Rawls' Grounds for the Priority of Liberty

The argument concerning the priority of liberty in A Theory of Justice is presented in a few places. In section 39 it was "defined" and in section 46 it was related to other cases of priority. In presenting the reasons for the principles of justice in section 26 the account of liberty that was presented was also one in which the swopping of lesser for greater liberty was shown not to be a reasonable outcome for the acceptance of contracting parties within the original position. In section 82 as Rawls moves towards the conclusion of the whole book he brings together and summarises the arguments for the priority of liberty in a well-ordered society as seen from the point of view of the original position. In this posting I am going to concentrate on how the arguments given in the latter do more than just demonstrate the grounds for the priority of liberty. The arguments also show that the suggestion made by Parfit that Rawls' account of the deliberative rationality that Rawls is articulating is desire-based and shows, to the contrary, that the recognition of interests by Rawls is one that is intrinsically normatively grounded.


The argument of section 82 opens by referring to the way the conception of the well-ordered society is a notion that requires regulation by a public conception of justice. If there is a well-ordered society then the members of it all view each other as free and equal moral persons. Now, in describing what is meant in determining each other as free and equal moral persons, Rawls refers to "the fundamental aims and interests" in the name of which each of them thinks it possible to make legitimate claims on each other. The way to understand these "aims and interests" is central to replying to the suggestion of Parfit that Rawls' moral psychology is essentially desire-based and to show in detail why this is not the case. One of the ways it becomes obvious that the account of "aims and interests" Rawls is drawing on here is not a desire-based moral psychology is that he explicitly and openly says that a right to equal respect and consideration is central to determining the principles by which the basic structure of their society is to be governed. Alongside this point about a right to equal respect is the sense of justice that would normally govern the conduct of all the members of the well-ordered society.


The original position itself is specified as governed by the constraints of right as these constraints determine the form an acceptable set of principles can take. Amongst the constraints of right that would thereby define the form of a well-ordered society is that the conception of justice that governed it should be a publicly justifiable one. It is within the constraint of such publicity that we comprehend the notion of the members of it as free and equal moral persons as this way of viewing the person (what we can generally term a "Kantian" conception of persons) are ones to whom principles of justice are publicly accessible and justifiable. The original position embodied principles of reciprocity and equality as further elements of the constraints of right and it is in the context of recognition of these principles that Rawls indicates that a basic rationale for the priority of liberty is that fundamental aims and interests of all persons are protected by it. So a first sense given to the understanding of these "aims and interests" is in terms of equal reciprocal relations between persons.


Now the way that these "aims and interests" are recognised tells one a great deal about how they are understood. The first "interest" Rawls here mentions is that which people have in religion. Religious interests are recognised in terms of equal liberty of conscience for all contracting parties. The general nature of the religious interest is recognised only since no one would be aware, under the veil of ignorance, of possessing any particular religious belief. An "aim" of persons is clearly to defend any given religious belief that they may possess since they, as particular persons, will hold to some definite religion. The "strains of commitment" of the original position will be such that contracting parties will see the point of giving precedence to liberty. 


Having given first a "religious" interest and specifying the concomitant "aim" that goes with it Rawls secondly looks at how "higher-order interests" in general shape and regulate the social institutions that will themselves shape other "interests". The recognition of the contracting parties as "free" persons is reflected in the understanding that they each have of an "interest" in having the ability to adopt, revise and alter, their conceptions of the good. This is another basis for recognition of the priority of liberty. The basic structure thus should be governed by the account of autonomy and objectivity that Rawls earlier provided.


The arrival at the principles of justice as a result of deliberation within the original position occurs by means not just of the constraints of right that govern the position but also by means of the way that persons within this position are moved by a "certain hierarchy of interests". The highest-order interests and fundamental aims of the parties are reflected in the priority given to liberty and the means that enable them to "advance their other desires and ends" is explicitly stated to have a subordinate place. Not only is this so, but, as we shall see, in the sense meant by desire-based theories of reasons, Rawls does not recognise "desires" here as having any real role at all. There are, for example, "interests" in liberty which have a real objective in terms of establishing basic liberties but this is not the kind of "interest" that is invoked by desire-based theories of deliberative rationality. The kind of "interest" involved in liberty is, as Rawls puts it, a "higher-order" one as it regulates all the ways that "interests" can be expressed within a well-ordered society.


This point is supplemented by the argument concerning the kinds of attitudes and feelings that would be generated within a well-ordered society, the argument that included the previous account of envy. The point of the account of envy was to respond to the kind of objection to the well-ordered society that suggests that within it there could be a form of competitive/comparative relation between persons that would be socially destructive. In other words, a more equal society might make people more obsessed with their relative share of social wealth. Against this view Rawls wishes to show that the well-ordered society would lead, rather, to people taking less interest in relative positions. The presence of envy would have less sway, at least in a destructive sense. This is not due to a lack of concern with status since recognition of self-respect as a basic primary good ensures instead that relating to others as worthy of respect is something central within the society. But the basis for self-respect is grounded not on relative share of income but instead on the public recognition of the equality of rights. Since there is such equality of rights there is no incentive to politically seek other ways of having status understood as central to worth that is non-public in form. 


One of the reasons why this argument is thought to hold by Rawls is due to the symmetrical reason why no one would wish to be publicly inferior as that would be damaging to self-esteem. Similarly attempting to reach a non-public form of self-esteem has the difficulty that it indicates a view of others as inferior to oneself, a conception that has no public endorsement and would rather lead to a general aversion to the one wishing to find expression for their view. Public attitudes of mutual respect have an essential place in maintaining a political balance between persons and in assuring everyone of their own worth and the acceptance of equal liberties is a central way in which this is expressed.


The distribution of material means in the well-ordered society is taken care of by principles of pure procedural justice and the good of social union is maintained by supporting the primary good of self-respect. The application of the difference principle allows for what was previously determined as excusable envy and this helps to show the grounds for the priority of liberty. The public knowledge of the facts about each other reflected in the general recognition of the Kantian conception of the person is both based in the culture of the well-ordered society and furthered by its institutional arrangements. The reasoning that led to the principles of justice and that can support it is of a form that is publicly available.


Notable in the whole argument of section 82 is that the interests that are recognised as decisive in it are not ones that are reflective of "desires" in the sense indicated in "desire-based" views of reasons. So, for example, they are not desires simply taken as given or as reflective of mere natural facts. They are rather civilly understood desires and desires that fundamentally reflect interests in recognition of aspects of personhood that are enshrined in the Kantian conception of the person. So not only does section 82 summarise and complete the arguments for the priority of liberty but it confirms that Rawls' general moral psychology is not a desire-based one.

Rawls on Envy and Equality

Two sections of Chapter IX of A Theory of Justice take up the apparently provincial question of how to respond to socially destructive psychological propensities with envy being used as the specific case for the general question. The point of this posting will not just be to critically reconstruct the argument of these sections but also to use them to answer the question of why Rawls bothers to expend space on an argument that might strike some as not particularly significant. 


The introduction of this question marks a shift in the general strategy of the argument of Theory. Within the original position Rawls assumed that there were not operative destructive psychological propensities as something like envy was taken not to motivate a rational person. This was part of the general removal of special contingent psychological circumstances from the specific choice situation defined in the original position. In making this move Rawls correctly followed the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness although, in so doing, he certainly simplified the situation within the original position. But part of the point in adopting such simplified assumptions is that there is no evident moral value in any special psychological states and we wished there to arrive at a situation in which contingencies that lacked moral value were eliminated. 


However when introducing the question of envy Rawls strikes a new note admitting here that such psychological states as this do exist and have, in some sense, to be dealt with as part of the theory of justice. What is his justification for undertaking an examination of such a question? It is that the general discussion of justice has two separate parts. The first part, which involved the discussion of the original position, proceeding on the assumptions of aiming to clarify rational discussion of justice without introduction of contingencies that lacked moral value. The second part, in which envy comes on the scene as a topic to be discussed, asks now whether the well-ordered society is one that will encourage feelings such as envy to develop and in so doing will create circumstances that are not favourable to its survival. So the discussion of envy is a special case of a general problem of the stability of the well-ordered society. Should this society really be subject to problems in terms of its possible encouragement of destructive propensities that destabilise it then it could yet be the case that the justificatory force of the earlier arguments given could yet have to be revised.


In looking specifically at envy Rawls has to make some distinctions concerning the way it is to be understood. In doing so he distinguishes between two forms of envy: looking at what he terms "general" envy as opposed to "particular" envy. General envy has social force in terms of the kinds of goods some possess as against the particular items they have. So general envy focuses on something like the opportunities possessed by some as opposed to others. Particular envy, by contrast, is well expressed in rivalry and competition where something specific is fought over. To understand the latter it is necessary to have a conception of the kinds of things that can be fought over just as to grasp the former it is necessary to understand what types of opportunities provoke general envy. The comprehension of such questions is focused for Rawls by his notion of primary goods which includes a sense of opportunities, liberties, income and wealth. 


On this basis Rawls arrives at a general definition of envy as "the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of others even though their being more fortunate than we are does not detract from our advantages". In understanding envy in this way Rawls is pointing to the way that the comparative sense involved in it is one that is operative regardless of any specific material disadvantage suffered by the one possessed of envy. Such disadvantage may afflict them (particularly in the case of particular envy) but it is not a necessary feature of envy and even if it is given it may not be a disadvantage in practice (i.e. may not prevent the envied person achieving anything they wish to). Further envy is such that deprivation of the goods in question from the person envied may even be to the disadvantage of the one possessed by envy and yet still be desired by the latter. The other problem provoked by envy is that discovery of its existence by the one envied may provoke them to jealous clinging to their advantages in such a way that they feel obliged to protect themselves against others. So envy provokes a kind of arms race between the one envied and the one suffering envy and this is the reason why Kant discussed envy as a vice.


This does not mean that there cannot be such a thing as "benign envy" as when we describe someone as having an enviable situation as they possess something we take to be good without wishing to deprive them of it or feeling we are in any sense worse off by them possessing it. We are, in such a benign case, agreeing with the one possessing the valued thing that it is indeed valuable. Slightly differently there can be an emulative type of envy in which we engage in competition with someone for something, such as a kind of status, without either of us thereby falling into the destructive spiral described above. It is the case that emulative envy is liable to become destructive under some conditions but it is not necessarily a destructive feeling.


Rawls is careful to argue that there is nothing intrinsically moral about envy. What is meant by this claim is that there does not exist a moral principle that can be cited as a justification for envy. In saying this Rawls distinguishes envy from resentment as resentment is taken by him to be a moral feeling. When resentment is expressed it is, according to Rawls, a response to unjust situations or wrongful conduct and thus refers to an injury suffered. Rawls also distinguishes envy from other non-moral feelings that might be thought related to it, such as jealously. Rawls describes jealously, however, in a somewhat odd way as he relies on the sense of it that is used when we say that someone is "jealous" of their possessions rather than when we say that someone is jealous of the way someone else than themselves is receiving the lions' share of glory for something. Because Rawls thinks of jealously in this way he takes it to be the "reverse" of envy rather than being, as it may often be, simply a different kind of way of experiencing a very similar response to something.


More interesting than the contrast between envy and jealously is the one that Rawls mentions between envy and spite where the latter is characterised as the inclination to deny someone else a benefit one does not need and perhaps cannot even use oneself. The latter is, like envy, a kind of vice in being a trait that is socially detrimental. This does not mean that envy is never "excusable" since if someone feels that they lack self-respect and it would be unreasonable to expect them not to feel this then envy of others might be a response to be expected from them.


Having given this general discussion of envy Rawls turns next to the likelihood of it endangering the stability of the well-ordered society. In doing so Rawls claims that the root of envy is a lack of self-confidence in our own worth combined with a sense of an inability to alter matters. Three conditions are listed by Rawls as likely to encourage envy in a destructive way. The first is that the psychological condition just mentioned prevails and the second is that social circumstances occur in which the discrepancy between oneself and others is made painfully visible to one. The third is that there is no constructive alternative open to the one who experiences the feelings in question. 


The listing of these circumstances is meant to provide the means to assess the construction of the well-ordered society. In such a society self-esteem is taken to be a primary good and circumstances of arranging for its cultivation are general. So publicly all are treated as equal and everyone possesses the same basic rights. A common sense of justice prevails and instills civic relations between persons. Part of this is that no assumes that the better off are thereby morally preferable to anyone else. So the less fortunate are not taken to be inferior in any central sense and this should enable them to bear better the circumstances in which they are placed than in other forms of society.


The absolute and relative differences between members of society are to be less than in other societies as the spread of income and wealth should not be excessive in practice given the background institutions of the society. Natural duties are honoured in practice which will include the diminution of conspicuous display of social differences by means of wealth. So the liability to envy is unlikely to be strongly evoked. Finally, there will be constructive alternatives to envy within such a society. So there are no specific reasons to think that there would be troublesome conditions of envy within the well-ordered society.


The second part of Rawls' discussion of envy has a different focus than the first part. Having assessed the reasons for thinking that envy is not a problem for the well-ordered society Rawls next looks at the arguments for taking envy to be bound up with demands for a more egalitarian order. Conservative writers often present demands of this sort as motivated by envy but Rawls points out that this cannot be said to be the ground of the principles of justice. These principles are justified by means of a procedure that allows no scope for such feelings as envy and whilst it is possible that some who argue for these principles feel resentment that is quite different for the reasons given. The principles are justified by reference to criteria of universality and generality not by means of special circumstances.


Rawls also rejects other types of arguments that relate demands for justice to envy such as the ones given by Freud. Freud's arguments can be responded to on the grounds of Rawls' earlier account of the morality of authority as certainly requiring first of all inculcation of principles based on the simple standing of the one making them but as requiring, in a well-ordered society, development into the basis of character in such a way that they are autonomously justified. 


The specific discussion of envy is brief and what it does is show a basis for thinking that the account of moral sentiments is provided in order to show the means by which positive feelings can be developed. The presence of negative feelings is facilitated and encouraged by conditions that breed them so Rawls' argument is meant to show that the change of such conditions is the ground for hope that destructive motivations would also thereby reduce. To the critic who alleges that Rawls has not dealt seriously enough with the topic it is possible to respond by pointing out that the general account of moral psychology he has provided can be backed up further by a Kantian conception of the person. Such a conception, when reinforced by conditions that positively affirm it, permits the hope that emotions could develop on grounds that are different in connection with background conditions that are.

Rawls on Stability and Equality

Chapter VIII of A Theory of Justice concludes with 2 sections that appear after the close of the account of moral psychology that has dominated the chapter. The first of these, section 76, is entitled "The Problem of Relative Stability". Rawls introduces it as concerned with a comparison between different conceptions of justice in terms of their stability. The rationale for coming back to this question of stability - a question which was discussed at the beginning of the chapter and which frames the account of moral psychology - is that just schemes of cooperation are not necessarily stable. A basic reason that counts against their stability is anchored in psychologism egoism which gives the ground for preference for free-riding. This psychological propensity can be incentivised if the basic structure does not safeguard cooperative behaviour so that it is consistently rewarded.


After introducing this problem Rawls mentions how Hobbes classically connected the question of stability to that of political obligation so that obedience to the sovereign is presented as the basis on which the system of cooperation is stabilised. Public knowledge of "a common and normally effective sense of justice" is argued by Rawls to bring about the same result as the institution of sovereignty in the Hobbesian sense. This public understanding undercuts the psychological propensity to egoism and thus removes the initial form of instability that section 76 concerned itself with. Given that the psychological prop for free riding has been removed interests can be pursued within the bounds of the cooperative system and this gives legitimacy to the system which removes a second kind of potential instability.


To these initial arguments Rawls adds another that refers back to the previous discussion of moral psychology. Three laws were previously stated of such psychology and Rawls now argues that the effective operation of any one of these adds strength to the other two. So if stronger attachments are maintained (as is required by the second law) then the sense of justice (affirmed by the third law) is likewise maintained. Similarly, the existence of a sense of justice leads to a more secure intention to do one's share in relation to the cooperative system. So the system should set up a virtuous circle between the three psychological laws.


Going back to the original position it seems evident that the condition of stability should be added to the constraints operative on procedure. Rawls specifies how this should effect the structure of the conception of justice: "The most stable conception of justice, therefore, is presumably one that is perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation of the self". The condition of congruence is stressed as stronger on the contract view as it ensures that the restrictions specified in the two principles of justice will not be over-ridden for the sake of other benefits. This is one of the reasons for stressing the Kantian interpretation of the difference principle. Seen as aiding in this way it is possible to argue that this interpretation heightens the operation of a concern with reciprocity. 


As is common within Theory Rawls emphasises the point about the comparative advantage of justice as fairness by contrasting it with adherence to the principle of utility. The point made here is that the three laws of moral psychology could not be retained in their basic form within a basic structure governed by reference to the principle of utility. For example, if this principle governs the selection of the operative principles of institutions it is unclear why the less fortunate should have feelings of obligation to the better placed. The invocation of the principle of utility appears to undercut appeals to reciprocity and the general appeal that all should count only for one fails to give the type of overriding considerations that are put in place by the principles of justice. 


After making this point concerning distributive effects with regard to the implementation of principles Rawls confesses that even a well-ordered society is not one within which there will be a sense of justice of the same weight in different social groups. However the two principles of justice are assumed by him to provide the basis of mutual ties between social groups and to do so in a way not plausible by reference to the principle of utility. The latter requires the notion of benevolence to have a lot of weight and this is to rely upon a form of empathetic identification that is assumed to serve instead of the smooth operation of the three psychological laws. However, one of the problems with a kind of utilitarian meritocracy is that it appears to undercut the sense of worth of the least well off members of the society. By contrast, a form of identification with the good of others flows more naturally from adoption of the two principles of justice. Given the overriding nature of these principles there is an assured sense of worth that is applicable to all members of the society. 


The next point made concerns the kind of transparency to which the principles of justice appeal. They are perspicuous in their requirements whilst the notion of maximisation, by contrast, is vague. One of the ways this can be seen is that the breach of the first principle of justice, concerned with liberty, is easy to ascertain. The structure of the two principles and the lexical priority rules between them are more definite in terms of the mode of operation meant to govern their application than can be true of appeal to the principle of utility. Similarly, appeal to reciprocity, as is made even by John Stuart Mill, requires that a standard for comprehension of this be offered and this is not available within the principle of utility itself but is something that emerges evidently from the second principle of justice.


The argument of section 76 has been meant to show that justice as fairness is at least as stable as other conceptions of justice and that it is more so than the principle of utility. In section 77, by contrast, Rawls looks at the basis of equality. The principles of justice have only been understood as applicable to relations between human beings and now Rawls assesses what the basis is for the determination of application of the range of the conception of justice. In looking at this he concentrates here on the concept of equality especially (thereby assuming that reference to it is part of the conception of justice). 


Three levels of operation of the concept of equality are distinguished. The first level is that of the administration of institutions. At that level we have justice as regularity which involves the impartial application and consistent application of rules according to a rule such as that specifying that like cases be treated in like fashion. This is what we might term the "core" element of common sense ideas of justice. However, a second level of application is more controversial and concerns the substantive structure of institutions. Here we have the specification of the principles of equality in terms of equal access to basic rights. It has been specified up to this point that such access is only given to human beings but this has not thus far been defended. The third level of application determines those to whom the principles set out in the first two levels apply.


Rawls articulates the sense that the third level of application should be to "moral persons" as it is they are who are entitled to equal justice. The features of such persons are distinguished in two ways. Firstly, they have a conception of the good such as is given in a rational plan of life. Secondly, they are capable of having a sense of justice, in an at least minimal sense. These capacities single out to whom the principles of justice apply. The reason this is so is that the adoption of the criteria given in the account of moral persons determines how the institutions to which the principles of equality apply are to be governed. As Rawls puts this: "equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial situation". 


So if moral personality is the condition for being entitled to equal justice then it is sufficient as a basis for inclusion in the account of such justice. No particular group of persons lacks this capacity according to Rawls. Perhaps some have a more restricted sense of justice than others but so long as an at least minimal sense of it is present there is no basis for withholding from people the full protection of justice. Development of the sense of justice to a greater degree is assumed by Rawls to be a natural capacity and whilst this may ensure that some are better placed to act justly this does not mean they have greater rights than others. 


Once this argument has appeared, however, there follows a necessary consideration as to whether the application of the principles of justice is to be understood in a purely procedural way. Rawls, however, denies this asserting that such an interpretation would produce only a conception of justice as regularity (the first level considered). This is insufficient to guarantee substantive equality as such a procedural account could justify a caste system. So rather than favour such a view Rawls instead argues that equality is grounded on natural capacities. This is founded on viewing the capacities of moral personality as "range" properties that are found in all. 


Some have objected to this conception saying it undermines equal justice in practice but Rawls argues this view is based on an implicit reference to a teleological theory of natural capacities. A teleological theory involves commitment to maximisation and such a commitment allows variation on the basis of natural capacities (which therefore understands them in an anti-egalitarian way). But justice as fairness does not view natural capacities in a maximising way. It is true that the notion of moral personality may appear, by contrast, vague in outline by comparison to the appeal to maximisation. But this vagueness appears here only by not considering the way that application of the principles applicable to those possessed of the capacity for moral personality has built in constraints that are not themselves vague. 


The capacity for moral personality is not the same thing as the realisation of this capacity. Infants and children generally either do not realise the capacity or do so very imperfectly. But their rights are guided by guardians of them who cater for the development of their future interests. Further the original position is itself hypothetical so the guarantees it offers cannot be only to actual capacities. 


The contract view is simple in the sense that it stresses a minimal capacity so that "those who can give justice are owed justice". Equality of distribution of benefits regulates the second principle of justice in a way that is efficient and fair. But equality of respect is guaranteed by the first principle and by duties that accompany it. However if fair opportunity requires us to view persons independently of their background then should it not lead to abolition of special conditions of backgrounds such as arise from the existence of families? There are grounds just on the basis of appeal to this notion to favour such an idea Rawls admits (echoing here Plato). But the context of the whole theory of justice does not favour such a view. The reasons for this are that the difference principle redefines social inequality by comparison to the notion of liberal equality; principles of fraternity and redress are given appropriate weight within the system of justice as fairness and the effect of this is that the contingencies of circumstances that arise from the luck with which natural endowments are handed out can be accepted more easily. 


The theory of justice is understood, however, to be limited by Rawls. It does not encompass duties towards animals or duties to nature. Justice is just part of a general moral view. So questions concerning cruelty to animals are outside its strict purview even though Rawls is willing to state that such conduct manifests "a great evil". Rawls thinks that "a theory of the natural order" and our place in it would be needed to deal with such issues though this may be doubted. With these considerations Chapter VIII concludes and future postings will consider the final chapter of Theory, Chapter IX.

Rawls on Moral Psychology (II)

The previous Rawls posting looked at part of the account given of moral psychology in Chapter VIII of A Theory of Justice. In this posting I am going to continue to track the account by seeing how Rawls develops on from the discussion looked at in the sections analysed in the previous posting.


In the second part of Rawls' discussion he indicates he will look at the three stages of morality (authority, association and principle) in more detail and he connects this description now with what he terms "moral sentiments". The term "moral sentiments" is an old one in the history of ethics dating back to the 17th and 18th centuries and Rawls uses the term "sentiment" to mean a permanent ordered family of governing dispositions. Included in this idea of a "sentiment" for Rawls are such things as a sense of justice, the "love of mankind" and lasting attachments. Importantly "sentiments" are not all viewed by Rawls as "moral" since natural attachments such as are expressed between children and parents are also viewed as types of sentiment. This does, however, mean that there are two types of sentiment and that a relationship between them needs to be described.


The main features of specifically moral sentiments are assessed in terms of responses to questions concerning the types of feelings that are occurrently experienced when they are manifested. This includes questions about the way we speak about these sentiments when we are referring to particular experiences, how we understand behavioural reactions in relation to them and what the sensations that are connected to them are. In raising these points Rawls wishes to distinguish the characteristic sensations felt for example from the moral experiences which they often characterise. So, whilst a feeling of guilt may lead one to feel hot the sensation in question is something different from the moral experience with which it is associated. No particular sensations are either necessary or sufficient to mark the moral experiences as occurring although it may be necessary that something like them happen if one is "overwhelmed" by particular moral feelings. But the recognition that the moral experience in question is occurring can be purely based upon a report from someone that this is what they are feeling.


This brings in a question that is sharper than the ones considered so far, to wit, what the definitive explanation is for having a moral feeling. So, assuming someone feels guilt, it is not only appropriate to ask them why they feel this but also to have some general idea of what kind of reply is appropriate as a response to the question. And included in this sense is an at least intuitive idea of a difference between guilt and, say, anxiety. Anxiety strictly speaking is viewed by Rawls as only a natural feeling and not seen by him thus as equivalent to guilt at all. Moral feelings as such refer, in the explanation we find acceptable of what has brought them on, to other moral phenomena. Ultimately, to certain types of expression of what is right or wrong. This does not mean that guilt, for example, is always experienced in ways that properly reflect moral concepts. Given the typology of moral development that Rawls outlined previously it is quite possible that sentiments that belong to an early stage of moralisation still have effects later so that guilt is attached to violations of precepts of authorities even though we, as mature reasoners, don't feel that the authorities in question are such for us.


The general contract view to which Rawls is committed leads to him seeing moral sentiments as generally based on principles of right that would be chosen in the original position. So they relate, for example, to the recognised conception of fairness. This does not mean that the moral feelings experienced at any one time have to be singular since there is no reason to think that particular events might not be productive of multiple moral feelings. Further, people might experience moral feelings that are not appropriate to the situation, perhaps due to being overly conscientious (or insufficiently so). 


This account leads on to the next question which concerns the characteristic intentions of people experiencing given moral feelings. These can be sketched in general terms as when a guilty person seeks to repair the fault for which they feel the guilt in question. There are families of dispositions that could be laid out here in terms of the appropriate behavioural modifications and connecting the moral feelings to different settings (such as associative ones by contrast to those of principle) might well lead to variations in terms of appropriate behaviour.


There are also questions about the kinds of responses expected from others when someone is undergoing a particular moral experience. Someone who is guilty expects those to whom he expresses his guilt to respond with resentment whilst one who is ashamed, by contrast, may expect contempt. The latter situation after all relates more intimately to the conduct that someone expects of themselves. Feelings of guilt relate generally speaking to conduct framed by principles of right whilst feelings of shame, by contrast, are connected to conduct framed by principles that reflect conceptions of the good.


The final question Rawls poses with regard to the sentiments concerns characteristic temptations and resolutions of the feelings in question. With regard to resolutions, feelings of guilt suggest a request for forgiveness, whilst feelings of shame are resolved by conduct that re-connects one to the excellencies one recognises. Just as Rawls earlier connected shame to conceptions of the good so also he now indicates that it is appropriately experienced as a breach of virtue.  What is interesting in the contrast is that on Rawls' view a morality framed in terms of shame is really one that describes supererogatory acts and related thus to the idea of the "love of mankind" (as expressed in an ideal of conduct). This differs from the feelings of guilt which in fact connect more to the right conduct towards others that all have a right to expect of one. The theory of right governs reciprocal action and requires a reconciliation between self and others. But the two moralities are viewed by Rawls as two parts of a general conception.


Having laid out this general account of moral sentiments Rawls turns next to what he terms the connection of moral attitudes to "natural" ones. The relationship between these two ideas is first formulated in terms of what types of "natural" attitudes are missing when a person appears not to have certain moral feelings. The second question, the converse of the first, is what types of natural attitudes are shown to be present when moral emotions are experienced. The three stages of morality provided something of a response to the first question (through use of a notion like that of "missing motives") and it is evident in terms of lack of recognitional capacities undermining the possibility of moral feelings. However evidence for the presence of "natural" attitudes does not admit of the same kind of direct examination since the expression of moral feelings may be based on a number of factors. One of the complications here is the development of general ideas of sympathy such as underlie the notion of the "love of mankind" and whether it is these or specific sentiments that underlie appropriate moral responses but on this Rawls remains agnostic.


Once certain types of natural attachments have developed it is usual to expect a liability to moral emotions to follow. As Rawls puts this:

To confirm the connection between the natural attitudes and the moral sentiments one simply notes that the disposition on A's part to feel remorse when he injures B, or guilt when he violates B's legitimate claims, or A's disposition to feel indignation when C seeks to deny B's right, are as closely related psychologically with the natural attitudes of love as the disposition to be joyful in the other's presence, or to feel sorrow when he suffers.

Moral sentiments thus have a directional intentionality that connects them to occasions that are taken to be ones that require appropriate types of response. Given this analysis it follows that moral sentiments grow out of "natural" sentiments to which they are intimately related.

It follows from this analysis that moral feelings are normally expected to be part of the structure of life. Someone who really acted only from self-interest and in whom we could identify none of the usual range of moral emotions would be someone with whom we could form no bonds of relation. Further such a person could form no sense of indignation at their own treatment since there would be no standard for that treatment that would permit such a notion. Indignation is a kind of moral feeling and requires, to be sustained, a reference to standards of right and such standards are not purely self-centred. 

The general account of moral psychology concludes in the chapter by Rawls restating the three laws that underpin the three stages of morality and stating that these laws require that there be recognised institutions of justice and that such institutions are recognised publicly. Principles of moral psychology have thus been shown to be such that the sense of justice is part of moral development. Further the relationship between moral psychology so understood and the theory of institutions is one whereby the latter are implicitly connected to notions of healthy moral development. 

Rawls now discusses why it is that the theory of justice is such that it has to be connected to moral notions, a discussion that is of particular interest given the way his theories developed subsequently to the writing of Theory. Here Rawls articulates the view that politics requires some sense of moral conduct and that it presupposes a theory of justice which explains moral sentiments. Not only is this so but the description of psychological laws that underpin the notion of moral development relates this development to an account of rationality. Included within the account of rationality is a sense of the normative sense of instrumental action. 

By the latter Rawls means that we have final ends that include attachments to persons, their interests and our sense of justice and that such attachments are part of what gives sense to our purposive actions. Affective ties are part of the way we learn to become moralised and the pursuit of life includes within it further moral relations. The psychological laws are not merely Pavlovian for Rawls either as they are founded on experiencing others in ways that reflect their embodiment of the ideals that are expected. Reciprocity underpins general social behaviour but it can only do so if others really are taken to have attitudes towards us that show a manifest concern for our good and the good of others. It is this that is the general basis of the sense of justice in sociality. Ethical norms are not understood merely as constraints but are rather part of a coherent self-conception formed through an extensive path of development.

Rawls on Moral Psychology (I)

The previous posting on Rawls looked at the opening of Chapter VIII of A Theory of Justice and, in the process, made some assessments about the structure of the last part of the work. As I discussed there the central subject of Chapter VIII is Rawls' discussion of how moral psychology provides a basis for the claimed stability of justice as fairness and in this posting I'll begin to look at Rawls' argument to this effect by focusing on sections 70-72 of Chapter VIII.


In these sections Rawls sketches "the course of moral development as it might occur in a well-ordered society realising the principles of justice as fairness". In doing so Rawls draws on an idealised conception that owes something to Piaget's conception of child development but also aims to combine in a certain way the empiricist and rationalist views of moral development that were contrasted in section 69. So the first stage, termed by Rawls the "morality of authority", draws on the empiricist notion that the primitive basis for moral conceptions in childhood arises in a manner that is principally external to the child. In presenting this in terms of the structure of a well-ordered society Rawls assumes that such a society will include the family "in some form" though he also appears not to think that if other arrangements for child care existed that this would affect the account given. One of the points that shows how much the description of this "morality of authority" relates to the empiricist tradition is Rawls' claim that the child "lacks the concept of justification altogether" a claim that will ensure that the early way morality is transmitted matches the view that there are "missing motives" in children as outlined by Rawls in section 69.


The question that animates the account of the morality of authority that Rawls gives concerns the affective bond between the child and its parents and is formulated according to a psychological principle that is also described by Rawls as a "law" and is stated as follows: "the child comes to love the parents only if they manifestly first love him". This conception belongs not to the "empiricist" tradition but to the "rationalist" one and is cited as paralleling a similar claim in Rousseau. The child's actions are hereby viewed as founded on initial motivations provided by instincts and desires with the possible regulation of these by a general notion of self-interest. To relate to others with love is thus not taken to be an immediate option for the child but rather to arise for it through a process of recognition of the way the child is cared for and how it benefits from the care in question being founded on an expression of love. This is a complicated form of recognition, especially for someone who "lacks" the concept of justification so it is instructive to see how Rawls understands the arrival of it.


Love is said by Rawls to be "displayed" by the parents by means of their showing pleasure in the presence of the child and supporting its sense of competence, and, even more importantly, its self-esteem. The centrality of this latter point is further emphasised when Rawls adds his basic description of what it is to love another, which is not only to be concerned with the wants and needs of this other but also "to affirm the sense of the worth of his own person". It is by means of this nurturing of a sense of worth within the person of the child that the parent makes it possible for the child to respond to the parent with a matching affective disposition that we can term its sense of a love for its parent. It is crucial to this explanation that the child's love for its parents is not couched in a merely instrumental sense as it would have been if the child was still operating at the first level of its relation to motives and inclinations. This is why Rawls terms the recognition of love in the child the arrival of "a new affection".


Having stated this initial "psychological law" Rawls goes on to analyse it into its elements. They include the sense that the child has of appreciation for its own sake, that the affective response of parents towards it is an unconditional one and the learning of the child to trust its parents. On the basis of the trust displayed the child is encouraged to expand its own sense of its potential and it is partly through this expanded sense of potential that the child comes to have deeper relations to those who permit this expanded potential to develop. 


However up to this point Rawls has not yet described the "morality" of the situation in terms of how the child comes to have moral conceptions based on its affective relations and the sense of this requires that the trust the child has shown in the parents be extended to the view that precepts that they require the child to act in accord with are internalised by the child. The internalisation of these precepts is based, at least partly, on an imitative relation to powerful figures who are assumed to have the ability to control the environment. Since the child's desires extend beyond the realm judged appropriate for the exercise of them it follows that the child has to learn limits of what is acceptable conduct. The constraints embedded in these precepts are only taken as ones to be guided by on the basis, however, of the affective bond the child has formed with its carers. This affective bond even leads to the child freely confessing to violations of precepts stated by the carers and the development of feelings of guilt when the child behaves in ways that the precepts declare unacceptable. In stating things this way Rawls binds in to the relationship between the child and its carer a conception of trust that has within it a reciprocity and this reciprocity requires the child to acknowledge the precepts as binding on its behaviour in result of the affective bond. Hence the affective bond of love and trust includes within it the potential for the development of guilt as a consequence of violation of trust where such violation is interpreted through the breaking of precepts stated by the carers.


There are initial problems at the stage of the morality of authority in ensuring that what is really being learnt are the basis of the moral precepts being stated since it is possible that the child responds as it does purely on the grounds of fear or anxiety concerning the withdrawal of affection that results from breaking of the precepts by which it has implicitly accepted it should be governed. It is a part of moral development for such fear or anxiety to be distinguished, at least gradually, by the child from the understanding of justified guilt as built in the affective bond. There are conditions that Rawls specifies which make it more favourable that the child will learn the distinctions required and thus become moralised. These include the sense the child is really loved by its parents, that they state clear and intelligible rules to the child and give reasons for them. The parents should also be seen to be governed themselves by the precepts they state. The morality of authority has truly come to be accepted when the child can be seen to behave in accordance with its precepts even when there is no evident prospect of rewards or punishments arising from violations of it.


The "morality of authority" assumes that the general basis of the precepts stated remain beyond the reach of the child's understanding and the prime virtues that it states are ones of obedience and fidelity to authority. When at this stage of development questioning is not a virtue for the newly moralised person.


The "morality of authority" is subsequently distinguished by Rawls from the second stage of moral development which is termed by him the "morality of association". This notion can cover a wide range of cases up to a relation to the national community. The morality here is one that is governed by what is taken to be appropriate to the role within the group in question that the person involved has. These include common sense rules adjusted to the position in question which are expressed by figures of authority within the association but also by the peers the person finds within the association. It is thus a mutually reinforcing system of organisation. An older child relates to the family in this way and the family can be seen as a basic model for how associations work. Just as being a good son or brother is a specific role so also is being a good student or a good sport. Similarly in adult life there are appropriate conceptions of what is fitting for a husband, friend or citizen. As development takes place there follows, as Rawls puts it, "finer moral discriminations". 


So the morality of associations is a morality of ideals in which exemplary notions of roles are taken to be regulative of behaviour. It requires an understanding of cooperation and the acceptance that others have to be engaged with, not least through a process of accepting that they have different motivations and that it is legitimate that they should have. Accepting this in its turn indicates a sense of what beliefs and views govern the conduct of others and thus such a form of morality requires us to view others as governed by what we term a general "mindedness". It is obviously insufficient simply to see this as our own behaviour has to be modified by the recognition of it.


Rawls' point is that this "morality of association" has to be learnt by children and that it is, at least initially, difficult for them. Not least difficult here is the second level of recognition that is required for being inducted into this type of morality, one that comes subsequent to the recognition of the love of the child's parents. This second recognition is of "the person of others". How well the person of others is perceived affects the moral sensibility of the child and part of the development of this sensibility concerns how the child can engage with others to ensure that mutual aid is the product. This requires arts of persuasion to be learnt. Just as the key question of the first stage concerned the reciprocity of love in the child's first relationships so the key question of this stage concerns the trust required for associations to be effectively operative. Simply participating in an association produces a certain level of mutual interaction and this calls on a sense of fellow feeling that is akin to that expressed in the first "law" of moral psychology that Rawls stated. The means by which this second type of attachment takes place reflects a second "law" that works by means of those already present within the group effectively teaching the child the right way to relate within it.


The ties that arise from the fellow feeling thus produced have the same type of affective effect as the reciprocal love involved in engagement with the child's parents. These ties produce, that is, engagements of trust and associated guilt with regard to lapses that affect such trust. So expectations are tied in to associations and failure to live up to them may even merit expulsion from the association. The general structure here is much as it was with parents: certain "natural" attitudes are adopted and on the basis of these moral feelings develop. Mutual benefits are assumed within associations and moral exemplars govern the place each has within them. The Aristotelian Principle further explains the phenomena of enjoyment of the abilities of others within such associations and the desire to emulate their accomplishments. In this sense the account of "excellencies" in Chapter VII can be seen to be part of the general relations that take place in associations.


The virtues of the morality of association are focused not, as was the case with the morality of authority, on obedience but rather on cooperation and the seat of the general desire for justice can be seen here as can the virtues of integrity and impartiality. By contrast the vices here outlawed concern not questioning but rather dishonesty and prejudice.


The third stage of moral development that Rawls considers is that of "the morality of principles". Within the morality of association, as we have seen, there is the growth of a sense of justice and with this a sense of a clear basic relationship to principles. This requires within associations that persons hope to have their conduct viewed as acceptable by wider groups than those with whom they have an immediate affective relation. Now, in a well-ordered society, principles govern the general public conduct of the way that associations fit into the society as a whole. This points to a third psychological law. This states: "once the attitudes of love and trust, and of friendly feelings and mutual confidence, have been generated in accordance with the two preceding psychological laws, then the recognition that we and those for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and enduring just institution tends to engender in us the corresponding sense of justice".


So the development of the general sense of justice that has emerged from the previous levels of moral engagement produces a relationship to principles. This sense of justice is manifested in two ways. On the one hand, the institutions from which we have benefited are ones that we want to do our part in maintaining. On the other hand, a willingness to work for justice in relation to institutions in terms of the perfectibility of these arises which extends beyond those which we have benefited from. The sense of justice carries with it, as a consequence of the third psychological law, an inherent tendency towards guilt if the propensities it encourages are not followed and especially if they are openly violated. At this stage we arrive at moral sentiments that are no longer governed by the particular circumstances of our own background and thus become, in a sense, independent of us.


This does not entail that natural relationships are thereby abandoned as moral sentiment has already been invested in these and betrayal of such investment would still be real for us. However, whilst this is so, there is here a new arena for moral sentiments that is not confined within the patterns of given particular relationships. The animating question of this form of morality concerns how it is possible for principles to be related to in an affective manner. Rawls replies to this question in terms of reference to how principles are capable of defining agreed forms of human interests. But to this prudential conception of a basis for principles Rawls also adds the anthropological claim that there exists such a thing as a benevolent disposition towards others. This disposition is described by him as "the love of mankind" and, whilst such a description defines something that could only be the basis of supererogatory relations to others it is taken to underpin the way the sense of justice becomes extended beyond particular concerns.


Finally the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness shows the latter to be the central social way in which free and equal rational beings relate to each other. It defines, as Kant would put it in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, the summum bonum. Rawls' view of this continues to pay homage to the device of the original position as it was the use of this that pointed to the basis of selection of the principles of justice. As he puts this now: "Being governed by these principles means that we want to live with others on terms that everyone would recognise as fair from a perspective that all would accept as reasonable". 


The morality of principles is described in two forms, one that relates to the sense of justice and the other to the love of mankind. The latter is supererogatory whilst the former is not and the split between them stated here reflects an attitude similar to that behind Kant's separation of right from virtue in The Metaphysics of Morals. The morality of principles is the last stage of moral development and is meant to be encompassing of the virtues recognised in the earlier stages and also to provide the settings within which the previous forms of morality find their ultimate justification. The morality of the love of mankind is not an ultimate morality for most people in daily conduct but defines instead something like a code for saints whilst the morality of right is the basic requirement for living in a well-ordered society.

Rawls on Stability and the Sense of Justice

In the same year of 1963 that Rawls first introduced the notion of the "original position", he also sets out an account of moral psychology in his paper called "The Sense of Justice". This paper opens with a citation from Rousseau's Emile indicating that the sense of justice is not formed by the understanding alone but is "a true sentiment of the heart enlightened by reason". In response to this, and following the pattern of the "analytic construction" that was used in his account of the original position, Rawls provides in this piece a "psychological construction". This is developed in relation to two questions, namely to whom is justice owed and what is it that accounts for us doing what justice requires?


Prior to laying out the "psychological construction" in detail Rawls first indicates that questions of justice arise in situations where people who have no position of authority in relation to each other have to settle or acknowledge the rules of the institutions they participate in and determine shares in benefits and burdens. This leads to stating the two principles of equal rights to the most extensive liberty compatible with like liberty for all and that inequalities are treated as arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect they will work to everyone's advantage. The former principle is very Kantian in formulation. Explicating the principles leads Rawls to restate the "analytic construction" of the original position again.


After going through the "analytic construction" Rawls returns to instances in which the principle of equality applies, indicating that they relate to institutions as part of the definition of them. This is slightly odd since the definition Rawls earlier gave of institutions only specified that they were "publicly recognized systems of rules" which doesn't seem to imply the principle of equality unless there is a presumed analytic link between publicity and equality. The second level at which the principle of equality is said to operate is in terms of the structure of an institution or social system and this requires seeing them as bound by the two principles derived from the "analytic construction". This neatly erases the difference between the principle concerning inequality and that concerning liberty since the latter included the notion of "equal liberty" but that seems rather too neat a move. Finally, the principle of equality is said to apply to the original position itself and that point is what is used to indicate the need for a general account of moral psychology as it presupposes a view of how cognition relates to morality (or a principle of practical reason).


Rawls' second question concerning what accounts for the fact that we and others do what justice requires indicates a need to find a view of how action takes place that is not, on Rawls' view, purely understood through the concept of rationality though what he seems to mean by this is that is it is not grasped by theoretical reason. Having placed these preliminary points in place we move on to the "psychological construction" which is described by Rawls as being something that is not to be taken empirically though it is to be thought of as "reasonably plausible".


The "psychological construction" is grounded on an idealisation of Piaget's view of the development of guilt in children where Piaget distinguished between authority guilt, association guilt and principle guilt though again the place given here to guilt is said by Rawls to be only "a matter of convenience". This use of guilt has, it should be said, rather large overtones, since it is, after all, central to Christian morality in particular. Authority guilt is characterized easily in relation to positions of children who basically accept that there are people - parents - in constituted places of authority whose injunctions are meant to be obeyed and so authority guilt is what is felt when we do not obey. This requires elaboration of a notion of rational self-love which requires taking seriously someone who, whilst in authority over you, nonetheless manifests some serious care for you. It does, however, assume that the one authority is exercised over does not possess serious standards of their own and is thus rightly governed by judgments they are incapable of making themselves.


The second form of guilt, association guilt, relates not to the standards of authority figures but rather peers with whom one has formed bonds of relation such as friendship and mutual trust. Breaking bond with these others produces association guilt. It is with regard to this that Rawls first makes manifest the whole point of this discussion is to enable thought about the "stability" of just relations since if others will not follow bonds or are generally thought likely not to then this loosens the whole association. Intimations of game theory are clearly present at this point of Rawls' analysis as becomes clear when he uses the discussion to interpret Hobbes:

One way of interpreting the Hobbesian sovereign is as an agency added to unstable forms of cooperation in such a way that it is no longer to anyone's advantage not to do his part given that others will do theirs. (104)

Friendship and mutual trust are seen, on this pattern as kinds of games of which the Hobbesian social contract is a supreme example.


The third form of guilt, principle guilt, requires separating ourselves from ties to others of any particular specified type and seeing how injury of anonymous others still produces in us feelings of guilt. This is taken to arise from the schemes of cooperation having been extended beyond their point of origin (a kind of Rawlsian "genealogy"). It requires then we accept and make explicit general principles of justice. If everyone in a system is known to have such feelings of justice then we have a situation that Rawls terms "stable".


The whole account relies, as Rawls himself states, on the notion of "moral feeling" but, whilst this notion can be found in Kant, Rawls has not referred at all to Kant in expounding it and his next move is, rather, Wittgensteinian in general flavour as he now speaks of characteristic linguistic expressions, behaviour manifestations and sensations that accompany moral feelings rather than trying to give any kind of transcendental account of moral feeling.


The account that follows of why we act on our duty of justice in particular cases is thus one that assumes the idealised anthropological account to broadly hold. Rawls sketches the idea of someone who does not feel a sense of justice but it is evident that this idea is merely a limit-case and not one that he takes seriously as something that could really arise.


The final discussion of who the obligation of justice is owed to revisits again the original position in order to describe such a situation as a "natural lottery". Finally Rawls effectively identifies the sense of justice with Kant's notion of a good will which is done in a preemptory way. The general argument has been intended to show that the capacity for a sense of justice is the key aspect of moral personality in the theory of justice but it is fairly evident that the argument of this piece is less than convincing.