There is a very good posting over at EAS Manchester addressing the ways in which the implementation of the Browne report will harm higher education in general and humanities in particular. It is useful to pull out from this posting the following crucial points that can sometimes get lost or receive insufficient emphasis:
1.The Arts and Humanities Research Council is directing funding for research into areas that have been determined for it by central government which includes research on the government idea of the so-called "Big Society".
2. The British Academy has ended the small grants scheme that was particularly heavily used in research in fine art.
3. There is increasing pressure to push humanities research that is connected to business, something that will ensure the marginalisation of research in all kinds of areas. In philosophy, it impacts on everyone who is not engaged in applied ethics programmes and even they will be pushed in a very specific direction.
4. There is virtually no support within the universities for the very notion of "impact", something on which the government is silent as it is has generally been in response to the criticisms that have been made of the Browne report's de-emphasis of humanities research in general.
It is clearly the case that humanities research, if carried out anywhere other than a select elite of institutions, will be increasingly difficult to sustain. Under these pressures, it is perhaps unsurprising that many of us are determined either to leave the university to pursue research elsewhere or are desperately trying to make it into the few places that will still deserve the name of "university".
Showing posts with label humanities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label humanities. Show all posts
Saturday, 12 March 2011
Tuesday, 16 November 2010
Resources For Campaigners Against the Education Cuts
Some further sites have come to my attention in relation to campaigning against the general attempts to cut higher education and the humanities in particular. Although it seems rather centred on London the Education Activist Network gives lists of activities and events. Humanities Matter have launched a national petition against cuts in the humanities. Finally, students at Sussex University are the latest to have occupied buildings of their campus in protest against the government's proposals. It is being widely reported that a national day of action is planned for 24th November.
Tuesday, 19 October 2010
The New York Times and the Defence of Humanities
Stanley Fish's recent defence of the modern languages in the face of the threatened cuts at SUNY Albany has led to on-going discussions at The New York Times. This has occurred in two ways. Firstly, Fish himself has written a follow-up piece that responds to some of the comment generated by the first one. This piece specifically replies to the view that humanities departments generally subsidise other departments, pointing out that such arguments are not the best form of response giving the problems of calculating cross-departmental subsidy. Secondly, it points out that the real problem concerns the cutting of state subsidy, exactly the same problem as is being faced in the UK with the proposal of the Browne report that the teaching block grant should be removed from the universities. This second point also makes clear the need for those defending higher education in the face of cuts to make common cause across national divides since it is essentially the same kind of attack that is being made in many places. Thirdly, Fish rightly argues that the defence of the humanities generally should not mainly consist in generic appeals with regard to the outside culture. The problem with appeals of the latter kind is that they can be met by emphasising a sizeable presence of things such as theatre in the wider culture. It is true, as Fish states, that theatre studies does not offer the same return to ordinary citizens as watching live theatre performances. Similarly, university provision of study in modern languages or in philosophy does not provide some clear and evident pay-back for the ordinary guy. The "value" of the humanities, if we must speak of the matter in these terms, is more nebulous than that. Fish emphasizes the basic self-sustaining character of the study of humanities and this is certainly one way to go, one that has more in its favour than just trying to reach for external justifications.
The second way the New York Times has responded to the situation is by organising a panel discussion on the topic of whether colleges need French departments. Stating it like this has something of the flavour of the BBC panel discussion earlier this year which asked whether homosexuals should be executed when faced with the prospect of a law requiring this being passed in Uganda. It is not, shall we say, the most supportive way of framing the question. And nor do all of the respondents do as well as Fish has in arguing the case for the humanities. In light of the fact that Martha Nussbaum has recently written a book in defence of the humanities we might expect that she could do better than open by making a "business case" for them. Her general case is that we require critical thinking, history and imagination in order to make democracy work but this kind of defence has a number of problems. Firstly, "critical thinking" as practiced in many places has a tendency simply to replace elementary logic and be a poor substitute for it at that. Secondly, whilst history is certainly valuable for much we shouldn't be resting our claim for humanities only on an historical value as if there were nothing they could teach us today. Thirdly, whilst the stress on imagination is better it would be good to connect that to an investigation of reason and thought, which are as much under attack as values of imagination and rather more core to the academic activity of humanities research and teaching.
John McWhorter, in his contribution, makes clearer the limits of Nussbaum's approach as he argues that there is no special need for the amount of humanities teaching on offer and no evidence of a general literacy in the culture due to its present prevalence. McWhorter's analysis sees little specific point in humanities study and Nussbaum's view is unlikely to convince him otherwise. In reply to this kind of position it is necessary to point out that it is far from evident what any intellectual endeavour that is not very applied indeed can offer to the general culture and that, in any case, certain kinds of humanities studies can be very applied indeed (but not that all should become so).
Mark Bauerlein also brings out the problems with Nussbaum's emphasis on history as he takes this to its logical conclusion and argues for curbing the "pretensions" of humanities theory (a la the "jokes" of Brian Leiter) and focussing instead on the historical values of such writers as Plutarch. This suggestion that there is a fall-off in student numbers and that such a fall-off is the result of humanities departments own concentration on the "wrong" subjects plays right into the hands of the bureaucrats. Rather than assess the question from the standpoint of "market-share" as Bauerlein does we need instead to look at the pattern of cuts in the humanities. There is not a general fall-off in students studying in these areas as Bauerlein suggests and, even if there were, there is certainly no specific fall-off in places where there is an emphasis on "theory" at the expense of the "classics". The experience, earlier this year, of Middlesex University, was rather that a thriving programme was cut. It was cut, despite the lack of evidence of student fall-out and the cuts in humanities generally are not based on some claim of lack of student satisfaction as these departments often have higher satisfaction ratings than others (not that such surveys in themselves are the best means of measuring anything).
Ellen Schrecker makes the better point that cutting the humanities out of institutions that are not at the top of the Ivory League will simply exacerbate general social inequality. Humanities graduates at the top institutions land good jobs even though they study subjects that are apparently not "vocational" and reduction in humanities departments outside these institutions will simply turn the latter towards being only trade schools aimed at particular kinds of outcomes, which will inevitably lower the status of the latter. Gaye Tuchman correctly adds that the emphasis on such outcomes is, in fact, part of the same outlook that led economies to look primarily at fast means of garnering wealth, something that created the crisis that is now being used to justify the current cuts.
The fact that open debate is happening in this area is itself broadly encouraging though the need for it to be focused more specifically on the right kinds of justifications of the humanities is apparent from reviewing the New York Times discussion. Academic study and research in the humanities does contribute to the wider culture in a number of ways but to focus on this as the primary justification of this as an area of study is problematic since this contribution is not one that is open to either simple statement or clear presentation (not least to those who insist on quantification). The university itself is imperilled if there is not humanities in it since without the humanities you either have institutions focused on science (itself less instrumental than policy-makers seem to think) or on simple vocational emphasis. Whilst the former can be excellent it is notable that serious institutions of scientific research incorporate humanities since without it they cannot look at the discipline, philosophy and language of their own areas of study. If the latter proliferate at the cost of universities then there is no doubt the result of this will be a general closure of access to the areas of thought that are some of the most creative. The time for a general campaign for the humanities and against cuts in higher education is clearly now.
The second way the New York Times has responded to the situation is by organising a panel discussion on the topic of whether colleges need French departments. Stating it like this has something of the flavour of the BBC panel discussion earlier this year which asked whether homosexuals should be executed when faced with the prospect of a law requiring this being passed in Uganda. It is not, shall we say, the most supportive way of framing the question. And nor do all of the respondents do as well as Fish has in arguing the case for the humanities. In light of the fact that Martha Nussbaum has recently written a book in defence of the humanities we might expect that she could do better than open by making a "business case" for them. Her general case is that we require critical thinking, history and imagination in order to make democracy work but this kind of defence has a number of problems. Firstly, "critical thinking" as practiced in many places has a tendency simply to replace elementary logic and be a poor substitute for it at that. Secondly, whilst history is certainly valuable for much we shouldn't be resting our claim for humanities only on an historical value as if there were nothing they could teach us today. Thirdly, whilst the stress on imagination is better it would be good to connect that to an investigation of reason and thought, which are as much under attack as values of imagination and rather more core to the academic activity of humanities research and teaching.
John McWhorter, in his contribution, makes clearer the limits of Nussbaum's approach as he argues that there is no special need for the amount of humanities teaching on offer and no evidence of a general literacy in the culture due to its present prevalence. McWhorter's analysis sees little specific point in humanities study and Nussbaum's view is unlikely to convince him otherwise. In reply to this kind of position it is necessary to point out that it is far from evident what any intellectual endeavour that is not very applied indeed can offer to the general culture and that, in any case, certain kinds of humanities studies can be very applied indeed (but not that all should become so).
Mark Bauerlein also brings out the problems with Nussbaum's emphasis on history as he takes this to its logical conclusion and argues for curbing the "pretensions" of humanities theory (a la the "jokes" of Brian Leiter) and focussing instead on the historical values of such writers as Plutarch. This suggestion that there is a fall-off in student numbers and that such a fall-off is the result of humanities departments own concentration on the "wrong" subjects plays right into the hands of the bureaucrats. Rather than assess the question from the standpoint of "market-share" as Bauerlein does we need instead to look at the pattern of cuts in the humanities. There is not a general fall-off in students studying in these areas as Bauerlein suggests and, even if there were, there is certainly no specific fall-off in places where there is an emphasis on "theory" at the expense of the "classics". The experience, earlier this year, of Middlesex University, was rather that a thriving programme was cut. It was cut, despite the lack of evidence of student fall-out and the cuts in humanities generally are not based on some claim of lack of student satisfaction as these departments often have higher satisfaction ratings than others (not that such surveys in themselves are the best means of measuring anything).
Ellen Schrecker makes the better point that cutting the humanities out of institutions that are not at the top of the Ivory League will simply exacerbate general social inequality. Humanities graduates at the top institutions land good jobs even though they study subjects that are apparently not "vocational" and reduction in humanities departments outside these institutions will simply turn the latter towards being only trade schools aimed at particular kinds of outcomes, which will inevitably lower the status of the latter. Gaye Tuchman correctly adds that the emphasis on such outcomes is, in fact, part of the same outlook that led economies to look primarily at fast means of garnering wealth, something that created the crisis that is now being used to justify the current cuts.
The fact that open debate is happening in this area is itself broadly encouraging though the need for it to be focused more specifically on the right kinds of justifications of the humanities is apparent from reviewing the New York Times discussion. Academic study and research in the humanities does contribute to the wider culture in a number of ways but to focus on this as the primary justification of this as an area of study is problematic since this contribution is not one that is open to either simple statement or clear presentation (not least to those who insist on quantification). The university itself is imperilled if there is not humanities in it since without the humanities you either have institutions focused on science (itself less instrumental than policy-makers seem to think) or on simple vocational emphasis. Whilst the former can be excellent it is notable that serious institutions of scientific research incorporate humanities since without it they cannot look at the discipline, philosophy and language of their own areas of study. If the latter proliferate at the cost of universities then there is no doubt the result of this will be a general closure of access to the areas of thought that are some of the most creative. The time for a general campaign for the humanities and against cuts in higher education is clearly now.
Friday, 15 October 2010
The Real Crisis of the Humanities
There is a problem discussing the idea of a "crisis" of the humanities and this is not merely because of the tired nature of the phrase. It is also due to the way in which such "crisis" tends to get understood. Primarily, when discussing this notion, philosophers and cultural theorists have in mind a problem with some tendency or other within the humanities itself. So, to take the classic case, Husserl, the thinker of "crisis" par excellence in his late unfinished work The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology presents the nature of the "crisis" that produced such phenomena as Nazism as residing in the spread of a false form of objectivism that ensured the true spirit of scientificity was lost.
Husserl's specific form of analysis has not been followed but the type of it has tended to spread. Other classic forms of analysis that take "crisis" to reside in some deep general cultural tendency include the late, fairly awful work of Lukacs The Destruction of Reason and Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. At least the analysis of Adorno and Horkheimer, following a certain Heideggerian root, takes the problem of their title to reside in the spread of an instrumental form of rationality, a notion that does make a lot of sense. All the same there is much about their analysis that is rightly contentious.
At present the split within philosophy between analytic and "Continental" philosophers has furthered the tendency to produce analyses that tend to take the diagnosed cultural malaise to have a more proximate cause than any of the above mentioned classic works of cultural analysis. On the analytic side, in particular, there has been for some time now a stress that the difference in philosophical approach is indicative of something very deep. It has been elevated by many to a difference between those who really believe in the "values" underpinning humanistic study as such and those (engaged in an "assault on reason") who do not. The suggestion then spontaneously emerges that the reason why policy makers and politicians can engage in cuts of the humanities is due to the way humanistic study has made itself ridiculous.
The latest manifestation of such thinking can be seen in the attitude of Brian Leiter to being challenged for publishing, on his blog, a fairly childish spoof of Derrida that some others were foolish enough to assume was an accurate finding of a manuscript. I blogged about this a couple of days ago and those interested will find, under the comments section at the close of the posting, a reply from Leiter that shows he was considerably irritated by my response but, not only does it show this, but it also reveals the reasoning behind his original posting well. As he says in this comment, the rise of such figures as Derrida, may well be the reason why there is a "crisis" in the humanities. In other words, it is due to certain kinds of philosophy and literary theory that managers, policy makers and politicians think it is alright to close humanities departments, slash budgets and generally make it difficult for such study to continue.
When such reasoning is put in such bold form its transparent absurdity really becomes apparent. It should be pretty obvious to anyone that the real "crisis" in the humanities is not one that is based on the rise or dispersal of any specific philosophy or literary theory but is rather due to a managerial culture that has little time for the activities of philosophers and cultural theorists. The fact is that these figures will see little to choose between the works of Leiter and the works of Derrida as neither of them produce anything they can see as needed. This is due to the emphasis on education having an intrinsically vocational character as it should contribute primarily to the core activities of wealth creation. This emphatic dismissal of the general point of humanistic study is the real crisis of the humanities and it does no one any service to muddle the situation by suggesting it has anything to do with one's favourite hated theory or thinker. It has nothing to do with any such theories or thinkers but with a hostility to philosophy as such and a hostility to the kinds of theorising that occur in the humanities as such. In response it would be useful if those of us in the humanities could think of ways of uniting in reply rather than giving our opponents an easier time through manifesting all the tendencies that cause us to appear divided. The attack on Middlesex earlier this year was an attack on a "Continental" dept, one that takes the work of figures such as Derrida very seriously whereas the attack on King's College London was an attack on some very analytic figures. In both cases philosophers generally responded by defending the subject. Let's try and keep that spirit rather than fostering division and suggesting that it is primarily philosophers themselves who have created the situation in which philosophy is under attack.
Husserl's specific form of analysis has not been followed but the type of it has tended to spread. Other classic forms of analysis that take "crisis" to reside in some deep general cultural tendency include the late, fairly awful work of Lukacs The Destruction of Reason and Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. At least the analysis of Adorno and Horkheimer, following a certain Heideggerian root, takes the problem of their title to reside in the spread of an instrumental form of rationality, a notion that does make a lot of sense. All the same there is much about their analysis that is rightly contentious.
At present the split within philosophy between analytic and "Continental" philosophers has furthered the tendency to produce analyses that tend to take the diagnosed cultural malaise to have a more proximate cause than any of the above mentioned classic works of cultural analysis. On the analytic side, in particular, there has been for some time now a stress that the difference in philosophical approach is indicative of something very deep. It has been elevated by many to a difference between those who really believe in the "values" underpinning humanistic study as such and those (engaged in an "assault on reason") who do not. The suggestion then spontaneously emerges that the reason why policy makers and politicians can engage in cuts of the humanities is due to the way humanistic study has made itself ridiculous.
The latest manifestation of such thinking can be seen in the attitude of Brian Leiter to being challenged for publishing, on his blog, a fairly childish spoof of Derrida that some others were foolish enough to assume was an accurate finding of a manuscript. I blogged about this a couple of days ago and those interested will find, under the comments section at the close of the posting, a reply from Leiter that shows he was considerably irritated by my response but, not only does it show this, but it also reveals the reasoning behind his original posting well. As he says in this comment, the rise of such figures as Derrida, may well be the reason why there is a "crisis" in the humanities. In other words, it is due to certain kinds of philosophy and literary theory that managers, policy makers and politicians think it is alright to close humanities departments, slash budgets and generally make it difficult for such study to continue.
When such reasoning is put in such bold form its transparent absurdity really becomes apparent. It should be pretty obvious to anyone that the real "crisis" in the humanities is not one that is based on the rise or dispersal of any specific philosophy or literary theory but is rather due to a managerial culture that has little time for the activities of philosophers and cultural theorists. The fact is that these figures will see little to choose between the works of Leiter and the works of Derrida as neither of them produce anything they can see as needed. This is due to the emphasis on education having an intrinsically vocational character as it should contribute primarily to the core activities of wealth creation. This emphatic dismissal of the general point of humanistic study is the real crisis of the humanities and it does no one any service to muddle the situation by suggesting it has anything to do with one's favourite hated theory or thinker. It has nothing to do with any such theories or thinkers but with a hostility to philosophy as such and a hostility to the kinds of theorising that occur in the humanities as such. In response it would be useful if those of us in the humanities could think of ways of uniting in reply rather than giving our opponents an easier time through manifesting all the tendencies that cause us to appear divided. The attack on Middlesex earlier this year was an attack on a "Continental" dept, one that takes the work of figures such as Derrida very seriously whereas the attack on King's College London was an attack on some very analytic figures. In both cases philosophers generally responded by defending the subject. Let's try and keep that spirit rather than fostering division and suggesting that it is primarily philosophers themselves who have created the situation in which philosophy is under attack.
Wednesday, 28 April 2010
The Pressure on the Humanities
The news mentioned in the previous posting is part of a general trend in the UK and also in other countries in the world. The general notion that there needs to be any focus, support or attention given to the place of the humanities in contemporary education has been entirely lost. In the current general election here in the UK the manifestoes of all three major parties are silent concerning any significant role for the humanities, focusing all their attention on the place of STEM subjects. The Labour Party has been particularly bold in this emphasis, folding the Dept for Education into that of Business whilst the Liberal Democrats intend to merge the Higher Education Funding Council for England with the Skills Funding Agency in order to create a single Council for Adult Skills and Higher Education. Since HEFCE pioneered the notion of impact assessment before the Labour Party there are some senses in which its loss would not be as grievous as all that but merging it with a skills council speaks volumes for the general view of higher education assumed.
Whilst the political parties are adopting these blinkered points of view universities across the UK are closing or cutting their philosophy departments. Amongst others there are threats of cuts at the University of Sussex, King's College London, the University of Leeds and Gloucestershire University. It can hardly be expected that these attacks are likely, in a situation of increased budgetary constraint, to cease.
It is worth pausing, however, to question why it is that the humanities in general and philosophy in particular are particularly susceptible to these attacks. It is true that the justifications offered for the cuts are often framed in very narrow budgetary terms as appears to be the case at Middlesex. Such terms do not intrinsically prevent other types of subjects and subject areas being affected and, indeed, at University College London, it is the life sciences that are threatened. However, despite the correctness of this point, there is a particular pattern of assault on the humanities in general and philosophy in particular, that reaches beyond the narrow rationale of budgets.
In a new book Martha Nussbaum takes aim at a logic that generally views the humanities as of little contemporary significance, a view that we can see reflected in the general failure to view focus on them as any kind of political priority. The economic situation has led to an intensification of a trend visible for sometime. This is one in which the value of education is generally assessed in terms of the price of wage one can attract after having consumed it. It is the model of education in terms of preparation for work, as is particularly evident in the subsumption of education under business and the merging of higher education with training.
In this situation the central difficulty with providing a general rationale for defending the humanities in general and philosophy in particular is that alternative views of the point of education are thought to be of little relevance in straitened times. The intriguing thing about this, however, is that this does not apply equally to education that is based on fine art. Whilst this is hardly a season of rejoicing in the arts in terms of funding there is not the same antipathy towards arts that is expressed towards the humanities. The reason appears to be that performance can be guaranteed from art whilst little that is taken to be significant emerges from the humanities.
The central political question that emerges from this concerns how it is that a sustainable civil society is meant to develop without education that is concerned with the nature of civility itself. Politicians make much out of the conditions for civility but seem to think that civility is merely a matter of moral exhortation, not something that requires development of moral sensitivity. Similarly, the focus on instrumental gain from knowledge leaves aside any questions concerning the nature of knowledge itself and hence does not allow for serious engagement with the point of relations with others. The basic case for philosophy as an enquiry is that without it assumptions ossify and prejudice replaces judgment. A "culture" without philosophy is possible, just not desirable and the case for this looks like needing to be made again.
Whilst the political parties are adopting these blinkered points of view universities across the UK are closing or cutting their philosophy departments. Amongst others there are threats of cuts at the University of Sussex, King's College London, the University of Leeds and Gloucestershire University. It can hardly be expected that these attacks are likely, in a situation of increased budgetary constraint, to cease.
It is worth pausing, however, to question why it is that the humanities in general and philosophy in particular are particularly susceptible to these attacks. It is true that the justifications offered for the cuts are often framed in very narrow budgetary terms as appears to be the case at Middlesex. Such terms do not intrinsically prevent other types of subjects and subject areas being affected and, indeed, at University College London, it is the life sciences that are threatened. However, despite the correctness of this point, there is a particular pattern of assault on the humanities in general and philosophy in particular, that reaches beyond the narrow rationale of budgets.
In a new book Martha Nussbaum takes aim at a logic that generally views the humanities as of little contemporary significance, a view that we can see reflected in the general failure to view focus on them as any kind of political priority. The economic situation has led to an intensification of a trend visible for sometime. This is one in which the value of education is generally assessed in terms of the price of wage one can attract after having consumed it. It is the model of education in terms of preparation for work, as is particularly evident in the subsumption of education under business and the merging of higher education with training.
In this situation the central difficulty with providing a general rationale for defending the humanities in general and philosophy in particular is that alternative views of the point of education are thought to be of little relevance in straitened times. The intriguing thing about this, however, is that this does not apply equally to education that is based on fine art. Whilst this is hardly a season of rejoicing in the arts in terms of funding there is not the same antipathy towards arts that is expressed towards the humanities. The reason appears to be that performance can be guaranteed from art whilst little that is taken to be significant emerges from the humanities.
The central political question that emerges from this concerns how it is that a sustainable civil society is meant to develop without education that is concerned with the nature of civility itself. Politicians make much out of the conditions for civility but seem to think that civility is merely a matter of moral exhortation, not something that requires development of moral sensitivity. Similarly, the focus on instrumental gain from knowledge leaves aside any questions concerning the nature of knowledge itself and hence does not allow for serious engagement with the point of relations with others. The basic case for philosophy as an enquiry is that without it assumptions ossify and prejudice replaces judgment. A "culture" without philosophy is possible, just not desirable and the case for this looks like needing to be made again.
Friday, 9 April 2010
Philosophy and the Humanities (II)
In an article in Inside Higher Ed by Jason Stanley there are a series of assertions to the effect that philosophy is somewhat alienated from the rest of the humanities. Part of the problem with assessing Stanley's argument is that it seems to be based exclusively on evidence from the US and to assume that "philosophy" is identical with contemporary Anglo-American writing. Stanley also appears upset that many people not employed in philosophy departments might be thought of by some as "philosophers" though why the particular employment designation should affect serious evaluation of whether someone is engaging in philosophy is less than clear.
Later Stanley claims that there is a general perception that the debates of philosophers are antiquated though, in including debates about the nature of justice amongst those thought to be "antiquated" he is surely asserting something that is dubious. Stanley later claims that philosophy was, in any event, particularly responsible for shaping the nature of modernity though, in making this claim, says nothing about how such a philosophy-shaped modernity might end up alienated from the philosophy that formed it, something that one might think required a very specific theory, perhaps on the lines of Adorno and Horkheimer's dialectic of enlightenment thesis.
Rather than investigate in what sense a philosophical account of modernity can be ventured, however, Stanley instead asserts as if it were obvious that there is no room in the contemporary humanities for such grand theorising as was practiced by Kant and Spinoza. The basis for the general claim seems to be that there is no audience for philosophy outside the university. This claim is a very difficult one to evaluate and depends partly again on what is meant by "philosophy". Certainly, as Stanley indicates, fiction has more general influence than any specific element of the humanities on the culture as a whole. However, much fiction is shaped by philosophy in quite a number of ways, not just fiction avowedly philosophical either. Again, a number of philosophers are widely read outside the university, though not many contemporary Anglo-American ones are. And it is this that again seems to irk Stanley though when he argues that Saul Kripke is more part of the tradition of philosophy than Slavoj Zizek he is surely right. Hardly anyone, however, including Zizek himself, views Zizek as a philosopher!
The concluding comments in the piece argue that the basis of the alienation alleged to exist occurs due to the practice of philosophy in a way that bears little relation to historical questions. This is, again, a particular practice of philosophy. To seriously study Kant or Spinoza without attending to historical matters is pretty much impossible and to read even 20th century analytic philosophers without some historical sense is pretty odd. So, overall, it is possible that it is something to do with a certain construction of what philosophy is thought to consist in that leads to the conclusion that philosophy is alienated from the humanities.
Later Stanley claims that there is a general perception that the debates of philosophers are antiquated though, in including debates about the nature of justice amongst those thought to be "antiquated" he is surely asserting something that is dubious. Stanley later claims that philosophy was, in any event, particularly responsible for shaping the nature of modernity though, in making this claim, says nothing about how such a philosophy-shaped modernity might end up alienated from the philosophy that formed it, something that one might think required a very specific theory, perhaps on the lines of Adorno and Horkheimer's dialectic of enlightenment thesis.
Rather than investigate in what sense a philosophical account of modernity can be ventured, however, Stanley instead asserts as if it were obvious that there is no room in the contemporary humanities for such grand theorising as was practiced by Kant and Spinoza. The basis for the general claim seems to be that there is no audience for philosophy outside the university. This claim is a very difficult one to evaluate and depends partly again on what is meant by "philosophy". Certainly, as Stanley indicates, fiction has more general influence than any specific element of the humanities on the culture as a whole. However, much fiction is shaped by philosophy in quite a number of ways, not just fiction avowedly philosophical either. Again, a number of philosophers are widely read outside the university, though not many contemporary Anglo-American ones are. And it is this that again seems to irk Stanley though when he argues that Saul Kripke is more part of the tradition of philosophy than Slavoj Zizek he is surely right. Hardly anyone, however, including Zizek himself, views Zizek as a philosopher!
The concluding comments in the piece argue that the basis of the alienation alleged to exist occurs due to the practice of philosophy in a way that bears little relation to historical questions. This is, again, a particular practice of philosophy. To seriously study Kant or Spinoza without attending to historical matters is pretty much impossible and to read even 20th century analytic philosophers without some historical sense is pretty odd. So, overall, it is possible that it is something to do with a certain construction of what philosophy is thought to consist in that leads to the conclusion that philosophy is alienated from the humanities.
Philosophy and the Humanities (I)
In a recent issue of the Times Higher there has been reported the results of a 2007 citation count in the humanities and social sciences that was carried out by Thomson Reuters. There are a number of interesting results from this. The most cited author is Michel Foucault, followed, depressingly enough, by Pierre Bourdieu. In the top group there are 15 philosophers and philosophers seem to be cited more within the general humanities that do representatives of any other discipline though sociology is not far behind. Somewhat surprisingly, there are no historians in the list at all.
Alongside these points the next interesting one is the the only author from the 18th century included is none other than Kant who comes in 13th in the list just below Gilles Deleuze but, gratifyingly, just above Martin Heidegger! Peculiarly all of these thinkers received fewer citations than Bruno Latour. There are virtually no Anglo-American philosophers in this list, however, since only John Rawls and Thomas Kuhn figure in it whilst quite a few 20th century French philosophers figure here suggesting that European philosophy has a wider general impact on the humanities than Anglo-American philosophy does, something not that surprising.
Alongside these points the next interesting one is the the only author from the 18th century included is none other than Kant who comes in 13th in the list just below Gilles Deleuze but, gratifyingly, just above Martin Heidegger! Peculiarly all of these thinkers received fewer citations than Bruno Latour. There are virtually no Anglo-American philosophers in this list, however, since only John Rawls and Thomas Kuhn figure in it whilst quite a few 20th century French philosophers figure here suggesting that European philosophy has a wider general impact on the humanities than Anglo-American philosophy does, something not that surprising.
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