Hospitality is defined here as "the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another" (Ak. 8: 357-8). So the limitative right in question is treated in terms of a reference to the response of nations to individuals who are not citizens. However, even within the scope of the discussion in Perpetual Peace (not to mention the wider scope of the Doctrine of Right) this initial characterization is not sufficient to account for all of Kant's discussion. Despite this, it is worth treating this initial characterization and seeing the limits that are set to it.
The next point that follows from the initial characterization that foreigner's have a right not to be treated with hostility is an indication of the narrowness of this claim. Foreigners can certainly be turned away: this is not part of what is meant by treating with hostility. They cannot, however, be turned away if this means that doing so will lead to their destruction. Since this is the case there is here a certain sense of recognition of the right of refugees since, presumably, if turning them away will lead to their destruction then there would be two reasons why this would result. Either because they were not able to support themselves independently (economic reasons) or because doing so would result in them being the victims of attack or assault (broadly political reasons of personal safety).
Kant views the claim in question as one that does not encompass any right to be a guest. To be a guest would require some form of contract between the foreigner and those who he presented himself before. At this point it is also interesting that Kant is speaking here of the foreigner presenting themselves before individuals of the state they have arrived in, not of some responsibility of the government. So, although I just suggested a form of "refugee" status was being recognized, in the absence of specific reference to duties of the state, it appears this kind of right is one that is required of the individuals of the state to which the foreigner presents themselves or that this is the primary way Kant tends to think of the matter.
The foreigner has a right to visit only and this is described in terms of the right to present himself before society, which widens the area of his right beyond that of reference to particular individuals and does invoke some sense of a responsibility of the community to whom he is presented though again without reference to the state being given. The ground of the right of visitation is based on the claim that all human beings have a right to possession in common of the earth's surface, a surface which is intrinsically limited and on which we hence naturally find ourselves in proximity to each other.
After referring to this cosmopolitan right Kant next mentions the behaviour of those who are inhospitable, a discussion that has two parts, only one of which will be treated in this posting. This first part refers to the pirates of the Barbary Coast and the Arabian Bedouin, both of whom are regarded as robbers of others and hence as peoples who behave contrary to "natural right". This reference to "natural right" also implies that cosmopolitan right is a kind of right within the state of nature, a right one can claim of anyone else, which, if right, again makes clear it has no necessary reference to state or government conduct.
The right to hospitality is next indicated to be limited to conditions that make it possible to seek commerce with the inhabitants of a given area. This reference to commerce suggests that the right to hospitality is one in which the one allowed visitation rights is, by virtue of having been granted them, further allowed to request a right to buy and sell. This right evidently would provide those who are visiting with a means to establish a livelihood which may be one of the reasons for granting them the right to commerce. A further ground for this is suggested when Kant refers to the possibility of public law entering into the relations between different parts of the world so that finally the human race could come close to a "cosmopolitan constitution".
So the first part of the discussion begins by reference to an individual right held in relation to inhabitants of foreign countries not to be treated in a hostile manner. The second point that follows is that this entails a right to visit other areas and the third part is that this right of visitation includes a right to seek commerce (note only to seek this, not to have it granted). Hence the first part of the discussion at any rate is markedly narrower than rights claimed and granted widely within the contemporary world to individuals who are not citizens of a given area and in the contemporary world reference to governments is central whereas it appears to be missing from the first part of Kant's account. In the next posting I'll visit the second part of Kant's treatment of inhospitable conduct and how it involves a reference to governments.