Allison and Kant's Practical Deduction

In the final chapter of Allison's commentary on the Groundwork he describes the way he understands the "deduction" of the categorical imperative in the third part of Kant's work. Given how controversial the argument of Groundwork III has become it is surprising that Allison's final chapter does not only focus on this question. However Allison also includes here an account of the way Kant concludes the Groundwork by describing the limit of practical philosophy though this account is certainly much less interesting than that of the "deduction" and it is the latter that will be the focus of this posting.

It is the fourth section of Groundwork III that is headlined "how is a categorical imperative possible?" and it is here that the focus on the reading of the "deduction" of the categorical imperative is based. As Allison puts it: "Since every imperative involves a necessitation...of the will, to account for its possibility is to account for this necessitation" (332). With regard to the categorical imperative we have a synthetic a priori proposition and accounting for the necessitation requires showing that the imperative is, as Allison puts it, "practically possible" by which is meant that it expresses something whose binding character can be shown.

In the opening paragraph of the fourth section of Groundwork III Kant discusses the sense in which rational beings are forms of "intelligence" and indicates that if we were merely members of the world of understanding all our actions would conform 'perfectly' with the principle of autonomy of the pure will. Kant also goes on to claim later that the world of understanding contains the "ground" of both the world of sense and of its laws and purports to use this claim to show that as a being of intelligence I am therefore bound by the laws of the world of understanding. 

Allison's analysis of the "deduction" argument begins with the claim that thinking beings place themselves in the world of the understanding but adding to this the point that it is only if such beings also have will that the argument can begin. The next step of the argument, for Allison, is the claim that the self, considered as an active being, possesses spontaneous causal power so that, when viewed as an intelligence, it is seen to be a causal agent. The third key step is that actions, when considered thus to be originated by the agent in question so viewed are part of the "space of reasons". Fourthly, this aspect of the self is contrasted with the empirical one which is governed by reference to "happiness".

Allison's major interpretative move, however, concerns the fifth and final step of the argument as he views it, a step he breaks down into two sub-steps. The first sub-step is concerned with the claim that the world of understanding contains the "ground" of that of sense. The key question with regard to this claim concerns the way the grounding relation is to be understood. Following his general deflationary manner of reading Allison dismisses the idea that this should be seen in a "metaphysical" way as a causal claim. However in addition to the general philosophical reasons Allison possesses for resisting this reading he adds an important normative one to the effect that such a reading provides no binding ground for accepting the validity of the "laws" of understanding. What is needed instead of such a reading is thus one that does show the ground of validity of these laws.

Hence it is not only "ground" that needs to be given an account of but also "laws" in the sense that there could be a "law" of understanding that was validly taken to be binding by a sensible being. In the Critique of Pure Reason this question drove the argument of the transcendental deduction, the schematism and the general Analytic of Principles. From the argument of this part of the Critique we arrived at an account of the conditions of possibility of experience and the analogy between this procedure and that undertaken here in Groundwork III would appear to be that the latter text must provide an additional way of viewing the "possibility of experience" that allows us now to see a way in which there is included amongst "experience" the working of moral law (in the shape of the categorical imperative). Since the will belongs also to the world of understanding it would seem that Kant views it as the basis for providing laws that have to be added to those laid out in the Critique of Pure Reason.

The second sub-part of the fifth claim is where Allison finds the "crux" of the argument. Here Kant includes the claim that the being of sense is nonetheless subject to the laws of understanding which Allison argues are intended to be seen as holding simultaneously with the laws of the type described in the Critique of Pure Reason. This is followed by a paragraph that Allison sees as "explaining" the deduction apparently now given. It opens by declaring that categorical imperatives are "possible" but Allison views this claim as only being that we have had provided to us a reason for thinking that the categorical imperative is a necessary and not a sufficient condition of the argument that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world. Further it is the "idea" of freedom only that makes one a member of such a world. Being a member of such a world is seen by Allison as having the mere intellectual capacity to think the idea of such freedom.

However Allison's conception of the "explanation" of the deduction runs into a problem with the appearance of a "sollen" (or "ought") that arises next when Kant states that I "ought" to conform my actions to the laws of the intelligible world. Allison thinks this move is here introduced illegitimately since all Kant has shown are epistemological grounds for being in two "worlds" and that a normative requirement does not arise from this alone. Part of the problem here is that Kant had earlier suggested that entirely belonging to the world of understanding would have produced the outcome that one simply "would" have followed the laws of understanding, a point that appears to render these laws, as Allison says, "vacuous". Allison argues that the problem with the text at this point arises from Kant not yet having explicitly to hand the distinction developed later in the Religion between two aspects of the "will". 

Kant next provides an account that is meant to give a basis for "confirmation" of the deduction and involves the awakening of a "scoundrel" to consciousness of the moral law. The claim of how this takes place in Groundwork III is, however, contrasted negatively with the parallel discussion in the Critique of Practical Reason by Allison. In Groundwork III Kant appears to state that it is the idea of freedom alone which suffices to change the standpoint of the scoundrel. By contrast, in the Critique of Practical Reason the "fact of reason" is invoked to provide the basis for a view that one does stand independent of determination by sensuous needs. This passage, even so amended, is, however, less plausible as a piece of moral psychology than Kant provides later in the Religion.

When Allison turns to assessing the deduction as he has reconstructed it he begins with the question of how to understand the argument that the world of "understanding" provides a ground for that of sense that enables a normative claim to be made on behalf of the former. Key to this is the point that the difference between the two is centred in the argument of Groundwork III on the self alone. This enables Allison to make the point that we need not view the supremacy of the "world" of understanding as a claim about a specific "realm" separate from that of sense. Further at Ak. 4: 458 Kant speaks of the distinction between the two "worlds" as that of a change in "standpoint". This change requires us to view ourselves as capable of legislating laws and having the capacity to recognise our own legislation as binding upon us. When we look at the "two standpoints" practically Allison adds we can give the "law" of understanding a content by means of the moral law. Such "laws" can also then be understood as "reasons". 

Allison also looks at the question of whether there is some specific non-empirical "interest" which supports the moral law and admits that it is impossible to account for the possibility of one. So Allison does not think Kant resolves or is capable of resolving this problem. However this leads to the question of the boundary of practical philosophy since this boundary is reached in terms of arguing that it is impossible to demonstrate the impossibility of freedom. Freedom is only an idea, not an "absolute reality" and it rests, for Allison, on viewing the relationship between a subject and an action in divergent ways. Part of Kant's defence of this claim was that it is essentially recognised within common human reason itself. The world of understanding, considered from a practical point of view, is the world of the will and this point requires us, given the general picture of the world, to see the will as something non-empirical. This supports the point that the "standpoint" of freedom is one that reason takes up in order to be able to think of itself practically.

However when Allison looks at the final passages of Groundwork III he argues that Kant here weakens some of the claims made earlier in the same section. Kant here states that the question of the possibility of the categorical imperative can be answered "to the extent that one can state the presupposition on which alone it is possible" (Ak. 4: 461). This "presupposition" is the idea of freedom. Allison's point is that this claim involves accepting that the deduction provides only a necessary condition of the possibility of the categorical imperative not conditions that are sufficient to account for its actual possibility. Thus it would appear, on this view, that the argument of Groundwork III is of less moment than it initially appears to be. This points, for Allison, to the superiority of the account of the "fact of reason" in the Critique of Practical Reason. Indeed the commentary Allison provides to the Groundwork ends with the claim that this work is "in many ways a transitional as well as a foundational work". 

Allison's account of the third part of the Groundwork in his commentary on it is instructive as the deflationary view of transcendental idealism that is Allison's hallmark is used here primarily to buttress the sense that the transcendental distinction has a primarily practical significance. However the conception that arises of the argument of the third part of the Groundwork is certainly a disappointing one and worth contrast in subsequent postings with quite different readings to that of Allison.

Allison and Kant on the Moral Law

My last posting on Allison concluded a series on Chapter 9 of his commentary on the Groundwork, a chapter that raised so many questions it seemed to be necessary to split it between a number of postings. Chapter 9 also culminated Allison's discussion of the second part of the Groundwork. In this posting I am going to address Chapter 10 where Allison begins his discussion of the third section of the Groundwork.


If Groundwork II is particularly significant due to the question of the formulas of the categorical imperative being addressed there, Groundwork III is traditionally taken to have a problematic status due to its account of a "deduction" of the principle of morality and in this chapter part of Allison's task is to discuss what precisely it is that Kant is providing here a deduction of. This turns out to be problematic since it appears that there are at least two differing views concerning this question. The basic question turns out to be whether Kant provides only a deduction of the categorical imperative or whether he also provides one of the "moral law".  Allison distinguishes these two readings terming the view that Kant only provides a deduction of the categorical imperative a "single deduction" reading as opposed to the "double deduction" one that focuses on the moral law as distinct from the categorical imperative and assumes that Kant here provides deductions of both.


Allison himself prefers the "double deduction" reading and rests part of his argument on what he claims to be distinct referents in the text of Groundwork III for the term "deduction". On Allison's reading "the moral law" is the term Kant uses for a descriptive principle which depicts the modus operandi of an agent in abstraction from whatever ends or interests they have in view whilst the categorical imperative, by contrast, is taken to be a prescriptive principle which only applies to certain types of agents (finite or imperfectly rational ones). However there are some problems with this distinction, not least, as Allison himself notes, Kant rarely refers to "the moral law" in the Groundwork although he cites Ak. 4: 449 as evidence that Kant equates it with the principle of the autonomy of the will. This principle is distinguished by Allison from autonomy as a formula of the categorical imperative. 


The second problem is that the textual questions at issue for showing that the distinction is relevant to the description of the overall task of Groundwork III are pretty difficult ones. So Allison cites for example Ak. 4: 444 where Kant speaks of a "synthetic practical proposition" without clearly identifying the proposition in question. On Allison's own reading the passage is ambiguous and capable of being read in two different ways so that Allison's preference for taking it to refer to the moral law doesn't appear very firmly grounded. Indeed Allison himself agrees that: "the obscurity of the text makes any interpretation hazardous". 


Another issue that Allison addresses in this chapter concerns whether "the moral law" is analytic or synthetic. Again the argument here turns on some very fine textual details but Allison's claim that "the moral law" is be taken generically as a synthetic principle is surely correct assuming that "the moral law" is a substantive principle that Kant is affirming. The other point about the suggestion that there is a distinct "deduction" of this "moral law" is, however, as Allison again confesses, that, should it exist, it must be quite different from the "deduction" of the categorical imperative. The reason why it must be different is that the categorical imperative states something that is binding and the deduction of it would aim to establish this bindingness. By contrast, the "moral law" cannot be binding as it does not state an imperative so that the deduction of it would only be a deduction of a "descriptive" law. Should Kant be attempting such a deduction it has to be said it is far from obvious what status it would have for him.


The other topic that Allison addresses in Chapter 10 concerns the relationship asserted there between freedom and autonomy. Allison takes Kant to be arguing in Groundwork III that freedom is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for autonomy and that freedom and unconditional practical law imply each other. The general name Allison gives to this claim is the "reciprocity thesis" and he finds Kant's argument for it to reside in a short passage at Ak. 4: 446. Back in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant already presented an argument for a kind of "law of freedom" though he did not there present this law as equivalent to autonomy. However Allison is not convinced that the argument Kant gives for the notion of autonomy as a necessary law of freedom is compelling finding it only a basis for saying that some kind of internal (and thus possibly only contingent) "law" is required. This leads Allison to distinguish between two different senses of "autonomy", namely moral autonomy and free agency in a general (even only contingent) sense. 


Allison uncovers what he takes to be a better argument for the reciprocity thesis in the Critique of Practical Reason, better in the sense that it does not, on his reading, equivocate between two senses of autonomy, though he continues to fault it for having an ambiguous use of "form", moving from the sense of it to indicate abstraction from matter to the quite different sense of "lawgiving". Thus Allison eventually arrives instead at the claim that the real basis for the "reciprocity thesis" asserted in Groundwork III is found not there, nor in the Critique of Practical Reason but instead in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. In the latter work Kant asserts what Allison terms the "incorporation thesis" which requires maxims, in order to be justified, to be self-consciously understood as acts of free agency. The point of invoking this thesis is that the notion of such incorporation requires, on the one hand, that only such agency can be seen as the real source of the maxim and hence rules out appeals to sensuousness as normatively determinative and that it enables the first principle of maxims to be clearly described.


Thus it is not merely the choice that agents are making when they formulate maxims but also the reason for the choice that matters, a point that is central to the understanding of autonomy. Whilst this argument for the reciprocity thesis has some importance, however, it is clearly not sufficient as yet to provide a deduction of the categorical imperative and to that Allison will turn in the next two chapters of his commentary.

Allison and Kant on Maxims and Moral Worth

In my last posting on Allison I discussed his initial account of the "good will" in Chapter 3 of his commentary on the Groundwork. In this posting I am moving on to an account of Chapter 4 of the commentary where Allison talks about 2 topics, the Kantian account of maxims on the one hand, and the dispute over the meaning Kant gives to "moral worth", on the other. The latter discussion expands upon some of the remarks about duty with which Chapter 3 closed.


The first part of the discussion in Chapter 4 on maxims opens with an examination of the two definitions Kant gives of the term "maxim" in the Groundwork. Key to these definitions is the view that "maxims" are "subjective" principles. Allison subsequently points that, in the Critique of Practical Reason (Ak. 5: 79), Kant also states that maxims presuppose interests and that interests rest on incentives. Further, in the Critique of Practical Reason, "incentives" are presented as subjective determining grounds of the will whilst an interest is defined there as "an incentive of the will insofar as it is represented by reason" (Ak. 5: 79). 


Maxims are ways of thinking and there can be a general orientation of the will that indicates its disposition to adopt maxims of certain sorts. They are the proper objects of moral deliberation and assessment and are related by Allison to a view of how deliberation takes place on a Kantian view. The generic account of deliberation includes a distinction between different forms of consciousness and self-consciousness but the key thing about these is that, in terms of practical deliberation, maxims are part of the spontaneity of an agent. When there is reflexive awareness of maxims then they become taken as guides for action.


Allison distinguishes three functions of maxims. Their first function is in moral deliberation where we examine maxims which requires their explicit formulation. By contrast, in moral assessment, we have to respond to the problem of Kant's account of the opacity of motivation. Allison argues, however, that Kant highlights such opacity only at the level of determination of the purity of motivation. Even spur of the moment decisions are choices made by agents and involve rational commitments. This point leads to the third level of discussion of maxims, which concerns their relationship to rational agency. What is crucial, on Allison's account, is that Kant's theory of rational agency requires that intentional action refer to some maxim even without requiring that there always be complete certainty about the nature of the maxim in question.


After going through the account of maxims, Allison turns to the objections that have been made to Kant's view of moral worth. One of the objections has concerned the relationship between duty and sentiment, in the name of more sentiment-based views. More radically, some argue that emphasis on duty is alienating (as Bernard Williams appears to have thought), a view that refers back to the traditional Schiller objection to the argument of Groundwork I. Allison mentions a number of possible responses to these objections, and, in particular, the more radical of them. The first response referred to is the one that was made by Paton and emphasised the view that Kant is practicing a "method of isolation" in the argument of Groundwork I. This argument has been taken further by Barbara Herman who takes Kant to be making not a general point about inclination but only a specific point concerning the alteration of the attitude of one person (as in the case about the sympathetic person who acts eventually only from duty). However, as Allison states, it is far from obvious that this is a sufficient reply to the Schillerian objection.


The second reply to objections given is the one formulated by Richard Henson and discussed in some detail here. Henson argues for a view he terms the "fitness report" model of moral worth in which the enjoyment of duty does not lessen its moral worth as long as the sense of duty is also present but this view is taken by Henson not to be the representative one given in the Groundwork where, instead, he found there to be a 'battle citation' model given which is essentially close to the argument that Schiller objected to. Not only is this so but, Allison argues, Henson's positive model reflects an empiricist view of agency.


By contrast to these two responses, Allison gives a third one in considerably more detail. This is the view argued for by Allen Wood which distinguishes acting from duty from possession of a "good will". Allison objects to the suggestion that someone with aversion or apathy to moral demands could be said to have a good will though this is in accord with Wood's own statements. However, unlike Wood, Allison stresses the need for self-constraint in following one's duty as there is always some temptation to act contrary to duty. Wood is also accused by Allison of failing to note the difference between taking duty to be a direct motivating factor and seeing it instead as an underlying commitment to do what morality requires. For Allison a maxim's moral content is evidently part of the maxim which leads him to the view that adoption of a good maxim is a reflection of possession of a good character. 


Allison's positive view of moral worth appeals to his conception of the "incorporation thesis", a thesis he famously located in a passage from Kant's Religion (Ak. 6: 24). On this view it is not the case that an incentive or desire can of itself provide us with a reason for action as such a reason is only given if the incentive or desire is incorporated into our maxim. Unlike with Henson's conception of overdetermination, Allison's view of the incorporation thesis does not take the will to be determined but it does involve seeing it as having determining grounds. When one adopts a maxim one also incorporates an incentive into one's reasons on this view. So you can act with inclination but from duty. However, as the previous chapter ended without a full enough view of moral worth emerging so this chapter ends without a full enough view of the incorporation thesis emerging and Allison promises to return to giving a fuller account of the latter later in the work.

Constructing the Original Position

In my last posting on Rawls I discussed the way the opening of Chapter III of A Theory of Justice moves towards the construction of the "original position" from the earlier more neutral conception of the "initial situation". In this posting, I want to move to looking at how Rawls constructs the "original position" in three very rich sections of Chapter III (sections 23-5).


The construction of the "original position" in these sections is by reference to three moves. Firstly, Rawls discusses what he terms the "formal constraints of the concept of right" which constraints are meant to flesh out what can be properly said to belong to the concept of right and which succeeds in ruling out for consideration in the "original position" one conception that was still left in play at the conclusion of his account of the "initial situation". Secondly, the "veil of ignorance" is brought into play and its function is made clear in terms of further accentuating the role of one of the elements of the "formal constraints of the concept of right". Finally, a discussion of the rationality of the parties involved in the original position is introduced and this discussion concludes Rawls' account of what it involves to comply with the "formal constraints of right". Essentially then, the account in section 23 of the "formal constraints of right" does the majority of the work in constructing the "original position" with the veil of ignorance and the discussion of rationality acting as supplementary reinforcements of what is concluded in the discussion of these formal constraints.


The idea that there are "formal constraints" involved in the concept of right is meant to determine the shape of the types of principles that can be considered in the "original position" as reasonable ones to be entertained. These constraints do not, Rawls is careful to point out, arise as a result of a definitional approach to the concept of right but are rather intended as a means of facilitating the process of reflective equilibrium. There are five conditions that emerge as requirements for facilitating such equilibrium. 


The first such condition is that principles to be considered in the "original position" have to be general in form which ensures that they cannot be formulated in a way that requires reference to "proper names" or "definite descriptions". The reason given for this generality constraint is that principles of justice should be unconditional and require no reference to contingent particulars. So generality as a constraint is given as a means of ensuring the unconditionality of the principles' scope and effects.


The second constraint on principles to be considered is that they should be universal in application and one of the ways indicated of ensuring that this constraint is met is that the principles should be generally understandable (which indicates a way of bringing the condition of universality in relation to the intuitive notion of "common sense"). Hence the principles cannot be overly complex in formulation or draw innumerable types of distinction. This criteria of universality is also used to rule out principles that are self-defeating since such defeasibility implies particularity of comprehension and application. One of the implications of such a commitment to universality is that it cannot be right that principles be selected that would have consequential import for social justice only if selectively followed. Principles that are ones of social justice cannot be regarded as fulfilled formally if they require such selective application. Rather, they are "to be chosen in view of the consequences of everyone's complying with them".


Generality and universality as the first two conditions have some special importance as will become clear when we turn to looking at the "veil of ignorance". However, they also need to be distinguished since generality touches on different criteria from universality. It is, according to Rawls, possible to universalise the conception of egoism as a first-person dictatorship as all could act in accordance with this principle. However, it is not a principle that is general since it requires reference to first-person contingencies. Similarly a principle can be general without being universal and principles that are weighted to specified groups are general in form without being universal in application. So generality, whilst important, and more important as we will see than Rawls first suggests, is in itself an insufficient constraint since it does not rule out principles that appeal to the conditions of specific groups.


The third condition, and the one that is of most interest from a Kantian viewpoint, is publicity. "The parties assume that they are choosing principles for a public conception of justice." In referring to this criteria Rawls explicitly refers to the discussion of publicity in Perpetual Peace that was treated at some length in previous postings on this blog. See for example, my earlier postings on annexation and the affirmative principle of publicity. Rawls cites not only Perpetual Peace here but also the description of "public right" from the Doctrine of Right where Kant speaks of public right as those laws "which require to be made universally public". Additionally Rawls refers to Kant's remarks ruling out "secret reservations" with regard to constitutions in the essay on theory and practice, a remark intended there to bolster Kant's case against the view that there is a "right" to rebellion. 


The discussion of publicity is importantly related by Rawls to the notion of "stability" of conceptions of justice as the general awareness of universal acceptance of principles of justice should "support the stability of social cooperation". If principles are known to be acknowledged and taken as an appropriate guide by others then social cooperation is given a basis it otherwise lacks and this point about stability is effectively used as Rawls' justification of reference to publicity. Interestingly, this support for publicity is also part of Kant's case for an affirmative rather than merely negative conception of publicity. (Equally interestingly, Rawls does not here specify if his conception of publicity is positive or negative.)


The final interesting connection between Rawls and Kant when it comes to the constraint of publicity is that Rawls reads Kant's reference to the notion of the "universal law of nature" in the typic of the categorical imperative as involving an implicit publicity condition in its application. Rawls presents the typic as also a way of reading Kant's references to the "kingdom of ends" stating that this kingdom is "an ethical commonwealth, as it were, which has such moral principles for its public charter". This reference suggests Rawls was referring to Kant's account of the "ethical community" in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone where it is formulated as "a people under divine commands, i.e. as a people of God, and indeed in accordance with the laws of virtue" (Ak. 6: 99). Within the account of the kingdom of ends in the Groundwork, by contrast, no such ethical community is so clearly brought into view (though it is far from odd to see it as part of Kant's point there).


The fourth "constraint" is that there should be an order imposed on conflicting claims. This constraint is meant, clearly, to include in the construction of the original position a means of forestalling intuitionist scepticism. The ordering is meant as transitive and clearly the form of ordering has to match the earlier constraints of being general, universal and publicly acceptable. 


The final "constraint" Rawls specifies is that principles selected within the "original position" should be final so that if reasoning is squarely and consistently based on these principles that should end the question of the acceptability of the reasoning in question. After stating this finality condition Rawls summarises the account given of the five formal constraints of the concept of right: "a conception of right is a set of principles, general in form and universal in application, that is to be publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for ordering the conflicting claims of moral persons".


An implication of the conjunction of the five formal constraints of right is the egoistic principles that were still left in play in the "initial situation" are ruled out of consideration within the "original position" constructed as the latter is by means of these formal constraints. Generality prevents appeal to first-person dictatorship and to free-riding claims though it is insufficient to exclude general egoism as the latter clearly is a general conception. The latter should be capable of being ruled out on the basis of universality but Rawls appeals not to that but rather to the need for ordering amongst principles since the universal application of general egoism would allow for no priority rules with regard to the separate claims. This is the same as saying that the adoption of general egoism is equivalent to a state of nature or lack of justice. In making this move Rawls effectively makes his case against intuitionist scepticism a social one since acceptance of the theory in question would prevent conditions of justice having any possibility of prevailing. If the formal constraints that define the construction of the "original position" are sufficient to rule out egoism by themselves then the construction of the "original position" has already scored a direct advance upon the account of the "initial situation". 


Having constructed the "original position" through the description of the formal constraints of right Rawls proceeds next to accentuate its characterisation by reference to the "veil of ignorance". The point of the "original position" is to use "the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory". Through the "original position" we can annul the appeal to special circumstances that have weight in ordinary social life. However Rawls next appeals to the "veil of ignorance" and the reason for this appeal is that by means of it being brought into play the parties in the "original position" will have to decide principles "solely on the basis of general considerations".


Hence the point of the "veil of ignorance" is to bring the generality constraint "closer to intuition" as Kant would put it. The "veil of ignorance" thereby operates in a way akin to Kant's typic of the categorical imperative and this reference is explicitly made by Rawls. Rawls writes of the way Kant operates the typic, which is by appealing to the universal law of nature, that Kant "must suppose that we do not know our place within this imagined system of nature". So Rawls views the reference to the universal law of nature as a means of enforcing the "veil of ignorance" and, similarly, he takes the introduction of the "veil of ignorance" to be a means of making the generality constraint publicly accessible and easier to comprehend.


The introduction of the "veil of ignorance" prevents the parties in the "original position" from appealing to natural assets, their own conception of the good, contingent elements of their psychology and even to features of their own society. Left outside this "veil" are the "circumstances of justice" that were introduced at the conclusion of the account of the "initial situation". Other, more problematic elements left outside the veil include "the principles of economic theory" and "the laws of human psychology". (Which "theories" and which "laws"?) One of the reasons the latter is assumed to be able to be left outside this "veil" is that it would count against a conception of justice if the requirements of it were too stringent for human beings as otherwise there would be "difficulty in securing the stability of social cooperation". Overly stringent conceptions would thus violate the reference to stability that we saw was used as justification for the constraint of publicity. In an important sense overly stringent conceptions would not be publicly justifiable. Conceptions of justice should, states Rawls, generate their own support so information that would ensure stability can be included as available despite the "veil".


The "veil of ignorance" is meant as a device that enables one to reason and the way it does this is, as suggested, by making the generality constraint more vividly available to one. "It must make no difference when one takes up this viewpoint" of the original position Rawls writes and the "veil of ignorance" is a condition of meeting this generality requirement as it insures that information available is "at all times the same". However the "veil" also serves another methodological requirement, that of providing a procedure that enables not merely generality of form but generality of agreement. Kant spoke of people only consenting to a law that they were capable of giving to themselves and this is echoed in Rawls' description of the "veil" as it is intended that, under the conditions of its application, that "a unanimous agreement can be reached".


Since no one knows their position in the social structure or the potential advantages and disadvantages of natural assets they would possess they reason in such a way that they adopt an effectively general standpoint and reach conclusions that are universal in application. This is thus a way of mapping autonomous reason. But there is one element left out and this indicates the reason why Rawls, at the conclusion of his account of the "initial situation" made reference to the problem of justice between generations. What is left out is a means of neutralising the place one has in the history of generations as one is existent now and not later so the conditions of the "veil" have not, as yet, prevented this contingency from having an effect on one's reasoning as one could reason in a general and universal way, publicly affirming principles that gave advantage to one's generation over and against future ones. This is why in section 22 Rawls referred to a "motivation assumption" being built into the parties of the "original position" even before he constructed this position and this assumption is that the parties were "heads of families" or that they required the parties to agree to principles subject to the "constraint" that they wish preceding generations had also adopted these principles. The former would motivate consideration of succeeding generations but would do so at the cost of ensuring an important piece of information concerning contingent circumstances was introduced so the latter way of specifying the constraint is surely to be preferred. If we wish previous generations had adopted our principles then this is equivalent to saying that we expect future generations will approve of our principles. So whatever our temporal position we are thereby "forced to choose for all".


The "veil of ignorance" is supplemented well by this further constraint and, given it, operates to neutralise all possible advantage in consideration of principles of justice. Further it provides a simulated way of ensuring that principles chosen will be such as to be universally acceptable whilst also making the choice situation much simpler, a desideratum in terms of ensuring that the choice situation is indeed constructed by reference to criteria that are generally understandable. This point about simplicity is also adduced by Rawls as a further constraint on principles of justice that will be chosen within the "original position" as, cateris paribus, principles that are simpler in their general form are to be preferred as the public conception of justice should be "evident to everyone".


The first two stages of the construction of the "original position" were thus, initially, the specification of a set of constraints on the types of principles that could be chosen within it and, secondly, a neutralisation of information that would give weight to contingencies that would threaten to render unstable commitment to the constraints previously specified. The third and final stage in the construction of the "original position" concerns the way in which reasoning within this position should be governed.


The introduction of the reasoning process involved in the "original position" is by means of how the neutralisation involved in the "veil of ignorance" is to be balanced by reference to a means by which the parties are capable of comprehending what is good without reference to a pre-existent view of the good. In resolving this conundrum Rawls does not merely suggest, as might have been expected from his account of the priority of the right over the good, that a view of the good will emerge from attending to the formal constraints of right. Rather, he refers to the list of primary social goods as being itself an "account of the good". This account has come to be referred to in discussion of Rawls as the "thin theory of the good". The view simply is that all will, at least under "normal" circumstances, "prefer more primary social goods rather than less".


This "theory of the good" will enable deliberation to take place within the "original position" as now theories can be assessed in relation to something. After this has been given Rawls can introduce what he takes to be a standard theory of rationality by means of which reasoning will be expected to be guided within the "original position" and this involves the view that persons are generally committed to a coherent set of preferences and follow the plan that satisfies more rather than less of these. Rawls does, however, add a special assumption here which is that the parties in the "original position" are free from envy and the reason for this is that envy has a generally disadvantageous social effect. Finally, the rationality in question includes the notion that the parties engaged are each possessed of a "sense of justice" and the possession of such a sense is publicly known. Once these points have been added we can say that the "original position" allows for strict compliance with the principles that will be chosen. 


The "original position" has thus been constructed by means of firstly specifying constraints on the principles of justice that can be chosen within it and then by adding a procedure that ensures obstacles to acceptance of these constraints are removed and a thin model of rationality has been sketched that includes a thin theory of the good, the latter two enabling the parties in the "original position" to be genuinely seen as human and thus governed by the "circumstances of justice". Once the position has been constructed the principles that Rawls believes would be chosen within it can be considered.

Related articles

• From the Initial Situation to the Original Position (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Rawls' Principles for Individuals (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Justice and Methodology (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Justice As Reciprocity (II) (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Rawls and Distributive Justice (I) (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Rawls and the Theory of Institutions (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Rawls, Intuitionism and the Priority Problem (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Rawls and "Classical Utilitarianism" (II) (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Rawls on Stability and the Sense of Justice (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• The Difference Principle and Fair Equality of Opportunity (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Rawls on Fair Equality and Stability (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Justice As Reciprocity (I) (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• Rawls and "Classical Utilitarianism" (kantinternational.blogspot.com)
• A Theory of Justice (kantinternational.blogspot.com)

Kant, Sen and Transcendental Institutionalism

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I began reading Amartya Sen's book The Idea of Justice recently and was interested by the way the introduction is structured around a dichotomy between two approaches, both alleged to originate in the Enlightenment. The two approaches are described as "transcendental institutionalism" on the one hand and "realization-focused comparison" on the other. The former emerges as a foil in order to make the latter, which is the view Sen endorses, more attractive.


The distinction between these approaches is really a device used by Sen to present his own approach in contrast primarily to that of John Rawls. It would require a different posting to assess how accurate an account Sen gives of Rawls. Since, however, the real basis of Sen's specific response to Rawls is given in Chapter 2 of The Idea of Justice I would like to leave discussion of that for another occasion.


The point I wish to assess in this posting concerns the accuracy of Sen's classifying of Kant as part of the tradition of what he terms "transcendental institutionalism" (or TI for short). The approach is traced back to Hobbes and Rousseau and is claimed to have two distinct features. The first is a concentration on "perfect justice" as opposed to relative comparisons of justice and injustice. This has the following result:

The inquiry is aimed at identifying the nature of 'the just', rather than finding some criteria for an alternative being 'less unjust' than another. (6)

The second feature is a primary focus on getting institutions right as opposed to focus on "actual societies" and in making this second move TI requires some "specific behavioural assumptions". After making this initial characterisation of TI Sen goes on to claim that this approach, initiated by Hobbes, was pursued later also by Locke, Rousseau and Kant and in the latter case he specifically cites the Metaphysics of Morals though in a fairly old translation and without discussing any of the secondary work done on Kant's political philosophy and its relationship to his moral philosophy.

The prime purpose of Sen's characterisation of TI is, as he goes on to make clear, a response to what he takes to be important contemporary claims in political philosophy but he has clearly thought it nonetheless important to trace TI as emergent from a definite lineage of political thought. The subsequent analysis provided of TI argues that it goes wrong in assuming that it is either necessary or sufficient to arrive at some decisive principles of justice that are supposedly uniquely "impartial" in their appeal.


Now the main point I want to make here is that Sen's characterisation of the tradition of TI goes seriously wrong in its picture of Kant's political philosophy. Firstly, Kant does not, in the Doctrine of Right, focus on "perfect justice". In fact Kant is very far from having such a focus as is made manifest in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone where the notion of a "kingdom of virtue" is distinguished sharply from a political state of affairs and the attempt to collapse the distinction between the two is also sharply criticised by Kant in Perpetual Peace.


The outline of the Doctrine of Right is focused on providing a basic condition of a political state that matches what Kant terms the demands of "strict right". It is precisely because these demands are quite different from those of "virtue" strictly speaking or the following in political life of some strict adherence to Kant's moral theory that some recent commentators on the Doctrine of Right have come to the conclusion that the philosophy elaborated there does not belong within the province of Kant's practical philosophy at all. Whilst this reaction also strikes me as wrong it is a more reasonable response than the view provided by Sen of Kant's political philosophy.


The second feature of Sen's account, the emphasis on "institutionalism" does describe correctly some features of Kant's view though it still fails to acknowledge the importance of his analysis of "private right" or the distinction between this and "public right". The emphasis on "actual societies" in Sen's own story is meant to address the way that behaviours are not simply derived from institutions but also shape and drive the ways in which the latter manifest themselves. Similarly the discussion of private right in Kant is meant to show that there is a region of life that has its justification separately from the justification that can be given of the state and whose normative validity hence is of a different sort. So whilst Kant does emphasise "institutions" he does not take them all to be simply part of the "social contract" in the sense of having their validity bestowed on them by the province of the state. In this respect, in fact, Kant shares some common ground with both Locke and Hobbes (and all of them are here different from Rousseau).


Sen's primary reason for drawing the distinction between TI and his own "comparative" approach is to argue for the need to think about situations as "more or less" just. However precisely this recognition of the need for such a notion is at the heart of Kant's own theory as Kant recognises well the various ways in which states fail to achieve the distinction of being completely republican and uses the notion of the republic as a critical device that helps to enable us to understand the different ways in which things are "more or less" just. So it is a clear disservice to discussion at least of Kant's theory to pit the concentration on institutions that emerges from his political theory against a comparative analysis of societies (further it is not clear that is helpful with Rawls either though that would be another story).


The critical reasons for Sen's analysis hence do not cut against the way that Kant's own theory is structured. This theory does not attempt to describe a "perfect" society and is not guilty of neglect of "comparative" analysis but does describe institutions primarily (not, however, entirely from the standpoint of the normative validity of the state) and has, from this analysis, a critical tool that enables further assessment of "degrees" of justice and injustice.

Kant's Birthday!

Today is the 286th anniversary of the birthday of Immanuel Kant! It is, as always, worth commemorating this day since, if nothing else, Kant enabled philosophy to secure an institutional recognition that had, prior to his day, been lacking given the subordination of philosophy previously to theology. The Conflict of the Faculties records his argument against the assumption that there is a ground for this subordination of philosophy to theology in either the nature of the university or in terms of what is best for state power. It also records, in its own way, some of the reasons for Kant's publishing record with regard to Religion with the Limits of Reason Alone, the work that had brought him into conflict with the political authorities of the day. At a time when professors are assaulted  by students from fundamentalist religious groups in Pakistan we should not forget the legacy of Kant's struggle against just such pressures.