The published Chapter 13 of On What Matters addresses moral dilemmas as a way of responding to the universalisation tests that Kant uses when motivating consideration of the Law of Nature formula. In relating the universalisation tests to moral dilemmas Parfit is following the precedent set by him in previous drafts of this material.
The basic question that is asked in the universalisation test concerns whether a maxim can be one that can include its own willing in the universalisation of it. Parfit asks, concerning this test, not whether it works, as has been common in the secondary literature on Kant and universalisation, but rather what the alternative to such willing would be. In raising this point Parfit moves the considerations involved in a definite direction since the adoption of a maxim as a universal law is taken to be something we can endorse if the outcome of adopting a different one would be worse than the adoption of this one. So the standard set immediately is an axiological one. Parfit's discussion thus begins with putting the good prior to the right.
Parfit assumes that the Law of Nature formula works best when it is applied to maxims of which 3 things are true: a) that it would be possible for many people to act on the maxim in question; b) when the effects of such acts will be similar regardless of the number so acting; c) when the effects would be distributed equally between different people. Having made this point Parfit next introduces classic dilemmas from games theory, dilemmas generically described by him as "each-we" coordination problems and which include the group known as prisoners dilemmas. The general structure of these dilemmas is that if each of us does what is best for themselves this will be worse for all of us collectively. There are various ways such dilemmas arise as policy questions, including with regards to public goods that benefit all, including those who do nothing to produce them and with regard to "fisherman's dilemmas" where if we all pursue activities of certain kinds we will collectively deplete the resource we are interested in though for each one of us it appears plausible to act in the specified way.
These general dilemmas tend to be structured on a peculiar model of rational agents where such agents are generically assumed to be personal utility maximisers, an implicit assumption that is not interrogated by Parfit. Parfit does, however, expand the arena of the utility maximisation by discussing how, according to common sense morality, we have special obligations to others and we tend to incorporate these special obligations into our calculations thus meaning that we need not be seen, even on this model, purely as egoistic utility maximisers. In political terms the consideration of treatment of these dilemmas tends to be undertaken through coercive measures that impose heavy costs on non-compliance with activities taken to have wider value than even that of our enlarged sense of self-interest allows. Morally consequentialists take themselves to have ways of addressing the problems of such dilemmas including associated difficulties with free riders.
There is a further class of dilemmas, called by Parfit, "unsolved" dilemmas in which no one is performing in the right way. With regard to such "dilemmas" Kant's universalisation procedure is regarded by Parfit as particularly useful since it prompts attitude adjustment in just the right way. One of the results of this is to lead to all of us seeing that acts that, taken individually, might not be "wrong" may be so in an accumulative sense and this will challenge us and lead to a different valuation being placed on these acts.
However, whilst Parfit introduces the relationship between dilemmas and the universalisation test by showing one way in which the latter can respond to a form of the former, his general attitude in this chapter is not favourable to the practice of universalisation tests as a response to the problems posed by the dilemmas. The reason why Parfit's reaction to universalisation tests takes this negative turn is due to his invocation of what he terms the "threshold objection". This objection basically states that there are thresholds that relate to the effects of actions and this is a salient criteria that should be invoked in terms of actions that we should perform. Given this salient criteria we should not simply invoke universalisation as a blunt tool to tell us what to do since the threshold determines the way our actions will impact on others and it is this that balances simple universalisation.
Having invoked this objection Parfit considers some possible responses Kant might make to it. The first response is to put universalisation tests in hypothetically conditional form. The second is to follow a suggestion of Thomas Pogge and to see the question as requiring us to invoke criteria of moral belief. However what becomes clear in the course of Parfit's discussion is that the threshold objection is really another form of the "mixed maxims" objection that was raised in the previous chapter of On What Matters. And when this becomes clear it also becomes evident that the threshold objection turns on how maxims are understood as did the "mixed maxims" objection. Essentially maxims can either be said to state aims or policies. Policies are adopted in order to realise aims whilst aims are the general thing that policies are guided by. Kant is after a formulation of aims with his universalisation test that will give us a formal way of relating to policies rather than viewing policies as ends we have selected due to some prior commitment to the good. Thus Kant's methodological approach is not akin to that which Parfit follows.
This division can be seen as Parfit moves to reformulate the Law of Nature formula so that it refers to what can be "rationally" willed in "similar circumstances" where the nature of the circumstances appears not just to require a sense of adjustment of policies as Parfit gives us the impression is the case but to affect the way we are to understand appropriate aims.
One of the ways this becomes apparent is when Parfit motivates the second major objection of this chapter, the so-called "Ideal World Objection". This differs from the "threshold objection" as it concerns not simply the effects produced after tipping points have been reached but also the plausibility of standards derived from ideal theory in a non-ideal world. Here Parfit argues that viewing universalisable maxims as stating ideal willing can produce counterproductive effects as attention to the actions of others doesn't lead me to adjust my own actions. The "coordination" required here is one in which my own willing is governed by what is achievable given the way others are behaving. Again Parfit considers conditional forms of maxims which, however, lead to the production of too permissive results. In response to this point Parfit arrives at the result that we should be aiming not to answer the question expressed as "what if everyone did that" but instead the answer to the question, "what if everyone thought this way". The revision in thought is meant to be governed by the attempt to coordinate action with others rather than to be concerned with universalisation as such.
The general shift away from universalisation tests as a generic procedure of action towards one that concerns how to inculcate the right kinds of moral beliefs is governed by a process of considering right results as "good" ones, i.e., ones in which the best consequences are produced by the following of the right rules. The result is that a kind of rule consequentialism is favoured rather than a Kantian morality. In reply it is worth pointing out that the Kantian question is not asked or considered in its own terms but always evaluated in terms that are alien to its account of the right structure of moral theory.
Showing posts with label moral dilemmas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label moral dilemmas. Show all posts
Thursday, 24 May 2012
Tuesday, 1 May 2012
Parfit and Kant on Moral Dilemmas (II)
I reviewed the account of moral dilemmas that Parfit poses with regard to universalisation tests in Climbing the Mountain and in this posting I am going to track the parallel treatment that he provided in Chapter 13 of the 2008 version of On What Matters. This chapter is given a title in the 2008 version that is new as it is now headed "what if everyone did that?", a question often used to crudely summarise the basic idea taken to be behind Kant's universalisation tests.
It is interesting to see how Parfit summarises the understanding he has of the question given in the chapter title. It is to the effect that what has to be asked, in testing maxims, is whether we could rationally will it to be true that everyone acts on some given maxim. However it is not merely that this is the translation Parfit gives of the question that appears to be asked when the universal law formula is related to maxims. It is also a question that Parfit considers has to include reference to alternatives. So, it is not just whether everyone could rationally will in a certain way, but a relation of this question to options that the situation includes that would be different. The way this is understood by Parfit is that the acting of everyone in accord with a "bad" maxim could be better than an alternative if the alternative were that everyone apart from ourselves were to act in a different way. This would ensure however, that the way the maxim testing procedure is going to go is through axiological measurement. An alternative to this which Parfit considers and approves of as preferable is that we ask instead whether rational willing of a maxim is better if everyone acts on the maxim in question rather than no one acting on it. But even this is complicated by the question of what other maxims people would act upon rather the one being put to the test.
Parfit argues that the Law of Nature Formula works best when it is applied to maxims of which 3 things are true, namely that it would be possible for many to act on the maxim, that the effects would be similar regardless of the number who so acted and that these effects would be equally distributed. The reason Parfit takes trouble to specify things in this way becomes clear when the topic of moral dilemmas subsequently enters the picture as these dilemmas are understood in a particular way. The dilemmas are taken from cases of game theory in which there exist what are termed "each-we" dilemmas of practical rationality in which "if each rather than none of us does what would be in a certain way better, we would be doing what would be, in this same way, worse".
Now the way these dilemmas are construed is not neutral between different ways the universalisation test could be understood. In these dilemmas there is an implicit assumption which Parfit makes explicit to the effect that what is really at issue are questions of "benefit" or "well-being". This applies to the classic prisoner's dilemmas cases which Parfit understands as "self-benefiting" dilemmas in which the whole question turns on whether self-interest is best served by doing what appears immediately to maximise it or rather by doing what would, should cooperation follow, be best overall. Similar considerations are at issue in "contributors dilemmas" that frame discussions of public goods. Parfit complicates matters in one way by introducing a variant that is not usually mentioned in these contexts. The variant concerns special attachments which are favoured by ordinary common sense morality including those formed between parents and children. These special attachments frame connections that Parfit terms M-relations and there can be "dilemmas" concerning whether we favour people in these relations as opposed to having impartial aims.
The public policy implications of these dilemmas are typically addressed as Parfit indicates by means of coercive measures intended to disincentivise "free-riding" behaviours. However in the moral arena act consequentialists favour direct responses to these dilemmas, albeit ones that have made many uncomfortable. Kantian solutions appear, by contrast, to favour universal responses on the grounds that the converse are not, as Parfit understands it, rationally willable. Kant's tests apply also not simply to "actual" cases (as do solutions to policy dilemmas) but also to possible ones. It is in so doing that they interest Parfit who thinks that Kantian ways of formulating views concerning putative possible dilemmas are capable of challenging the standard intuitions of common sense morality. An example of this concerns the connection of Kant's universalisation test to acts that appear trivial in impact when related to each person's acts but which have a large accumulative effect. So, on grounds of appeal to the Formula of the Law of Nature Parfit takes it there is a duty not to act so that the earth's resources become seriously depleted as this would not be rationally willable.
If Parfit thinks that appeal to the universalisation tests has a good sense with regard to cases where particular acts seem not to be wrong in themselves but only in their accumulative effect he nonetheless has reservations about the appeal to the Formula of the Law of Nature in other areas. In many cases, on Parfit's view, the problem is not picked out by the universalisation test since the wrongness of an act may often depend, on Parfit's conception, on how many people act in a given way. So when a certain number, call it x, acts on a given maxim, the effect of their so acting is neutral but when the number rises above this, it becomes bad. (Note again the axiological measurement procedure appealed to here.) The example given refers to a behaviour manifested by Kant himself and some of the rest of us. This would be not to have children so as to devote oneself to philosophy. If a certain number act on this maxim the result can be beneficial but if the number rises too high the result would be negative. Notice that the suggestion here of how to assess the maxim assumes, however, that the existence of people is something that can be calculated in terms of its goodness or badness, something that is not at all obvious to Kantians.
The objection that is put here is one that Parfit terms a "Threshold Objection" and Thomas Pogge is mentioned now as someone who thinks that a response to this objection would require us to move away from the Law of Nature Formula to considerations based on moral belief. This would mean not assessing the maxim given in terms of acts but instead in terms of what is believed concerning acts. Parfit is far from convinced that this response is a good one since Pogge's response appears to involve us endorsing beliefs that would, in regard to the acts, specify something untrue of them. Pogge also appeals to conditionality considerations which suggest that acts are endorsed only given certain conditions. This does involve Pogge giving concession however to the implicit consequentialism of the discussion.
In considering this claim about conditionality Parfit looks at a different kind of example such as what is at work in someone acting on the "maxim" that they should become a dentist. Clearly not everyone could become one but there is conditionality built into this maxim since the aim of becoming a dentist refers, at least implicitly to the understanding that this is a stable way of making a living. But, if this kind of case is handled well by reference to moral beliefs of the sort appealed to by Pogge, there are exceptions to it. Not only is this so but, on Parfit's demanding account, we have to consider not just maxims that anyone would endorse but any that someone conceivably "could" endorse. This involves conjuring up a figure familiar from the writings of R.M. Hare, the figure of the moral "fanatic". Such a figure adopts maxims unconditionally and hence is not dealt with by the type of move Pogge has made.
When we reach this level of account however, it appears that the type of objection that is really at work in "threshold cases" is not really a new objection after all as the figure of the fanatic makes clear that what is being considered are cases of "mixed maxims", maxims that it would be sometimes but not always wrong to act upon. And when it becomes clear that the cases in question are really of this type Parfit alters the account he gives of the way that Kantians could respond. Now Parfit suggests that "maxims" should not be considered as referring to general "policies" but instead to morally relevant descriptions of what people are doing. This leads to a revised version of the Law of Nature Formula being given: "We act wrongly unless we are doing something that we could rationally will everyone to do, in similar circumstances, if they can".
The reference to similar circumstances is supposed to cover even the case of the moral fanatic and their unconditional endorsement of maxims. Having introduced the variant of the Law of Nature Formula intended to address the renewed "mixed maxims" objection Parfit next considers a different type of objection. On this objection it would be the case that if enough people act in a certain way, these acts would have good effects but when fewer people act in this way the effects would or might be very bad. Here we have a kind of "reverse threshold" since it is the case that it is the number dropping below x that produces the problem. A case said to indicate the problem is real is that of the maxim, "never use violence" which, according to some, is one that Kant's tests should lead us to endorse but which clear cases (like those prevailing in the 1930's) count against. Game theoretic considerations of similar sort are also again wheeled on here by Parfit. The point of this reverse threshold objection is to motivate the general complaint, attributed to Christine Korsgaard, that Kant provides only standards of conduct that apply to ideal states of affairs and not to actual ones in which they might have disastrous results.
Parfit considers conditional statements of maxims again in order to show that it need not follow that maxims are endorsed that fail to take any account of what others are doing. This enables, for example, a much clearer statement of response to violent acts which allows response to the violence of others should that be manifested. Given that conditionality of maxim formation allows a response to the "ideal world objection" it is not so clear that this can be sustained. However, rather than this being the case, it could instead be true, as Parfit considers, that unrestricted retaliation to violence could be rationally willed. Since this would only be in response to actual violence undergone Parfit assumes that this type of maxim could be, mistakenly, endorsed by Kant's test though it is not at all clear to me why Parfit thinks this. If the onus passes from being unreasonably restrictive to being unreasonably permissive there still appears to be a way of thinking about thresholds that creates a problem (at least according to Parfit). These problems do often afflict rule consequentialism, as Parfit indicates. On the basis of consideration of this reverse threshold objection Parfit revises further the Law of Nature Formula so that it becomes: "It is wrong for us to act on some maxim unless we could rationally will it to be true that this maxim be acted on by everyone, and by any other number of people, rather than by no one".
This revised maxim builds in consideration of the numbers of others that act according to the maxim given. The advantage of this, on Parfit's view, is that many more maxims are now condemned so that Kant's test does not become unreasonably permissive. This revision is one that Parfit assumes further enables it to be the case that moral beliefs that can be endorsed by most are thereby capable of being pursued.
It is interesting to see how Parfit summarises the understanding he has of the question given in the chapter title. It is to the effect that what has to be asked, in testing maxims, is whether we could rationally will it to be true that everyone acts on some given maxim. However it is not merely that this is the translation Parfit gives of the question that appears to be asked when the universal law formula is related to maxims. It is also a question that Parfit considers has to include reference to alternatives. So, it is not just whether everyone could rationally will in a certain way, but a relation of this question to options that the situation includes that would be different. The way this is understood by Parfit is that the acting of everyone in accord with a "bad" maxim could be better than an alternative if the alternative were that everyone apart from ourselves were to act in a different way. This would ensure however, that the way the maxim testing procedure is going to go is through axiological measurement. An alternative to this which Parfit considers and approves of as preferable is that we ask instead whether rational willing of a maxim is better if everyone acts on the maxim in question rather than no one acting on it. But even this is complicated by the question of what other maxims people would act upon rather the one being put to the test.
Parfit argues that the Law of Nature Formula works best when it is applied to maxims of which 3 things are true, namely that it would be possible for many to act on the maxim, that the effects would be similar regardless of the number who so acted and that these effects would be equally distributed. The reason Parfit takes trouble to specify things in this way becomes clear when the topic of moral dilemmas subsequently enters the picture as these dilemmas are understood in a particular way. The dilemmas are taken from cases of game theory in which there exist what are termed "each-we" dilemmas of practical rationality in which "if each rather than none of us does what would be in a certain way better, we would be doing what would be, in this same way, worse".
Now the way these dilemmas are construed is not neutral between different ways the universalisation test could be understood. In these dilemmas there is an implicit assumption which Parfit makes explicit to the effect that what is really at issue are questions of "benefit" or "well-being". This applies to the classic prisoner's dilemmas cases which Parfit understands as "self-benefiting" dilemmas in which the whole question turns on whether self-interest is best served by doing what appears immediately to maximise it or rather by doing what would, should cooperation follow, be best overall. Similar considerations are at issue in "contributors dilemmas" that frame discussions of public goods. Parfit complicates matters in one way by introducing a variant that is not usually mentioned in these contexts. The variant concerns special attachments which are favoured by ordinary common sense morality including those formed between parents and children. These special attachments frame connections that Parfit terms M-relations and there can be "dilemmas" concerning whether we favour people in these relations as opposed to having impartial aims.
The public policy implications of these dilemmas are typically addressed as Parfit indicates by means of coercive measures intended to disincentivise "free-riding" behaviours. However in the moral arena act consequentialists favour direct responses to these dilemmas, albeit ones that have made many uncomfortable. Kantian solutions appear, by contrast, to favour universal responses on the grounds that the converse are not, as Parfit understands it, rationally willable. Kant's tests apply also not simply to "actual" cases (as do solutions to policy dilemmas) but also to possible ones. It is in so doing that they interest Parfit who thinks that Kantian ways of formulating views concerning putative possible dilemmas are capable of challenging the standard intuitions of common sense morality. An example of this concerns the connection of Kant's universalisation test to acts that appear trivial in impact when related to each person's acts but which have a large accumulative effect. So, on grounds of appeal to the Formula of the Law of Nature Parfit takes it there is a duty not to act so that the earth's resources become seriously depleted as this would not be rationally willable.
If Parfit thinks that appeal to the universalisation tests has a good sense with regard to cases where particular acts seem not to be wrong in themselves but only in their accumulative effect he nonetheless has reservations about the appeal to the Formula of the Law of Nature in other areas. In many cases, on Parfit's view, the problem is not picked out by the universalisation test since the wrongness of an act may often depend, on Parfit's conception, on how many people act in a given way. So when a certain number, call it x, acts on a given maxim, the effect of their so acting is neutral but when the number rises above this, it becomes bad. (Note again the axiological measurement procedure appealed to here.) The example given refers to a behaviour manifested by Kant himself and some of the rest of us. This would be not to have children so as to devote oneself to philosophy. If a certain number act on this maxim the result can be beneficial but if the number rises too high the result would be negative. Notice that the suggestion here of how to assess the maxim assumes, however, that the existence of people is something that can be calculated in terms of its goodness or badness, something that is not at all obvious to Kantians.
The objection that is put here is one that Parfit terms a "Threshold Objection" and Thomas Pogge is mentioned now as someone who thinks that a response to this objection would require us to move away from the Law of Nature Formula to considerations based on moral belief. This would mean not assessing the maxim given in terms of acts but instead in terms of what is believed concerning acts. Parfit is far from convinced that this response is a good one since Pogge's response appears to involve us endorsing beliefs that would, in regard to the acts, specify something untrue of them. Pogge also appeals to conditionality considerations which suggest that acts are endorsed only given certain conditions. This does involve Pogge giving concession however to the implicit consequentialism of the discussion.
In considering this claim about conditionality Parfit looks at a different kind of example such as what is at work in someone acting on the "maxim" that they should become a dentist. Clearly not everyone could become one but there is conditionality built into this maxim since the aim of becoming a dentist refers, at least implicitly to the understanding that this is a stable way of making a living. But, if this kind of case is handled well by reference to moral beliefs of the sort appealed to by Pogge, there are exceptions to it. Not only is this so but, on Parfit's demanding account, we have to consider not just maxims that anyone would endorse but any that someone conceivably "could" endorse. This involves conjuring up a figure familiar from the writings of R.M. Hare, the figure of the moral "fanatic". Such a figure adopts maxims unconditionally and hence is not dealt with by the type of move Pogge has made.
When we reach this level of account however, it appears that the type of objection that is really at work in "threshold cases" is not really a new objection after all as the figure of the fanatic makes clear that what is being considered are cases of "mixed maxims", maxims that it would be sometimes but not always wrong to act upon. And when it becomes clear that the cases in question are really of this type Parfit alters the account he gives of the way that Kantians could respond. Now Parfit suggests that "maxims" should not be considered as referring to general "policies" but instead to morally relevant descriptions of what people are doing. This leads to a revised version of the Law of Nature Formula being given: "We act wrongly unless we are doing something that we could rationally will everyone to do, in similar circumstances, if they can".
The reference to similar circumstances is supposed to cover even the case of the moral fanatic and their unconditional endorsement of maxims. Having introduced the variant of the Law of Nature Formula intended to address the renewed "mixed maxims" objection Parfit next considers a different type of objection. On this objection it would be the case that if enough people act in a certain way, these acts would have good effects but when fewer people act in this way the effects would or might be very bad. Here we have a kind of "reverse threshold" since it is the case that it is the number dropping below x that produces the problem. A case said to indicate the problem is real is that of the maxim, "never use violence" which, according to some, is one that Kant's tests should lead us to endorse but which clear cases (like those prevailing in the 1930's) count against. Game theoretic considerations of similar sort are also again wheeled on here by Parfit. The point of this reverse threshold objection is to motivate the general complaint, attributed to Christine Korsgaard, that Kant provides only standards of conduct that apply to ideal states of affairs and not to actual ones in which they might have disastrous results.
Parfit considers conditional statements of maxims again in order to show that it need not follow that maxims are endorsed that fail to take any account of what others are doing. This enables, for example, a much clearer statement of response to violent acts which allows response to the violence of others should that be manifested. Given that conditionality of maxim formation allows a response to the "ideal world objection" it is not so clear that this can be sustained. However, rather than this being the case, it could instead be true, as Parfit considers, that unrestricted retaliation to violence could be rationally willed. Since this would only be in response to actual violence undergone Parfit assumes that this type of maxim could be, mistakenly, endorsed by Kant's test though it is not at all clear to me why Parfit thinks this. If the onus passes from being unreasonably restrictive to being unreasonably permissive there still appears to be a way of thinking about thresholds that creates a problem (at least according to Parfit). These problems do often afflict rule consequentialism, as Parfit indicates. On the basis of consideration of this reverse threshold objection Parfit revises further the Law of Nature Formula so that it becomes: "It is wrong for us to act on some maxim unless we could rationally will it to be true that this maxim be acted on by everyone, and by any other number of people, rather than by no one".
This revised maxim builds in consideration of the numbers of others that act according to the maxim given. The advantage of this, on Parfit's view, is that many more maxims are now condemned so that Kant's test does not become unreasonably permissive. This revision is one that Parfit assumes further enables it to be the case that moral beliefs that can be endorsed by most are thereby capable of being pursued.
Tuesday, 3 April 2012
Parfit and Kant on Moral Dilemmas
In the previous posting on Parfit I looked at Chapter 8 of Climbing the Mountain, the first full monograph-length version of what later was to become published as On What Matters and suggested some significant problems with the treatment Parfit gave there of Kantian formulas of universal law. In this posting I'm going to look at Chapter 9 of Climbing the Mountain where Parfit moves on to addressing some moral dilemmas and connects the understanding of these dilemmas to questions about universalisation tests.
One of the points that this chapter raises concerns the world that is being referred to when universalisation tests are formulated. Is it the "actual" world or not? There are good reasons to think not, not least some remarks Kant makes in his discussion of the typic in the Critique of Practical Reason where he makes clear that we frequently give ourselves a pass with regard to moral requirements precisely on the grounds that not everyone will follow our example in the actual world. Parfit construes this point as requiring the test that is formulated by the Law of Nature Formula to be understood as asking us whether it would be better if no one acted in a certain way.
Parfit takes the Law of Nature Formula to work best when applied to maxims of which 3 things are true: a) it is possible for many people to act on this maxim; b) whatever the number of people who act on it the effects of each such act would be similar; c) these effects would be roughly equally distributed between different people. After stating these points Parfit moves on to the real business of this chapter which is to discuss moral dilemmas, beginning with the case of "each-we dilemmas" in which "if each rather than none of us does what would be better in some kind of way, we would be doing what would be, in this way, worse" (171). These cases are next summarised in terms of well-being.
The basic move that Parfit thus makes, apparently casually, in this chapter, is to examine types of moral dilemma that are based on a general consequentialist appraisal basis and to apply versions of the universality test to cases so considered. Such cases have a wide range, involving free-rider considerations for example, as applied to "public goods" such as the provision of law and order (with cases of tax evasion having force here). The general cases of each-we dilemmas also touch upon special questions from common sense morality that involve those to whom we have special obligations (such as children, clients or colleagues). Each-we dilemmas arise in these cases in particular affecting the people Parfit dubs M-related to us.
Moral cases of each-we dilemmas are often resolved by appeal to forms of utilitarianism but Parfit considers here Kantian solutions though he does so not by asking the question with which the chapter is titled, namely, "what if everyone did that", but rather its negative complement, "what if no one did that". The reasons for invoking this formula in these cases, according to Parfit, is that it will lead us to revise widely held moral beliefs that are mistaken. Not only will appeal to Kant's Law of Nature Formula have this effect, on Parfit's view, it will also challenge common sense beliefs here in an especially forceful way.
When Parfit comes to apply the Law of Nature Formula to the each-we dilemmas he does so with a proviso. This is that we consider acts whose rightness depends at least in part on their predictable effects. The point Parfit is after here is that certain types of maxims are fine if restrictively applied whilst they would become problematic if widely adopted. This type of problem is widely stated in secondary literature on Kant's universal law formulas and would require more consideration than can be given here. Parfit's example is of the maxim "have no children so I can devote myself to philosophy", a maxim that is fine in restricted application but would be disastrous if adopted universally.This is what is termed by Parfit the "permissible acts objection".
With regard to these "permissible acts" most maxims concerning them are formulated in a conditional way and this points to Parfit to restrictions on the maxims in question that are taken by him to be broadly in accord with the standards of the hypothetical imperative (though he doesn't explicitly refer here to the hypothetical imperative). However, in accord with Parfit's general conflation of maxims with intentions he reformulates the Law of Nature Formula to say that we act wrongly unless what we are intentionally doing is something that we could rationally will everyone to do.
After considering this first objection Parfit moves on to a second one. This again is formulated in terms of effects of adopting certain maxims. However, in this case, the problem is taken to be that Kant's general standard is that of an ideal world. Parfit here follows Christine Korsgaard in stating that there might be a problem with stating things in terms of ideal worlds since, in the "actual" world, disastrous results could ensue from following maxims that would ideally be alright. This "Ideal World Objection" applies, for example, to any maxims that rule against violence as such since, in the "actual" world, use of it cannot be unrestrictedly ruled out. However, once we have admitted this and formulated maxims to meet it, there is a different ideal world objection, namely, that maxims might thus become too permissive.
This objection concerning permissiveness is applied by Parfit to the general formulations that are often given of rule consequentialism, and used to further revise the Law of Nature formula. However the revision that arises from considering the permissiveness objection also has the effect of making the kind of consequentialism that Parfit has been building in to the moral situation one that becomes closer to that envisaged by act consequentialists. The chapter closes with this construal of the Law of Nature Formula having become thus close to a modified notion of rule consequentialism that appears well on the way to act consequentialism.
One of the points that this chapter raises concerns the world that is being referred to when universalisation tests are formulated. Is it the "actual" world or not? There are good reasons to think not, not least some remarks Kant makes in his discussion of the typic in the Critique of Practical Reason where he makes clear that we frequently give ourselves a pass with regard to moral requirements precisely on the grounds that not everyone will follow our example in the actual world. Parfit construes this point as requiring the test that is formulated by the Law of Nature Formula to be understood as asking us whether it would be better if no one acted in a certain way.
Parfit takes the Law of Nature Formula to work best when applied to maxims of which 3 things are true: a) it is possible for many people to act on this maxim; b) whatever the number of people who act on it the effects of each such act would be similar; c) these effects would be roughly equally distributed between different people. After stating these points Parfit moves on to the real business of this chapter which is to discuss moral dilemmas, beginning with the case of "each-we dilemmas" in which "if each rather than none of us does what would be better in some kind of way, we would be doing what would be, in this way, worse" (171). These cases are next summarised in terms of well-being.
The basic move that Parfit thus makes, apparently casually, in this chapter, is to examine types of moral dilemma that are based on a general consequentialist appraisal basis and to apply versions of the universality test to cases so considered. Such cases have a wide range, involving free-rider considerations for example, as applied to "public goods" such as the provision of law and order (with cases of tax evasion having force here). The general cases of each-we dilemmas also touch upon special questions from common sense morality that involve those to whom we have special obligations (such as children, clients or colleagues). Each-we dilemmas arise in these cases in particular affecting the people Parfit dubs M-related to us.
Moral cases of each-we dilemmas are often resolved by appeal to forms of utilitarianism but Parfit considers here Kantian solutions though he does so not by asking the question with which the chapter is titled, namely, "what if everyone did that", but rather its negative complement, "what if no one did that". The reasons for invoking this formula in these cases, according to Parfit, is that it will lead us to revise widely held moral beliefs that are mistaken. Not only will appeal to Kant's Law of Nature Formula have this effect, on Parfit's view, it will also challenge common sense beliefs here in an especially forceful way.
When Parfit comes to apply the Law of Nature Formula to the each-we dilemmas he does so with a proviso. This is that we consider acts whose rightness depends at least in part on their predictable effects. The point Parfit is after here is that certain types of maxims are fine if restrictively applied whilst they would become problematic if widely adopted. This type of problem is widely stated in secondary literature on Kant's universal law formulas and would require more consideration than can be given here. Parfit's example is of the maxim "have no children so I can devote myself to philosophy", a maxim that is fine in restricted application but would be disastrous if adopted universally.This is what is termed by Parfit the "permissible acts objection".
With regard to these "permissible acts" most maxims concerning them are formulated in a conditional way and this points to Parfit to restrictions on the maxims in question that are taken by him to be broadly in accord with the standards of the hypothetical imperative (though he doesn't explicitly refer here to the hypothetical imperative). However, in accord with Parfit's general conflation of maxims with intentions he reformulates the Law of Nature Formula to say that we act wrongly unless what we are intentionally doing is something that we could rationally will everyone to do.
After considering this first objection Parfit moves on to a second one. This again is formulated in terms of effects of adopting certain maxims. However, in this case, the problem is taken to be that Kant's general standard is that of an ideal world. Parfit here follows Christine Korsgaard in stating that there might be a problem with stating things in terms of ideal worlds since, in the "actual" world, disastrous results could ensue from following maxims that would ideally be alright. This "Ideal World Objection" applies, for example, to any maxims that rule against violence as such since, in the "actual" world, use of it cannot be unrestrictedly ruled out. However, once we have admitted this and formulated maxims to meet it, there is a different ideal world objection, namely, that maxims might thus become too permissive.
This objection concerning permissiveness is applied by Parfit to the general formulations that are often given of rule consequentialism, and used to further revise the Law of Nature formula. However the revision that arises from considering the permissiveness objection also has the effect of making the kind of consequentialism that Parfit has been building in to the moral situation one that becomes closer to that envisaged by act consequentialists. The chapter closes with this construal of the Law of Nature Formula having become thus close to a modified notion of rule consequentialism that appears well on the way to act consequentialism.
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