Allison and *Groundwork* III

In Chapter 11 of his commentary on the Groundwork Allison looks at two questions concerning the interpretation of the third section of the work. On the one hand, he assesses the way freedom is discussed here and on the other looks at the nature of the apparent "circle" the argument reaches at a crucial point. In looking at these points in Chapter 11 Allison prepares the way for an account of the "deduction" apparently carried out in Groundwork III. 

The first point Allison makes is that Kant does not really attempt to "prove" the reality of freedom but only the need to "presuppose" it (thus disagreeing with the view of Karl Ameriks who assimilates the argument of Groundwork III to certain passages from lectures in the 1770s). The "presupposition" in question is a necessary one in the sense that morality expresses a law for every rational being as such and so its principle must be bound up in an a priori fashion with the will of such a being. One of the reasons for taking this to be true is that it is requisite rationally to be able to act and one does so under the "idea" of freedom. The "idea" in question is understood by Allison to be freedom in the sense of transcendental spontaneity, the ability, that is, to begin a series absolutely. However this is not equivalent for Allison to the claim that it is necessary to "believe" that one is free or to the fictive claim that this freedom is "heuristic". Rather the idea in question is one which is a necessary product of reason and is thus possessed of objective validity. 

Not only is this the case but the idea of freedom also has normative force and acting in accordance with it places one in the "space of reasons". The use of this Sellarsian vocabulary is particularly interesting given that Allison connects the question of freedom to reason in two respects, both theoretical and practical. The understanding is the source of spontaneous grasp of truth (as given in the German for "concept") and it does this in a rule-governed way which is part of its internal operation. Similarly freedom in a practical sense is a product of the internal operation of the will. However whilst Kant's argument, as construed by Allison, appears to lead at this point to the conclusion that there is operative a practical reason whose "reality" we can show, the argument instead takes the turn that leads towards the "circle" that stops its progression in the manner that appears obvious.

Allison's account of the move the argument of Groundwork III takes at this point is grounded on the view that all that has been established up until now is a conditional claim. Freedom has not, as yet, been shown to be actual and the consciousness of autonomy is not one whose binding validity has been shown. So the establishment of the supreme principle of morality has not been achieved and thus the reason for departing from empirical interests has not been conclusively given. This is why Kant speaks now (at Ak. 4: 453) of a "hidden circle" having been apparent in the argument up to this point. Kant's reference to this "circle" is one that has puzzled many including Paton whose commentary Allison cites as a case of misrepresentation of Kant's argument. Allison understands the "circle" to consist in an inference from freedom to autonomy or from negative to positive freedom. However this does mean that Kant was not previously really guilty of arguing in a "circle" but only of begging the question in the sense of taking freedom to have an immediate certainty. 

In preparing the way for the resolution of the "circle" in question Kant discusses the notion of "two standpoints" and the rest of Allison's chapter is devoted to looking at the way these standpoints are characterised in Groundwork III. This distinction is one that has to be shown not to be merely an ad hoc device and Kant aims also to show that it is recognised by common understanding although the latter claim is regarded by Allison as dubious. The account of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves is drawn crudely enough in Groundwork III however and it may be, as Allison suggests, that the reason for this crudity is precisely to make the distinction one that can be related to "common understanding". It does, however, also include the distinction between two aspects of the agent, one that certainly seems at variance with "common understanding" but which is justified to it by means of the difference between active and passive aspects of the self. The active element includes the sense of spontaneity in the production of ideas, a capacity not sensibly conditioned. However the question of whether this consciousness is illusory has to be addressed. This is where the claim that all Kant is showing is that freedom is a necessary "presupposition" comes in for Allison since the presupposition is one that we have a warrant for adopting inasmuch as we consider ourselves as members of the intelligible world. This provides, on Allison's reading, a basis for claiming a "deduction" of the "moral law" though not the categorical imperative given his commitment to a "double deduction" reading.

Rawls on Moral Psychology (I)

The previous posting on Rawls looked at the opening of Chapter VIII of A Theory of Justice and, in the process, made some assessments about the structure of the last part of the work. As I discussed there the central subject of Chapter VIII is Rawls' discussion of how moral psychology provides a basis for the claimed stability of justice as fairness and in this posting I'll begin to look at Rawls' argument to this effect by focusing on sections 70-72 of Chapter VIII.


In these sections Rawls sketches "the course of moral development as it might occur in a well-ordered society realising the principles of justice as fairness". In doing so Rawls draws on an idealised conception that owes something to Piaget's conception of child development but also aims to combine in a certain way the empiricist and rationalist views of moral development that were contrasted in section 69. So the first stage, termed by Rawls the "morality of authority", draws on the empiricist notion that the primitive basis for moral conceptions in childhood arises in a manner that is principally external to the child. In presenting this in terms of the structure of a well-ordered society Rawls assumes that such a society will include the family "in some form" though he also appears not to think that if other arrangements for child care existed that this would affect the account given. One of the points that shows how much the description of this "morality of authority" relates to the empiricist tradition is Rawls' claim that the child "lacks the concept of justification altogether" a claim that will ensure that the early way morality is transmitted matches the view that there are "missing motives" in children as outlined by Rawls in section 69.


The question that animates the account of the morality of authority that Rawls gives concerns the affective bond between the child and its parents and is formulated according to a psychological principle that is also described by Rawls as a "law" and is stated as follows: "the child comes to love the parents only if they manifestly first love him". This conception belongs not to the "empiricist" tradition but to the "rationalist" one and is cited as paralleling a similar claim in Rousseau. The child's actions are hereby viewed as founded on initial motivations provided by instincts and desires with the possible regulation of these by a general notion of self-interest. To relate to others with love is thus not taken to be an immediate option for the child but rather to arise for it through a process of recognition of the way the child is cared for and how it benefits from the care in question being founded on an expression of love. This is a complicated form of recognition, especially for someone who "lacks" the concept of justification so it is instructive to see how Rawls understands the arrival of it.


Love is said by Rawls to be "displayed" by the parents by means of their showing pleasure in the presence of the child and supporting its sense of competence, and, even more importantly, its self-esteem. The centrality of this latter point is further emphasised when Rawls adds his basic description of what it is to love another, which is not only to be concerned with the wants and needs of this other but also "to affirm the sense of the worth of his own person". It is by means of this nurturing of a sense of worth within the person of the child that the parent makes it possible for the child to respond to the parent with a matching affective disposition that we can term its sense of a love for its parent. It is crucial to this explanation that the child's love for its parents is not couched in a merely instrumental sense as it would have been if the child was still operating at the first level of its relation to motives and inclinations. This is why Rawls terms the recognition of love in the child the arrival of "a new affection".


Having stated this initial "psychological law" Rawls goes on to analyse it into its elements. They include the sense that the child has of appreciation for its own sake, that the affective response of parents towards it is an unconditional one and the learning of the child to trust its parents. On the basis of the trust displayed the child is encouraged to expand its own sense of its potential and it is partly through this expanded sense of potential that the child comes to have deeper relations to those who permit this expanded potential to develop. 


However up to this point Rawls has not yet described the "morality" of the situation in terms of how the child comes to have moral conceptions based on its affective relations and the sense of this requires that the trust the child has shown in the parents be extended to the view that precepts that they require the child to act in accord with are internalised by the child. The internalisation of these precepts is based, at least partly, on an imitative relation to powerful figures who are assumed to have the ability to control the environment. Since the child's desires extend beyond the realm judged appropriate for the exercise of them it follows that the child has to learn limits of what is acceptable conduct. The constraints embedded in these precepts are only taken as ones to be guided by on the basis, however, of the affective bond the child has formed with its carers. This affective bond even leads to the child freely confessing to violations of precepts stated by the carers and the development of feelings of guilt when the child behaves in ways that the precepts declare unacceptable. In stating things this way Rawls binds in to the relationship between the child and its carer a conception of trust that has within it a reciprocity and this reciprocity requires the child to acknowledge the precepts as binding on its behaviour in result of the affective bond. Hence the affective bond of love and trust includes within it the potential for the development of guilt as a consequence of violation of trust where such violation is interpreted through the breaking of precepts stated by the carers.


There are initial problems at the stage of the morality of authority in ensuring that what is really being learnt are the basis of the moral precepts being stated since it is possible that the child responds as it does purely on the grounds of fear or anxiety concerning the withdrawal of affection that results from breaking of the precepts by which it has implicitly accepted it should be governed. It is a part of moral development for such fear or anxiety to be distinguished, at least gradually, by the child from the understanding of justified guilt as built in the affective bond. There are conditions that Rawls specifies which make it more favourable that the child will learn the distinctions required and thus become moralised. These include the sense the child is really loved by its parents, that they state clear and intelligible rules to the child and give reasons for them. The parents should also be seen to be governed themselves by the precepts they state. The morality of authority has truly come to be accepted when the child can be seen to behave in accordance with its precepts even when there is no evident prospect of rewards or punishments arising from violations of it.


The "morality of authority" assumes that the general basis of the precepts stated remain beyond the reach of the child's understanding and the prime virtues that it states are ones of obedience and fidelity to authority. When at this stage of development questioning is not a virtue for the newly moralised person.


The "morality of authority" is subsequently distinguished by Rawls from the second stage of moral development which is termed by him the "morality of association". This notion can cover a wide range of cases up to a relation to the national community. The morality here is one that is governed by what is taken to be appropriate to the role within the group in question that the person involved has. These include common sense rules adjusted to the position in question which are expressed by figures of authority within the association but also by the peers the person finds within the association. It is thus a mutually reinforcing system of organisation. An older child relates to the family in this way and the family can be seen as a basic model for how associations work. Just as being a good son or brother is a specific role so also is being a good student or a good sport. Similarly in adult life there are appropriate conceptions of what is fitting for a husband, friend or citizen. As development takes place there follows, as Rawls puts it, "finer moral discriminations". 


So the morality of associations is a morality of ideals in which exemplary notions of roles are taken to be regulative of behaviour. It requires an understanding of cooperation and the acceptance that others have to be engaged with, not least through a process of accepting that they have different motivations and that it is legitimate that they should have. Accepting this in its turn indicates a sense of what beliefs and views govern the conduct of others and thus such a form of morality requires us to view others as governed by what we term a general "mindedness". It is obviously insufficient simply to see this as our own behaviour has to be modified by the recognition of it.


Rawls' point is that this "morality of association" has to be learnt by children and that it is, at least initially, difficult for them. Not least difficult here is the second level of recognition that is required for being inducted into this type of morality, one that comes subsequent to the recognition of the love of the child's parents. This second recognition is of "the person of others". How well the person of others is perceived affects the moral sensibility of the child and part of the development of this sensibility concerns how the child can engage with others to ensure that mutual aid is the product. This requires arts of persuasion to be learnt. Just as the key question of the first stage concerned the reciprocity of love in the child's first relationships so the key question of this stage concerns the trust required for associations to be effectively operative. Simply participating in an association produces a certain level of mutual interaction and this calls on a sense of fellow feeling that is akin to that expressed in the first "law" of moral psychology that Rawls stated. The means by which this second type of attachment takes place reflects a second "law" that works by means of those already present within the group effectively teaching the child the right way to relate within it.


The ties that arise from the fellow feeling thus produced have the same type of affective effect as the reciprocal love involved in engagement with the child's parents. These ties produce, that is, engagements of trust and associated guilt with regard to lapses that affect such trust. So expectations are tied in to associations and failure to live up to them may even merit expulsion from the association. The general structure here is much as it was with parents: certain "natural" attitudes are adopted and on the basis of these moral feelings develop. Mutual benefits are assumed within associations and moral exemplars govern the place each has within them. The Aristotelian Principle further explains the phenomena of enjoyment of the abilities of others within such associations and the desire to emulate their accomplishments. In this sense the account of "excellencies" in Chapter VII can be seen to be part of the general relations that take place in associations.


The virtues of the morality of association are focused not, as was the case with the morality of authority, on obedience but rather on cooperation and the seat of the general desire for justice can be seen here as can the virtues of integrity and impartiality. By contrast the vices here outlawed concern not questioning but rather dishonesty and prejudice.


The third stage of moral development that Rawls considers is that of "the morality of principles". Within the morality of association, as we have seen, there is the growth of a sense of justice and with this a sense of a clear basic relationship to principles. This requires within associations that persons hope to have their conduct viewed as acceptable by wider groups than those with whom they have an immediate affective relation. Now, in a well-ordered society, principles govern the general public conduct of the way that associations fit into the society as a whole. This points to a third psychological law. This states: "once the attitudes of love and trust, and of friendly feelings and mutual confidence, have been generated in accordance with the two preceding psychological laws, then the recognition that we and those for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and enduring just institution tends to engender in us the corresponding sense of justice".


So the development of the general sense of justice that has emerged from the previous levels of moral engagement produces a relationship to principles. This sense of justice is manifested in two ways. On the one hand, the institutions from which we have benefited are ones that we want to do our part in maintaining. On the other hand, a willingness to work for justice in relation to institutions in terms of the perfectibility of these arises which extends beyond those which we have benefited from. The sense of justice carries with it, as a consequence of the third psychological law, an inherent tendency towards guilt if the propensities it encourages are not followed and especially if they are openly violated. At this stage we arrive at moral sentiments that are no longer governed by the particular circumstances of our own background and thus become, in a sense, independent of us.


This does not entail that natural relationships are thereby abandoned as moral sentiment has already been invested in these and betrayal of such investment would still be real for us. However, whilst this is so, there is here a new arena for moral sentiments that is not confined within the patterns of given particular relationships. The animating question of this form of morality concerns how it is possible for principles to be related to in an affective manner. Rawls replies to this question in terms of reference to how principles are capable of defining agreed forms of human interests. But to this prudential conception of a basis for principles Rawls also adds the anthropological claim that there exists such a thing as a benevolent disposition towards others. This disposition is described by him as "the love of mankind" and, whilst such a description defines something that could only be the basis of supererogatory relations to others it is taken to underpin the way the sense of justice becomes extended beyond particular concerns.


Finally the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness shows the latter to be the central social way in which free and equal rational beings relate to each other. It defines, as Kant would put it in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, the summum bonum. Rawls' view of this continues to pay homage to the device of the original position as it was the use of this that pointed to the basis of selection of the principles of justice. As he puts this now: "Being governed by these principles means that we want to live with others on terms that everyone would recognise as fair from a perspective that all would accept as reasonable". 


The morality of principles is described in two forms, one that relates to the sense of justice and the other to the love of mankind. The latter is supererogatory whilst the former is not and the split between them stated here reflects an attitude similar to that behind Kant's separation of right from virtue in The Metaphysics of Morals. The morality of principles is the last stage of moral development and is meant to be encompassing of the virtues recognised in the earlier stages and also to provide the settings within which the previous forms of morality find their ultimate justification. The morality of the love of mankind is not an ultimate morality for most people in daily conduct but defines instead something like a code for saints whilst the morality of right is the basic requirement for living in a well-ordered society.

Skorupski on morality and normativity

It is sometime now since I last blogged on John Skorupski's book The Domain of Reasons. This book, which is presented by some as an alternative to Parfit's On What Matters and which concerns, like Parfit, a general theory of reason, is one whose preliminary account of sentimentalism about practical reason (not morality) I looked at in my last posting on it. In the present posting I want to conclude my review of the introduction to Skorupski's book so that future postings on it can begin the arduous task of going through the major sections of the work.


Skorupski concludes his introduction to the work by discussing morality further and linking his view of morality to his general claims about normativity. With regard to morality Skorupski makes clear that an examination of the "sentiment" of blame is one that he thinks will help us to understand the "categoricity" of morality. By the "categoricity" of morality Skorupski means that morality is categorical in the sense that "it is a priori that if someone has a moral obligation to a he has reason to a" (28). The link of this to the view of blame is that to blame someone for something is to take them to have had a reason not to do the thing that they did. Further, blame (along with a list of other dispositions that Skorupski gives) involves a withdrawal of recognition from the one blamed. This does not mean that the one from whom recognition is withdrawn cannot retrieve the situation though Skorupski is perhaps going too far in claiming that the situation is one that can, as he puts it, "always" be retrieved since I can certainly think of cases (without having to move into serious crime) where it certainly is not possible for someone to recover from this withdrawal.


Skorupski's general view of morality, in addition to aiming to understand its categoricity, also aims at grasping the spontaneity of it as something that is basic to the epistemology of all norms. Skorupski relates this spontaneity to a conception of discussion that seems to suggest a relationship between his view and the Habermasian notion of communicative reason.


Skorupski's overall conception is one he terms the "Normative view" and he intends this to be the basis of a new form of "Critical" philosophy. As with previous forms of "Critical" philosophy Skorupski accepts a basic duality between spontaneity and receptivity but assumes that the epistemology of reasons requires that there are purely spontaneous responses with regards to norms. Reason relations, whilst irreal for Skorupski, are objective and form the "unconditioned condition" on which he will account for the possibility of knowledge and freedom. The account of the relationship between reason relations, normativity and morality will be central to the basic arguments of The Domain of Reasons and must constitute the main basis for assessing the success of the work.

Nelson Potter, Kant and Respect

A little while ago I wrote about Nelson Potter's response to the argument of Groundwork I. However, one part of Potter's response to the argument that was not treated in this earlier posting concerns his "appendix" that addresses the role of "respect" in the discussion of Groundwork I. The "third proposition" of the argument of Groundwork I is that "duty is the necessity of an action from respect for the law" (Ak. 4: 400). Kant states that this proposition is "the conclusion" from the first two propositions of his argument. 


Potter presents the third proposition as a subjective account of the nature of action from duty. The key to it, however, is that it treats "respect", putatively something that could be regarded as a "feeling", as worthy of inclusion in a rational determination of moral action. In order to demonstrate this point it is necessary for Kant to provide an account of how the "feeling" of respect is something distinct from feelings generally considered since the latter have been treated, under the heading of "pathology", as unworthy of being part of a purely rational account of morality.


Now the argument of Kant here is one that distinguishes between "inclination" and "respect" and in doing so he views the former as attached to objects as the effects of actions. In doing so Kant is placing inclination in relation to passivity whereas respect, by contrast, is viewed as part of spontaneous willing. Similarly, Kant views inclination as something towards which I cannot have the "feeling" of respect. By contrast to the object related to as an effect to which inclination is tied, Kant emphasises the "ground" of my will as something that can be an object of respect. This "ground", however, is none other than "the mere law by itself". In other words respect attaches to the law as the third proposition stated. 


Potter analyses the claim in this argument and divides it into three parts. Firstly, he argues that taking the object of respect to be the ground of the determination of the will is equivalent to viewing its object as purely formal in nature. This is a point worth making, not least since Kant does not make it explicit in his compressed argument. Secondly, Potter argues that respect is an effect and not a cause of the law. This point is not stated by Kant here but Potter supports it on the ground that viewing respect as a cause of the law would entail that acting from the law was acting in response to a feeling. However, since Kant is indicating the special quality of the feeling of respect, as a feeling that is not a product of receptivity, it is less obvious than Potter suggests that Kant could not have viewed respect as part of what allows the law to act upon us (though seeing respect like this does require eschewing reference to causal vocabulary at all). Thirdly, Potter points out that the feeling of respect is "self-produced", precisely the point I have just used to put his second point into question.


What Kant specifically writes about respect in the footnote introduced into the argument of Groundwork I that concerns respect is that if we recognise something immediately as a law for us then we recognise it "with respect" and this latter recognition "signifies merely the consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law" (Ak. 4: 401n). So respect is a kind of recognition whereby a law is taken to have validity for us. This recognition involves the sense that the validity of the law requires our will's conformity to its command. So respect shows us the requirement that we act in accordance with that which we respect. It thus appears, from this statement that the action of respect is part of the means by which the law has efficacy for us, just as I suggested above.


Potter summarises the unique character of the "feeling" of respect in claiming that it is unique in "its cause, its object, and its effects in action". The cause of the appearance of the feeling is not due to the stimulus of sense and this marks out respect as a special feeling. The object of respect is the ground of the will, not the effect of the will. Finally, however, the relation of respect to the effect of the action of the will is mentioned by Potter though this appears merely to be his odd way of referring to the spontaneity of respect's appearance.


Potter indicates, however, that he is unsure what role the feeling of respect has in the determination of "moral value" or in Kant's moral philosophy generally. The reason why Potter is puzzled about these points is that respect is not something that is part of the content of the maxims of duty although it is, as he admits, part of our awareness of the moral law. Since Potter views respect as only derivative of the law, he also takes it to arise only after the formation of maxims. But this is not required to make sense of Kant's view as I have suggested. Rather, the formation of the law seems to require recognition of the need for the will to be subordinated to its command, that is, to recognise the validity of its demand upon us. Unless this validity is granted the command of the law will have no efficacy and respect is the means by which this validity is given. Potter effectively has to recognise this and states it as our awareness of being put under obligation. So another way of putting the point would be to say that the recognition that the law has put us under obligation in a certain way is to operate with respect with regard to the law.


Essentially despite raising difficulties concerning the formulations of Kant's view Potter does accept the necessity of respect and does so in terms of its belonging to the "subjective" side of morality's pull. What is missing from his analysis however is the development of this point in terms of the means by which the recognition that respect effects us concerns the way the law commands us, not merely the recognition that it command us.

Morality and Rationality

I was reading today about attempts in various US jurisdictions to bring in laws that will force schools and educational institutions generally to have "open debate" on such matters as climate change and the theory of evolution and, after calming down, considered the nature of what irritates me so much about such an approach, not least to law. There seems to have grown, particularly on the right in the US, a generic kind of irrationalism that is based on the view that all kinds and types of belief are effectively equivalent to each other and hence that there can be some kind of "neutral forum" in which they can all present their case before the public.


This belief is in fact a masquerade since the kinds of people who think that there are grounds for serious debate concerning the "theory" of evolution have very little conception of what a theory consists in and what kinds of considerations are relevant for evaluation of it. So it appears "reasonable" to some to appeal either to Scripture or to a set of apparent "evidences" of design in nature as if either of these appeals was somehow evidentially on a par with the accumulative work of natural science. In responding to such people one tends to lose one's patience simply because they have such a peculiar view of what counts as an argument. So the kinds of evidence of "design", to take the most respectable version of this kind of view, that are supposed to count are either versions of an anthropomorphic fallacy or they are clearly accounted for within the scope of evolutionary theory in any case which is based on a comprehension of adaptation to environment that would predict such effects of design as emergent. Further, any serious rational person is aware that the use of Occam's razor commits us to accepting that the simplest explanation that accounts for the phenomena in question is, by virtue of its simplicity, the best one.


Since the kinds of people one is arguing with, however, systematically flout all considerations of evidence and rational grounds of belief these types of appeal are unlikely to persuade them. At which point one finds that effectively there is no kind of rational ground that would persuade them of anything. So, to move over to climate change, apparently some "religiously" motivated critics of it argue that we can't be affecting the climate in this way as the climate was designed by God. Again, since it is apparent that any and all aspects of the climate are susceptible to harm by us, there is no ground at all for thinking it per se impossible that we could be responsible for damaging the climate. But anyone who thinks that you can invoke God in this kind of way in an argument has so little conception of argument that one is at a loss how to begin with them.


At this point I tend towards the view that the real problem in these cases is a moral one. Irrational people of the sort who deny the intrinsic possibility of climate change or think that the theory of evolution is "just" a theory are people in a grip of a conviction and this conviction is one that has corrupted their reasoning powers. This doesn't entail that they are generically incapable of reasoning but that, with a range of subjects, there is a moral fault when it comes to being able to practice the skills of reasoning that they undoubtedly are capable of using. In this sense people of this sort are morally corrupt persons, persons that is, who prefer a belief to be adopted because it suits them and feel no responsibility to see how such a belief may relate to the myriad kinds of considerations that are appropriate for its evaluation. In this sense the fault they have is not, in the first instance, one of reason but of morality and the kind of fault it is involves submitting to inclination in the sense that certain kinds of beliefs strike them as "looking" better than others. Hence, though it seems ugly to say it, these people are guided by a kind of corrupt aesthetic that has taken charge of their morals and atrophied their reasoning capacities.


There is a moral basis to reasoning correctly which involves acceptance of rules and canons of argument, understanding of what kind of thing counts as evidence and agreement to engage with others in a common discussion. In the absence of this there is moral irresponsibility based on abdication before presumed "facts" that have an absolute status and yet get defended by means of a perverse relativism.