Patterned Regressiveness and Global Justice

Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State and Utopia discusses the notion of patterned principles in his very critical account of distributive justice. He initially defines a patterned principle as one which "specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions" (156). However, as Miriam Ronzoni has recently pointed out, Nozick's general usage of the term is broader referring to principles that "aim at maintaining a certain distribution or a certain system of social relationship within society". [Citation from article in vol. 37: No. 3 of Philosophy and Public Affairs]

When viewed in the broader way, however, there can emerge a conception that patterned principles may operate without anyone explicitly adopting them as such and without operating in a way that produces redistributive effects. Ronzoni, in fact, gives two examples that can be interpreted in this way, both of which, importantly, are connected not to the presence of international institutions enforcing certain norms but rather to the absence of global regulation. The first example is that of tax competition. Assuming that large corporations and capital generally favour environments in which tax is low, not high, then it follows that in a global market that does not regulate tax rates that there will be competitive pressure to reduce them. This does not require anyone (including any government) having adopted as a desiderata the simple emergence of low tax environments. The effect of a general global pressure towards lower taxation will evidently be to produce globally a reduction in state entitlements and state spending which has regressive effects.

Another example that Ronzoni gives concerns tariffs. Tariffs are not generally implemented on raw materials but on materials that have undergone secondary improvements. The greater the improvement, the greater tariff a product is susceptible to in a competition with similar products. This reproduces a tendency of ensuring that poorer nations will work to cultivate a set primary product (or set number of them) on the basis that this will ensure their products are less likely to be subject to tariffs. However since the development of secondary production is also tied to the ability of the economy to develop it follows that this pressure upon them will produce an underdevelopment of their economy. I am more sceptical of this second point since there can be other pressures within and on the economy in question that may lead it to produce secondary products and become developed. (This line of argument reproduces dependency theory, a notion I argued against in an earlier posting.)

Whilst the scenarios may not be entirely convincing the effect of them, one not directly drawn out in this fashion by Ronzoni, is nonetheless evident. It is fivefold: a) patterned behaviour can be produced and reinforced without any principle being explicitly invoked or championed by any agent and this is most likely at the global level; b) such patterned behaviour can be formulated in terms of principles but these principles would effectively be ones that would devolve into those of lesser regulation and greater market mobility, hence not "patterned" in the way Nozick intended; c) hence patterning can be an effect of libertarianism as much as egalitarianism; d) when it is an effect of libertarianism it will have socially regressive results; e) hence questions of justice at the global level are as likely to arise due to the lack of regulation and the need for regulation to be established as due to the operation of regulation.

The overall effect of the argument would be to suggest that there is a state of nature at the global level in terms of an absence of regulation of transactions between societies. This is a separate question from the arguments Kant gives concerning the state of nature that can be said to be operative between societies in terms of there being no basis of rightful agreement existent between states as Kant's main concern was how to establish a basis for peace between states (so that disputes between them are not made into an occasion for war). However there is a link since one of the tensions between states concerns different relative prosperities of them. One of the bases for such difference (though not, I would add, the only one) would, on this argument, be grounded on the insufficient character of regulation of transactions between them. This would hence be a prime basis for thinking about global justice.

Cosmopolitan Right (II)

The second part of the discussion of Kant's 3rd definitive article opens with an account of the inhospitable way commercial states have operated in terms of their visits to other countries. The behaviour that is here condemned is the way in which, when countries were visited that were composed only of peoples who existed in pre-state conditions (such as American Indians and Africans) the countries in question were treated in such a way that the inhabitants of them were taken as possessed of no status. The further example of the operations of the East India Company are also cited in this regard.

In response to these colonialist actions Kant mentions that the inhabitants of China and Japan had good reason to restrict the activities of Europeans allowing them only access but not entry with the Japanese allowing only the Dutch trading rights and keeping them entirely out of community with the natives. What is revealed by these comments, is how colonialism was grounded, in fact, on denial of a general community with those colonised where community should be understood in Gerry Cohen's sense of "justificatory community", i.e. a community composed of those who give and accept reasons against a common normative background.

The opening of this point about community gives a sense of what might be meant by "hospitality". If we take hospitality to involve some sense of justificatory community and hostility to indicate denial of any such then the general understanding of cosmopolitan right as based on conditions of universal hospitality would be indicative of cosmopolitan right as a specification of the formula of humanity from Kant's moral theory.

What further supports this reading of cosmopolitan right are Kant's concluding remarks concerning this 3rd definitive article. Here Kant states that the idea of cosmopolitan right is a "supplement to the unwritten code of the right of a state and the right of nations necessary for the sake of any public rights of human beings and so for perpetual peace" (Ak. 8: 360). Further Kant adds that it is only under this condition (of the third article) that we can flatter ourselves that we are constantly approaching perpetual peace.

These remarks indicate that the 3rd definitive article has a special place in Kant's discussion. Two curious things arise here. Firstly, in describing this third article as a supplement to the "unwritten code" Kant makes reference to the idea of supplement twice over. The "unwritten code" itself is presumably something over and above written codes and for it to have a supplement suggests a twofold addition to the written code. Secondly, if this condition is necessary for the sake of public rights of human beings the question arises as to the sense of its necessity. What makes it so necessary? Is it that only by means of it can a general approach be made towards overcoming the divisions between peoples? Or that what it guarantees (trade above all) is what would do this?

Cosmopolitan Right (I)

Kant's third definitive article for perpetual peace concerns cosmopolitan right and, like the second definitive article, is expressed in one sentence. It reads: "Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality" (Ak. 8: 357). It is the only one of the three definitive articles to immediately limit the conditions of the right it specifies and the nature of this limitation has proved controversial in subsequent treatments of Kant's topic.

Hospitality is defined here as "the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another" (Ak. 8: 357-8). So the limitative right in question is treated in terms of a reference to the response of nations to individuals who are not citizens. However, even within the scope of the discussion in Perpetual Peace (not to mention the wider scope of the Doctrine of Right) this initial characterization is not sufficient to account for all of Kant's discussion. Despite this, it is worth treating this initial characterization and seeing the limits that are set to it.

The next point that follows from the initial characterization that foreigner's have a right not to be treated with hostility is an indication of the narrowness of this claim. Foreigners can certainly be turned away: this is not part of what is meant by treating with hostility. They cannot, however, be turned away if this means that doing so will lead to their destruction. Since this is the case there is here a certain sense of recognition of the right of refugees since, presumably, if turning them away will lead to their destruction then there would be two reasons why this would result. Either because they were not able to support themselves independently (economic reasons) or because doing so would result in them being the victims of attack or assault (broadly political reasons of personal safety).

Kant views the claim in question as one that does not encompass any right to be a guest. To be a guest would require some form of contract between the foreigner and those who he presented himself before. At this point it is also interesting that Kant is speaking here of the foreigner presenting themselves before individuals of the state they have arrived in, not of some responsibility of the government. So, although I just suggested a form of "refugee" status was being recognized, in the absence of specific reference to duties of the state, it appears this kind of right is one that is required of the individuals of the state to which the foreigner presents themselves or that this is the primary way Kant tends to think of the matter.

The foreigner has a right to visit only and this is described in terms of the right to present himself before society, which widens the area of his right beyond that of reference to particular individuals and does invoke some sense of a responsibility of the community to whom he is presented though again without reference to the state being given. The ground of the right of visitation is based on the claim that all human beings have a right to possession in common of the earth's surface, a surface which is intrinsically limited and on which we hence naturally find ourselves in proximity to each other.

After referring to this cosmopolitan right Kant next mentions the behaviour of those who are inhospitable, a discussion that has two parts, only one of which will be treated in this posting. This first part refers to the pirates of the Barbary Coast and the Arabian Bedouin, both of whom are regarded as robbers of others and hence as peoples who behave contrary to "natural right". This reference to "natural right" also implies that cosmopolitan right is a kind of right within the state of nature, a right one can claim of anyone else, which, if right, again makes clear it has no necessary reference to state or government conduct.

The right to hospitality is next indicated to be limited to conditions that make it possible to seek commerce with the inhabitants of a given area. This reference to commerce suggests that the right to hospitality is one in which the one allowed visitation rights is, by virtue of having been granted them, further allowed to request a right to buy and sell. This right evidently would provide those who are visiting with a means to establish a livelihood which may be one of the reasons for granting them the right to commerce. A further ground for this is suggested when Kant refers to the possibility of public law entering into the relations between different parts of the world so that finally the human race could come close to a "cosmopolitan constitution".

So the first part of the discussion begins by reference to an individual right held in relation to inhabitants of foreign countries not to be treated in a hostile manner. The second point that follows is that this entails a right to visit other areas and the third part is that this right of visitation includes a right to seek commerce (note only to seek this, not to have it granted). Hence the first part of the discussion at any rate is markedly narrower than rights claimed and granted widely within the contemporary world to individuals who are not citizens of a given area and in the contemporary world reference to governments is central whereas it appears to be missing from the first part of Kant's account. In the next posting I'll visit the second part of Kant's treatment of inhospitable conduct and how it involves a reference to governments.

Publicity and Permissive Laws

At the end of yesterday's posting I suggested that there might be some kind of argument at the close of Kant's treatment of the second definitive article of Perpetual Peace that was worth consideration and that would, if so considered, perhaps alter the view I have previously expressed concerning the division of the preliminary articles in Perpetual Peace. Now, without perhaps entirely delivering on this promise, I want to give an account of publicity that might lie at the back of the idea that there are permissive laws to do certain things that a full condition of right would not authorize.

In the course of one of the many splendid chapters of his book Justice and the Social Contract Samuel Freeman makes the following remark: "Publicity assumes that principles of justice will provide a shared public basis for political discussion, criticism, and justification. Principles that cannot gain knowing, widespread support from reasonable and rational members of a well-ordered society are to be passed over in favour of those that do." (91) I am now going to re-interpret this remark in relation to Kant's admission at the close of his discussion of the second definitive article that since nations reject the hypothesis of the world republic (despite its correctness as a thesis) then they should adopt instead the surrogate of the pacific league.

In making this claim Kant is, I want to suggest, formulating a kind of permissive law. When he formulated the notion of the permissive law earlier in Perpetual Peace he indicated that such laws permitted to continue in the present something that would be outlawed in the future. If we take the future here to refer to the condition under which right was fully and completely realized then the continuance of such separate states would not then be permitted but, under present conditions, it is allowed to remain. The ground for its being allowed to remain is only that the separate nations will not allow the abolition of themselves. Since they will not the surrogate is adopted instead.

Now if we re-formulate Freeman's account of public reason we can understand it to be saying that if a principle cannot reach agreement between all parties to discussion in a public forum then a different principle needs to be adopted instead with the intent of serving the same end as the first (rejected) principle. In this way the public opinion of those in the discussion has been respected whilst right has not been neglected. This is, I think, the consideration by which Kant proposes the pacific league. What brings this closer to Freeman's account than would otherwise be the case is that the pacific league is formed by republics uniting together. Since republics are moral persons (unlike despotisms) then their public agreement is akin to that between individual members of a state of nature.

Reverting to the division of the preliminary articles: the argument considered in the posting of two days ago assessed it in relation to principles of publicity. The point here was that principles 2-4 are all ones that can be assessed publicly and it is the fact that they can that enables an understanding of what is at issue in delaying their implementation since measures that lead towards full recognition of them can be commonly understood. By contrast, principles 1 and 6 are ones that cannot be assessed by public methods which is why they have to immediately cease. This argument works also by considering public opinion as a rightful force operative within the moral personalities of the international set of states. However, there remains a problem with understanding the fifth article (concerning non-intervention) as one that requires immediate implementation. It is unlike 1 and 6 in being available to public measurement. It is also not congruent with the first definitive article since one of the grounds for this article was that republics are more inclined to peace than despotisms. Since this is so, the existence of despotic constitutions is itself not merely something not in accord with right but also something that tends to constantly produce conditions of war. Given these points there are reasons for treating despotisms as little better than states torn by civil war and with regard to the latter there is permission to intervene. So shouldn't there also be a ground to intervene to overthrow despotic regimes? I will return to the topic of intervention in future postings.

Federalism

Kant's second definitive article for perpetual peace is stated in one sentence, though the reasoning in favour of it has some odd contortions, not least when put into relation with further accounts of the same topic in later writings. The sentence stating the article is: "The right of nations shall be based on a federalism of free states" (Ak. 8: 354).

The first type of argument Kant gives for the second definitive article concerns state of nature theory. Initially Kant presents states as akin to individuals and points out that in a state of nature they wrong each other merely by being contiguous with each other. The very fact that states are in close relation with each other produces a condition that is wrong so that each should, for the sake of their own security, enter with each other into a civil constitution analogous to that which led to the formation of states in the first place. This comparison of the relation of states between each other to the state of nature that existed prior to the formation of states in the first place is one that should carry with it, if the analogy was perfect, an argument for a world state.

Kant does not regard the argument as perfect, however, as he shows by going on to argue that what the analogy with the state of nature points to is not a "state of nations" but only a "league of nations". The first reason given for avoiding the formation of a general world state is odd since Kant simply refers back to the operation of sovereignty within any given state and then says that if we had a world state we would no longer have separate operative nations but only one. However this is hardly a ground in itself since surely we have found a reason for thinking that it would be better for there to be one state than many?

Not only does Kant's first rationale for suggesting that we require a league of nations rather than a "state" (of nations!) beg the question but the subsequent discussion suggests a further ground for thinking that the formation of a general state is preferable to the existing condition. Reverting to the comparison with the state of nature Kant points to the difference between "mad freedom" and "rational freedom" and asserts the difference to be one between a form of "freedom" that authorizes savage behaviour to one that enables a civilized condition to come into being. The problem with overcoming such a state of nature, when it comes to states, is said to reside in the commitment of heads of state to behaving in typically despotic fashion by putting their peoples at risk for matters that don't really concern them. A comparison between Europeans and American Indians is then vouched in which the former are seen to be "superior" to the latter only in terms of having an instrumental response to people that enables the multiplication of them for more wars!

Similarly, Kant points to the use made by states of legal writings of thinkers such as Grotius and and Pufendorf, to support a right to offensive war, whilst no state has ever been dissuaded from going to war by considering arguments from such sources. The behaviour of states towards each in the state of nature between is in fact evidence of the "malevolence of human nature" (Ak 8: 355). Given all this one would expect some argument to now be forthcoming for why it is that we cannot over-ride the distinction between states and form one state.

At this point Kant states that the way in which states pursue right in relation to each other can be only by means of war since there is no court between them. This shows, as he re-states, a reason why states should leave their present condition. This requires a pact of nations among themselves to create a pacific league aimed at ending war forever. Now, Kant returns to the question of why this league should not be a new world state and gives what is in effect his second argument for a federal union rather than the formation of a world state. This second argument states that the league is to be formed not for the purposes of acquiring power but only to preserve and secure the freedom of states in their league with each other. So this time Kant does not simply beg the question but suggests that the motivation towards the league within each state is towards the protection of the freedom that each has attained independently.

This second argument, however, also points back to the first definitive article since it is pointed out that the reason for hope that such a federal union could be formed is grounded on the inclination towards peace of republics once they are formed. It is the possession of republican constitutions that will lead states to union with each other in order to "secure a condition of freedom of states conformably with the idea of the right of nations" (Ak. 8: 356). So the suggestion is that once republics exist they will, by incarnation of the principles of right internally to each one, naturally attract towards each other and that this natural attraction will act as a basis for the inclination towards peace.

The federal union is nonetheless still presented by Kant as a "surrogate" of the civil union that any given state represents. The discussion of the second article concludes with revisiting the comparison with the state of nature and now Kant indicates that superseding the state of nature between states does point to the formation of the state of nations that his first argument apparently ruled out! In conclusion he points out that the problem with the formation of such a "state of nations" is that separate states, in accordance with the idea of the right of nations, do not wish to form such a state. So the states themselves reject the hypothesis of such a state even though Kant now concedes that such a state is a correct thesis. Hence, his third "argument" is simply that we place the negative idea of a league that averts war in place of the positive one of a world republic simply because individual states are likely to be more receptive to the former idea than the latter one.

The third "argument" appears the weakest of the three but perhaps it is, instead, the strongest. The attention to the existent views of states was also mentioned in the discussion of the division of the preliminary articles where settled opinions were invoked in terms of why previous inheritances of states could continue to be allowed despite the fact that such inheritances were not really in accord with right. Similarly, here Kant appears to be concluding that we should accept the division between states since states themselves appear to have a settled insistence on it. That would indicate that such acceptance is something provisional that we might hope to overcome by means of the federal union and make Kant's grounds for preferring the negative league to the positive republic similar to his invocation of the general public opinion in the division of the preliminary articles. However, to accept this as a good ground would require revising my earlier treatment of the invocation of public opinion in the division of the preliminary articles and indicates further the need to think through the normative status of such a reference in Kant's thinking. It will need to have something to do with publicity and suggests a connection in some sense between public opinion and the concluding invocation in Perpetual Peace of the principles of publicity.

Publicity, Peace and the Preliminary Articles

I previously argued that the division of the preliminary articles of Perpetual Peace that Kant gives is not well justified but, in an extended comment on this posting, Tim suggested a basis for this division that was grounded both on appeal to considerations of publicity and those of peace and Tim's arguments are worth extended treatment. But first it is necessary to reprise the preliminary articles and Kant's division of them.

The first article concerned secret reservations when making peace treaties, the second inheritance of states by exchange, purchase or donation and the third the abolition of standing armies. The fourth covered external debt with regard to the affairs of a state, the fifth was the controversial banning of intervention in the constitutions of other states and the sixth concerned dishonourable stratagems in war. Kant divides them in the following way: the first, the fifth and the sixth are to be stopped at once whilst the second, third and fourth can be postponed being put into effect. In my earlier posting I questioned whether Kant had provided clear and good reasons for this division suggesting that his account of it marked a low point in the exposition of Perpetual Peace.

In response Tim suggested a number of considerations that make it worth revisiting my verdict. The first article concerns secret reservations and, in a sense, it is less than clear when these are at work though the general indictment of them is evident in terms of peace (but difficult to relate to questions of publicity). With five and six (non-intervention and dishonourable stratagems) these practices are, Tim suggests, ones that would, if allowed, make everyone insecure. Due to that it is a good idea to end them immediately. The aim is to increase general security in doing so though, it needs to be pointed out, that six, involving as it does secretive conduct, is, like the first article, intrinsically difficult to evaluate in practice. Only the ban on intervention in the constitution and affairs of other states is one that can be clearly measured though there are good reasons for viewing it as controversial.

If we turn to the three articles that Kant gives a right to postponement of, then, in these cases, Tim suggests, we have always got something intrinsically public in view. The purchase of a state occurred publicly and in accordance with norms held by those engaged in the practice. Invalidating the present status of the state in question now would add to insecurity. Standing armies and public debt are also intrinsically public and the point of that would be that progress with regard to these matters would be itself public. So other states can tell what you are doing here and whether you are moving towards the desired end but, in the interim, immediate implementation would create more problems than postponement.

Tim's account is better than the explicit one provided in the text where Kant appeals only to a kind of possession in "good faith" that held with regard to the articles that can be given postponement referring to a kind of public opinion holding (although Tim's account does, at one point, refer to this). The problem here is why this reference to public opinion should be thought to have normative standing? The only rationale appears to be the one Tim makes explicit: security/stability of the general system of states. Since public undermining in an immediate sense of articles 2-4 would increase instability there is a case in public reason for delay.

The substantial problem with this reconstruction is that the description of the need for immediate implementation of the fifth article concerning non-intervention doesn't really fit. Whilst the presumption that allowing intervention into the affairs of other states would create instability is not, prima facie, unreasonable, there is a problem with it. This is that certain kinds of states may possess constitutions that make them more likely to be troublesome to their neighbours. Indeed, something like this claim is made in the argument for the first definitive article. Due to this claim being made there it is not evident that stability/security in a general sense is up-held by immediate implementation of the fifth preliminary article. It might be generally better to delay implementation of it until after the aspiration of the first definitive article has been met. This creates a problem with viewing the fifth article as kin to the first and the sixth, as the first and the sixth involved actions intrinsically secret in nature as opposed to the public ones of 2-4. Hence the fifth article is an anomaly and doesn't fit the rationale of Tim's reconstruction (although his original note making his case for this reconstruction does admit this).

On these grounds, I would have to say I am still not convinced that the division of the preliminary articles is well articulated by Kant.

Kantemplation

In addition to this blog and the one of Tim's mentioned in yesterday's posting I should also mention a long-standing one of Heather Roff's, called kantemplation. Putting Heather's blog alongside that of Tim and Inter Kant makes for a Kantian trinity! Any other Kantian bloggers out there please contact us and link up!!

New Blog on Cosmopolitics

Timothy Waligore, a supporter of this blog, who has commented on a number of previous postings, particularly with extensive comments on global taxes, and matters connected with the views of Thomas Pogge, has launched his own blog. It is focused on questions of cosmopolitics and Tim is good enough to credit this blog with being an inspiration to him. Expect dialogue and productive exchange between the two blogs, not least due to the fact that, in the course of forthcoming commentary on the text of Perpetual Peace, there will be discussion here of the 3rd definitive article on the question of cosmopolitan right.

Global Injustice and Resources

In my earlier posting on global taxes I mentioned Thomas Pogge's conception of a Global Resource Dividend (GRD) which prompted a flurry of comments on that posting defending his conception. The literature that has arisen as commentary and critique of Pogge's proposal is now very large and cannot be surveyed within the context of a single posting. What does require comment however is the assumption behind the proposal of the GRD: the assumption that there is an inherent injustice in current global affairs that is connected to the use of resources and that can be remedied through redistribution of them.

The first part of Pogge's assumption is to the effect that, given the evident and large disparities between different parts of the world and the particularly gross difference between a select group of countries (roughly labelled as the "West" or the "North") and a second group (called "developing" or the "Third World" or the "South") that there is a sense in which the poverty of the second group is attributable to the use of resources by the first group. The general claim that was, for a time, used to articulate this view was "dependency theory" or the "underdevelopment" thesis. This theory was proposed initially by Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch in different studies carried out in 1949 which suggested a structural imbalance of trade between countries that carried out "primary" production of extraction of resources on the one hand and others that, due to a more sophisticated workforce that was capable of ensuring that these products were developed and sold back, after integration with other primary products, to the first group of countries as "secondary" products that had greater financial value. On this basis the initial primary producers were fated constantly to be dependent on the secondary producers.

The main problem with dependency theory is that it presupposes a causal relation between the prosperity of the secondary producers and the poverty of the primary producers such that the latter are poor in a corresponding ratio to the riches of the latter, something not, to put it mildly, substantiated by empirical research which suggests, conversely to the claims of dependency theory, that the primary producers get more prosperous at times of boom in the "secondary" economies. Whilst Pogge does not offer a specific account (such as this one concerning production) of the reason for the imbalance between countries one is surely required and, when given, needs to be open to assessment but previous versions of dependency theory have not tended to win extended acceptance.

The second element of Pogge's assumption is to the effect that the ground of injustice is inherently tied to differential access of resources which is why his proposal is one for a resource dividend. Effectively, his claim is to the effect that resources are preventably kept out of reach of the global poor so that the richest countries owe a duty of compensation to the poor. There are two central questions here, one of which was raised in the previous posting on global taxes. This concerns the institutional arrangements by which such redistribution can be effected. This is a large question and does concern, as Pogge rightly emphasizes, conditions of trade. I will return to this element of his proposal in a subsequent posting. Even without focusing directly on the question of trade (which is evidently central to redistribution) there is a basic question concerning how the mechanism of distribution would function. Since there is a clear problem with the governance of many poorer states there would need to be some form of intermediary between the countries that were providing the funds and the countries to which they were aimed. The populations of these countries cannot simply be accessed by means of bank or credit transfers so NGOs or UN agencies would be required to distribute the money in question which would ensure massive political intervention in the poorer states. That it would have to be massive is clear since the intermediary organizations would have to be responsible for fair compliance procedures in distributing the fund and in working out priorities for its distribution. They would thus effectively replace the governments of these places, quite possibly in a way that was an improvement, but clearly would usurp local political decision, at least for a period of a generation. Pogge's analysis does not discuss or deal with this matter.

The second point concerning the use of the fund developed would concern the nature of the plan for development adopted, something that would require international agreement about the best means for developing economies, something about which there remains considerable disagreement. Without an argued and accepted case for ensuring economic development and a mechanism for ensuring that it was carried out there remains a problem as to whether the plan of Pogge's would in fact attain its desired objectives. Finally, since Pogge's plan for collection of the dividend is a small percentage charged on all transactions between states there also enters the question of how the cut-off point at which a country had to be a contributor to this plan is to be calculated.

The question of whether it is the use of resources that is uncompensated remains to be asked. Clearly once a reliable state of wealth is achieved there is a greater use of resources following. However it is not evident that the difference between rich and poor countries can be argued to be grounded in the latter since the difference in use of resources is a consequence of certain types of path of development. Hence it would be hitting on that path that would be most important. In terms of thinking further about means for ensuring poorer countries had some means of attaining this we would need to consider further the question of market regulation and means of articulating a political connection between trade and governance. That would return us to the question of the division between international right and cosmopolitan right. Some of these implications will be worked out in terms of commentary on Kant and others through more general postings of this sort.