Kant opens the discussion of this "disagreement" by reference to the point that morals is practical of itself, a contention that clearly refers back to the whole account of practical reason in The Critique of Practical Reason. In making this point Kant refers in passing to the general claim that "ought" implies "can". The point of these initial references is to make the claim (in contrast to some contemporary readings of Kant's practical philosophy) that morals and politics belong together as distinct parts, as he here puts it, of "doctrine of right" (Ak. 8: 370). Morals is now presented as the theoretical part of this doctrine with politics described as the doctrine of right put into practice. This does involve a distinction in some sense between what Kant will put out in the Doctrine of Right as a theory and politics as conventionally understood. So there is some form of relation that needs to be mapped (as is also apparent from Kant's essay on theory and practice).
The relationship that Kant maps between morals and politics thus understood is subsequently condensed into two statements. Politics is presented as based on the statement that we should be wise as serpents whilst morals is indicated to limit the application of this statement (thus in a sense to schematise it) by means of the condition that we be also as guileless as doves. Both need to be able to exist together if there is not to be a conflict between politics and morals.
The problem of the origin of the conflict is next traced to the attitude of the "practical man" who takes morals to be only theory. This person adopts the view that it is pointless to will the conditions of perpetual peace due to a claim concerning human nature. After a careful rendition of contractarian reasoning Kant points to the point that is at issue here which concerns the nature of power. The claim of the practical man is to the effect that the one who holds power will not let the prescription of laws be based on the ground of the social contract. Further, that states, once independent, will not be constrained by reference to other states. These claims rest on an appeal to political prudence and empirical principles of human nature. It is the combination of the "prudent" attitude and the purely empirical view of humanity that is the ground of this "realist" position, the same position still adopted in various guises in contemporary IR theory. Subsequent postings will trace further Kant's account of the problems he takes this view to have.
6 comments:
"The point of these initial references is to make the claim (in contrast to some contemporary readings of Kant's practical philosophy) that morals and politics belong together as distinct parts, as he here puts it, of "doctrine of right" (Ak. 8: 370)."
Which contemporary readers are you thinking of? Or rather: what claims do they make?
When I think of some of the arguments you might be thinking of, I don't see how this passage bears on it.
Maybe this is because I read the passage differently (I am not sure if I do). When kant refers to morals as the theoretical doctrine of right as I simply take to contrast with moral as the theoretical doctrine of virtue. He is making clear that by "morals" he means here the (doctrine of) right, not the (doctrine of) virtue.
Politics is the doctrine of right put into practice. Politics is an art, isn't it? Its about how to bring the conditions of right into effect.
Is that your understanding? If so, I am not sure what you mean by saying that "morals and politics belong together as distinct parts"-- it may be true that they belong together, but you seem to imply the result of bringing them together is the "doctrine of right". Rather, I think that morals (in the sense kant uses it here) is the theoretical doctrine of right, while politics is something not so much discussed in part I of the Metaphysics of Morals. (Alternatively, the theoretical part of the doctrine right and politics together make up the "doctrine of right" BUT the first part of the book, the Metaphysics of morals, is concerned not with the doctrine of right per se, but with the metaphysical *first* principles of the doctrine of right... perhaps the theoretical doctrine of right and not politics, even though politics would be required to complete the doctrine of right)
Thanks for this. I was thinking in very general terms here of the claim made by Thomas Pogge to the effect that the Doctrine of Right should be seen as distinct in principle from the general moral philosophy. Kant does here present "morals" as in some sense part of the Doctrine of Right which cuts against a view that the Doctrine of Right is intrinsically separate from general moral considerations.
You are right to point out that the Doctrine of Right concerns the metaphysical first principles of right and that in some sense "politics" is something further though that would take a bit of working out. Thanks for picking up on this general point: will need to return to thinking this over again in a future posting.
"The problem of the origin of the conflict is next traced to the attitude of the "practical man" who takes morals to be only theory."
On a different issue: Something I have always is whether the "practical man" mentioned by Kant is the same as the political moralist. Does the former not care about theory, whereas the latter at least pretends to try to reconcile right and prudential politics (though by subordinating right to politics) Perhaps for the practical man, right or morals drops out of the equation in the first place. Or is, as it seems, there no difference between the two?
Also, in the doctrine of virtue, Kant says that there are two parts to morals: right, and virtue. Right is part of morals. How does that fit with what you say here about morals being part of right? Are you sure Kant is not just saying right is part of morals?
This is a good point about the "practical man" since there does seem in principle to be a difference between this figure and the political moralist though effectively Kant treats them as interchangeable. The difference is not marked by Kant but perhaps should be marked by someone who is carefully working through Kant.
Towards the conclusion of *Perpetual Peace* Kant makes the remark I mention here and the point is to deny that right can be conceived of without morals. The discussion in the Doctrine of Virtue is part of a more systematic consideration.
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