Due to the postings on this blog concerning Derek Parfit's magnum opus On What Matters being distributed on Twitter I was contacted by Constantine Sandis who suggested an alternative work to Parfit's that deals, in some respects, with similar questions. This alternative is provided by John Skorupski in his book The Domain of Reasons. It has to be said that whilst Skorupski's book is not as lengthy as Parfit's it is almost certainly as dense. In this posting I will only lay out the basic points made in the Introduction to Skorupski's book about the content of the claims he will make and how they relate to the structure of the work.
Skorupski opens the introduction by describing the book's concern as being to do with normativity and reasons, two topics of wide contemporary currency but also states that by the work's conclusion we will come to see it as ultimately addressing themes concerning the relations between self, thought, and world. Since the latter appear, at least plausibly, as metaphysical topics whilst the former appear, rather, parts of a theory of practical reason, it would seem that the work intends a kind of integration of theoretical and practical concerns with reason. The fourth part of the book, which is headed "normativity", is apparently where all this is meant to come together.
The project of the book, like that of Parfit's, is very ambitious and perhaps hard to imagine being achieved. So Skorupski, more modestly, indicates that his work hopes only to give a comprehensive solution "to which at least some people can give serious and settled assent". Even this may be rather too ambitious.
The first section of the introduction sets out a general picture of the project of the whole work and in it Skorupski indicates that "normative" is intended primarily as a contrastive term to "descriptive" and that this is why investigation of it extends to epistemology as much as ethics and aesthetics. The basic concept of the work, as indicated in its title, is, however, the idea of a "reason" and thus in this respect its overall concern appears to mesh with the first part of On What Matters. Skorupski even suggests that thinking in general is no more than "sensitivity to reasons", a claim that ensures that the whole region of conceptuality is at issue for him in addressing reasons.
This basic claim stakes a view of the 'pervasiveness' of reasons but, least it be assumed that it commits Skorupski to an intellectualist conception, he is quick to include sentiments under the heading of reasons (thus implicitly demarcating his conception from a Humean one). If the pervasiveness claim is bought partly at the cost of apparently diluting what is specific to the notion of a "reason" it is also coupled with a claim concerning the 'primitiveness' of reasons to the effect that "a reason" is the basic normative concept. This primitiveness claim is what Skorupski terms the "Reasons thesis".
The "Reasons thesis" itself can be taken in stronger and weaker senses but the stronger sense - leading to the view that normative predicates can be reduced to reasons predicates - is not ultimately going to be supported by Skorupski. Rather, the weaker form of the thesis is what he will be supporting, the claim, basically, that the concept of a reason is the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept.
Added to the pervasiveness thesis and the primitiveness thesis there is also a constitutive claim to the effect that what enables us to say that thought is occurring is that response to reasons is taking place. This includes the view of thinking that suggests a kind of apperceptive feature in thought or, as Skorupski puts it, that there is a capacity for epistemic self-audit.
If these are the three major claims about reasons that Skorupski wishes to advance the question next concerns how the structure of the work supports them and the points involved in assuming that the argument concerning them leads us finally to views about the relations between self, thought, and world. The first part of the book concerns the "structure of normative concepts" and it is here that Skorupski promises the arguments concerning the "Reasons thesis" or the weak form of the primitiveness claim. The way I understand Skorupski's subsequent claims about the structure of the work is that the second and third parts of the book (concerning epistemic and evaluative and practical reasons) aim to show the case for the pervasiveness claim and that the fourth part (on the normative view) then concludes with an argument for the constitutive view.
Given that this is the overall structure of the book it follows that it is not Skorupski's primary purpose to advance theses in normative ethics (or normative epistemology either) so that any specific claims that the book contains about these areas will only be of second-order importance. However, despite this being apparently true, the third part of the book will present a number of substantive claims about the normative structure of practical reason. In this respect the third part of Skorupski's book is likely to contribute to controversies within the area of normative ethics in a way that the second part is unlikely to in the area of normative epistemology.
One of the reasons Skorupski gives for this difference between ethics and epistemology is that in the former area there is less agreement about the basic structure of reasons. Skorupski indicates early that he takes there to be an heterogeneity of sources of practical reasons.
The concluding fourth part is meant to take us into the terrain of the broadest account of the metaphysics of reasons. This circles on the question of epistemic norms and reasons for taking epistemology to be a normative subject.
Skorupski's general project is set up, in some respects like Parfit's, in opposition to non-cognitivism but, despite this, and unlike the case with Parfit, Skorupski does not wish to endorse realism. Cognitivism minus realism is a combination that already suggests a connection between Skorupski's project and the Kantian one and I'll explore more of the introductory ways in which Skorupski distinguishes his account from Kant's in future postings.
The basic ground for Skorupski not being a realist is his simple commitment to the view that normative propositions do not represent states of affairs or, otherwise put, that they are starkly different from anything descriptive. So if this is so then propositions which concern reasons do not concern the world (which appears to reinstate a kind of Humean view despite the earlier claim that sentiments belong under the heading of reasons being non-Humean).
Skorupski's ultimate position of cognitive irrealism is what he terms a "meta-normative" view and the support for it is provided in the fourth part of the volume. It is not directly entailed by the normative views provided earlier so it is in principle possible to accept the claims of pervasiveness and primitiveness without agreeing with the constitutive claim. The second part of the introduction begins to lay out the meta-normative claim's relation to the Kantian view and I will turn to this in the next posting on Skorupski.
Wednesday, 17 August 2011
Thursday, 11 August 2011
Riots, the State of Nature and the Social Contract
The scenes of rioting in the UK over the last few days have been pretty awful, involving, as they have, widespread destruction of property and of some people's homes. The responses to the riots have had problems of their own, resting largely, as they have, on appeals for repressive state measures and ritual incantations of the need for re-moralising society. Amidst this fevered hubbub it has become apparent that the reflex responses of members of the public, as well as of the leading politicians in the country, are basically punitive in nature.
To an extent these responses are understandable since it is true that threats to livelihoods, homes and basic physical security, do tend to panic people. And I am far from wanting to engage in extended responses here concerning the question of what drives people to engage in behaviour that puts such things at risk, though not because I think such discussion is otiose. Rather it is because, in the first instance, what strikes me as important here is to reflect on the question of what philosophically there is to say about what these riots reveal to us about social order and social cohesion.
In the first instance, what comes to mind is the way that these riots reveal the need for discussion of the notion of the "state of nature". This notion has been misunderstood as either a historical one or as being something that is only at the edges of political theory, something preliminary, as it were, to its real business. What disturbances of the sort we have witnessed have revealed, however, is how central to the task of political philosophy the discussion of the state of nature really is. It is not only that the riots reveal well how a state of nature can be re-created in advanced societies, even if only in a few streets and for a short time. It is, even more, that the problems that the social contract is meant to resolve, problems of assurance and the overcoming of isolation, are not conclusively solved in any of the societies in which we live which is why they remain beset by recurrences of reversion to the state of nature.
Hence it is not only false to think that the state of nature is an historically closed episode, it is also wrong to think that it is not of continuous relevance in the comprehension of the bases of social order. A state of nature is constituted whenever it is the case that there exists in a situation no conclusively established and reliably applicable authority. In this sense our societies, whilst based on social contracts for the most part, are riven with exceptions that place us either as individuals or members of groups, back into the state of nature. Once placed there we have the basic problems revealed again that require recourse to the social contract. In this sense the need for social order is much more basic than the ritual incantations of politicians, commentators and social theorists, suggest.
It is not merely a problem of appealing for 'parents to parent' or for measures that alleviate problems of poverty and neglect, it is also a problem of articulating both within the spaces governed by the social contract and those apertures through which authority disappears, the need for a regulation of behaviour that enables the formation and re-formation of ordered connections such that something like cohesion can be said to exist. The ritual noises that we hear on such occasions point to formations that allegedly threaten such order, whether what is meant here are loose morals or chasms of inequality. Such factors are not without interest in the overall understanding of social order but the basis of it is elsewhere. It is in the simple view that there is an interest in order existing and being maintained in a manner that supersedes that which can tie together a band of robbers. This case is far from simple and cannot be regarded as conclusively established but that it requires to be made and re-made is the basic philosophical lesson that emerges from these disturbances, a lesson that is of more lasting interest and importance than either the disturbances themselves or the ritual denunciations that are made when they take place.
To an extent these responses are understandable since it is true that threats to livelihoods, homes and basic physical security, do tend to panic people. And I am far from wanting to engage in extended responses here concerning the question of what drives people to engage in behaviour that puts such things at risk, though not because I think such discussion is otiose. Rather it is because, in the first instance, what strikes me as important here is to reflect on the question of what philosophically there is to say about what these riots reveal to us about social order and social cohesion.
In the first instance, what comes to mind is the way that these riots reveal the need for discussion of the notion of the "state of nature". This notion has been misunderstood as either a historical one or as being something that is only at the edges of political theory, something preliminary, as it were, to its real business. What disturbances of the sort we have witnessed have revealed, however, is how central to the task of political philosophy the discussion of the state of nature really is. It is not only that the riots reveal well how a state of nature can be re-created in advanced societies, even if only in a few streets and for a short time. It is, even more, that the problems that the social contract is meant to resolve, problems of assurance and the overcoming of isolation, are not conclusively solved in any of the societies in which we live which is why they remain beset by recurrences of reversion to the state of nature.
Hence it is not only false to think that the state of nature is an historically closed episode, it is also wrong to think that it is not of continuous relevance in the comprehension of the bases of social order. A state of nature is constituted whenever it is the case that there exists in a situation no conclusively established and reliably applicable authority. In this sense our societies, whilst based on social contracts for the most part, are riven with exceptions that place us either as individuals or members of groups, back into the state of nature. Once placed there we have the basic problems revealed again that require recourse to the social contract. In this sense the need for social order is much more basic than the ritual incantations of politicians, commentators and social theorists, suggest.
It is not merely a problem of appealing for 'parents to parent' or for measures that alleviate problems of poverty and neglect, it is also a problem of articulating both within the spaces governed by the social contract and those apertures through which authority disappears, the need for a regulation of behaviour that enables the formation and re-formation of ordered connections such that something like cohesion can be said to exist. The ritual noises that we hear on such occasions point to formations that allegedly threaten such order, whether what is meant here are loose morals or chasms of inequality. Such factors are not without interest in the overall understanding of social order but the basis of it is elsewhere. It is in the simple view that there is an interest in order existing and being maintained in a manner that supersedes that which can tie together a band of robbers. This case is far from simple and cannot be regarded as conclusively established but that it requires to be made and re-made is the basic philosophical lesson that emerges from these disturbances, a lesson that is of more lasting interest and importance than either the disturbances themselves or the ritual denunciations that are made when they take place.
Wednesday, 10 August 2011
Rawls and Distributive Justice (III)
Sometime back I wrote a couple of postings about Rawls' 1967 pieces on distributive justice: the first one is here and the second here. The topics addressed in these pieces reappear in A Theory of Justice section 43 of Chapter V, the section immediately after the one in which Rawls discussed political economy.
In the version in Theory Rawls describes the "main problem" of distributive justice as being the choice of a social system. By a "social system" Rawls is referring to the way in which a basic structure is regulated and how its major institutions come together. The central conception of pure procedural justice has been the mechanism of regulation promoted by justice as fairness. Since the main point of the second part of Theory is to work through the understanding of institutions the setting of the principles of justice are here being displayed in such a way that the basic structure really does reflect their precepts.
In this section Rawls looks at the means by which 'background' institutions are reflective of the principles of justice both in terms of private ownership and in relation to more socialistic systems. In the first type of system we have a constitution that guarantees the priority of liberty and fair equality of opportunity applies. When looking at how the background institutions are to be governed so that these principles are reflected Rawls reaches for the theory of branches of government articulated by R.A. Musgrave. This theory is quite different to the classic ones of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau or Kant since it does not concern the 'separation of powers' but rather an account of public finance.
On this theory of public finance government is seen as having four branches which don't neatly fit administrative categories but are instead descriptive of functions. The first function is allocation which concerns, in a market economy, keeping prices competitive and undercutting tendencies to prevent this. Allocation is also part of the business of ensuring efficiency is met in relation to social benefits and costs.
By contrast to the allocation branch, the stabilization branch is concerned with bringing about "full employment" and works with the allocation branch in terms of ensuring market efficiency.
The "transfer branch" has responsibility for the social minimum which involves taking account of needs, something the competitive price system alone has no concern with. Competitive determination of total income alone would ignore the claims of need so it is rational to insure oneself against this alone setting the standards of living. The difference principle further mandates that these standards are addressed and it is the point of the transfer branch to see to this. Above the minimum the rest of income can be met by the price system assuming that the latter is efficiently governed.
The last branch is the distribution branch. It concerns how distributive shares are provided by means of taxation and regulation of ownership of property. From here comes taxes that concern inheritance in order that the dispersal of property is consistent with fair value of equal liberties. This is one of the places where Rawls makes a 'luck egalitarian' point arguing that the distribution of intelligence is no more just in its distribution than that of wealth. Hence distribution of the goods accruing to those with a greater than average of the former have also to be governed by application of the difference principle.
One of the points of the discussion of the difference principle is, however, to suggest that the institutions of fair equality of opportunity are put at risk when inequalities of wealth exceed a certain limit. One of the effects of that happening is, further, that political liberties have less worth for many than is otherwise the case. If one part of the distribution branch is concerned with taxation and regulation of property the other part concerns raising revenue. The raising of revenue itself can be undertaken by different means since the taxation of consumption is as available to government as the taxation of income and has more chance of being progressive in application particularly if it includes exemptions for dependents. However, the precise questions of policy here are not specifically part of the theory of justice.
The two parts of the distribution branch relate to the two principles of justice as taxation of inheritance and income and regulation of property secure the institutions of equal liberty (at least in a property-owning democracy). Taxes are the means by which public goods are provided and this aspect of the distribution branch works with the transfer branch to meet the second principle of justice. There are questions here concerning how taxation is itself to be regulated involving precepts such as apply to ability to pay that arise from what Rawls terms "common sense" and indicate an intuitive element is here thought of as applicable though the question of the status of such precepts is not investigated in this section.
One of the points of the general description of the private property system described in the way Rawls has given is to prevent too restrictive an ownership of wealth, thus intending to mitigate the effects of capitalism that socialists complain of. However, after raising this point, Rawls refers to the notion of "liberal socialism" suggesting that it has two ways of meeting the principles of justice. The first would be to assume the means of production were publicly owned and thus that collective decisions were made about the general features of the economy. The "liberal" part of this notion is that it still allows firms to be engaged in competition with each other albeit with such competition only covering one of the functions of prices.
The point of such remarks is to suggest that a place for the market does not entail that people are unmoved by altruistic concerns. In stating this Rawls does, however, recognise the automatic and impersonal character of market mechanisms and the way they abstract from individual decisions. One of the reasons is that the theory of justice is not intended to shape a basic structure that is entirely governed by altruism.
Rawls entertains a possible further branch of government, the exchange branch, that is a special body that takes note of social interests and preferences for public goods and looks only at the latter separately from what is strictly mandated by the principles of justice. The description of this further branch does, however, take the discussion into technicalities that are less evidently of foundational constitutional significance. One of the reasons why this is so is that this further supposed branch does not arise out of the principles of justice themselves.
In the version in Theory Rawls describes the "main problem" of distributive justice as being the choice of a social system. By a "social system" Rawls is referring to the way in which a basic structure is regulated and how its major institutions come together. The central conception of pure procedural justice has been the mechanism of regulation promoted by justice as fairness. Since the main point of the second part of Theory is to work through the understanding of institutions the setting of the principles of justice are here being displayed in such a way that the basic structure really does reflect their precepts.
In this section Rawls looks at the means by which 'background' institutions are reflective of the principles of justice both in terms of private ownership and in relation to more socialistic systems. In the first type of system we have a constitution that guarantees the priority of liberty and fair equality of opportunity applies. When looking at how the background institutions are to be governed so that these principles are reflected Rawls reaches for the theory of branches of government articulated by R.A. Musgrave. This theory is quite different to the classic ones of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau or Kant since it does not concern the 'separation of powers' but rather an account of public finance.
On this theory of public finance government is seen as having four branches which don't neatly fit administrative categories but are instead descriptive of functions. The first function is allocation which concerns, in a market economy, keeping prices competitive and undercutting tendencies to prevent this. Allocation is also part of the business of ensuring efficiency is met in relation to social benefits and costs.
By contrast to the allocation branch, the stabilization branch is concerned with bringing about "full employment" and works with the allocation branch in terms of ensuring market efficiency.
The "transfer branch" has responsibility for the social minimum which involves taking account of needs, something the competitive price system alone has no concern with. Competitive determination of total income alone would ignore the claims of need so it is rational to insure oneself against this alone setting the standards of living. The difference principle further mandates that these standards are addressed and it is the point of the transfer branch to see to this. Above the minimum the rest of income can be met by the price system assuming that the latter is efficiently governed.
The last branch is the distribution branch. It concerns how distributive shares are provided by means of taxation and regulation of ownership of property. From here comes taxes that concern inheritance in order that the dispersal of property is consistent with fair value of equal liberties. This is one of the places where Rawls makes a 'luck egalitarian' point arguing that the distribution of intelligence is no more just in its distribution than that of wealth. Hence distribution of the goods accruing to those with a greater than average of the former have also to be governed by application of the difference principle.
One of the points of the discussion of the difference principle is, however, to suggest that the institutions of fair equality of opportunity are put at risk when inequalities of wealth exceed a certain limit. One of the effects of that happening is, further, that political liberties have less worth for many than is otherwise the case. If one part of the distribution branch is concerned with taxation and regulation of property the other part concerns raising revenue. The raising of revenue itself can be undertaken by different means since the taxation of consumption is as available to government as the taxation of income and has more chance of being progressive in application particularly if it includes exemptions for dependents. However, the precise questions of policy here are not specifically part of the theory of justice.
The two parts of the distribution branch relate to the two principles of justice as taxation of inheritance and income and regulation of property secure the institutions of equal liberty (at least in a property-owning democracy). Taxes are the means by which public goods are provided and this aspect of the distribution branch works with the transfer branch to meet the second principle of justice. There are questions here concerning how taxation is itself to be regulated involving precepts such as apply to ability to pay that arise from what Rawls terms "common sense" and indicate an intuitive element is here thought of as applicable though the question of the status of such precepts is not investigated in this section.
One of the points of the general description of the private property system described in the way Rawls has given is to prevent too restrictive an ownership of wealth, thus intending to mitigate the effects of capitalism that socialists complain of. However, after raising this point, Rawls refers to the notion of "liberal socialism" suggesting that it has two ways of meeting the principles of justice. The first would be to assume the means of production were publicly owned and thus that collective decisions were made about the general features of the economy. The "liberal" part of this notion is that it still allows firms to be engaged in competition with each other albeit with such competition only covering one of the functions of prices.
The point of such remarks is to suggest that a place for the market does not entail that people are unmoved by altruistic concerns. In stating this Rawls does, however, recognise the automatic and impersonal character of market mechanisms and the way they abstract from individual decisions. One of the reasons is that the theory of justice is not intended to shape a basic structure that is entirely governed by altruism.
Rawls entertains a possible further branch of government, the exchange branch, that is a special body that takes note of social interests and preferences for public goods and looks only at the latter separately from what is strictly mandated by the principles of justice. The description of this further branch does, however, take the discussion into technicalities that are less evidently of foundational constitutional significance. One of the reasons why this is so is that this further supposed branch does not arise out of the principles of justice themselves.
Tuesday, 9 August 2011
Mark Schroeder's Review of Parfit
Another person has managed to already review the whole of On What Matters and, unlike Simon Blackburn, has managed the considerable feat of addressing a number of its intellectual claims and, although disagreeing with the book on important matters, treated it with some considerable respect. This person, whose review is an admirable example of careful prose, is Mark Schroeder.
Schroeder's review is published in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews and shows some considerable acuity in addressing the difficult question as to why Parfit chose to publish such a long and difficult to engage with book as On What Matters. Schroeder presents a compelling engagement with the "convergence thesis" in normative ethics that Parts 2 and 3 of the book are concerned with where Parfit seeks to reconcile Kantian, contractualist and consequentialist views of the terrain. Importantly, Schroeder points out that the convergence theory, whilst worth attention strictly within the limits of normative ethics itself also appears to presuppose views concerning reason that not all the normative theories in question do share and so is perhaps less convincing as a form of convergence than Parfit seems to think.
Schroeder also treats Part 6 of On What Matters to some engaged comment bringing out again why the accounts of normativity involved there are regarded by Parfit as part of the same project whilst also calling into question the commitments involved in assuming them to be part of the same project as the earlier account of normative ethics. Schroeder both expresses scepticism about the all-inclusive view of the terrain Parfit has attempted in the book whilst also showing, by deft connection back to Reasons and Persons how Parfit's view of 'moral progress' is the basis of this all-inclusive view. Schroeder also treats the comparisons that have been made between On What Matters and Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics to some careful attention indicating ways in which Sidgwick's version of a convergence thesis rests, in many respects, on different argumentative ground to Parfit's.
Unfortunately Schroeder makes little comment on the first part of On What Matters with which I have been engaged thus far in the commentary on this blog though I think implications for its treatment of reasons is pretty clear from things Schroeder does say. This review of Schroeder's is almost a model of what it means to disagree philosophically whilst indicating respect for the thinker in question. Perhaps Simon Blackburn will read it, one can only hope!
Schroeder's review is published in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews and shows some considerable acuity in addressing the difficult question as to why Parfit chose to publish such a long and difficult to engage with book as On What Matters. Schroeder presents a compelling engagement with the "convergence thesis" in normative ethics that Parts 2 and 3 of the book are concerned with where Parfit seeks to reconcile Kantian, contractualist and consequentialist views of the terrain. Importantly, Schroeder points out that the convergence theory, whilst worth attention strictly within the limits of normative ethics itself also appears to presuppose views concerning reason that not all the normative theories in question do share and so is perhaps less convincing as a form of convergence than Parfit seems to think.
Schroeder also treats Part 6 of On What Matters to some engaged comment bringing out again why the accounts of normativity involved there are regarded by Parfit as part of the same project whilst also calling into question the commitments involved in assuming them to be part of the same project as the earlier account of normative ethics. Schroeder both expresses scepticism about the all-inclusive view of the terrain Parfit has attempted in the book whilst also showing, by deft connection back to Reasons and Persons how Parfit's view of 'moral progress' is the basis of this all-inclusive view. Schroeder also treats the comparisons that have been made between On What Matters and Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics to some careful attention indicating ways in which Sidgwick's version of a convergence thesis rests, in many respects, on different argumentative ground to Parfit's.
Unfortunately Schroeder makes little comment on the first part of On What Matters with which I have been engaged thus far in the commentary on this blog though I think implications for its treatment of reasons is pretty clear from things Schroeder does say. This review of Schroeder's is almost a model of what it means to disagree philosophically whilst indicating respect for the thinker in question. Perhaps Simon Blackburn will read it, one can only hope!
Sunday, 7 August 2011
Simon Blackburn's Review of Parfit (II)
I discussed last month Simon Blackburn's review of Parfit in the form that Blackburn released it on his web-site, accompanied as it was by a statement that the Financial Times had apparently decided not to publish it after initially commissioning it. However, the review has now appeared in the Financial Times and can be accessed here (paywall). For those able to access it and compare it with Blackburn's original it is worth the effort of seeing what has happened to it in the meantime. As in the original so in the published form Blackburn disagrees with Parfit's rationalism and supports a form of the Humean sentimentalist theory. The 'support' offered for the latter is now buttressed with wider references to other authorities who agree with Blackburn but, of more concern, is the ease with which Blackburn associates rationalism with 'absolutism' and then having done this condemns it further as part of a 'colonial' or 'imperial' view. Following this habit of guilt by association Blackburn aligns Parfit with Tony Blair in a particularly gross example of distorting the relationship between philosophy and politics. This is surely unworthy of Blackburn and is hardly an apt way to introduce philosophical disputes to a general public.
Blackburn's defence of the Humean view does now have the grace to include a consideration of Parfit's objectivist understanding of intentionality and provide a case against it so is in this respect an improvement on the version published previously on his web-site. Consideration of thought-experiments, something hardly unique to Parfit is still presented as a weird eccentricity, again something odd in a presentation of a philosophical work for a wide public. The peculiar attack on All Souls that marred the earlier version is at least mercifully missing but this 'review' is still not one that can be said to have seriously shown any respect or serious philosophical regard for a work that some at least have taken to be worth extended engagement and is really a poor form of public engagement for an intellectual of Blackburn's standing.
Blackburn's defence of the Humean view does now have the grace to include a consideration of Parfit's objectivist understanding of intentionality and provide a case against it so is in this respect an improvement on the version published previously on his web-site. Consideration of thought-experiments, something hardly unique to Parfit is still presented as a weird eccentricity, again something odd in a presentation of a philosophical work for a wide public. The peculiar attack on All Souls that marred the earlier version is at least mercifully missing but this 'review' is still not one that can be said to have seriously shown any respect or serious philosophical regard for a work that some at least have taken to be worth extended engagement and is really a poor form of public engagement for an intellectual of Blackburn's standing.
Rawls and Political Economy
The fifth chapter of A Theory of Justice is entitled 'Distributive Shares' and, just as the fourth chapter focused on the first principle of justice, so this chapter looks at the second principle. The point of the opening two sections of Chapter V is to look at the sense in which the principles of justice serve as part of the doctrine of political economy and it is these sections I'll look at in this posting.
The first of these sections, section 41, describes the general role principles of justice have in the assessment of political economy intending to show only that doctrines of political economy have to include a notion of the public good which ensures that there has to be a role within them for principles of justice. Since the 'basic structure' is the key notion of Rawls' conception of justice it follows that political economy is seen by him as part of what creates and fashions wants for all. Hence political economy is not viewed as a self-standing discipline but as part of the consideration of moral and political matters.
In making this point Rawls considers the objection that political economy is concerned only with existing wants whereas the contract view describes an ideal conception, an argument which understands the two to be in necessary opposition to each other. However, such a stark way of presenting the relationship between the contract view and political economy is understood by Rawls to rest upon seeing the contract view as incorporating perfectionist constraints. By contrast, Rawls' own view of the contract position involves only a commitment to primary social goods albeit in so doing does make anthropological commitments of a certain sort. But the point of the theory of primary goods is that they are meant only to apply to the most general rational wants and not to include specifics that are contentiously ideal in form. So the "theory of the good" assumed within the contract view is not taken by Rawls to define an ideal of the person.
In some respects this point is, however, odd given the conclusion of the previous chapter which described a 'Kantian interpretation' of 'justice as fairness'. Taking this interpretation to require viewing the original position as incorporating conditions of autonomy does seem to require an ideal view of the contracting parties. It is likely to be Rawls' contention that this view involves no substantive commitment to the sense of the 'good' of these parties and thus to include no more than the formal constraints of right. But it is still the case that the view of autonomy that structures the original position is one that not all would accept as an ideal in the initial situation so is a move 'from' the initial situation. Precisely the move between the initial situation and the original position was, indeed, a central part (on my interpretation at least) of the argument of Chapter III.
Rawls articulates in this section further reasons for taking the notion of 'stability' very seriously as it is a prime source of the way that the formal constraints of right are manifested. This does lead Rawls to admit that the principles of justice do define at least 'a partial ideal of the person' and that this ideal is one that social and economic arrangements have to be bound by. Indeed, it is part of the point of this to resist the other pole of the stark contrast between political economy and the contract doctrine. Just as Rawls wishes to mitigate this contrast from one side by down-playing to a certain extent the ideal character of the contract view by denying that it is perfectionist so also he has to prevent the contract view merely being seen to submit (as utilitarianism is often thought to) to existing wants. It is the ideal of the person that is involved in the contract view that prevents it from simply accepting existing wants.
It is due to this ideal of the person that the contract view represents that it requires certain institutional forms to be embedded in its conception of justice. In this respect, as Rawls himself argues, there is a clear sense in which 'justice as fairness' is in alliance with perfectionism against utilitarianism. Whilst utilitarianism does not have to meekly accept existing wants either, given its commitment to optimific states of affairs, it is still the case, on Rawls' view, that its choice of ideals depends importantly upon how existing desires continue into the future. Another way of putting this is that utilitarianism does not include an ideal of the person in its first principle and in this respect is quite unlike both 'justice as fairness' and perfectionism.
The two principles of justice are not intended to be dependent upon the contingencies of existing desires but, unlike perfectionism, it is also not the case that these principles are supposed to arise a priori. The point is only that the principles are meant to arise from the construction of the original position but this construction is not one in which all conceptions would have equal chances given the way that the construction is constrained by the forms of right.
One of the oddities of how Rawls reflects back on the achievements of Chapter III at the beginning of Chapter V is that he now presents the methodology of the original position, in apparent accord with the idea of the 'Kantian interpretation' as, in an important sense, arising from a certain kind of individualism. The individualism in question is theoretical in the sense that the rationality of the contracting parties is modelled on the sense of what any one given reasoner would take to be rationally mandated. It is therefore meant to lead to a valuation of communal conditions but is not first framed in terms of how these conditions are meant to proceed. In presenting the issue in this way, Rawls may well mis-characterise his procedure since it rather appears that the appeal in the 'Kantian interpretation' to autonomy requires a sense of the mutuality of respect, something that cannot be modelled simply on the reasoning of one party.
In section 42 Rawls turns next to the question of distinct economic systems. However, as always, such systems are not considered from within economics but only from the principles of justice. Political economy is understood by Rawls to be concerned importantly with the public sector and with the regulation of property, taxation and the structure of markets. In presenting this view of political economy Rawls distinguishes between different elements of the public sector. The first element of it he considers concerns the ownership of the means of production. The classic distinction between socialistic and private-property arrangements concerns precisely this with the former viewing the public sector as the main or sole place in which ownership of the means of production takes place. By contrast, an ideally pictured private property system would appear to give the public sector a much smaller role in the ownership of means of production and perhaps circumscribe such public ownership only to generally agreed public goods such as apply to utilities and certain forms of transport.
If the ownership of the means of production is one element of the public sector the other that Rawls differentiates from it is the proportion of social resources devoted to public goods. In turning to this second element of the public sector Rawls concentrates on how such public goods have distinguishing characteristics that separates them from private goods properly considered. The characteristics in question are that public goods are indivisible in nature and they are public in quality. Indivisibility applies to the need that all elements of the public have to their supply. Since the need for them is thus general they cannot easily be parcelled into separable units of consumption.
Public goods can, on this conception of indivisibility, be understood to be have more or less of the characteristic of resistance to private consumption. In the case that is at the extreme end of the spectrum a public good has to be made completely and equally available to all. This would be 'full indivisibility' for the good over the society. The example Rawls provides of this is national defence against attack from outside. No part of the society can be denied provision of this good so it has the extreme characteristic of 'full indivisibility'. Since public goods have, to varying degrees, this characteristic of indivisibility, they are not provided by means of market arrangements but require provision by means of politics. In the extreme case of 'full indivisibility' the distribution of the public good is also not something that is considered in the sense that it is supplied to all.
However the characteristics that are specific to public goods carry with them certain special problems. One is the problem of 'free-riders' that afflicts taxation. Essentially if a good is made generally available then the calculations of some is that it matters not if they pay for its up-keep since provision will not be affected thereby. It is precisely due to this problem that coercive force is required to ensure that payments for indivisible public goods is provided. This does, however, also point to the need for such coercion to be built into the social contract. It is interesting and instructive that it is only at this stage of his theory that Rawls arrives at the requirement for coercion whereas Kant, by contrast, explicated authorisation to use coercion as the second step in his theory of right immediately after the statement of the universal principle of right. This was done even before such questions as provision of public goods was considered. Rawls' own example of national defence shows that authorisation of use of coercion in the articulation of right must be foundational for a society to be said to exist at all and so its late arrival in Rawls' theory does have the peculiar consequence of almost leading to be overlooked something that is key to political theory.
If the response to the 'free-rider' problem is expressed by Rawls by appeal to the coercive need that arises from provision of indivisible public goods the next point he raises concerning them is the notion of externality. Indivisible goods have wide effects and even if the financial basis of their provision was limited within a society its formation could be a matter of indifference to no one. Such public harms as effect the environment also have to be understood as part of the costs of the provision of the public good that produces this effect. Indeed, market mechanisms are alone incapable of responding to such externalities which is why governments have to attend to them.
Rawls' reference to the 'state of nature' is also made in this context, a notion otherwise rarely referred to in his theory and which some commentators argue has been banished from it in favour of the construction of the original position. In truth the original position cannot be seen to have simply replaced the reference to the 'state of nature'. Consideration of externalities of harm is essentially calculation of what 'naturally' arises and has to be regulated. Part of the case for the contract is made through the regulation in question. In this sense Rawls' contractarianism is far from having dispensed with the reference to the 'state of nature'.
Modern theories of rationality in terms of games theories replicate the problems of the 'state of nature' as Rawls' original accounting of the prisoner's dilemma testifies. In this situation the parties have been artificially isolated from each other and the problem is precisely how to ensure contractarian formations that promote the public good are to arise and this is nothing other than a restatement of the problem of the state of nature. Rawls terms this an 'isolation' problem and he distinguishes it from an 'assurance' one in which the latter is formulated through the question of how to effectively eliminate the free-rider question. Free-riders in a general sense are partaking of the 'benefits' of natural positioning whilst dependent upon social protection and the diminishment of the possibility of the former is required by others if they are to be assured of the point of their cooperation. But this is nothing other than the case for a sovereign power restated as an 'assurance' problem. What the distinction between 'isolation' and 'assurance' does point to is that the case for the contractual agreement is not equivalent to the case for the sovereign as the authority executive in relation to it and in this respect Rawls has added something at this point to the consideration of state of nature theory.
Having separated out the two elements of the public sector it becomes clear that the proportion of resources devoted to public goods is an analytically separable question from the ownership of the means of production. A private-property economy could allocate more or less resources to the purposes of public goods as could a socialist one. Further, the provision of public goods is not itself necessarily one that requires public providers. These are questions that Rawls leaves to 'political sociology' however and he does not consider them therefore foundational for the theory of justice.
This does not mean that Rawls has little to say about the role of market mechanisms. Rather, Rawls assumes that all regimes will use the market to ration out consumption goods since any other mechanism would be unnecessarily cumbersome. The difference between a market economy and a socialist one is not taken by him to reside there. Rather, in the free market the output of commodities is understood to be guided by 'kind and quantity' according to household preferences. By contrast the 'kind and quantity' of such output would be guided, in a socialist economy, by either 'collective decisions' or the preferences of planners.
Rawls thus concedes to 'market socialists' the view that a market economy could be utilised in important respects within a socialist system, not least due to the greater efficiency of the market in allocation of resources. However, the failures of markets are also well noted by Rawls, not least with regard to the provision of public goods. However, market systems are consistent with equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity and do not require forced direction of labour. Further, they decentralise how economic power is manifested.
The case for the 'consistency' of market arrangements with socialist institutions is made through a distinction between two separable functions of markets considered as operative in the determination of price. Price is taken by Rawls to have two functions. One is allocative and this he relates to economic efficiency. The other is distributive and Rawls connects this with how income is received by individuals. The allocative function of prices could be maintained through artificial rent attaching to the use of resources by state institutions and this is required if there is to be any efficiency in their use. But this function of pricing does not require distribution of the price charged to any owners. Distributive pricing is thus restricted under socialism but not allocative pricing.
The first of these sections, section 41, describes the general role principles of justice have in the assessment of political economy intending to show only that doctrines of political economy have to include a notion of the public good which ensures that there has to be a role within them for principles of justice. Since the 'basic structure' is the key notion of Rawls' conception of justice it follows that political economy is seen by him as part of what creates and fashions wants for all. Hence political economy is not viewed as a self-standing discipline but as part of the consideration of moral and political matters.
In making this point Rawls considers the objection that political economy is concerned only with existing wants whereas the contract view describes an ideal conception, an argument which understands the two to be in necessary opposition to each other. However, such a stark way of presenting the relationship between the contract view and political economy is understood by Rawls to rest upon seeing the contract view as incorporating perfectionist constraints. By contrast, Rawls' own view of the contract position involves only a commitment to primary social goods albeit in so doing does make anthropological commitments of a certain sort. But the point of the theory of primary goods is that they are meant only to apply to the most general rational wants and not to include specifics that are contentiously ideal in form. So the "theory of the good" assumed within the contract view is not taken by Rawls to define an ideal of the person.
In some respects this point is, however, odd given the conclusion of the previous chapter which described a 'Kantian interpretation' of 'justice as fairness'. Taking this interpretation to require viewing the original position as incorporating conditions of autonomy does seem to require an ideal view of the contracting parties. It is likely to be Rawls' contention that this view involves no substantive commitment to the sense of the 'good' of these parties and thus to include no more than the formal constraints of right. But it is still the case that the view of autonomy that structures the original position is one that not all would accept as an ideal in the initial situation so is a move 'from' the initial situation. Precisely the move between the initial situation and the original position was, indeed, a central part (on my interpretation at least) of the argument of Chapter III.
Rawls articulates in this section further reasons for taking the notion of 'stability' very seriously as it is a prime source of the way that the formal constraints of right are manifested. This does lead Rawls to admit that the principles of justice do define at least 'a partial ideal of the person' and that this ideal is one that social and economic arrangements have to be bound by. Indeed, it is part of the point of this to resist the other pole of the stark contrast between political economy and the contract doctrine. Just as Rawls wishes to mitigate this contrast from one side by down-playing to a certain extent the ideal character of the contract view by denying that it is perfectionist so also he has to prevent the contract view merely being seen to submit (as utilitarianism is often thought to) to existing wants. It is the ideal of the person that is involved in the contract view that prevents it from simply accepting existing wants.
It is due to this ideal of the person that the contract view represents that it requires certain institutional forms to be embedded in its conception of justice. In this respect, as Rawls himself argues, there is a clear sense in which 'justice as fairness' is in alliance with perfectionism against utilitarianism. Whilst utilitarianism does not have to meekly accept existing wants either, given its commitment to optimific states of affairs, it is still the case, on Rawls' view, that its choice of ideals depends importantly upon how existing desires continue into the future. Another way of putting this is that utilitarianism does not include an ideal of the person in its first principle and in this respect is quite unlike both 'justice as fairness' and perfectionism.
The two principles of justice are not intended to be dependent upon the contingencies of existing desires but, unlike perfectionism, it is also not the case that these principles are supposed to arise a priori. The point is only that the principles are meant to arise from the construction of the original position but this construction is not one in which all conceptions would have equal chances given the way that the construction is constrained by the forms of right.
One of the oddities of how Rawls reflects back on the achievements of Chapter III at the beginning of Chapter V is that he now presents the methodology of the original position, in apparent accord with the idea of the 'Kantian interpretation' as, in an important sense, arising from a certain kind of individualism. The individualism in question is theoretical in the sense that the rationality of the contracting parties is modelled on the sense of what any one given reasoner would take to be rationally mandated. It is therefore meant to lead to a valuation of communal conditions but is not first framed in terms of how these conditions are meant to proceed. In presenting the issue in this way, Rawls may well mis-characterise his procedure since it rather appears that the appeal in the 'Kantian interpretation' to autonomy requires a sense of the mutuality of respect, something that cannot be modelled simply on the reasoning of one party.
In section 42 Rawls turns next to the question of distinct economic systems. However, as always, such systems are not considered from within economics but only from the principles of justice. Political economy is understood by Rawls to be concerned importantly with the public sector and with the regulation of property, taxation and the structure of markets. In presenting this view of political economy Rawls distinguishes between different elements of the public sector. The first element of it he considers concerns the ownership of the means of production. The classic distinction between socialistic and private-property arrangements concerns precisely this with the former viewing the public sector as the main or sole place in which ownership of the means of production takes place. By contrast, an ideally pictured private property system would appear to give the public sector a much smaller role in the ownership of means of production and perhaps circumscribe such public ownership only to generally agreed public goods such as apply to utilities and certain forms of transport.
If the ownership of the means of production is one element of the public sector the other that Rawls differentiates from it is the proportion of social resources devoted to public goods. In turning to this second element of the public sector Rawls concentrates on how such public goods have distinguishing characteristics that separates them from private goods properly considered. The characteristics in question are that public goods are indivisible in nature and they are public in quality. Indivisibility applies to the need that all elements of the public have to their supply. Since the need for them is thus general they cannot easily be parcelled into separable units of consumption.
Public goods can, on this conception of indivisibility, be understood to be have more or less of the characteristic of resistance to private consumption. In the case that is at the extreme end of the spectrum a public good has to be made completely and equally available to all. This would be 'full indivisibility' for the good over the society. The example Rawls provides of this is national defence against attack from outside. No part of the society can be denied provision of this good so it has the extreme characteristic of 'full indivisibility'. Since public goods have, to varying degrees, this characteristic of indivisibility, they are not provided by means of market arrangements but require provision by means of politics. In the extreme case of 'full indivisibility' the distribution of the public good is also not something that is considered in the sense that it is supplied to all.
However the characteristics that are specific to public goods carry with them certain special problems. One is the problem of 'free-riders' that afflicts taxation. Essentially if a good is made generally available then the calculations of some is that it matters not if they pay for its up-keep since provision will not be affected thereby. It is precisely due to this problem that coercive force is required to ensure that payments for indivisible public goods is provided. This does, however, also point to the need for such coercion to be built into the social contract. It is interesting and instructive that it is only at this stage of his theory that Rawls arrives at the requirement for coercion whereas Kant, by contrast, explicated authorisation to use coercion as the second step in his theory of right immediately after the statement of the universal principle of right. This was done even before such questions as provision of public goods was considered. Rawls' own example of national defence shows that authorisation of use of coercion in the articulation of right must be foundational for a society to be said to exist at all and so its late arrival in Rawls' theory does have the peculiar consequence of almost leading to be overlooked something that is key to political theory.
If the response to the 'free-rider' problem is expressed by Rawls by appeal to the coercive need that arises from provision of indivisible public goods the next point he raises concerning them is the notion of externality. Indivisible goods have wide effects and even if the financial basis of their provision was limited within a society its formation could be a matter of indifference to no one. Such public harms as effect the environment also have to be understood as part of the costs of the provision of the public good that produces this effect. Indeed, market mechanisms are alone incapable of responding to such externalities which is why governments have to attend to them.
Rawls' reference to the 'state of nature' is also made in this context, a notion otherwise rarely referred to in his theory and which some commentators argue has been banished from it in favour of the construction of the original position. In truth the original position cannot be seen to have simply replaced the reference to the 'state of nature'. Consideration of externalities of harm is essentially calculation of what 'naturally' arises and has to be regulated. Part of the case for the contract is made through the regulation in question. In this sense Rawls' contractarianism is far from having dispensed with the reference to the 'state of nature'.
Modern theories of rationality in terms of games theories replicate the problems of the 'state of nature' as Rawls' original accounting of the prisoner's dilemma testifies. In this situation the parties have been artificially isolated from each other and the problem is precisely how to ensure contractarian formations that promote the public good are to arise and this is nothing other than a restatement of the problem of the state of nature. Rawls terms this an 'isolation' problem and he distinguishes it from an 'assurance' one in which the latter is formulated through the question of how to effectively eliminate the free-rider question. Free-riders in a general sense are partaking of the 'benefits' of natural positioning whilst dependent upon social protection and the diminishment of the possibility of the former is required by others if they are to be assured of the point of their cooperation. But this is nothing other than the case for a sovereign power restated as an 'assurance' problem. What the distinction between 'isolation' and 'assurance' does point to is that the case for the contractual agreement is not equivalent to the case for the sovereign as the authority executive in relation to it and in this respect Rawls has added something at this point to the consideration of state of nature theory.
Having separated out the two elements of the public sector it becomes clear that the proportion of resources devoted to public goods is an analytically separable question from the ownership of the means of production. A private-property economy could allocate more or less resources to the purposes of public goods as could a socialist one. Further, the provision of public goods is not itself necessarily one that requires public providers. These are questions that Rawls leaves to 'political sociology' however and he does not consider them therefore foundational for the theory of justice.
This does not mean that Rawls has little to say about the role of market mechanisms. Rather, Rawls assumes that all regimes will use the market to ration out consumption goods since any other mechanism would be unnecessarily cumbersome. The difference between a market economy and a socialist one is not taken by him to reside there. Rather, in the free market the output of commodities is understood to be guided by 'kind and quantity' according to household preferences. By contrast the 'kind and quantity' of such output would be guided, in a socialist economy, by either 'collective decisions' or the preferences of planners.
Rawls thus concedes to 'market socialists' the view that a market economy could be utilised in important respects within a socialist system, not least due to the greater efficiency of the market in allocation of resources. However, the failures of markets are also well noted by Rawls, not least with regard to the provision of public goods. However, market systems are consistent with equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity and do not require forced direction of labour. Further, they decentralise how economic power is manifested.
The case for the 'consistency' of market arrangements with socialist institutions is made through a distinction between two separable functions of markets considered as operative in the determination of price. Price is taken by Rawls to have two functions. One is allocative and this he relates to economic efficiency. The other is distributive and Rawls connects this with how income is received by individuals. The allocative function of prices could be maintained through artificial rent attaching to the use of resources by state institutions and this is required if there is to be any efficiency in their use. But this function of pricing does not require distribution of the price charged to any owners. Distributive pricing is thus restricted under socialism but not allocative pricing.
Saturday, 6 August 2011
The Kantian Interpretation of 'Justice As Fairness'
Chapter IV of A Theory of Justice concludes with the central section 40 that discusses the sense in which Rawls takes it to be the case that 'justice as fairness' can be given a 'Kantian interpretation'. There is a great deal worthy of comment in this very rich section, not least with regard to how it both explicates a lot of Rawls' view and raises some important points about the Kantian implications of it.
The section opens by relating the general view of justice Rawls has set out to the Kantian conception of autonomy and emphasizes this conception over the place of universality and generality in Kant's ethics. The downgrading of the importance of universal law follows from an acceptance on Rawls' part of the force of the Hegelian objection of the "triviality" of the focus on universal law (although Hegel is not explicitly here referred to). In some respects this is surprising given the account Rawls gives subsequently of the "categorical imperative procedure" and is certainly not in accord with the work later done by constructivist interpreters of Kant.
However, whilst the downgrading of emphasis on universal law has problematic elements in it, there is also one basis for it that is creditable to Rawls and this is his intention to pay attention to the full scope of Kant's ethical view, a point made in an important footnote where Rawls wishes to distinguish Kant's view from the utilitarian conception of universality and attempts to easily reconcile Kant with utilitarian considerations. In making this point Rawls points, in a way that until extremely recently was unusual, at Kant's later ethical writings, particularly the Metaphysics of Morals although he also mentions the moral significance of Kant's works on religion and even refers to the Critique of Judgment. In the course of making this comment Rawls states that there was, at the time of writing Theory, 'no commentary on Kant's theory as a whole", adding, 'perhaps it would prove impossible to write'. Without saying that the work has addressed all elements of Kant's theory, since I am now certainly aware of a number that it does not, I think I can, without undue immodesty, point now to my own book, Kant's Practical Philosophy as covering rather more ground than any of the works Rawls here cites and going at least someway to disproving his pessimism concerning the possibility of addressing the ramifications of the whole theory.
Returning to the main text of section 40, Rawls' substantive philosophical point is to articulate the sense in which Kant makes moral principles objects of rational choice so that moral philosophy becomes the study of "the conception and outcome of a suitably defined rational decision". One of the points that Rawls derives from this is that understanding the point of legislation in relation to the kingdom of ends leads as a matter of course to the centrality of public principles although he neglects here to discuss the differing formulas of publicity Kant offers in Perpetual Peace. Free and equal rational beings are also presupposed in Kant's moral legislation.
Rawls articulates the original position as a way of realising the legislation of the kingdom of ends. One of the supporting considerations for this philosophical interpretation of the reference to the kingdom of ends is that Kant wishes to exclude heteronomous motivation and the adoption of the "veil of ignorance" ensures that the methodology of the original position maps this constraint. Effectively the ruling out of heteronomy is understood to require what Rawls earlier referred to as the formal constraints of right and the "veil of ignorance" is a means to ensure these formal constraints are met.
However, as Rawls goes on to add, there are additional elements in his construction that Kant does not refer to. One of the central ones is that of the basic structure although in referring to this Rawls neglects to follow the admonition of his own footnote since he doesn't mention here the formation of the basis of a state of right in Kant's Doctrine of Right but he does indicate generally that when all Kant's ethical writings are taken together something like the basic structure can be seen to emerge.
The principles of justice are also suggested to be analogous to the categorical imperative again when the latter is viewed primarily as a constraint that applies to persons understood as purely free, equal and rational. Just as the exclusion of heteronomy is mirrored in the "veil of ignorance" so also is the adoption of specific ends as required in hypothetical imperatives. However, Rawls does retain the notion of primary goods although he does assume these arise only from the most general assumptions about rationality and human conditions. The assumption of motivations in the original condition was also one of general mutual disinterest and this is again mapped in relation to the Kantian conception of autonomy.
Having made these points Rawls follows Sidgwick in identifying a problem with Kantian ethics, a 'problem' first articulated in the 'appendix' to the latter's Methods of Ethics. The 'problem' concerns an alleged ambiguity in Kant's view of freedom as on the one hand it is understood as a basis of choice whilst on the other it is also argued that choice of the law indicates a manifestation of freedom itself. This 'problem' has been examined at length since Rawls wrote this section of Theory with extensive accounts of the different types of freedom in Kant being undertaken by, for example, Henry Allison in his important book Kant's Theory of Freedom (amongst many other key treatments). It is a matter of distinguishing different ways in which Kant understands freedom that allows for the argument that "the scoundrel" as Rawls puts it does not realise freedom in the same sense as the one following the law and is far from being, as Rawls, following Sidgwick, thinks, a "decisive objection" to the Kantian view of freedom. Rawls says that Kant does not show "that acting from the moral law expresses our nature in identifiable ways that acting from contrary principles does not" but this is a mere assertion on Rawls' part since he does nothing to examine the evidence here.
It is likely far from being Rawls' case to engage Kant on this point since he wishes instead to articulate the original position as making good the alleged lack in Kant's view. Saying this does mean that the original position is taken to be an analogue to the noumenal view of choice with built-in constraints showing the ground for rational decision. In saying this however Rawls effectively reprises again the argument Kant gives not of moral choice in relation to autonomy but instead free choice in relation to right showing a surprising confusion of levels in Kantian theory afflicts Rawls' account. The description of the original position does not, as he claims, replicate that of noumenal freedom. Instead it replicates the contract position of right showing the ground for the restriction of external freedom being what can also realise it (the argument of his own previous two sections).
Rawls however is right to present Kant's view as one in which liberty is acting in accord with a law we give ourselves and that the understanding of shame, in Kant, is precisely one in which we fail to live up to such an ideal. The comprehension of Kant's view as an ethic of mutual respect is correct. The original position is presented in general by Rawls as a procedural interpretation of autonomy and the categorical imperative "within the framework of an empirical theory". One of the consequences of this is that Rawls does not investigate the notion that there is such a thing as pure practical reason. Another is that he conflates conditions of right with conditions of noumenal freedom. A third is that Kant's transcendental view is presented by Rawls as "transcendent", a mistake that is particularly striking. Finally, Rawls' view is explicitly distinguished from Kant's in the sense that whilst Kant's view applies to rational beings as such, Rawls' view is only meant to apply to human beings. The basic result of this is that Rawls gives up on providing a general theory of normativity or practical reason. One of the reasons for this is that Rawls wishes to give up on Kant's "dualisms", something that shows the philosophical modesty of Rawls' view. This modesty involves abstraction from central philosophical problems, an abstraction that much recent moral philosophy has, in my view rightly, given up on. The revival of more ambitious and comprehensive theories of practical reason is a return to the view of it that contemporary philosophers share with Kant and shows that the influence of Rawls on a central element of philosophy has waned.
The section opens by relating the general view of justice Rawls has set out to the Kantian conception of autonomy and emphasizes this conception over the place of universality and generality in Kant's ethics. The downgrading of the importance of universal law follows from an acceptance on Rawls' part of the force of the Hegelian objection of the "triviality" of the focus on universal law (although Hegel is not explicitly here referred to). In some respects this is surprising given the account Rawls gives subsequently of the "categorical imperative procedure" and is certainly not in accord with the work later done by constructivist interpreters of Kant.
However, whilst the downgrading of emphasis on universal law has problematic elements in it, there is also one basis for it that is creditable to Rawls and this is his intention to pay attention to the full scope of Kant's ethical view, a point made in an important footnote where Rawls wishes to distinguish Kant's view from the utilitarian conception of universality and attempts to easily reconcile Kant with utilitarian considerations. In making this point Rawls points, in a way that until extremely recently was unusual, at Kant's later ethical writings, particularly the Metaphysics of Morals although he also mentions the moral significance of Kant's works on religion and even refers to the Critique of Judgment. In the course of making this comment Rawls states that there was, at the time of writing Theory, 'no commentary on Kant's theory as a whole", adding, 'perhaps it would prove impossible to write'. Without saying that the work has addressed all elements of Kant's theory, since I am now certainly aware of a number that it does not, I think I can, without undue immodesty, point now to my own book, Kant's Practical Philosophy as covering rather more ground than any of the works Rawls here cites and going at least someway to disproving his pessimism concerning the possibility of addressing the ramifications of the whole theory.
Returning to the main text of section 40, Rawls' substantive philosophical point is to articulate the sense in which Kant makes moral principles objects of rational choice so that moral philosophy becomes the study of "the conception and outcome of a suitably defined rational decision". One of the points that Rawls derives from this is that understanding the point of legislation in relation to the kingdom of ends leads as a matter of course to the centrality of public principles although he neglects here to discuss the differing formulas of publicity Kant offers in Perpetual Peace. Free and equal rational beings are also presupposed in Kant's moral legislation.
Rawls articulates the original position as a way of realising the legislation of the kingdom of ends. One of the supporting considerations for this philosophical interpretation of the reference to the kingdom of ends is that Kant wishes to exclude heteronomous motivation and the adoption of the "veil of ignorance" ensures that the methodology of the original position maps this constraint. Effectively the ruling out of heteronomy is understood to require what Rawls earlier referred to as the formal constraints of right and the "veil of ignorance" is a means to ensure these formal constraints are met.
However, as Rawls goes on to add, there are additional elements in his construction that Kant does not refer to. One of the central ones is that of the basic structure although in referring to this Rawls neglects to follow the admonition of his own footnote since he doesn't mention here the formation of the basis of a state of right in Kant's Doctrine of Right but he does indicate generally that when all Kant's ethical writings are taken together something like the basic structure can be seen to emerge.
The principles of justice are also suggested to be analogous to the categorical imperative again when the latter is viewed primarily as a constraint that applies to persons understood as purely free, equal and rational. Just as the exclusion of heteronomy is mirrored in the "veil of ignorance" so also is the adoption of specific ends as required in hypothetical imperatives. However, Rawls does retain the notion of primary goods although he does assume these arise only from the most general assumptions about rationality and human conditions. The assumption of motivations in the original condition was also one of general mutual disinterest and this is again mapped in relation to the Kantian conception of autonomy.
Having made these points Rawls follows Sidgwick in identifying a problem with Kantian ethics, a 'problem' first articulated in the 'appendix' to the latter's Methods of Ethics. The 'problem' concerns an alleged ambiguity in Kant's view of freedom as on the one hand it is understood as a basis of choice whilst on the other it is also argued that choice of the law indicates a manifestation of freedom itself. This 'problem' has been examined at length since Rawls wrote this section of Theory with extensive accounts of the different types of freedom in Kant being undertaken by, for example, Henry Allison in his important book Kant's Theory of Freedom (amongst many other key treatments). It is a matter of distinguishing different ways in which Kant understands freedom that allows for the argument that "the scoundrel" as Rawls puts it does not realise freedom in the same sense as the one following the law and is far from being, as Rawls, following Sidgwick, thinks, a "decisive objection" to the Kantian view of freedom. Rawls says that Kant does not show "that acting from the moral law expresses our nature in identifiable ways that acting from contrary principles does not" but this is a mere assertion on Rawls' part since he does nothing to examine the evidence here.
It is likely far from being Rawls' case to engage Kant on this point since he wishes instead to articulate the original position as making good the alleged lack in Kant's view. Saying this does mean that the original position is taken to be an analogue to the noumenal view of choice with built-in constraints showing the ground for rational decision. In saying this however Rawls effectively reprises again the argument Kant gives not of moral choice in relation to autonomy but instead free choice in relation to right showing a surprising confusion of levels in Kantian theory afflicts Rawls' account. The description of the original position does not, as he claims, replicate that of noumenal freedom. Instead it replicates the contract position of right showing the ground for the restriction of external freedom being what can also realise it (the argument of his own previous two sections).
Rawls however is right to present Kant's view as one in which liberty is acting in accord with a law we give ourselves and that the understanding of shame, in Kant, is precisely one in which we fail to live up to such an ideal. The comprehension of Kant's view as an ethic of mutual respect is correct. The original position is presented in general by Rawls as a procedural interpretation of autonomy and the categorical imperative "within the framework of an empirical theory". One of the consequences of this is that Rawls does not investigate the notion that there is such a thing as pure practical reason. Another is that he conflates conditions of right with conditions of noumenal freedom. A third is that Kant's transcendental view is presented by Rawls as "transcendent", a mistake that is particularly striking. Finally, Rawls' view is explicitly distinguished from Kant's in the sense that whilst Kant's view applies to rational beings as such, Rawls' view is only meant to apply to human beings. The basic result of this is that Rawls gives up on providing a general theory of normativity or practical reason. One of the reasons for this is that Rawls wishes to give up on Kant's "dualisms", something that shows the philosophical modesty of Rawls' view. This modesty involves abstraction from central philosophical problems, an abstraction that much recent moral philosophy has, in my view rightly, given up on. The revival of more ambitious and comprehensive theories of practical reason is a return to the view of it that contemporary philosophers share with Kant and shows that the influence of Rawls on a central element of philosophy has waned.
Friday, 5 August 2011
Rawls on the Rule of Law and the Priority of Liberty
Sections 38 and 39 of Chapter IV of A Theory of Justice focus, after the previous discussion of the principle of participation, on the relationship between law and liberty. Section 38 discusses the notion of the rule of law, drawing out from the idea the basis under which rights are protected by law. Section 39 then follows up with a discussion of how the account of the rule of law affects the formulation of the first principle of justice and concludes with a re-statement of this first principle in the light of the discussion.
Rawls' account in section 38 opens with a description of the most basic element of the legal system, the view that there has to be 'impartial and regular' administration of public rules. Rawls describes this as "justice as regularity" but, whilst it appears the most formal part of the legal system, he includes within its correct functioning ways in which subtle bias are undermined or prevented from having more than limited effect so its scope is wider than is often included in formal views of law.
Law creates, as Rawls puts it, 'legitimate expectations' for social cooperation, including forming the basis for mutual trust. Law effectively "defines" the basic structure of a society so is fundamental to Rawls' conception. The rules that we term "laws" are also public and are governed by some precepts that are further built into the conception of justice as regularity. Included amongst these precepts are the assumptions that ought implies can; similar cases are treated similarly; there is no offense without a law and the precepts of natural justice. "Ought implies can", an important Kantian notion, is interpreted here legalistically to imply that legal systems cannot ask us to perform impossible actions. It includes a sense within it that laws are framed in "good faith" with regard to this assumption. The rule requiring similarity of treatment with regard to similar cases limits judicial discretion and sets the basis for precedents to build up into a general pattern. The central element of this second rule is the importance of 'consistency' just as the first rule was formulated by reference to 'good faith'. The third rule relates back to the point about publicity indicating that laws have to be general in statement and intent and not retroactive in application. Rules of natural justice require due process, impartiality of legal application, fairness of procedure and regular maintenance of rules.
The general conception of justice as regularity thus contains a great deal more than pure references to "formality" alone might suggest. After making this clear Rawls turns to the relationship of the rule of law to liberty. Without clear specification of what the law permits, for example, liberty is insecure. This helps to show that the desire for liberty is central to a functional legal system that is regular in application. This regularity of the legal system secures stability in social arrangements, not least with regard to penal sanctions for bad conduct and the understanding of what the latter consists in. This is the general point of all contractarian reasoning, going back to Hobbes.
Liberty is protected best by impartial and regular administration of law. On the basis of this regularity citizens have a plan for how to operate. One of the things that follows from Rawls' way of comprehending the legal system as based on securing liberty is that punishment is not seen by him (as some allege it is by Kant) as primarily retributive in point. Rather, punishment is connected to liberty in terms of responsibility being the ground on which we can trust each other to act. Since punishment is viewed in this way by Rawls it is to be expected that his account of it would differ later in substantive ways from Kant's but, unfortunately, little is really said by Rawls about this topic in Theory.
The only real point raised in section 38 concerns the way that liberties might have to be restricted more than one would wish in ideal circumstances in order to be better realised in non-ideal conditions. This point is referred to with regard to how the provisions of justice as regularity might have to be relaxed in emergency conditions. However, the point of any such relaxation would only be the better thereby to base equal liberties on the good of the representative citizen.
Section 39 turns to the further definition of the priority of liberty. Liberty can only be restricted for its own sake, as followed from the argument of section 38. But it can be restricted in two distinct ways. The first way would be that the basic liberties, whilst being equal, may be more or less extensive in range. The second way would be that the basic liberties may remain extensive but be unequally applied. If the first way is taken then the lesser extensiveness of the liberties has itself to be justified by reference to the gain of freedom of the representative citizen. On the other hand if liberties are unequally applied then the freedom of those with lesser liberty has to be all the better secured this way.
Restrictions on liberty can be grounded either on natural limitations or on contingencies of historical or social sort. Natural limitations affect the situation of children for example whilst contingencies of various sorts restrict freedom of speech (for example). However these points are distinguished by Rawls from the non-ideal circumstances in which there is injustice existent in various ways.
Rawls' general point is to consider the basis of restrictions on liberty of the two sorts indicated and to show that these restrictions cannot be such as to undermine the priority of liberty. Regulation of liberty of speech, for example, restricts liberty in various ways but it can be done in ways that are not unequal in application so such a kind of limitation can effectively be assimilated to a natural constraint despite having contingent ways of presenting itself.
Unequal liberties, if administered, by contrast, clearly show injustice exists but can still be regulated in such a way that the most important liberties are most equally allowed. This involves Rawls discussing paternalism as the real basis of inequality of liberties is a certain kind of paternalistic concern but such concern has to be guided by a theory of primary goods and by an understanding of real preferences. The discussion thus culminates with the restatement of the first principle of justice now given in a way that strikingly resembles Kant's universal principle of right in the Doctrine of Right (Ak. 6: 230). Rawls' first principle now reads: "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all". However this new formulation of the first principle of justice is accompanied now by the 'priority rule' which indicates not just that the principles of justice are in lexical order and that liberty, hence, can only be restricted for its own sake. It also indicates the two cases in which such restrictions are plausible. There is, as yet, no systematic argument given for the priority of liberty and Rawls postpones this to section 82, towards the conclusion of Theory.
Rawls' account in section 38 opens with a description of the most basic element of the legal system, the view that there has to be 'impartial and regular' administration of public rules. Rawls describes this as "justice as regularity" but, whilst it appears the most formal part of the legal system, he includes within its correct functioning ways in which subtle bias are undermined or prevented from having more than limited effect so its scope is wider than is often included in formal views of law.
Law creates, as Rawls puts it, 'legitimate expectations' for social cooperation, including forming the basis for mutual trust. Law effectively "defines" the basic structure of a society so is fundamental to Rawls' conception. The rules that we term "laws" are also public and are governed by some precepts that are further built into the conception of justice as regularity. Included amongst these precepts are the assumptions that ought implies can; similar cases are treated similarly; there is no offense without a law and the precepts of natural justice. "Ought implies can", an important Kantian notion, is interpreted here legalistically to imply that legal systems cannot ask us to perform impossible actions. It includes a sense within it that laws are framed in "good faith" with regard to this assumption. The rule requiring similarity of treatment with regard to similar cases limits judicial discretion and sets the basis for precedents to build up into a general pattern. The central element of this second rule is the importance of 'consistency' just as the first rule was formulated by reference to 'good faith'. The third rule relates back to the point about publicity indicating that laws have to be general in statement and intent and not retroactive in application. Rules of natural justice require due process, impartiality of legal application, fairness of procedure and regular maintenance of rules.
The general conception of justice as regularity thus contains a great deal more than pure references to "formality" alone might suggest. After making this clear Rawls turns to the relationship of the rule of law to liberty. Without clear specification of what the law permits, for example, liberty is insecure. This helps to show that the desire for liberty is central to a functional legal system that is regular in application. This regularity of the legal system secures stability in social arrangements, not least with regard to penal sanctions for bad conduct and the understanding of what the latter consists in. This is the general point of all contractarian reasoning, going back to Hobbes.
Liberty is protected best by impartial and regular administration of law. On the basis of this regularity citizens have a plan for how to operate. One of the things that follows from Rawls' way of comprehending the legal system as based on securing liberty is that punishment is not seen by him (as some allege it is by Kant) as primarily retributive in point. Rather, punishment is connected to liberty in terms of responsibility being the ground on which we can trust each other to act. Since punishment is viewed in this way by Rawls it is to be expected that his account of it would differ later in substantive ways from Kant's but, unfortunately, little is really said by Rawls about this topic in Theory.
The only real point raised in section 38 concerns the way that liberties might have to be restricted more than one would wish in ideal circumstances in order to be better realised in non-ideal conditions. This point is referred to with regard to how the provisions of justice as regularity might have to be relaxed in emergency conditions. However, the point of any such relaxation would only be the better thereby to base equal liberties on the good of the representative citizen.
Section 39 turns to the further definition of the priority of liberty. Liberty can only be restricted for its own sake, as followed from the argument of section 38. But it can be restricted in two distinct ways. The first way would be that the basic liberties, whilst being equal, may be more or less extensive in range. The second way would be that the basic liberties may remain extensive but be unequally applied. If the first way is taken then the lesser extensiveness of the liberties has itself to be justified by reference to the gain of freedom of the representative citizen. On the other hand if liberties are unequally applied then the freedom of those with lesser liberty has to be all the better secured this way.
Restrictions on liberty can be grounded either on natural limitations or on contingencies of historical or social sort. Natural limitations affect the situation of children for example whilst contingencies of various sorts restrict freedom of speech (for example). However these points are distinguished by Rawls from the non-ideal circumstances in which there is injustice existent in various ways.
Rawls' general point is to consider the basis of restrictions on liberty of the two sorts indicated and to show that these restrictions cannot be such as to undermine the priority of liberty. Regulation of liberty of speech, for example, restricts liberty in various ways but it can be done in ways that are not unequal in application so such a kind of limitation can effectively be assimilated to a natural constraint despite having contingent ways of presenting itself.
Unequal liberties, if administered, by contrast, clearly show injustice exists but can still be regulated in such a way that the most important liberties are most equally allowed. This involves Rawls discussing paternalism as the real basis of inequality of liberties is a certain kind of paternalistic concern but such concern has to be guided by a theory of primary goods and by an understanding of real preferences. The discussion thus culminates with the restatement of the first principle of justice now given in a way that strikingly resembles Kant's universal principle of right in the Doctrine of Right (Ak. 6: 230). Rawls' first principle now reads: "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all". However this new formulation of the first principle of justice is accompanied now by the 'priority rule' which indicates not just that the principles of justice are in lexical order and that liberty, hence, can only be restricted for its own sake. It also indicates the two cases in which such restrictions are plausible. There is, as yet, no systematic argument given for the priority of liberty and Rawls postpones this to section 82, towards the conclusion of Theory.
Thursday, 4 August 2011
Nelson Potter and Groundwork I
I recently set out a "casual" reading of the first part of the Groundwork promising thereafter to return to its argument in the light of some secondary literature. In doing so I've turned to Paul Guyer's edited collection on the Groundwork which features three articles on the first section and I'll be responding to these in turn. The first piece is by Nelson Potter and it's his reading of the first section I'll look at in this posting.
Potter's reading of Groundwork I works by analysing the argument into nine propositions, on each of which he comments. The first one is his statement of the first sentence which Potter translates as stating that only a good will has "absolute" worth. What Kant writes is that only the good will has "unlimited" worth with the point of the first paragraph being that other things that one could call "good" are limited in their goodness whereas the "good will" is not so limited. Potter, rather oddly, in translating the statement of the opening sentence into a claim about "absolute" worth, gives himself an unnecessary puzzle concerning where Kant provides an argument for this special status. Kant doesn't have an argument for this status because he doesn't make a claim about it. Nor does he simply think this claim would be "accepted" by anyone as Potter also suggests since the argument is immediately given about the limited goodness of other good things which are thereby contrasted with the unlimited goodness of the "good will".
Potter also speaks of the "good will" as a possibly pre-analytic concept but whilst it is true that Kant does not initially analyse it the subsequent discussion (which turns into an account of duty) does show what the "good will" has to involve. So the first parts of Potter's account are not very perspicuous and he has to restate the first proposition of the Groundwork as concerning the relationship between different kinds of value claiming that it amounts to a statement that moral value outweighs other forms of value. However, this is still an odd way to read Kant's argument since virtues, with which the "good will" is contrasted in the second paragraph, are also usually viewed as having "moral value" so Kant's claim can't simply be taken to be one about the incomparable weight of moral value simpliciter. Rather a point is being made here about the nature of moral value that requires subordination of the 'virtues' in some way (albeit prior to critically indicating a new sense of their status later).
Potter's second proposition is better stating, as it does, that a good will is not made good through what it brings about, a point clearly made as Potter correctly points out, at the beginning of the third paragraph of the first section. Here Potter is on solid ground pointing to the derivative character of that which is good as a means compared to that which is good in itself. Since, however, Potter confused the first proposition, he aligns this claim about something being good in itself with possession of an "absolute" rather than an "unlimited" status.
Potter now misses entirely the discussion of teleology that Kant engages in after making the point about the derivative character of things whose "effect" is good. Potter misses this part of Kant's argument out of his reconstruction because, as he puts it later, it is "unusual and not very convincing". The reason why Kant includes it, however, is to give support for the claim of the unconditional goodness of the good will in abstraction from considerations of utility. (It is also at this point that Kant does mention the "absolute worth" of the good will, absolute by contrast "in worth" to all derivative forms of "worth". ) The argument is a pre-emptive one concerning the difference between the ends of reason and the ends of nature with the latter understood to involve a concern with "happiness" and in arguing for a disconnect between these ends it is important.
In skipping past the two pages of discussion of teleology Potter moves directly to the claim that human actions are, as he puts it, "morally good" if and only if they are done from duty. This touches on Kant's distinction between actions done "in accordance" with duty as opposed to being done "from duty". The relationship between these claims about duty and the earlier ones about the "good will" are, however missed if we don't attend to Kant's claim that duty "contains" the thought of the good will albeit under certain "limitations". Potter thinks of the claim about "moral goodness" as being one Kant thought to "follow from" the earlier claim about the "good will" but is unclear how it is supposed to "follow". Potter emphasizes that looking at duty means discussing the value of actions that follow from the will rather than focusing on the value of the will alone. What Potter doesn't mention, however, is that we require here an account of "character", one that Kant in fact gives in describing dutiful action, a view that is contrasted directly there with an account of "temperament".
Potter's fourth proposition concerns a further development of the notion of dutiful action which is related now to the maxim on which it is based. This point is described by Kant himself as a "second proposition" of his argument at Ak 4: 399 and is the source of the general view that Kant takes motivation to be central to moral worth rather than consequentialist appraisal. Potter, however, states that Kant is not here "entirely clear about what he is arguing for". The principle of volition is described by Kant here as 'formal' and the point of this is to rule out motives grounded on "desires" in the Humean sense as all such would be merely "material". So what does Potter find "unclear" in Kant's argument?
Well the principal claim that Potter presented as proposition four of Kant's argument is now analysed by him as containing two sub-claims. One of these claims is that the moral value of an action is a quality of its maxim. This point is assumed to have a status separate from the claim that the maxim is one that will have a formal quality. However whilst it is true that maxims need not be formal in quality the whole point of Kant's argument at this point is to stress formality in opposition to materiality and the value of a maxim that was not formal would be merely derivative as follows from the previous argument on Potter's own construal so this point hardly seems sufficient to suggest that Kant was "not entirely clear"!
The next proposition on Potter's account is that the formal principle of volition is the same as the requirement that actions conform to universal law. Part of the problem with transitioning to this point next is that Potter has abstracted in his reconstruction from the account of "respect" that Kant includes at this point as when he states that duty is the "necessity of an action from respect for the law". Kant makes here an extended argument distinguishing between "objects","inclinations" and "effects" to arrive at the point that there is something that can serve the will as its ground rather than being an effect of it. This is the point about the law. It is only after this argument has been made that Kant gives the first section version of the categorical imperative.
However Potter leaves this aside at this point of his analysis moving swiftly from a claim that the formal principle of volition should be the requirement of conformity to universal law to a suggestion that Kant views the "essence" of law to consist in universality. This would appear to be a metaphysical claim that would be odd in the context of Groundwork I and there is little sign that Kant made it. It is after introducing it that Potter then moves to the "seventh" proposition which he takes to be the version of the categorical imperative made in this section. Potter in fact refines the version of the categorical imperative stated in Groundwork I into a second formulation that translates acting dutifully into acting in accord with a maxim that can be willed as a universal law. Finally, Potter returns to the "good will" claiming that such a will would always act on maxims that can be willed as universal law.
Potter's last two propositions are not directly stated in Groundwork I at all and hence should have been marked by him as implications of its argument rather than being part of its reconstruction. Further, some key elements of the argument have been entirely missed by Potter. Potter has not included the discussion of the example that Kant mentions in Groundwork I of false promising or the way it is used to make a first pass at a contradiction in conception test. Nor does Potter mention the notion of "standard of judgment" that Kant refers to as something that ordinary moral cognition is supposed to have before its eyes. Finally, Potter only mentions the "natural dialectic" Kant claims belongs to such ordinary consciousness but makes nothing of this. Potter's reconstruction of the central argument of Groundwork I thus seems to me incomplete even without looking further at his discussion of philosophical disputes concerning the meaning of its argument.
Potter's reading of Groundwork I works by analysing the argument into nine propositions, on each of which he comments. The first one is his statement of the first sentence which Potter translates as stating that only a good will has "absolute" worth. What Kant writes is that only the good will has "unlimited" worth with the point of the first paragraph being that other things that one could call "good" are limited in their goodness whereas the "good will" is not so limited. Potter, rather oddly, in translating the statement of the opening sentence into a claim about "absolute" worth, gives himself an unnecessary puzzle concerning where Kant provides an argument for this special status. Kant doesn't have an argument for this status because he doesn't make a claim about it. Nor does he simply think this claim would be "accepted" by anyone as Potter also suggests since the argument is immediately given about the limited goodness of other good things which are thereby contrasted with the unlimited goodness of the "good will".
Potter also speaks of the "good will" as a possibly pre-analytic concept but whilst it is true that Kant does not initially analyse it the subsequent discussion (which turns into an account of duty) does show what the "good will" has to involve. So the first parts of Potter's account are not very perspicuous and he has to restate the first proposition of the Groundwork as concerning the relationship between different kinds of value claiming that it amounts to a statement that moral value outweighs other forms of value. However, this is still an odd way to read Kant's argument since virtues, with which the "good will" is contrasted in the second paragraph, are also usually viewed as having "moral value" so Kant's claim can't simply be taken to be one about the incomparable weight of moral value simpliciter. Rather a point is being made here about the nature of moral value that requires subordination of the 'virtues' in some way (albeit prior to critically indicating a new sense of their status later).
Potter's second proposition is better stating, as it does, that a good will is not made good through what it brings about, a point clearly made as Potter correctly points out, at the beginning of the third paragraph of the first section. Here Potter is on solid ground pointing to the derivative character of that which is good as a means compared to that which is good in itself. Since, however, Potter confused the first proposition, he aligns this claim about something being good in itself with possession of an "absolute" rather than an "unlimited" status.
Potter now misses entirely the discussion of teleology that Kant engages in after making the point about the derivative character of things whose "effect" is good. Potter misses this part of Kant's argument out of his reconstruction because, as he puts it later, it is "unusual and not very convincing". The reason why Kant includes it, however, is to give support for the claim of the unconditional goodness of the good will in abstraction from considerations of utility. (It is also at this point that Kant does mention the "absolute worth" of the good will, absolute by contrast "in worth" to all derivative forms of "worth". ) The argument is a pre-emptive one concerning the difference between the ends of reason and the ends of nature with the latter understood to involve a concern with "happiness" and in arguing for a disconnect between these ends it is important.
In skipping past the two pages of discussion of teleology Potter moves directly to the claim that human actions are, as he puts it, "morally good" if and only if they are done from duty. This touches on Kant's distinction between actions done "in accordance" with duty as opposed to being done "from duty". The relationship between these claims about duty and the earlier ones about the "good will" are, however missed if we don't attend to Kant's claim that duty "contains" the thought of the good will albeit under certain "limitations". Potter thinks of the claim about "moral goodness" as being one Kant thought to "follow from" the earlier claim about the "good will" but is unclear how it is supposed to "follow". Potter emphasizes that looking at duty means discussing the value of actions that follow from the will rather than focusing on the value of the will alone. What Potter doesn't mention, however, is that we require here an account of "character", one that Kant in fact gives in describing dutiful action, a view that is contrasted directly there with an account of "temperament".
Potter's fourth proposition concerns a further development of the notion of dutiful action which is related now to the maxim on which it is based. This point is described by Kant himself as a "second proposition" of his argument at Ak 4: 399 and is the source of the general view that Kant takes motivation to be central to moral worth rather than consequentialist appraisal. Potter, however, states that Kant is not here "entirely clear about what he is arguing for". The principle of volition is described by Kant here as 'formal' and the point of this is to rule out motives grounded on "desires" in the Humean sense as all such would be merely "material". So what does Potter find "unclear" in Kant's argument?
Well the principal claim that Potter presented as proposition four of Kant's argument is now analysed by him as containing two sub-claims. One of these claims is that the moral value of an action is a quality of its maxim. This point is assumed to have a status separate from the claim that the maxim is one that will have a formal quality. However whilst it is true that maxims need not be formal in quality the whole point of Kant's argument at this point is to stress formality in opposition to materiality and the value of a maxim that was not formal would be merely derivative as follows from the previous argument on Potter's own construal so this point hardly seems sufficient to suggest that Kant was "not entirely clear"!
The next proposition on Potter's account is that the formal principle of volition is the same as the requirement that actions conform to universal law. Part of the problem with transitioning to this point next is that Potter has abstracted in his reconstruction from the account of "respect" that Kant includes at this point as when he states that duty is the "necessity of an action from respect for the law". Kant makes here an extended argument distinguishing between "objects","inclinations" and "effects" to arrive at the point that there is something that can serve the will as its ground rather than being an effect of it. This is the point about the law. It is only after this argument has been made that Kant gives the first section version of the categorical imperative.
However Potter leaves this aside at this point of his analysis moving swiftly from a claim that the formal principle of volition should be the requirement of conformity to universal law to a suggestion that Kant views the "essence" of law to consist in universality. This would appear to be a metaphysical claim that would be odd in the context of Groundwork I and there is little sign that Kant made it. It is after introducing it that Potter then moves to the "seventh" proposition which he takes to be the version of the categorical imperative made in this section. Potter in fact refines the version of the categorical imperative stated in Groundwork I into a second formulation that translates acting dutifully into acting in accord with a maxim that can be willed as a universal law. Finally, Potter returns to the "good will" claiming that such a will would always act on maxims that can be willed as universal law.
Potter's last two propositions are not directly stated in Groundwork I at all and hence should have been marked by him as implications of its argument rather than being part of its reconstruction. Further, some key elements of the argument have been entirely missed by Potter. Potter has not included the discussion of the example that Kant mentions in Groundwork I of false promising or the way it is used to make a first pass at a contradiction in conception test. Nor does Potter mention the notion of "standard of judgment" that Kant refers to as something that ordinary moral cognition is supposed to have before its eyes. Finally, Potter only mentions the "natural dialectic" Kant claims belongs to such ordinary consciousness but makes nothing of this. Potter's reconstruction of the central argument of Groundwork I thus seems to me incomplete even without looking further at his discussion of philosophical disputes concerning the meaning of its argument.
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