Kant, Objectification and Feminism

In a further response to the piece mentioned a couple of postings ago that denigrated Kant on the basis of some "bad arguments" he makes in a few places, not least with regard to matters sexual, it is worth pointing out how widespread the references to Kantian analysis are in feminist writing. See, for example, the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia on Feminist Perspectives on Objectification, a piece that makes clear how often views drawn from Kant's accounts of sex are implicitly and explicitly made use of in contemporary feminist philosophy. The fact that such use can be made of Kant's analysis of sex suggests that this analysis is less subject to being only seen as a cause of contemporary condemnation than might have been thought by anyone who only focused on Kant's views on masturbation and homosexuality.


In fact, the situation is even more complicated than this since it is partly elements of what might be problematic in some of Kant's points that also show how valuable his analysis is. So, the author of the Stanford article doesn't make explicit that the "Kantian" analysis in much contemporary feminist philosophy is itself partially traceable to the same line of thought as underlies Kant's negative view of masturbation. Take the following passage from the Doctrine of Virtue for example: "Lust is called unnatural if one is aroused to it not by a real object but by his imagining it, so that he himself creates one, contrapurposively" (Ak. 6: 424-5). This argument finds the problem with unnatural lust to reside in preferring an imaginary object to a real one. Compare the analyses of pornography by such writers as Andrea Dworkin and Catherine McKinnon and one will find the allure of Kant's analysis resides precisely in a point of this kind. So, whilst this point may well not persuade many now to adopt the attitude towards masturbation in particular that Kant argues for, the manner of his argument might nonetheless be part of a motivation for a case that indicates the contemporary relevance of the form of the argument. And, after all, it is the form of the argument (in relation to the comprehension of ultimate Kantian principles) that is most of interest.


Again, Kant's general problems with sexuality itself reside in areas that have clear parallels with contemporary feminist analysis of much that is taken to be problematic about heterosexual conduct. In Kant's suggestion that sexuality involves a kind of "objectification" for example, something that he views as grounded in treating the other only as a thing so that moral relations between persons cease and the other is, effectively, no longer seen as a person at all. The motivation of his argument in favour of marriage is to ensure that a protection is given by it to each person through a mutual adoption of a position: "while one person is acquired by another as if it were a thing, the one who is acquired acquires the other in turn; for in this way each reclaims itself and restores its personality" (Ak. 6: 278). Mutual relation of possessive acquisition enables reclamation of personality by nullifying the one-sided and obsessive claim on the other's body. By means of the rules that are at work in the contract that is marriage there is a means to escape the condition of objectification, a means that requires, however, a mutual recognition in the contract itself. In some respects the idea of this undercuts other elements of Kant's account since, on the basis of the mutual recognition alone, there is no serious ground for treating women in the marriage relation differentially to men.


The suggestion that marriage as it exists embodies in an obvious sense Kant's notion as expressed in the above citation would be as foolhardy as viewing existent states as expressive in a comprehensive way of the notion of Kant's state of right. However, just as the imperfection of these states does not prevent it from being possible to see the existence of them as part of the move towards the state of right so the existence of marriages whilst not a sufficient guarantee of mutual recognition may well be a necessary ground for its emergence. And that claim, after all, might well be thought not to be one of Kant's "bad" arguments.

Heterosexism

A posting on the subject of heterosexism on the Christian blog Parableman got me thinking. In it the author objects to the conflation apparently at work in a book by Elizabeth Meyer between attitudes that express a) a bias that denigrates gay people; b) a presumption of heterosexual superiority; c) prejudice, bias or discrimination based on either of a) or b).


Whilst the author of the posting is resolutely opposed to a), he regards b) and c) as potentially more problematic and, at any event, to be morally distinguishable from a). The up-shot of this is that the uses suggested for the term "heterosexism" by Meyer are far from equivalent to each other and thus that the blanket term in question might well be less morally useful than it first seems.


Prior to examining the specific arguments here, and disregarding whatever case Meyer may or may not be making, I should first state that the term "heterosexism" despite having an ugly look and being pretty difficult to say (since it is so close simply to "heterosexual" and "heterosexuality") is, nonetheless, in many respects an improvement on "homophobia". Whilst homophobia expresses well the notion that there is active hatred of gay people that is being expressed by many people it tends towards the view that such hatred is an expression of a kind of pathology, thus in a sense moving it out of the realm of moral condemnation to a kind of failing that is instead one of having fallen victim to a sort of sickness. In not having this connotation and in having the proximity invited to "racism" and "sexism" the term "heterosexism" is a distinct improvement on "homophobia".


The first and least obvious point being made against the three claims brought together here under the heading "heterosexism" is against the assumption that there is something inherently "wrong" in b). The reason why this is presented is due, I think, to the point I made above, namely, that the term "heterosexism" has the signal disadvantage that it implies to many hearing it that the problem is with heterosexuality itself. So, the poster over at Parableman wants to say that there's nothing wrong in saying heterosexuality is "superior" in some sense since all you might mean by saying that is either a) that it's better for you (since you are heterosexual) or b) that it's better for some things (e.g. a simpler way to lead to the production of off-spring). This kind of point is not, despite what the guy at Parableman thinks, really a very good one. Take, by analogy here, the cases of racism and sexism. In those cases b) would be mirrored by the claims that b1) white people are superior to other races or b2) men are superior to women. The case of b1) is pretty obviously offensive and it is hard to imagine anyone trying to motivate on similar grounds to those alleged to make b) potentially alright. What about b2)? It's true that, if what you meant in that case was something like men are generally physically stronger than women you wouldn't run into an argument, but that, quite evidently, isn't what would be meant in making the assertion and nor can one imagine anyone ever seriously suggesting it would be. So what it would really mean, like the similar racist claim b1), would be a moral, intellectual or general civilizational claim of superiority. And that would be pretty clearly offensive. Just as clearly it is the analogy with this that is at work in the point being made by alleging that b) is a moral fault.


The first reason, then, for supposing that b) is less "wrong" than a) and c) doesn't exactly hold up well. The next point that is made by Parableman is a slightly different one where a sliding scale is introduced with the suggestion that the term "heterosexism" is too broad to recognise the kind of slide needed. So, to use the case given in the posting, the fact that Catholics (or any other religious denomination) don't want to recognise gay marriage isn't sufficient to condemn them in the same terms as those who would allow no kinds of rights at all to gay people and would wish to treat them in ways that were absolutely inhuman. Again, imagine here the analogy with the cases of racism and sexism. So, there are some people who we call racists who treat people of other racists with absolute inhumanity and others who "only" want to assert that they should be given inferior facilities and an unequal place in the general society. Surely the first is much the worse and the second doesn't really deny all rights as such? It's only necessary to present the comparison to imagine what the response here would be. A similar case with regard to women in the case of sexism is obviously relatively easy to construct. In one sense, clearly there are differentiations here and no one would wish to deny them, but the suggestion that the second set of people don't wish to denigrate the group that they are discriminating against is false. This kind of suggestion was in fact made just this week in the UK where a Catholic charity took a case to court because they didn't want to allow gay couples to adopt children that their agency was in charge of. The spokesperson for the charity stated that this didn't mean he wished to denigrate gay people or deny them rights. But the charity does denigrate gay people in its actions and does deny them rights, rights, for example, to care for children and adopt them. Again, imagine a charity that said it wouldn't allow black or yellow people to adopt children from it but that this didn't mean it was denying them rights. Would anyone find this acceptable? Or a charity that denied that men could adopt children as only women had nurturing skills? This case further shows that the use of doctrines that purport to recognise the "dignity of the human person" whilst denying equal treatment are morally objectionable in just the same way as doctrines that promoted a notion of "separate but equal" with regard to race.


The next point made by Parableman concerns the different kinds of motivations that might lead someone to a view like b) with a suggestion that these might produce different kinds of moral evaluation. So, some evolutionary psychologists allege that homosexuality is "less good" at such things as perpetuating the species. In fact, this kind of claim is simply empirically false. The only basis for it would have been that there is only one way to ensure reproduction takes place but everyone knows that this is untrue so that there is no effective need now for heterosexual coitus in order for children to be produced even though this is evidently a much "simpler" way to achieve the purpose in question than any others. It's a gross exaggeration of the writer over at Parableman, however, to suggest that this is the main purpose of heterosexuality. The numbers of times heterosexuals copulate compared to the numbers of children produced is pretty clear evidence of that!


The suggestion that others make is that homosexuality is not part of "God's design", a view that, in its hubristic comprehension of the nature of that alleged design, is, frankly, breathtaking. Based on a couple of random passages from certain selected Scriptures whose status is, in any event, far from secure for most of us, it hardly merits consideration as the basis for a moral view, let alone a legislative one. The implied suggestion that those adopting it are somehow in a "better" moral class than childish or brutal gay-baiters is one I simply can't see.


The final suggestion of the piece is that you could, for example, be a Christian who didn't want bullying of gay people and hence opposed a) and c) but still wanted to affirm some version of b) and were, perhaps, sullied by being associated in the definition with people with whom you wished to have nothing in common. Again, there are nice parallels here. So, some racists don't want bullying of other races or necessarily support laws against other races but they do think their race superior to others. Isn't it unfair to tar them with the same brush? I'll leave that to readers to decide!

Moral Philosophy and Moral Disagreement

In a recent posting over at Pea Soup there is a discussion, set off by Ralph Wedgwood concerning whether there is significant disagreement amongst moral philosophers concerning specific moral judgments. The argument Wedgwood makes is to the effect that there is not a general disagreement amongst moral philosophers and, in the process, he argues that moral philosophers have frequently been in the vanguard of liberalising attitudes, citing, as examples, the cases of homosexuality and capital punishment. The general case Wedgwood makes is that there is something in the nature of philosophy's fostering of a critical attitude that leads philosophers to be specifically agents of such liberalisation. 


The posting by Wedgwood raises thus two related but distinct questions: is there general agreement between moral philosophers regardless of their adherence to different meta-ethical views and does this alleged agreement lead to a convergence on positions that promote liberalisation? These are good questions though rather difficult to answer. Part of the problem here is that much of the debate amongst moral philosophers is not strictly about specific judgments, at least that is so outside the specialist area of practical ethics. When moral philosophers engage in practical ethics they are, by contrast, exhibiting bases for disagreement on concrete questions.


The question of the disagreement that does exist strikes me as more interesting than a suggestion of a convergence on a liberalising view. If we take the central areas of practical ethics on which such disagreement currently centres they include the wide areas of bio-ethics and ethical questions connected to war and peace. On these topics the disagreements that exist often cross liberal/conservative lines inasmuch as such lines are stable in philosophical terms. For example, in the area of war and peace, there are reasons for disquiet about "just war" doctrines that can be voiced both by those on the pacifist side of an argument and on the side of those who feel that conduct of soldiers is too tightly constrained by such arguments. The former would tend to be "liberal", the latter "conservative". But the "centre ground" of the debate, if there is one, would draw out the difficulties of the terrain in a more general sense. It is far from clear to me that the ensuing discussions and clarifications have produced a liberalising consensus though it is true that when philosophers join explicit public debate on these issues they tend to urge positions that require some sense of legality to be brought to bear on war so most philosophers, on grounds related to that, had problems of one sort or another with the second Gulf War.


However, the general claim for a liberalising effect of the discussions that take place within the area of moral philosophy is not always so clear. For example, the area of abortion has tended to encourage both a view that there are rights here that accrue to women as those whose bodies are, in some sense, at issue. But this has not prevented there being some general sense, that has be weighed in the balance with this, that there are considerations that attach to the fetus, that it is not, as John Locke once put it, merely a "vegetable". If Locke's position was generally adopted there wouldn't tend to be any basis for restrictions on the "right" to abortion but few legislatures view that as correct and the philosophical discussion has not tended toward that view though it would be a "liberal" one.


The cases on which Wedgwood relies, those of homosexuality and the death penalty, seem less contentious. Certainly few philosophers tend to support the death penalty today despite the evidence of previous centuries in which philosophers did think there were grounds for support for it. Kant, for one, certainly does present arguments in favour of capital punishment though the question of his general position on punishment is a very difficult one to interpret. The argument for capital punishment, though, does indicate a basis for respect for the criminal as a ground for capital punishment, something that would tend, today, to be regarded as counter-intuitive, though this is partly due to the fact that how "respect" is understood in contemporary moral philosophy is not evidently Kantian. The question of homosexuality is one where there are strong grounds presented by some philosophers for notions that do not support the view of treating it in a way that produces outcomes of clear equality for gay people. Whilst the latter is certainly what I would hope would prevail I am less than convinced by the conception that there is a solid philosophical consensus here.


Without getting too far into the discussion of specific issues, however, the question of whether moral philosophers tend to agreement on specific moral issues is not as evident to me as it seems to be to Wedgwood. On the separate question of whether philosophy tends to promote liberalisation I am also not entirely convinced that we can make such a claim in a general way. Set against Wedgwood's point that philosophy promotes criticism is the opposite tendency of philosophy to find reasons for why things are as they are. The latter is also a key focus of philosophy (think here, for example, of Aristotle). So I suppose the weight of how I am thinking here does not tend to support Wedgwood's view.

On Kant's "Bad Arguments"

A recent posting made over at The Splintered Mind makes great hay out of the view that Kant makes a number of "bad arguments" by which is meant that he defends or attacks a number of things, particularly in The Metaphysics of Morals that would not, now, generally be viewed as acceptable. Pretty sweeping things are thought to follow from this, including that it is quite possible that Kant is generally indulging in what the author refers to as "gobbedly-gook". (Like the reference to "bullshit" in the citation given in the previous posting it is intriguing to find philosophers using such terms as if they were, in some sense, state of art, that is, defined something.)


There are a number of things at issue here which are rather odd even assuming, as very likely, that Kant did make a number of "bad arguments" and defended things that should not have been defended as well as attacked a number of things that should not have been attacked. The first thing at issue concerns whether something of philosophical value arises when Kant, or any other confessedly "major" philosopher says something that, on reflection, seems clearly wrong. In the cases at issue in the posting there are remarks Kant makes concerning wives and servants, masturbation, organ donation, homosexuality, the killing of bastards and tyranny. Now, even before attempting to go into any detail here, the first point would be that the cases at issue here are quite varied. So, whilst the status of wives and servants has undoubtedly changed considerably since Kant was writing, the nature of that change has, amongst other important elements of it, reflected a sense of how "property in one's person" should be understood. This is no small change and grappling with the nature of that change might well be worth some philosophical time rather than simply thinking that the citation of a passage from the history of philosophy on this topic was sufficient to close down consideration of the question of whether this philosopher has made an important contribution to the area of philosophy in question. 


Masturbation is a topic that concerns "duties to oneself" and, on this, I hope I am not immodest if I point to the discussion of this in my book Kant's Practical Philosophy as indicative of a way a serious approach to this topic can both bring out the means by which Kant's response here does draw on deep resources of his practical philosophy that point to the conclusions he draws whilst also enabling discussion of how a different conclusion could have been drawn. Without work of that kind I struggle to see how we can learn at all from the history of philosophy unless, that is, name-calling is thought an appropriate response to a position on which disagreement with historical positions is pretty manifest.


Organ donation remains a subject on which there are varied and serious philosophical options open and when Kant here tries to tackle the question of the boundaries of the self he is surely doing something important even should the way that he does it be thought problematic. It is hardly, in any case, a settled business this topic. No more is the topic of homosexuality even though the stand adopted here by Kant is one that would not tend to be adopted by Kantians today. That serious work on this area is decidedly necessary is manifest today and whilst I would certainly not want Kant's view here to become one widely adopted I would hope it worth attending to the rationale for what that view was. The question of resistance to tyranny and rebellion is a decidedly complex one that, once again, we do a disservice to if we simply reject Kant's position since here he does raise a serious problem about the basis of right.


Going through the cases is one thing, however, adjudicating the charge of "gobbledy-gook" quite another. This does, again, partly come back to questions of what "clarity" involves. The author of the posting I am here replying to seems to think it is "elitist" to write in a way that many people find difficult though it is hard to think of any philosopher who is not seriously difficult quite a lot of the time. That would, after all, be part of the point of being a philosopher! Another element of the charge made in the posting in question is that Kant can attain no greater insight on moral topics than anyone else, as is shown by his "bad" judgments on the topics in question. Now here there is surely some serious conflation. On the one hand there are the "judgments" of Kant, the guy. On the other, there is a question about what, if anything, is enduring in the body of works signed by this person. To infer from the view that the former misjudged things that the latter is untrustworthy is a sure fallacy. Secondly, the arguments cited from the Metaphysics of Morals are not all equivalent within the logic of the work since the discussion of homosexuality has no place in the strict position of right for example whilst that on tyranny and rebellion has a very important role there. Given this difference insight into the structure of the work and the basis of the positions in this structure would be of signal help in evaluating the results achieved. Amongst other points here would an assessment of how far Kant has followed his own guidelines for procedure in reaching his conclusions and what the general alternative positions, considered within that procedure, might well be. In fact, without work of that sort it is only by reference to previously assumed standards that the arguments can even be viewed as "bad". 


Two last points. Even if none of the above compels conviction it would still be surely bizarre to find an extension from the passages cited to a general conclusion about Kant's work. There is no way any body of work can be treated in such a summary fashion. Finally, if there is any point to a notion of "common sense morality" then the relation of philosophy to it needs to be evaluated from both ends. That is, whilst philosophy should surely attempt to make such morality more explicit it should also provide a critical riposte to it. On the other hand, if there is a robust sense to such morality then it should, in its turn, provide an image by which to test philosophical criticism. So the relation should be mutual without it following that nothing particular has come from the philosophical end of the argument.