not also engaged in a philosophical task though it may lead one to understand the task of philosophy as something that cannot be assumed to fit a method most suitable or convenient to oneself.
The second commitment is to interpretive humility, the view that the authors one is reading and interpreting are, in an important sense, wiser than oneself. When this principle is added to the first then one has specific reasons to work to try to find out the "genius" of the text one is interpreting in order to work out the basis of its significant contribution to the discipline one is engaged with.
Now if these are the principles of Rawls' hermeneutics in a general sense, Frazer contrasts them with a philosophical commitment that, in a sense, undercuts the hermeneutic principles (at least that of interpretive humility). This philosophical commitment is Rawls' modest conception of the role and import of political philosophy, political-philosophical humility, a humility that deflates the place of political philosophy viewing it as, at most, a part of the background conditions for public reason to be effective. However, to this general view of the role of political philosophy is also attached the specific way Rawls understands this modesty with regard to the place of political philosophy. The modesty is defined in terms of viewing political philosophy in the terms that emerged after the "Kantian constructivist" period when Rawls stressed the notion that political philosophy is "political, not metaphysical". This claim requires political philosophy to abstain from commitments with regard to profound existential questions of political life.
Now Frazer's general point is that if you hold, as Rawls did, to such a clear form of political-philosophical humility then you will often have trouble, when interpreting texts, in viewing them through the lenses of interpretive humility when you realise that these authors do not share your view of political-philosophical humility. This tension can be resolved in one of two possible ways. On the one hand, you can interpret the authors according to a notion of interpretive charity and include in your notion of interpretive charity the view that any reasonable author will implicitly or explicitly include in their approach a form of political-philosophical humility even if not one quite as specific as the view that political philosophy should be "political, not metaphysical". This resolution of the tension between interpretive humility and political-philosophical humility by means of interpretive charity has odd results however, implying as it does anachronistic views of the task of political philosophy. The other form of resolution would be to accept that the authors in question do not fit your model of political-philosophical humility but in that case you can no longer be committed to the notion of interpretive humility with regard to these authors given your conviction of the superiority of the approach of political-philosophical humility.
Frazer's review in raising these questions about Rawls' response to the history of philosophy has the important effect of posing a problem for those, like Rawls, who are committed to the view that the interpretation of the history of philosophy has to be, in the first instance, philosophical rather than historical. If one is committed to this view then the standards that one regards as philosophically apt will tend to have the possible effect of distortion of the texts in question. To view the interpretation of philosophical texts, by contrast, as including a commitment to finding the historical basis of the texts' positions as a matter of first priority need not imply that one is not also engaged in a philosophical task though it may lead one to understand the task of philosophy as something that cannot be assumed to fit a method most suitable or convenient to oneself.
Sunday, 17 April 2011
Justice and Methodology
The first four sections of the first chapter of A Theory of Justice are stated by Rawls in the "Preface" to the book to be the place where "the fundamental intuitive ideas" of the theory are presented and it is these sections I wish to concentrate on in this posting. As Rawls also writes in the introductory paragraph of this first chapter, the discussion is here "informal" and only intended to "prepare the way" for what is to come.
The first section of the first chapter discusses the "role" of justice and opens with the striking remark comparing justice and truth as forms of virtue (forms presumably of "intellectual" virtue on Aristotle's conception). Truth is the "first virtue" of systems of thought according to Rawls and, by analogy, justice the "first virtue" of social institutions. This comparison is set up in terms of the claim about the priority of these "virtues" above all others since, as Rawls puts it, a theory even if elegant and economical has to be revised if untrue (here an implied account not merely of science but of philosophy appears to be given).
Similar to truth in this respect is justice in the sense that questions of efficiency and cohesion have to take second place to justice. This claim is supported by an assertion that, however, appears to arise from a larger, implicitly Kantian moral theory when Rawls writes: "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override". This point is clearly a kind of pre-emptive strike against utilitarianism, a theory considered in more detail in the fifth section of the first chapter. However, the nature of the strike is that it involves an assumption about the status of particular persons that implies something like Kant's formula of humanity being invoked for its justification, something that certainly is not given at this early a stage of A Theory of Justice. In support of the claim, however, Rawls does advance the consideration that the "inviolability" mentioned in this sentence is one that relates to the possession of freedom since it would be the loss of this that could not be compensated for by a greater good of others. This point is then emphasized further as it is suggested that in a just society "the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled". This point already seems to indicate one of the key principles of justice although Rawls has not, as yet, even advanced the key methodological principles that it is the main burden of these opening sections of chapter 1 to give. The point about the liberties of equal citizenship is introduced as an illustration of the claim concerning justice as the "first virtue" of social institutions as is clear when Rawls states that justice is "uncompromising" given its standing as such a first virtue but giving such an illustration in advance of the description of liberty as one of the principles of justice is certainly curious.
Having begun this first section of the first chapter in such a strong fashion Rawls next begins to draw back since the propositions just given are now indicated as expressing "our intuitive conviction" of the primacy of justice and confessed to express this conviction "too strongly" but what Rawls aims to do, he states, is to interpret and assess such claims by means of working out his theory of justice. In order to do this he next turns to the methodological consideration of principles of justice and their relationship to a unique "choice". The principles of justice are described as designed to deal with the conflict between the "cooperation" required for society to work on the one hand with the conflicts of interest that are evident also within societies. The latter leads to argument given that each prefers a distribution that would be personally most advantageous. The principles of social justice are thus the means by which rights and duties in "the basic institutions of society" can be assigned.
Having begun with a description of the point of principles of social justice Rawls next describes the nature of a "well ordered" society as consisting in having the design that it does due to the general wish to advance the good of its members according to a "public conception of justice". This first appeal to publicity is then specified given that the principles of justice are ones that "everyone accepts and knows that the others accept" so that the basic social institutions are held both to satisfy and to be known to satisfy these principles. Such a public sense of justice enables security to apply to social association, a point that ties together the notions of publicity and stability.
After introducing this notion of a "well ordered" society Rawls again moves back from it to an account of "existing" societies as being "seldom" well ordered since, within them, it is a matter of course that principles of justice are in dispute. In such societies thus there is not a generally agreed and accepted public conception of justice and, due to this, existing societies are unstable. In the disputes that split such societies there are present divergent conceptions of justice but Rawls immediately raises the critical question of what is held in common between the disputants suggesting that uncovering this enables the "concept of justice" to be distinguished from the "conceptions" of it. On doing so Rawls points to the general agreement that there should be no "arbitrary" distinctions made between persons when assigning rights and duties as well as the point that there should be a "proper balance" between competing claims to social advantages. If these points are generally agreed, however, between disputing conceptions of justice, it is the case that this agreement depends precisely on the point that the notions of arbitrariness and proper balance themselves require to be interpreted.
A final point is raised in this introductory section which concerns other prerequisites for viable societies which are "coordination, efficiency and stability" (although, as we have noted, the last named has already played a role in the account of publicity in "well ordered" societies). "Coordination" is involved in ensuring that activities of distinct parties are compatible with each other and efficiency is the way of ensuring that such compatibility is brought about in the best manner. Stability indicates the need for regularity in enforcement of rules and these factors are all connected to justice.
The second section of the first chapter concerns the "subject" rather than the "role" of justice. If the latter has enabled the point of fundamental principles to become clear, the former requires the site of justice to be specified. Rawls does this by distinguishing the point of his theory as to give an account of "social" justice which means an account of how major institutions distribute rights, duties and the division of advantages. Interestingly, included amongst these "major" institutions are not just political constitutions and the principal economic arrangements but also the social arrangements, down to such matters as the "monogamous family". The general name Rawls gives to this conglomerate of major institutions is the "basic structure" and he takes it to be the "primary subject" of justice.
The rationale given at this stage for the focus on the "basic structure" is only an intuitive one to the effect that the institutions of society favour certain starting places in life and thus give rise to deep inequalities though it is instantly noticeable that just as the justification of the claim about justice being the "first virtue" of social institutions led to an anticipation of one of the principles of justice so the account of the "basic structure" leads to an anticipation of the other principle of justice. The focus on the "basic structure" ensures that Rawls leaves aside considerations of justice in voluntary associations and it leads to the major methodological abstraction of considering a particular society in isolation from others, as thus a "closed system".
The second abstraction involved leads back to the earlier invocation of a "well-ordered" society since it is the principles that would regulate such a society that Rawls is principally concerned with. This ensures that A Theory of Justice is, in its fundamental principles, a form of strict compliance theory or ideal theory. Partial compliance theory or non-ideal theory is dealt with in the discussions of punishment, war, civil disobedience, resistance and revolution but these topics are not the centre of the theory that follows.
The conception of social justice as built upon the notion of the "basic structure" is "in the first instance a standard whereby the distributive aspects" of society are to be assessed. It is not a complete conception as questions of efficiency, for example, are not included within the orbit of the theory given despite the importance they have in social life.
The third section of the first chapter looks at the "main idea" of the theory of justice and this is that it is intended as a conception which generalizes and makes more abstract the notion of the social contract. The manner in which this is done is by means of the notion of justice as fairness. Justice as fairness involves the notion of all arriving at the principles of justice by means of a hypothetical situation of equal liberty. This original position of equality is meant to be analogous to the state of nature in the older theory of the social contract. However there is an interesting difference which is not the one Rawls stresses of the older theory appearing to refer to an actual occasion (since it is arguable that this was never intended). It is rather that the state of nature generally indicates constraints that are pictured in terms of coordination of action between persons leading to the need for sovereigns to emerge to resolve the problem. By contrast, Rawls' account is meant instead to arrive at constraints on reasoning that will show the need for two specific principles and the rejection of rival contenders. Whilst the older conceptions do aim at justifying conceptions, it could be argued that they do this indirectly by means of discussion of constraints on action whereas Rawls' procedure, by contrast could be said to discuss constraints on action indirectly by focusing instead on constraints on reasoning. (Though the example of Kant here would be much more complicated than this contrast might suggest.)
Included in the hypothetical situation Rawls envisages is the "veil of ignorance" concerning one's place within society and that it is not possible even to have a view of one's conception of justice in this situation. So the principles of justice are presented as the product of a "fair agreement" and this is what is meant by describing the "main idea" of Rawlsian contractarianism as "justice as fairness".
Features of the situation envisaged include a view of the persons in it as rational and mutually disinterested with the latter meaning that persons are not taken to have any particular interest in the affairs of others. The rationality of the participants is also interpreted in a narrow sense that conforms with rational choice theory. However this ensures that no one has a reason to opt for any principles that will produce enduring loss for themselves and, given that they do not know where they are in the society, will thus have an incentive to adopt principles of the greatest generality.
Rawls' two principles are next mentioned for the first time though the account of this third section is not one that justifies them. The principles are the ones familiar from Rawls' earlier work of equality in assignment of basic rights and duties and that inequalities in social and economic senses are justified only if they are met with compensating benefits for all.
The fourth section of the first chapter concerns the original position and justification. Rawls here explicitly connects the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice and discusses the "choice problem". In describing this problem he agues from widely accepted but weak premises to specific conclusions. This includes the point that no one should be given advantage (or its reverse) by natural fortune and that principles should not be tailored to one's own case and this is taken to justify the need for the veil of ignorance. Rawls indicates again the point that this provides "constraints on arguments". A further such constraint is the assumption of equality between the parties in the original position, a moral assumption. Finally Rawls arrives at the notion of "reflective equilibrium" which involves a kind of zig-zag movement between the initial situation and considered convictions of justice, sometimes modifying one, sometimes the other.
The first section of the first chapter discusses the "role" of justice and opens with the striking remark comparing justice and truth as forms of virtue (forms presumably of "intellectual" virtue on Aristotle's conception). Truth is the "first virtue" of systems of thought according to Rawls and, by analogy, justice the "first virtue" of social institutions. This comparison is set up in terms of the claim about the priority of these "virtues" above all others since, as Rawls puts it, a theory even if elegant and economical has to be revised if untrue (here an implied account not merely of science but of philosophy appears to be given).
Similar to truth in this respect is justice in the sense that questions of efficiency and cohesion have to take second place to justice. This claim is supported by an assertion that, however, appears to arise from a larger, implicitly Kantian moral theory when Rawls writes: "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override". This point is clearly a kind of pre-emptive strike against utilitarianism, a theory considered in more detail in the fifth section of the first chapter. However, the nature of the strike is that it involves an assumption about the status of particular persons that implies something like Kant's formula of humanity being invoked for its justification, something that certainly is not given at this early a stage of A Theory of Justice. In support of the claim, however, Rawls does advance the consideration that the "inviolability" mentioned in this sentence is one that relates to the possession of freedom since it would be the loss of this that could not be compensated for by a greater good of others. This point is then emphasized further as it is suggested that in a just society "the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled". This point already seems to indicate one of the key principles of justice although Rawls has not, as yet, even advanced the key methodological principles that it is the main burden of these opening sections of chapter 1 to give. The point about the liberties of equal citizenship is introduced as an illustration of the claim concerning justice as the "first virtue" of social institutions as is clear when Rawls states that justice is "uncompromising" given its standing as such a first virtue but giving such an illustration in advance of the description of liberty as one of the principles of justice is certainly curious.
Having begun this first section of the first chapter in such a strong fashion Rawls next begins to draw back since the propositions just given are now indicated as expressing "our intuitive conviction" of the primacy of justice and confessed to express this conviction "too strongly" but what Rawls aims to do, he states, is to interpret and assess such claims by means of working out his theory of justice. In order to do this he next turns to the methodological consideration of principles of justice and their relationship to a unique "choice". The principles of justice are described as designed to deal with the conflict between the "cooperation" required for society to work on the one hand with the conflicts of interest that are evident also within societies. The latter leads to argument given that each prefers a distribution that would be personally most advantageous. The principles of social justice are thus the means by which rights and duties in "the basic institutions of society" can be assigned.
Having begun with a description of the point of principles of social justice Rawls next describes the nature of a "well ordered" society as consisting in having the design that it does due to the general wish to advance the good of its members according to a "public conception of justice". This first appeal to publicity is then specified given that the principles of justice are ones that "everyone accepts and knows that the others accept" so that the basic social institutions are held both to satisfy and to be known to satisfy these principles. Such a public sense of justice enables security to apply to social association, a point that ties together the notions of publicity and stability.
After introducing this notion of a "well ordered" society Rawls again moves back from it to an account of "existing" societies as being "seldom" well ordered since, within them, it is a matter of course that principles of justice are in dispute. In such societies thus there is not a generally agreed and accepted public conception of justice and, due to this, existing societies are unstable. In the disputes that split such societies there are present divergent conceptions of justice but Rawls immediately raises the critical question of what is held in common between the disputants suggesting that uncovering this enables the "concept of justice" to be distinguished from the "conceptions" of it. On doing so Rawls points to the general agreement that there should be no "arbitrary" distinctions made between persons when assigning rights and duties as well as the point that there should be a "proper balance" between competing claims to social advantages. If these points are generally agreed, however, between disputing conceptions of justice, it is the case that this agreement depends precisely on the point that the notions of arbitrariness and proper balance themselves require to be interpreted.
A final point is raised in this introductory section which concerns other prerequisites for viable societies which are "coordination, efficiency and stability" (although, as we have noted, the last named has already played a role in the account of publicity in "well ordered" societies). "Coordination" is involved in ensuring that activities of distinct parties are compatible with each other and efficiency is the way of ensuring that such compatibility is brought about in the best manner. Stability indicates the need for regularity in enforcement of rules and these factors are all connected to justice.
The second section of the first chapter concerns the "subject" rather than the "role" of justice. If the latter has enabled the point of fundamental principles to become clear, the former requires the site of justice to be specified. Rawls does this by distinguishing the point of his theory as to give an account of "social" justice which means an account of how major institutions distribute rights, duties and the division of advantages. Interestingly, included amongst these "major" institutions are not just political constitutions and the principal economic arrangements but also the social arrangements, down to such matters as the "monogamous family". The general name Rawls gives to this conglomerate of major institutions is the "basic structure" and he takes it to be the "primary subject" of justice.
The rationale given at this stage for the focus on the "basic structure" is only an intuitive one to the effect that the institutions of society favour certain starting places in life and thus give rise to deep inequalities though it is instantly noticeable that just as the justification of the claim about justice being the "first virtue" of social institutions led to an anticipation of one of the principles of justice so the account of the "basic structure" leads to an anticipation of the other principle of justice. The focus on the "basic structure" ensures that Rawls leaves aside considerations of justice in voluntary associations and it leads to the major methodological abstraction of considering a particular society in isolation from others, as thus a "closed system".
The second abstraction involved leads back to the earlier invocation of a "well-ordered" society since it is the principles that would regulate such a society that Rawls is principally concerned with. This ensures that A Theory of Justice is, in its fundamental principles, a form of strict compliance theory or ideal theory. Partial compliance theory or non-ideal theory is dealt with in the discussions of punishment, war, civil disobedience, resistance and revolution but these topics are not the centre of the theory that follows.
The conception of social justice as built upon the notion of the "basic structure" is "in the first instance a standard whereby the distributive aspects" of society are to be assessed. It is not a complete conception as questions of efficiency, for example, are not included within the orbit of the theory given despite the importance they have in social life.
The third section of the first chapter looks at the "main idea" of the theory of justice and this is that it is intended as a conception which generalizes and makes more abstract the notion of the social contract. The manner in which this is done is by means of the notion of justice as fairness. Justice as fairness involves the notion of all arriving at the principles of justice by means of a hypothetical situation of equal liberty. This original position of equality is meant to be analogous to the state of nature in the older theory of the social contract. However there is an interesting difference which is not the one Rawls stresses of the older theory appearing to refer to an actual occasion (since it is arguable that this was never intended). It is rather that the state of nature generally indicates constraints that are pictured in terms of coordination of action between persons leading to the need for sovereigns to emerge to resolve the problem. By contrast, Rawls' account is meant instead to arrive at constraints on reasoning that will show the need for two specific principles and the rejection of rival contenders. Whilst the older conceptions do aim at justifying conceptions, it could be argued that they do this indirectly by means of discussion of constraints on action whereas Rawls' procedure, by contrast could be said to discuss constraints on action indirectly by focusing instead on constraints on reasoning. (Though the example of Kant here would be much more complicated than this contrast might suggest.)
Included in the hypothetical situation Rawls envisages is the "veil of ignorance" concerning one's place within society and that it is not possible even to have a view of one's conception of justice in this situation. So the principles of justice are presented as the product of a "fair agreement" and this is what is meant by describing the "main idea" of Rawlsian contractarianism as "justice as fairness".
For given the circumstances of the original position, the symmetry of everyone's relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between individuals as moral persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends and capable, I shall assume, of a sense of justice. The original position is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.
Features of the situation envisaged include a view of the persons in it as rational and mutually disinterested with the latter meaning that persons are not taken to have any particular interest in the affairs of others. The rationality of the participants is also interpreted in a narrow sense that conforms with rational choice theory. However this ensures that no one has a reason to opt for any principles that will produce enduring loss for themselves and, given that they do not know where they are in the society, will thus have an incentive to adopt principles of the greatest generality.
Rawls' two principles are next mentioned for the first time though the account of this third section is not one that justifies them. The principles are the ones familiar from Rawls' earlier work of equality in assignment of basic rights and duties and that inequalities in social and economic senses are justified only if they are met with compensating benefits for all.
The fourth section of the first chapter concerns the original position and justification. Rawls here explicitly connects the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice and discusses the "choice problem". In describing this problem he agues from widely accepted but weak premises to specific conclusions. This includes the point that no one should be given advantage (or its reverse) by natural fortune and that principles should not be tailored to one's own case and this is taken to justify the need for the veil of ignorance. Rawls indicates again the point that this provides "constraints on arguments". A further such constraint is the assumption of equality between the parties in the original position, a moral assumption. Finally Rawls arrives at the notion of "reflective equilibrium" which involves a kind of zig-zag movement between the initial situation and considered convictions of justice, sometimes modifying one, sometimes the other.
Friday, 15 April 2011
London Metropolitan University Implodes
According to an article in the latest Times Higher it appears that London Metropolitan University has plans to abolish itself. Plans have been uncovered that include yet another plan to abolish philosophy but, in this case, that's hardly the half of it since they are also thinking of abolishing history, theatre studies and modern languages. The general proposal in effect would remove more half of the courses on offer. It is true that London Metropolitan has had a rather troubled history and is in dire financial trouble but proposals of this sort are surely tantamount to the institution advocating that it cease to be a university at all. Perhaps it should be retitled "London College That Doesn't Teach Very Much"?
Monday, 11 April 2011
A Theory of Justice
Cover of A Theory of JusticeIt is an ambitious task to attempt this and it is worth thinking about a basic reason why this should be attempted on this blog which is because, as Rawls himself states, the theory outlined in A Theory of Justice is to be viewed as "highly Kantian in nature". What the meaning of such a claim consists in is central to the interpretation of the work that will be given in the postings investigating it here. Which does not mean, naturally, that this can be the only concern since, after all, regardless of what this claim consists in, there is a simpler question concerning how the theory is, in general, to be understood through its central statements and aims.
A Theory of Justice is a complicated work in a number of ways. Firstly, there are textual questions since the work was revised and reissued by Rawls and includes a 1990 preface written for the revised edition. Few interpretations try to rest too much on this point though it is of interest to note sections and places that Rawls saw fit to expand or delete. Second, there is the relationship of the book to the work Rawls did before, a relationship heavily discussed in the preface to the original edition of the book. Thirdly, there is the relationship of the work to Rawls' later work, both in terms of the subsequent work of the 1970s and 1980s and to the second substantial work he wrote, Political Liberalism. This area is one that includes a great number of questions, not least given that Rawls' official line authorises an interpretation both of A Theory of Justice itself and the works subsequent to it that tends to take the arrival at the position of Political Liberalism to be the natural outcome of his work, something that many have, however, found counter-intuitive and, indeed, a product of an undesirable "turn" in Rawls' own thought. Regardless of the attitude here adopted the nature of the change involved and the reasons for it require investigation but this investigation cannot be grounded only on reading A Theory of Justice. Rather the reading of A Theory of Justice should first suggest how the work prior to it led to Rawls' formulations in it and later interpretations of other works should then complicate the question of the self-interpretations of the work that multiply subsequently to its publication.
In this posting I want to stick, for now, to pointing to some significant points raised in Rawls' 1971 preface to the first edition of the book. Here Rawls opens by referring back straightaway to the works written previously to its publication. Rawls refers to the division of the work and relates how the different parts connect to previous publications. So the first part of A Theory of Justice which is concerned, apparently, with "Theory", is related to two papers specifically, the 1958 original paper on "Justice As Fairness" and the 1968 paper "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda" and this hint will be worth following when looking at the first part of the book. The second part of the book, by contrast, which concerns "Institutions" is related to the papers on "Constitutional Liberty" (1963), "Distributive Justice" (1967) and "Civil Disobedience" (1967 but, for some reason, referred to here as 1966). The third part of the book, concerned with "Ends", is, by contrast to the first two parts, treated as distinct from the previous essays written except for being related to the 1963 paper on the "Sense of Justice". All these connections will bear consideration later.
After referring back to these connections to previous publications Rawls goes on to give the basic rationale for writing the book which is to provide a systematic or, as he terms it, "comprehensive" reply to utilitarianism since the utilitarian theory involves not merely an account of morality but also of social theory and economics and yet there has been little attempt to reply to such a view with something that is as comprehensive and this is why the main opponents of utilitarianism have tended to be intuitionists. The basis of the comprehensive reply that will be given is the distillation of the social contract tradition which occurs through the use of "certain simplifying devices" in a general framework so that the "chief structural features" of an alternative conception come into view.
After making this general claim Rawls provides a view of the main claims of A Theory of Justice indicating a way of understanding its sub-parts. This leads to the view that chapters IV-VIII are not basic to the argument of the book, that is, all of the part dealing with institutions and two-thirds of the part dealing with ends. This is a surprising overview of the book's claims though Rawls modifies this slightly by stating that the discussions in these chapters are "an important test" of how well order and system has been introduced into a wide range of questions. Nonetheless there are likely to be problems that will concern different readers here more or less so latitude is allowed for how much one thinks about or looks at these questions.
The final part of the preface indicates debts Rawls has incurred in arriving at the publication of A Theory of Justice and these basically relate to previous drafts of the work and articles that have addressed some of the essays written on the way to its publication. Whilst there would be something to be said for looking at all the material there listed it would have something of a purely scholarly endeavour, not necessarily of the greatest import for a philosophical evaluation of the work.
Friday, 8 April 2011
Christian Onof in *Kant Studies Online*
The latest article to be published in Kant Studies Online is by Christian Onof and it is entitled "Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics" and it can be freely accessed and downloaded here.
Wednesday, 6 April 2011
Blogging When Distressed
I'm aware that, after the bumper number of postings in March, the blog has got off to a slow start in April. There is a simple reason for this: distressing family news. Without going into detail about it, safe to say it is the kind of happening that has to be faced in life but which never is something that can be expected to be easy. This creates a number of questions but one I thought I would put to myself and my readers here is, what is it like to try to keep in communication with others on a public site such as a blog when life has taken you and given you a difficult time?
Of course the simple thing to do in such a situation is shut down such public activities for a time and I might do this. The opposite response would be to use such a platform for open confessional purposes but I would find that distasteful. So an intermediate solution would be to acknowledge to readers that I am feeling this distress and that, due to it, I might be intermittent in posting for a little while and perhaps sound a bit off-key. I will be back on form soon but, in the interim, would just like to say that it is true that no one ever said this living thing would be easy and its just as well they didn't because it isn't!
Of course the simple thing to do in such a situation is shut down such public activities for a time and I might do this. The opposite response would be to use such a platform for open confessional purposes but I would find that distasteful. So an intermediate solution would be to acknowledge to readers that I am feeling this distress and that, due to it, I might be intermittent in posting for a little while and perhaps sound a bit off-key. I will be back on form soon but, in the interim, would just like to say that it is true that no one ever said this living thing would be easy and its just as well they didn't because it isn't!
Thursday, 31 March 2011
Greenwich the Latest University to Attack Philosophy
Hot on the heels of the recent fight at Keele University it now appears that the University of Greenwich has decided to close philosophy provision. The staff who teach philosophy there are a small and committed group, all of whom are known to me personally. They have established a Facebook Group and a petition in their defence. The attempt to close the BA in Philosophy at Greenwich should be resisted as should all attempts to remove or diminish philosophy provision.
Wednesday, 30 March 2011
Justice As Reciprocity (II)
In the last posting I did on this topic the focus on methodological devices was prominent. Rawls reaches the conclusion, however, that there is a close relationship between the principles of justice and the sense of justice. And from this connection he states some key points, including the argument that justice is "the first moral virtue" as it arises from the concept of morality being related to self-interested persons in similar situations. Effectively, if it is possible at all to transcend the bounds of rational self-interest then this is the concept that we reach when we do so.
From the "conjectural derivation" as Rawls here terms the "original position" we have an assured root of both justice and fairness in reciprocity. Reciprocity is connected to the notion of free peoples relating to each other in a situation where no one possesses moral authority over another and we find ourselves engaged in some kind of mutual endeavour. Interestingly connected to this stress on reciprocity is the sense that just principles are ones that require people to be able to affirm them when they openly face one another. So Rawls builds in a publicity constraint on the principles that can be understood as ones of justice.
This publicity constraint is one that enables communicative relations between people and without it there can only be relations between people based on force. After building in this publicity constraint Rawls distinguishes fairness and justice from each other in order to be able to connect them back together. Fairness, on Rawls' view, applies to practices where there is either a competition between people or a cooperative activity in which they have no compulsion to participate. This is why the notion of fairness applies particularly to games and yet also to trade and bargaining. Justice, by contrast, applies to practices in which there is no choice whether or not one participates. There is, that is, an element of necessity in justice which applies to institutions that are generally pervasive or to practices which, if limited in application, are nonetheless ones that have no optional character for those involved in them.
Judging practices by reference to mutual acknowledgement of principles is to engage in applying the principle of reciprocity to their justification. So if one is engaged in a practice that we can acknowledge as satisfying the principle of reciprocity and so we can accept that its rules are either fair or just then we have no grounds of complaint with regard to it. So, for example, if the rules in question limit our sphere of activity in some important respects, then we have a right to expect that others will acknowledge in their own turn the same kinds of limits. If the practice is understood to be just or fair then there is a basic sense in which we all benefit from participation in it.
When one has thus acknowledged the practice in question as satisfying in this way the principle of reciprocity then it becomes the case that one has a "prima facie" obligation to abide by its rules. This obligation is what Rawls earlier referred to as the duty of fair play. Rawls admits, however, that in terming political obligation the duty of fair play he is extending the use of "fair" here beyond ordinary usage which only relates to acting in accordance with the spirit of a practice. But Rawls regards it as a not "unnatural extension" to incorporate the general obligation to abide by the rules in question as part of the duty of fair play as it requires that expecting the benefits of a practice to accrue to one does mean agreeing to the basis of that practice.
This point involves familiar considerations of "free-riding" that arose already in Rawls' earlier paper on justice as fairness. The interesting point about listing fair play as a prima facie duty is that in so doing Rawls deliberately adopts the language of W.D. Ross' intuitionism (though without referring to Ross). The justification of the general duty of fair play is clear in relation to the earlier mentioned publicity constraint since it meshes with this constraint in a natural way. Rawls further indicates that the recognition of the duty of fair play is not only closely meshed with the publicity constraint but that it is also an essential part of the recognition of another as a person. "To recognize another as a person one must respond to him and act towards him in certain ways; and these ways are intimately connected with the various prima facie duties." In making this point Rawls explicitly attempts to take the notion of prima facie duties away from intuitionist views and incorporate it instead in a basic act of recognition.
This point about recognition is used further in relating fairness to justice in terms of the earlier distinction between voluntary and involuntary engagement of practices. If fairness applies to practices in which one engages voluntarily then it is obvious that no one willingly agrees to play in a game that is stacked against them. So in relating the notion of fair practices to justice we effectively act as if practices that were carried out necessarily had in them the freedom we express in situations of choice.
Having reached this point in the analysis Rawls turns next to a comparison between this notion of justice as reciprocity and the utilitarian view. The utilitarian view is taken to be in clear conflict with the notion of justice Rawls has advanced due to the over-riding concern of utilitarians being with efficiency in which administrators are concerned with rules that have little relation to justice. Utilitarian calculation is concerned with preferences and interests so that it engages in abstraction from the separation of persons.
Rawls presses the case about the difference by considering the case of slavery. Utilitarian calculations concerning it have to begin with the interests of all concerned and, whilst they may well produce from this analysis, a condemnation of slavery, there is a fault at the root of such a conception as it does not relate to the slave-holder and slave in terms of reciprocity. If one has reciprocity at the root then you cannot regard the slave-holder's interests as in way relevant in making out the injustice of the institution that he perpetrates. This does not mean that it could never be treated as provisionally excusable but it could only be related to as such if there was an advance in the reciprocal understanding involved in it on what had previously been established and not at all with regard to interests of a slave-holder.
The principles of justice that Rawls has specified could never select slavery as a bearable system and these principles have special weight in determining the character of reciprocity. Following on the earlier stress on the notion of recognition Rawls subsequently points out that all the elements of justice as reciprocity are involved in Kant's formula of humanity as an end in itself. The general point of the argument, however, and this is importantly different from where Rawls ends up in Political Liberalism, is to show the moral roots of the conception of justice that is being justified.
From the "conjectural derivation" as Rawls here terms the "original position" we have an assured root of both justice and fairness in reciprocity. Reciprocity is connected to the notion of free peoples relating to each other in a situation where no one possesses moral authority over another and we find ourselves engaged in some kind of mutual endeavour. Interestingly connected to this stress on reciprocity is the sense that just principles are ones that require people to be able to affirm them when they openly face one another. So Rawls builds in a publicity constraint on the principles that can be understood as ones of justice.
This publicity constraint is one that enables communicative relations between people and without it there can only be relations between people based on force. After building in this publicity constraint Rawls distinguishes fairness and justice from each other in order to be able to connect them back together. Fairness, on Rawls' view, applies to practices where there is either a competition between people or a cooperative activity in which they have no compulsion to participate. This is why the notion of fairness applies particularly to games and yet also to trade and bargaining. Justice, by contrast, applies to practices in which there is no choice whether or not one participates. There is, that is, an element of necessity in justice which applies to institutions that are generally pervasive or to practices which, if limited in application, are nonetheless ones that have no optional character for those involved in them.
Judging practices by reference to mutual acknowledgement of principles is to engage in applying the principle of reciprocity to their justification. So if one is engaged in a practice that we can acknowledge as satisfying the principle of reciprocity and so we can accept that its rules are either fair or just then we have no grounds of complaint with regard to it. So, for example, if the rules in question limit our sphere of activity in some important respects, then we have a right to expect that others will acknowledge in their own turn the same kinds of limits. If the practice is understood to be just or fair then there is a basic sense in which we all benefit from participation in it.
When one has thus acknowledged the practice in question as satisfying in this way the principle of reciprocity then it becomes the case that one has a "prima facie" obligation to abide by its rules. This obligation is what Rawls earlier referred to as the duty of fair play. Rawls admits, however, that in terming political obligation the duty of fair play he is extending the use of "fair" here beyond ordinary usage which only relates to acting in accordance with the spirit of a practice. But Rawls regards it as a not "unnatural extension" to incorporate the general obligation to abide by the rules in question as part of the duty of fair play as it requires that expecting the benefits of a practice to accrue to one does mean agreeing to the basis of that practice.
This point involves familiar considerations of "free-riding" that arose already in Rawls' earlier paper on justice as fairness. The interesting point about listing fair play as a prima facie duty is that in so doing Rawls deliberately adopts the language of W.D. Ross' intuitionism (though without referring to Ross). The justification of the general duty of fair play is clear in relation to the earlier mentioned publicity constraint since it meshes with this constraint in a natural way. Rawls further indicates that the recognition of the duty of fair play is not only closely meshed with the publicity constraint but that it is also an essential part of the recognition of another as a person. "To recognize another as a person one must respond to him and act towards him in certain ways; and these ways are intimately connected with the various prima facie duties." In making this point Rawls explicitly attempts to take the notion of prima facie duties away from intuitionist views and incorporate it instead in a basic act of recognition.
This point about recognition is used further in relating fairness to justice in terms of the earlier distinction between voluntary and involuntary engagement of practices. If fairness applies to practices in which one engages voluntarily then it is obvious that no one willingly agrees to play in a game that is stacked against them. So in relating the notion of fair practices to justice we effectively act as if practices that were carried out necessarily had in them the freedom we express in situations of choice.
Having reached this point in the analysis Rawls turns next to a comparison between this notion of justice as reciprocity and the utilitarian view. The utilitarian view is taken to be in clear conflict with the notion of justice Rawls has advanced due to the over-riding concern of utilitarians being with efficiency in which administrators are concerned with rules that have little relation to justice. Utilitarian calculation is concerned with preferences and interests so that it engages in abstraction from the separation of persons.
Rawls presses the case about the difference by considering the case of slavery. Utilitarian calculations concerning it have to begin with the interests of all concerned and, whilst they may well produce from this analysis, a condemnation of slavery, there is a fault at the root of such a conception as it does not relate to the slave-holder and slave in terms of reciprocity. If one has reciprocity at the root then you cannot regard the slave-holder's interests as in way relevant in making out the injustice of the institution that he perpetrates. This does not mean that it could never be treated as provisionally excusable but it could only be related to as such if there was an advance in the reciprocal understanding involved in it on what had previously been established and not at all with regard to interests of a slave-holder.
The principles of justice that Rawls has specified could never select slavery as a bearable system and these principles have special weight in determining the character of reciprocity. Following on the earlier stress on the notion of recognition Rawls subsequently points out that all the elements of justice as reciprocity are involved in Kant's formula of humanity as an end in itself. The general point of the argument, however, and this is importantly different from where Rawls ends up in Political Liberalism, is to show the moral roots of the conception of justice that is being justified.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)